can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to create, so also does God create; but, through an ineffable and surpassing power, creating all things timelessly, He perfects all things, and at the same time that He is, He also creates beings, not having need like us of first coming into being and being perfected, and then creating, because there is in Him nothing before and after. We indeed change the former into the latter by the discovery of something better; but God does not, but, as is fitting, He creates from the beginning, not changing former things into latter things. For if from the beginning He proposed to change former things into latter things and does not change, either a weakness of power would be supposed or that He found something better than what was proposed, none of which pertains to God, neither weakness of power nor later finding something better than the former. If God creates all things, not those which come into being but those which co-exist, it would be superfluous for Him to create beings at the same time that He is. For just as it would be superfluous, when the composition of the lines exists, to create the angles, so it would be superfluous, when God exists with the world, to create the world, if indeed it co-exists with God, as the respondent says. If at the same time that God is, the world also is, and the world is always in motion, and motion is in time, then God is in time with the world. If God, being uncreated, also uncreatedly creates uncreated things, not things that come into being but things that co-exist with him, then man too is unbegotten, being a part of the world. How then does the respondent call this one begotten? And if God, being uncreated, also uncreatedly creates uncreated things, it is clear that being simple, He also creates all simple things that co-exist with Him. But if this is so, then the world does not co-exist with God, since it is composite both in whole and in part. If God is one, and that which co-exists with Him is not one, then created things do not co-exist with Him who is uncreated. If God is beyond intelligible and sensible things, and does not create works beyond intelligible and sensible things, then being uncreated He does not create uncreated things. If it is impossible to co-exist with that which is beyond itself, how did the world co-exist with God, who is beyond it? If it is impossible for composite things to be uncreated, how are the heaven and the sun and the world uncreated, being composite, having their matter from one place and their form from another? We see also that nature by its very being creates and always works an instantaneous change, just as in the case of the curdling of milk we observe the curdling happening to the milk instantaneously. Much more, therefore, must we think that God creates all things instantaneously and timelessly, being Himself one, but by the infinity of His power bringing forth different things, and these being completely self-subsistent. Nature indeed works an instantaneous change, not for the creation of substance but for the creation of an attribute; for the curdling in the milk is an attribute

δύναται. Μὴ προσέχωμεν δὲ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸν θεὸν ἀνθρωπίνως. Oὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, τὸ πρότερον ἄλλως ἔχοντες, ὕστερον εἰς ἄλλο μεταβάλλοντες, λεγόμεθα ποιεῖν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ θεὸς ποιεῖ· ἀλλά, δι' ἄῤῥητον ὑπερβάλλουσάν τε δύναμιν ἀχρόνως ποιῶν πάντα, τελειοῖ πάντα, καὶ ἅμα τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὄντα ποιεῖ, οὐ χρείαν ἔχων ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τοῦ πρότερον γενέσθαι καὶ τελειωθῆναι, καὶ οὕτως ποιῆσαι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. Ἡμεῖς μὲν τὸ πρότερον μετα βάλλομεν εἰς τὸ ὕστερον τῇ εὑρέσει τοῦ βελτίονος· ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ προσήκει, τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιεῖ, οὐ μετα βάλλων εἰς ὕστερον τὰ πρότερα. Eἰ γὰρ προέθηκε μὲν ἐξ ἀρ χῆς τὸ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ὕστερα τὰ πρότερα καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει, ἢ ἀσθένεια ἐνομίζετο τῆς δυνάμεως ἢ ὅτι εὗρε τοῦ προκειμένου τὸ βέλτιον, ὧν οὐδὲν πρόσεστι τῷ θεῷ, οὔτε ἡ ἀσθένεια τῆς δυνάμεως οὔτε τὸ ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦ προτέρου τὸ βέλτιον. Eἰ ποιεῖ ὁ θεὸς πάντα, τὰ μὴ γινόμενα ἀλλὰ συνυφιστάμενα, περιττὸν ἦν τὸ ἅμα τῷ εἶναι αὐτὸν τὰ ὄντα ποιεῖν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ περιττὸν ἦν, οὔσης τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν γραμμῶν, ποιῆσαι τὰς γωνίας, οὕτως περιττὸν ἦν, ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ, ποιῆσαι τὸν κόσμον, εἰ ἄρα συνυφίσταται τῷ θεῷ, καθά φησιν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος. Eἰ ἅμα τῷ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἔστι καὶ ὁ κόσμος, ὁ δὲ κόσμος ἀεὶ ἐν κινήσει, ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ, ἐν χρόνῳ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ. Eἰ ἀγένητος ὢν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἀγενήτως ἀγένητα ποιεῖ, οὐ τὰ γινόμενα ἀλλὰ τὰ συνυφιστάμενα αὐτῷ, ἀγέννητος ἄρα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, μέρος ἂν τοῦ κόσμου. Πῶς οὖν γεννητὸν τοῦτον ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος καλεῖ; Καὶ εἰ ἀγένητος ὢν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἀγενήτως ἀγένητα ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἁπλοῦς ὢν ἁπλᾶ πάντα συνυφιστάμενα αὐτῷ ποιεῖ. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἄρα συνυφίσταται τῷ θεῷ ὁ κόσμος, σύνθετος ὢν καὶ ὅλῳ καὶ μέρει. Eἰ ἕν ἐστιν ὁ θεός, καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ συνυφιστάμενον αὐτῷ, οὐδ' ἄρα συνυφίσταται αὐτῷ τὰ γενητὰ ἀγενήτῳ ὄντι. Ὁ θεὸς εἰ νοητῶν τε καὶ αἰ σθητῶν ἐστιν ἐπέκεινα, καὶ οὐ ποιεῖ ἔργα νοητῶν τε καὶ αἰ σθητῶν ἐπέκεινα, οὐδ' ἄρα ἀγένητος ὢν ἀγένητα ποιεῖ. Eἰ ἀδύνατον συνυφίστασθαι τῷ ἐπέκεινα ἑαυτοῦ, πῶς συνυπέστη ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ, ἐπέκεινα ὄντι αὐτοῦ; Eἰ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀγένητα τὰ σύνθετα, πῶς ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ κόσμος εἰσὶν ἀγένητοι, σύνθετοι ὄντες, ἄλλοθεν ἔχοντες τὴν ὕλην καὶ ἄλλοθεν τὸ εἶδος; Ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦσαν καὶ ἀθρόαν ἀεὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐργαζομένην, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς πή ξεως τοῦ γάλακτος ἀθρόως τὴν πῆξιν θεώμεθα παραγινο μένην τῷ γάλακτι. Πολλῷ τοίνυν τὸν θεὸν μᾶλλον οἰητέον ἀθρόως καὶ ἀχρόνως πάντα ποιεῖν, αὐτὸν μὲν ὄντα ἕν, τῇ δὲ ἀπειρίᾳ τῆς δυνάμεως διάφορα προάγοντα, καὶ αὐτὰ παν τελῶς αὐτοπάρακτα τυγχάνοντα. Ἡ μὲν φύσις ἀθρόαν τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐργάζεται, οὐ πρὸς ποίησιν οὐσίας ἀλλὰ πρὸς ποίησιν τοῦ πάθους· ἡ γὰρ πῆξις ἐν τῷ γάλακτι πάθος ἐστὶ