Of saint justin philosopher and martyr, an overthrow of certain aristotelian dogmas.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from god to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 Posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 Is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? further, if when the form

 By its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 Animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 And matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying if, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. how th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. how then was god able to make som

 And of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. for just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 He subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 Sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 Is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. but this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 Second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? and if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 To have come into being. for those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. from the same discourse. whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 Time to be, so also has the past been. but the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 To be straight. the principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. for if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 According to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. if before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 We say, of which there is no demonstration. but god and nature do nothing in vain. if there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 Worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. fr

 And an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? if heaven cannot do by w

 Each other. but now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 And the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 Chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 To suffer it. these things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 It was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? but if it was not moved this way according to

 Always? if to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 And have what they have? if the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? but if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 Of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. from the

 And the bricks. therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 Change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time; for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measure of motion and of rest. If that which is in time moves and is at rest, and the heaven moves, according to him who says so, and the earth is at rest, then the heaven and the earth and their motion and rest are in time. And if time is created, then of necessity the heaven and the earth are also created. 39. From the fifth discourse of the same treatise. Therefore, from what has been said, there must be three kinds of change, that from a substrate to a substrate, and that from a substrate to a non-substrate, and that from a non-substrate to a substrate. For that which is not from a substrate to a non-substrate is not a change, because it is not according to an opposition; for there is neither contrariety nor contradiction. Therefore, the change not from a substrate to a substrate according to contradiction is generation, and that from a substrate to a non-substrate is corruption. Nowhere, then, is matter, which you said in the preceding passages underlies things that come to be and pass away, for some as that from which, for others as that into which. 40. From the same discourse. For what is not white or not good can nevertheless be moved accidentally (for a man might be what is not white), but what is simply not a "this" in no way can; for it is impossible for what is not to be moved. If it is impossible for substance to come to be from that which is not moved, and that which is simply not a "this" is in no way moved (for it is impossible for what is not to be moved), how has substance come to be from matter, which is simply not a "this"? 41. From the eighth discourse of the same treatise. But if it is impossible for time to exist or be conceived without the "now," and the "now" is a kind of mean, having both a beginning and an end, but a beginning of the future time, and an end of the past, it is necessary for time to exist always; for the extremity of the last time taken is the "now"; for it is not possible to take anything in time besides the "now." So, since it is a beginning and an end, it is necessary for time to be on both sides. But if time, then necessarily also motion, if indeed time is an attribute of motion. In these passages Aristotle constructs the argument that the heaven is eternal. For if it is a kind of mean and a beginning and an end, and on each side it always has time, from which premise it necessarily follows that time is eternal; and if time is eternal, motion, of which time is the number, is also necessarily eternal; and if motion is eternal, necessarily the body that is moved is also eternal. But this he posited absurdly, that it is co-eternal; and it will be refuted thus. For as the future will come to be

λη. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὅσα μήτε κινεῖται μήτε ἠρεμεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι ἐστὶ τὸ μετρεῖσθαι χρόνῳ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος κινήσεως καὶ ἠρεμίας μέτρον. Eἰ τὸ ὂν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται καὶ ἠρεμεῖ, κι νεῖται δὲ ὁ οὐρανὸς κατὰ τὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἡ γῆ, ἐν χρόνῳ ἄρα ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ ἡ τούτων κίνησίς τε καὶ ἠρεμία. Καὶ εἰ γενητὸς ὁ χρόνος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα γενητὸς καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ. λθ. Ἐκ τοῦ πέμπτου λόγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. Ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τρεῖς εἶναι μεταβολάς, τήν τε ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον, καὶ τὴν ἐξ ὑποκει μένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον. Ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκεί μενον οὐκ ἔστι μεταβολὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κατ' ἀντίθεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐναντία οὔτε ἀντίφασίς ἐστιν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον μεταβολὴ κατ' ἀντίφασιν γέ νεσίς ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς οὐχ ὑποκείμενον φθορά. Oὐδαμοῦ ἄρα ἡ ὕλη, ἣν εἶπες ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ὑποκει μένην τοῖς γινομένοις τε καὶ φθειρομένοις, τοῖς μὲν ὡς ἐξ οὗ, τοῖς δὲ ὡς εἰς ὅ. μ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ὅμως ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός (εἴη γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὴ λευ κόν), τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶς μὴ τόδε οὐδαμῶς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν κινεῖσθαι. Eἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ κινουμένου ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς τόδε μὴ ὂν οὐδαμῶς κινεῖται (ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν κινεῖσθαι), πῶς γέγονεν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης οὐσία ἁπλῶς τόδε τι οὐκ οὔσης; μα. Ἐκ τοῦ ὀγδόου λόγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. Eἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ νοῆσαι χρόνον ἄνευ τοῦ νῦν, τὸ δὲ νῦν μεσότης τις, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴν μὲν τοῦ ἐσομένου χρόνου, τελευτὴν δὲ τοῦ παρελθόν τος, ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸν χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ἔσχατον τοῦ τε λευταίου ληφθέντος χρόνου τὸ νῦν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστι λαβεῖν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ παρὰ τὸ νῦν. Ὥστε ἐπεί ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή, ἀνάγκη ἐπ' ἀμφότερα εἶναι χρόνον. Ἀλλ' εἰ χρόνον, ἀνάγκη καὶ κίνησιν, εἴπερ ὁ χρόνος πάθος ἐστὶ κι νήσεως. Ἐν τούτοις κατασκευάζει ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶναι ἀΐδιον. Eἰ γὰρ μεσότης τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή, καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν ἀεὶ ἔχει χρόνον, ᾧ τεθέντι ἀναγκαίως ἕπεται τὸ τὸν χρόνον εἶναι ἀΐδιον· καὶ εἰ ὁ χρόνος ἀΐδιος, καὶ ἡ κί νησις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ἀΐδιος, ἧς ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός· καὶ εἰ ἡ κίνησις ἀΐδιος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα ἀΐδιόν ἐστι. Τοῦτο δὲ ἀτόπως ἔθηκε τὸ συναΐδιον εἶναι· καὶ ἐλεγχθήσεται οὕτως. Ὡς γὰρ γενήσεται ὁ μέλλων γί