Of saint justin philosopher and martyr, an overthrow of certain aristotelian dogmas.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from god to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 Posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 Is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? further, if when the form

 By its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 Animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 And matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying if, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. how th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. how then was god able to make som

 And of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. for just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 He subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 Sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 Is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. but this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 Second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? and if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 To have come into being. for those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. from the same discourse. whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 Time to be, so also has the past been. but the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 To be straight. the principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. for if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 According to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. if before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 We say, of which there is no demonstration. but god and nature do nothing in vain. if there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 Worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. fr

 And an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? if heaven cannot do by w

 Each other. but now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 And the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 Chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 To suffer it. these things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 It was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? but if it was not moved this way according to

 Always? if to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 And have what they have? if the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? but if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 Of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. from the

 And the bricks. therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 Change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unoriginate and the infinite are absent. 34. From the same argument. We say that time has come into being, when we perceive the before and after in motion. And we define it by our apprehending them as one thing and another, and that there is something different between them. For when we think of the extremes as different from the middle, and the soul says there are two "nows," the one before and the other after, then we also say that this is time; for what is defined by the "now" seems to be time; for time is the number of motion according to the before and after. Time, then, is not motion, but that in respect of which motion has a number. And here is a sign: we judge the more and the less by number, but more and less motion by time. He who defines the generation of time by the before and after in motion says that neither time nor motion is eternal, unoriginate, and infinite; for if it has come into being, it is neither eternal nor unoriginate, and if it is limited by its own extremities, it is not infinite. 35. From the same argument. The "now" measures time, insofar as it is before and after, and motion follows magnitude, and time follows motion. If the "now" is not a part of time, as he said in the thirty-first chapter, how does it measure time? Either, then, the "now" does not measure time, or it must necessarily be a part of time. And if motion follows magnitude, and time follows motion, then magnitude is generable, just as are motion and time, which follow it. 30. From the same argument. The smallest number of a line in plurality is two or one, but in magnitude there is no smallest; for the smallest in number is one or two, but in magnitude there is no smallest. If the point in the line and the "now" in time are not the smallest part, what else is the point in the line and the "now" in time? But if it is not the smallest part, but a limit, how then is it impossible for the limit to exist without that which is limited, yet it is possible for the point to exist without the line? And if in things in which there is no smallest, there is also no greatest, according to what is the remaining difference of the parts, when the difference of the greatest and the smallest is taken away? 37. From the same argument. So it is clear that things that always are or things that always are not are not in time; for they are not contained by time, nor is their being measured by time. How then have you said that motion is eternal, and time its number? For those things from which time is inseparable, it is not possible for them not to be in time.

γεγονέναι. Oἷς τὸ γενητὸν καὶ τὸ γεγονέναι πρόσεστι, τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἄναρχον καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄπεστιν. λδ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν. Ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν ἕτε ρον. Ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν εἶναι χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. Oὐκ ἄρα κίνησις ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις. Σημεῖον δέ· τὸ μὲν πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον κρίνομεν ἀριθμῷ, κίνησιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνῳ. Ὁ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ χρόνου τῷ ἐν τῇ κινήσει προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστέρῳ ὁριζόμενος ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἄναρχον καὶ ἄπειρον οὔτε τὸν χρόνον λέγει οὔτε τὴν κίνησιν· εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, οὔτε ἀΐδιόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἄναρχον, καὶ εἰ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἄκροις ἐστὶ περατουμένη, ἄπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν. λε. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τὸ δὲ νῦν τὸν χρόνον μετρεῖ, ᾗ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις, ταύτῃ δὲ ὁ χρόνος. Eἰ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ νῦν μέρος τοῦ χρόνου, καθὼς εἶπεν ἐν τῷ τριακοστῷ πρώτῳ κεφαλαίῳ, πῶς μετρεῖ τὸν χρόνον; Ἢ ἄρα οὐ μετρεῖ τὸν χρόνον τὸ νῦν, ἢ μέρος αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου. Καὶ εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις, ταύτῃ δὲ ὁ χρόνος, γενητὸν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος, ὥσπερ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος, τὰ ἐκείνῳ ἀκολουθοῦντα. λ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τῆς γραμμῆς ἐλάχιστος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει μέν ἐστι δύο ἢ μία, μεγέθει δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλάχιστος· ἐλάχιστος γὰρ κατὰ μὲν ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ὁ εἷς ἢ δύο, κατὰ δὲ μέγεθος οὐκ ἔστιν. Eἰ μὴ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι μέρος ἐν τῇ γραμμῇ μὲν ἡ στιγμή, ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ τὸ νῦν, τί ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἡ στιγμὴ ἐν τῇ γραμμῇ καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ; Eἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι μέρος, ἀλλὰ πέρας, πῶς οὖν χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ πεπερασμένου ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸ πέρας, χωρὶς δὲ τῆς γραμμῆς ἐν δέχεται εἶναι τὴν στιγμήν; Καὶ εἰ ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐλάχι στον, ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον, κατὰ τί ἡ λοιπὴ διαφορὰ τῶν μερῶν, τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου ἀναιρουμένης τῆς διαφορᾶς; λζ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα ἢ τὰ ἀεὶ μὴ ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται ὑπὸ χρόνου, οὐδὲ με τρεῖται τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου. Πῶς οὖν τὴν κίνησιν εἴρηκας εἶναι ἀΐδιον, καὶ τὸν χρό νον ταύτης ἀριθμόν; Ὧν γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀχώριστος, ταῦτα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ.