irrational desire, in this it neither exists nor desires existing things, but it nevertheless partakes of the good by virtue of the faint echo itself of union and friendship. And anger partakes of the good by virtue of its being moved and aiming to set right things that seem evil and turn them back to what seems good. And he who desires the worst life, insofar as he desires life at all and what seems to him the best life, by virtue of the very desiring, and desiring of life, and looking towards the best life, partakes of the good. And if you take away the good entirely, there will be neither being nor life nor desire nor motion nor anything else. So that even the generation that comes from corruption is not a power of evil, but the presence of a lesser good, just as disease is a lack of order, but not a total lack. For if this should happen, the disease itself will not subsist. But the disease remains and exists, having as its being the least order and subsisting parasitically in it. For that which is entirely devoid of the good is neither a being nor among beings, but that which is mixed is among beings on account of the good, and on this account it is among beings and is a being, insofar as it partakes of the good. Rather, all beings will be more or less so to the extent that they partake of the good. For even with respect to being itself, that which in no way and nowhere is, will not be. But that which in one way is, and in another is not, insofar as it has fallen away from that which always is, it is not; but insofar as it has partaken of being, to that extent it is, and its being as a whole and its non-being are maintained and preserved. And evil, that which has fallen away entirely from the good, will be neither among the things that are more good nor among those that are less good. But that which is in one way good, and in another not good, fights against some particular good, but not against the Good as a whole. And it too is maintained by its participation in the good, and the good gives substance even to its own privation by a complete participation in itself. For if the good were to depart completely, there will be nothing that is altogether good, nor mixed, nor evil-in-itself. For if evil is an imperfect good, with the complete absence of the good, both the imperfect and the perfect good will be absent. And evil will only exist and be seen then, when it is evil for some things, to which it is opposed, and depends on other things as good. For it is impossible for the same things to fight each other in the same respects in all things. Evil therefore is not a being. <21> But neither is evil in beings. For if all beings are from the good, and the good is in all beings and encompasses all things, either evil will not be in beings, or it will be in the good. And yet it will not be in the good, for neither is the cold in fire, nor the act of making evil in that which makes even evil good. But if it will be, how will evil be in the good? If from it, it is absurd and impossible. For "it is not possible," as the truth of the oracles says, "for a good tree to bear evil fruit," nor indeed the reverse. But if not from it, clearly it is from another principle and cause. For either evil will be from the good, or the good from evil, or, if this is not possible, both the good and the evil will be from another principle and cause. For every dyad is not a principle, but a monad will be the principle of every dyad. And yet it is absurd for two completely opposite things to proceed from one and the same source, and for the principle itself to be not simple and single, but divided and dual-formed and contrary to itself and altered. And yet it is not possible for there to be two contrary principles of beings, and for these to be in each other and in the whole and at war. For if this were granted, God too will not be without suffering nor free from difficulty. If indeed there were something to trouble Him, then all things will be disordered and always at war. And yet the good imparts friendship to all beings, and is praised as peace-itself and giver-of-peace by the sacred theologians. Therefore all good things are friendly and harmonious, and offspring of one life, and ordered towards one good, and kindly and like and congenial to one another. Therefore evil is not in God, and evil is not divine. But neither is evil from God. For either He is not good, or He does good and produces good things; and not sometimes and some things, and at other times not and not all things, for in this He would suffer change and alteration even with respect to His causality, the most divine of all things. But if the good is existence in God, a God changing from the good will be at one time existing, at another time not existing. But if He has the good by participation, He will have it from another, and at one time He will have it, and at another time He will not have it. Therefore evil is not from God, neither in God nor
ἄλογον ἐπιθυμίαν, ἐν τούτῳ μὲν οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ὄντων ἐπιθυμεῖ, μετέχει δὲ ὅμως τἀγαθοῦ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως καὶ φιλίας ἀμυδρὸν ἀπήχημα. Καὶ ὁ θυμὸς μετέχει τἀγαθοῦ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐφίεσθαι τὰ δοκοῦντα κακὰ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν καλὸν ἀνορθοῦν καὶ ἐπιστρέφειν. Καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ τῆς χειρίστης ζωῆς ἐφιέμενος ὡς ὅλως ζωῆς ἐφιέμενος καὶ τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτῷ δοκούσης κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ζωῆς ἐφίεσθαι καὶ πρὸς ἀρίστην ζωὴν ἀποσκοπεῖν μετέχει τἀγαθοῦ. Καὶ εἰ πάντη τἀγαθὸν ἀνέλῃς, οὔτε οὐσία ἔσται οὔτε ζωὴ οὔτε ἔφεσις οὔτε κίνησις οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν. Ὥστε καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι ἐκ φθορᾶς γένεσιν οὐκ ἔστι κακοῦ δύναμις, ἀλλ' ἥττονος ἀγαθοῦ παρουσία, καθ' ὅσον καὶ νόσος ἔλλειψίς ἐστι τάξεως, οὐ πάσης. Eἰ γὰρ τοῦτο γένηται, οὔτε ἡ νόσος αὐτὴ ὑποστήσεται. Μένει δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόσος οὐσίαν ἔχουσα τὴν ἐλαχίστην τάξιν καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ παρυφισταμένη. Τὸ γὰρ πάντη ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε ὂν οὔτε ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὸ δὲ μικτὸν διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καὶ ὄν, καθ' ὅσον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετέχει. Μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ὄντα πάντα κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καθ' ὅσον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετέχει, καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς ὂν οὔτε ἔσται. Τὸ δὲ πῇ μὲν ὄν, πῇ δὲ μὴ ὄν, καθ' ὅσον μὲν ἀποπέπτωκε τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος, οὐκ ἔστι, καθ' ὅσον δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μετείληφε, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὅλως εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτοῦ διακρατεῖται καὶ διασώζεται. Καὶ τὸ κακὸν τὸ μὲν πάντη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποπεπτωκὸς οὔτε ἐν τοῖς μᾶλλον οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἧττον ἀγαθοῖς ἔσται. Τὸ δὲ πῇ μὲν ἀγαθόν, πῇ δὲ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν μάχεται μὲν ἀγαθῷ τινι, οὐχ ὅλῳ δὲ τἀγαθῷ. Κρατεῖται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίᾳ, καὶ οὐσιοῖ καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στέρησιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῇ ὅλως αὐτοῦ μεθέξει. Πάντη γὰρ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε καθόλου τι ἔσται ἀγαθὸν οὔτε μικτὸν οὔτε αὐτοκακόν. Eἰ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν ἀτελές ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ἀπουσίᾳ παντελεῖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀτελὲς καὶ τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν ἀπέσται. Καὶ τότε μόνον ἔσται καὶ ὀφθήσεται τὸ κακόν, ἡνίκα τοῖς μέν ἐστι κακόν, οἷς ἠναντίωται, τῶν δὲ ὡς ἀγαθῶν ἐξήρτηται. Μάχεσθαι γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον. Oὐκ ἄρα ὂν τὸ κακόν. <21> Ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσίν ἐστι τὸ κακόν. Eἰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι καὶ πάντα περιέχει τἀγαθόν, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται τὸ κακὸν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἢ ἐν τἀγαθῷ ἔσται. Καὶ μὴν ἐν τἀγαθῷ οὐκ ἔσται, καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐν πυρὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κακύνεσθαι τῷ καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἀγαθύνοντι. Eἰ δὲ ἔσται, πῶς ἔσται ἐν τἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν; Eἰ μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον. «Oὐ δύναται» γάρ, ὡς ἡ τῶν λογίων ἀλήθειά φησι, «δένδρον ἀγαθὸν καρποὺς πονηροὺς ποιεῖν» οὐδὲ μὴν τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. Eἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐξ ἄλλης δηλονότι ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας. Καὶ γὰρ ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔσται ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ ἤ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο δυνατόν, ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. Πᾶσα γὰρ δυὰς οὐκ ἀρχή, μονὰς δὲ ἔσται πάσης δυάδος ἀρχή. Καίτοι ἄτοπον ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δύο παντελῶς ἐναντία προϊέναι καὶ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐχ ἁπλῆν καὶ ἑνιαίαν, ἀλλὰ μεριστὴν καὶ δυοειδῆ καὶ ἐναντίαν ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἠλλοιωμένην. Καὶ μὴν οὔτε δύο τῶν ὄντων ἐναντίας ἀρχὰς δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐν ἀλλήλαις καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ μαχομένας. Eἰ γὰρ τοῦτο δοθείη, ἔσται καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἀπήμων οὐδὲ ἐκτὸς δυσχερείας. Eἴπερ εἴη τι καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ ἐνοχλοῦν, ἔπειτα ἔσται πάντα ἄτακτα καὶ ἀεὶ μαχόμενα. Καίτοι φιλίας πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν μεταδίδωσι καὶ αὐτοειρήνη καὶ εἰρηνόδωρος ὑμνεῖται πρὸς τῶν ἱερῶν θεολόγων. ∆ιὸ καὶ φίλα τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἐναρμόνια πάντα καὶ μιᾶς ζωῆς ἔκγονα καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἀγαθὸν συντεταγμένα καὶ προσηνῆ καὶ ὅμοια καὶ προσήγορα ἀλλήλοις. Ὥστε οὐκ ἐν θεῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἔνθεον. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκ θεοῦ τὸ κακόν. Ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγαθὸς ἢ ἀγαθοποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὰ παράγει, καὶ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν καί τινα, ποτὲ δὲ οὐ καὶ οὐ πάντα, μεταβολὴν γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ πείσεται καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πάντων θειότατον τὴν αἰτίαν. Eἰ δὲ ἐν θεῷ τἀγαθὸν ὕπαρξίς ἐστιν, ἔσται ὁ μεταβάλλων ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ θεὸς ποτὲ μὲν ὤν, ποτὲ δὲ οὐκ ὤν. Eἰ δὲ μεθέξει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου ἕξει καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἕξει, ποτὲ δὲ οὐχ ἕξει. Oὐκ ἄρα ἐκ θεοῦ τὸ κακὸν οὔτε ἐν θεῷ οὔτε