Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible; for the indivisible can neither be divided nor can the non-composite be altered. Therefore, either nothing will be productive or the incorporeal will be, since body, insofar as it is body, does not produce, being exposed only to being divided and to suffering. Since indeed everything that produces has a productive power; but body in itself is without quality and without power; so that it will not produce insofar as it is body, but according to the power of producing in it; therefore, when it produces, it produces by participation in a power. And indeed, incorporeals also participate in passions when they come to be in a body, being divided along with bodies and partaking of their divisible nature, though being indivisible according to their own substance. 81 Everything that is participated in separably is present to the participant through some inseparable power which it bestows. For if it itself exists separate from the participant and is not in that thing, as having its subsistence in itself, there is need of some medium between them holding the one to the other, a medium more like that which is participated in, though being in the participant itself. For if that is separate, how does this participate, having neither that thing itself nor something else from it? Therefore, a power from that thing and an illumination proceeding into the participant will join both; and the one will be that through which participation occurs, the other that which is participated in, and the other the participant. 82 Every incorporeal, being revertive to itself, when participated in by others is participated in separably. For if inseparably, its activity will not be separate from the participant, just as its substance is not. If this is so, it will not revert to itself; for having reverted it will be apart from the participant, it being one thing and the other another. If, therefore, it is able to revert to itself, it is participated in separably, whenever it is participated in by others. 83 Everything that is cognitive of itself is in every way revertive to itself. For that it reverts to itself in activity, knowing itself, is clear; for that which knows and that which is known is one, and its knowledge is of itself as knowable; as knowing, it is a certain activity; and of itself towards itself, because it is cognitive of itself. But indeed, that it is also revertive in its substance, if in its activity, has been shown; for everything that is revertive to itself in its activity also has a substance that inclines towards itself and is in itself. 84 Everything that is eternal is of infinite power. For if its subsistence is unfailing, then the power, by which it is what it is and is able to be, is infinite. For if the power of being were finite, it would someday fail; and having failed, the being of that which has it would also fail, and it would no longer exist as an eternal being. Therefore, the power of an eternal being, which sustains it in its substance, must be infinite. 85 Everything that is always coming into being has an infinite power of coming into being. For if it is always coming into being, the power of generation in it is unfailing. For being finite, it will cease in infinite time; and when the power of coming into being has ceased, that which comes into being according to it would also cease, and it would no longer be a thing that is always coming into being. But it is posited that it is always coming into being; therefore, it has an infinite power of coming into being. 86 Everything that truly is is infinite neither in multitude nor in magnitude, but in power alone. For everything that is infinite is so either in quantity, or in size, or in power. That which truly is is infinite in that it has an unquenchable life and an unfailing existence and an undiminished activity; but it is infinite neither through magnitude (for that which truly is is without magnitude, existing self-subsistently; for everything that is self-subsistent is indivisible and simple), nor through multitude (for it is most like a unity, inasmuch as it is ordered nearest to the One, and is most akin to the One), but that thing is infinite in power. Wherefore that thing is at the same time indivisible and infinite; and by so much as it is more one and more indivisible, by so much is it more infinite. For a divided power is at once weak and finite, and powers that are in every way divisible are altogether finite; for the last and furthest from the One are altogether finite because of their division, but the first are infinite because of their indivisibility; for division differentiates and dissipates the power of each, but indivisibility, by binding and concentrating it, makes it unfailing and

παθητόν, πάντῃ ὂν μεριστόν, καὶ πάντῃ εἰς ἄπειρον. τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον, ἁπλοῦν ὄν, ἀπαθές ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ διαιρεῖσθαι δύναται τὸ ἀμερὲς οὔτε ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὸ μὴ σύνθετον. ἢ οὖν οὐδὲν ἔσται ποιητικὸν ἢ τὸ ἀσώματον, εἴπερ τὸ σῶμα, καθὸ σῶμα, οὐ ποιεῖ, πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖσθαι μόνον καὶ πάσχειν ἐκκείμενον. ἐπεὶ καὶ πᾶν τὸ ποιοῦν δύναμιν ἔχει ποιητικήν· ἄποιον δὲ καὶ ἀδύναμον τὸ σῶμα καθ' αὑτό· ὥστε οὐ καθὸ σῶμα ποιήσει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ δύναμιν· μεθέξει ἄρα δυνάμεως ποιεῖ, ὅταν ποιῇ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα παθῶν μετέχει ἐν σώματι γενόμενα, συνδιαιρούμενα σώμασι καὶ ἀπο λαύοντα τῆς μεριστῆς ἐκείνων φύσεως, ἀμερῆ ὄντα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν οὐσίαν. 81 Πᾶν τὸ χωριστῶς μετεχόμενον διά τινος ἀχωρίστου δυνάμεως, ἣν ἐνδίδωσι, τῷ μετέχοντι πάρεστιν. εἰ γὰρ [καὶ] αὐτὸ χωριστὸν ὑπάρχει τοῦ μετέχοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ὡς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κεκτημένον, δεῖ δή τινος αὐτοῖς μεσότητος συνεχούσης θάτερον πρὸς θάτερον, ὁμοιο τέρας τῷ μετεχομένῳ καίτοι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μετέχοντι οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο χωριστόν ἐστι, πῶς τοῦτο μετέχει, μήτε αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἔχον μήτε ἄλλο ἀπ' αὐτοῦ; δύναμις ἄρα ἀπ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἔλλαμψις εἰς τὸ μετέχον προελθοῦσα συνάψει ἄμφω· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔσται δι' οὗ ἡ μέθεξις, τὸ δὲ μετεχόμενον, τὸ δὲ μετέχον. 82 Πᾶν ἀσώματον, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν ὄν, ὑπ' ἄλλων μετεχόμενον χωριστῶς μετέχεται. εἰ γὰρ ἀχωρίστως, ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται χωριστὴ τοῦ μετέχοντος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐπιστρέψει πρὸς ἑαυτό· ἐπιστρέψαν γὰρ ἔσται τοῦ μετέχοντος χωρίς, ἄλλου ὄντος αὐτὸ ἄλλο ὄν. εἰ ἄρα δύναται πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπι στρέφειν, χωριστῶς μετέχεται, ὅταν μετέχηται ὑπ' ἄλλων. 83 Πᾶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ γνωστικὸν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πάντῃ ἐπιστρε πτικόν ἐστιν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφει, γινῶσκον ἑαυτό, δῆλον· ἓν γάρ ἐστι τὸ γινῶσκον καὶ γινωσκόμενον, καὶ ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ὡς γνωστόν· ὡς μὲν γινώσκοντος, ἐνέργειά τις οὖσα· αὐτοῦ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτό, διότι ἑαυτοῦ γνωστικόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἰ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, δέδεικται· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν καὶ οὐσίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συννεύουσαν καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ οὖσαν. 84 Πᾶν τὸ ἀεὶ ὂν ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀνέκλειπτός ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὑπόστασις, καὶ ἡ δύναμις, καθ' ἥν ἐστιν ὅ ἐστι καὶ εἶναι δύναται, ἄπειρός ἐστι. πεπε ρασμένη γὰρ οὖσα ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι δύναμις ἀπολίποι ἄν ποτε· ἀπολιποῦσα δέ, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ ἔχοντος αὐτὴν ἀπολίποι καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἀεὶ ὂν ὑπάρχοι. δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος δύναμιν, τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἄπειρον εἶναι. 85 Πᾶν τὸ ἀεὶ γινόμενον ἄπειρον τοῦ γίνεσθαι δύναμιν ἔχει. εἰ γὰρ ἀεὶ γίνεται, ἀνέκλειπτός ἐστιν ἡ τῆς γενέσεως ἐν αὐτῷ δύναμις. πεπερασμένη γὰρ οὖσα, ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ παύσεται· παυσαμένης δὲ τῆς τοῦ γίνεσθαι δυνάμεως παύσαιτο ἂν καὶ τὸ γινόμενον τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν γινόμενον, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἀεὶ γινόμενον εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀεὶ ὑπόκειται γινόμενον· ἄπειρον ἄρα ἔχει τὴν τοῦ γίνεσθαι δύναμιν. 86 Πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἄπειρόν ἐστιν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οὔτε κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν μόνην. πᾶν [μὲν] γὰρ τὸ ἄπειρον ἢ ἐν ποσῷ ἐστιν ἢ ἐν πηλίκῳ ἢ ἐν δυνάμει. τὸ δ' ὄντως ὂν ἄπειρον μὲν ὡς ἄσβεστον ἔχον τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἀνέκλειπτον καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνε λάττωτον· οὔτε δὲ διὰ μέγεθός ἐστιν ἄπειρον (ἀμέγεθες γὰρ τὸ ὄντως ὄν, αὐθυποστάτως ὄν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ αὐθυποστάτως ὂν ἀμερές ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν), οὔτε διὰ πλῆθος (ἑνοειδέστατον γάρ, ἅτε ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ ἑνὸς τεταγμένον, καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ συγγενέστατον), ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἄπειρον ἐκεῖνο. διὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀμερὲς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἄπειρον· καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ μᾶλλον ἓν καὶ μᾶλλον ἀμερές, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἄπειρον μᾶλλον. ἡ γὰρ μεριζομένη δύναμις ἀσθενὴς ἤδη καὶ πεπερασμένη, καὶ αἵ γε πάντῃ μερισταὶ δυνάμεις πεπερασμέναι πάντως εἰσίν· αἱ γὰρ ἔσχαται καὶ πορρωτάτω τοῦ ἑνὸς διὰ τὸν μερισμὸν πεπερασμέναι πάντως εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ πρῶται διὰ τὴν ἀμέρειαν ἄπειροι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μερισμὸς διαφορεῖ καὶ ἐκλύει τὴν ἑκάστου δύναμιν, ἡ δὲ ἀμέρεια σφίγγουσα καὶ συσπειρῶσα ἀνέκλειπτον αὐτὴν καὶ