of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to represent the timeless working of God, who is the creator of many and different substances, which, even if God makes them all at once, are not thus timeless? For the "all at once" is the indivisible moment of time. The will of God does not rule over things that are self-produced, but the will of God does rule over the things which it itself produces. But if the will of God rules over all things, then nothing is self-produced. The respondent calls both God and the world self-produced. But if the world is self-produced, co-existing with the cause of its own subsistence, then it is necessary that God also, being self-produced, co-exists with the cause of His own subsistence. But if this is absurd, then it is also absurd to say that God and the world are self-produced, and co-exist with each other without interval. If God is self-produced in Himself, but the world which co-exists with Him is so by accident, how is the statement "Nothing happens to God" not false, if, when God was produced self-productively, the self-produced world co-existed with Him? If things that happen to him by some natural necessity happen without his will, how, if the world co-exists with God by natural necessity, does it not co-exist with him without his will by accident? If for God to be is the same as to will, it is clear that in those things which God does not will, He is not. How then, when He is not, does the world co-exist with Him? For the world co-exists with Him without his will. If the ungenerated ungeneratedly makes ungenerated things, it is clear that the uncompounded also uncompoundedly makes uncompounded things. But if the second is not true, then neither is the first. For the world is compounded. If God does not divinely make gods, how does the ungenerated ungeneratedly make ungenerated things? For He does not co-exist with Himself, but with another. God is one thing, the ungenerated is another; the latter belongs to Him, and by it He is separated from generated things. And God exists as making, as making He is not separated. But if He also makes by that by which He is separated, but accidentally and not in Himself, how does nothing happen to God who makes accidentally? If, just as the concave and the convex co-exist with the sphere, so the world co-exists with God, then God is the cause of the world, and the world is the cause of God, just like those things. If one does not make by will what he would have made even unwillingly, how then did God make the world by will, which He would have made out of necessity even if He did not will to make it? If God is one in substance, but infinite in power, and the things co-existing with Him are neither one according to His substance nor infinite according to His power, then they do not co-exist with Him. God is always perfect, He is always powerful; and in Him there is nothing prior and posterior, but in His works there are both. If His works are composite, and every composite is composed of simple things, and it is impossible for the simple to exist at the same time as the composites;

τοῦ γάλακτος, οὐσίαν δὲ οὐδαμῶς ἀθρόως ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἀνοικείῳ ὑποδείγματι, τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τῆς φύσεως, χρησάμενος πρὸς παράστασιν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἀχρόνως ἐργασίας, δημιουργοῦ πολλῶν καὶ διαφό ρων οὐσιῶν ὄντος, ἅς, κἂν ἀθρόως ποιῇ ὁ θεός, οὐδ' οὕτως ἀχρόνως; Τὸ γὰρ ἀθρόον τοῦ χρόνου ἐστὶ τὸ ἄτομον. Τῶν αὐτοπαράκτων οὐ κυριεύει ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ βούλησις, κυριεύει δὲ ἡ βούλησις τοῦ θεοῦ ὧν αὐτὴ παράγει. Ἀλλ' εἰ κυριεύει ἡ βούλησις τοῦ θεοῦ πάντων, οὐδὲν ἄρα αὐτοπάρακτον. Aὐτο πάρακτον ὀνομάζει ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν κόσμον. Ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτοπάρακτός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, συνυφιστά μενος τῇ αἰτίᾳ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὸν θεόν, αὐτοπάρακτον ὄντα, συνυφίστασθαι τῇ αἰτίᾳ τῆς ὑπο στάσεως αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν κόσμον αὐτοπαράκτους, καὶ συνυ φισταμένους ἀλλήλοις ἀδιαστάτως. Eἰ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοπάρακτος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος ὁ συνυφιστάμενος αὐτῷ, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ Oὐδὲν συμ βαίνει θεῷ, εἴγε, αὐτοπαράκτως παραγομένου τοῦ θεοῦ, συν υπέστη αὐτῷ αὐτοπάρακτος ὁ κόσμος; Eἰ τὰ φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ τινὶ συμβησόμενα ἀβουλήτως συμβαίνει αὐτῷ, πῶς, εἰ φυ σικῇ ἀνάγκῃ συνυφίσταται ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ, οὐκ ἀβουλήτως αὐτῷ συνυφίσταται κατὰ συμβεβηκός; Eἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὸ εἶναι τῷ βούλεσθαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς οὐ βούλε ται ὁ θεὸς ἐν τούτοις οὐδέ ἐστι. Πῶς οὖν, μὴ ὄντος αὐτοῦ, ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ συνυφίσταται; Ἀβουλήτως γὰρ αὐτῷ συνυ φίσταται ὁ κόσμος. Eἰ ὁ ἀγένητος ἀγενήτως ἀγένητα ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἀσύνθετος ἀσυνθέτως ἀσύνθετα ποιεῖ. Eἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ δεύτερον, οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον. Σύνθετος γὰρ ὁ κόσμος. Eἰ ὁ θεὸς θεϊκῶς θεοὺς οὐ ποιεῖ, πῶς ὁ ἀγένητος ἀγενήτως ἀγένητα ποιεῖ; Oὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ συνυφίσταται, ἀλλὰ ἕτερος. Ἄλλο ὁ θεός, ἄλλο τὸ ἀγένητον· ἐκείνῳ μὲν ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ δὲ χωρίζεται τῶν γενητῶν. Καὶ ποιῶν ὁ θεὸς ὑπάρχει, ποιῶν οὐ χωρίζεται. Eἰ δὲ καὶ ᾧ χωρί ζεται ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐ καθ' αὑτό, πῶς οὐδὲν συμβαίνει τῷ θεῷ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ποιοῦντι; Eἰ, ὥσπερ συνυφίσταται τῇ σφαίρᾳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτόν, οὕτως συνυφίσταται τῷ θεῷ ὁ κόσμος, ἀλληλαίτιοι ἄρα ὁ μὲν θεὸς τοῦ κόσμου, ὁ δὲ κόσμος τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ κἀ κεῖνα. Eἰ οὐ ποιεῖ τις βουλήσει ἃ καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος ἐποίει, πῶς οὖν βουλήσει τὸν κόσμον ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, ὃν καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος ποιεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐποίει; Eἰ ἓν μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὁ θεός, ἄπειρος δὲ τῇ δυνάμει, τὰ δὲ συνυφιστάμενα αὐτῷ μήτε ἓν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ μήτε ἄπειρα κατὰ τὴν δύ ναμιν αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' ἄρα συνυφίσταται αὐτῷ. Ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ τέ λειός ἐστιν, ἀεὶ δυνατός ἐστιν· καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὐδέν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἀμφότερα. Eἰ σύνθετα τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, πᾶν δὲ σύνθετον ἐξ ἁπλῶν σύγ κειται, καὶ ἀδύνατον ἅμα εἶναι τὰ ἁπλᾶ τοῖς συνθέτοις·