Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica
After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the
to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes
having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them
left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin
regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes
and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is
a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo
a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern
through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo
agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min
to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-
distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt
Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and
is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr
but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to
When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th
concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be
as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat
this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c
definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e
the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i
is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h
is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,
we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that
with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that
a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th
For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.
the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many
Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-
Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t
We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w
in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says
theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn
organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc
simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then
he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving
closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso
it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic
a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,
Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat
have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will
to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo
both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for
of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer
has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply
would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw
Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some
The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first
but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath
For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent
fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is
are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y
it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,
and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y
and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided
what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a
proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause
in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje
by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not
having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi
tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t
make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o
cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer
Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,
such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si
often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it
they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi
and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo
they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with
for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the
an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w
of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap
enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle
to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org
parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but
knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan
from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so
they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in the seed; in quantity, as boys are potentially men; in quality, as cold things are potentially hot; in change of place; for the rising sun is potentially at its zenith, is potentially setting. Matter is only potentiality, and nothing in actuality; form is only actuality; that which is from matter and form is in both. in every way potentially in matter and sometimes it has this potentially, and sometimes that in actuality; or rather, at the same time both the potential and the actual, in respect to different things. Divine things are never in potentiality, because they are not in matter. It is possible to say that man has many souls insofar as they differ in form, and one soul on account of their connateness and sympathy. For even the rational faculties pass through even to the vegetative faculties. Those who say the soul is a mixture make the effects superior to the causes; for they make the soulless body the cause of the soul and the non-living the cause of life. There is not one genus of souls, since <in> them the prior and posterior is observed; for the rational is prior and where it is, the others are also, but not the reverse. Therefore, like things that are from one and toward one, is the account of the soul. Aristotle seems to hold the doctrine of the Ideas prior to the many in saying, "<as> order is in the general and the soldiers, health in the patient and the physician, so also the order here is <in> God and the cosmos." Definitions are not in the things prior to the many, but in the concepts (for we define the concept which we have about things), and these are derivative. Clearer are the things that are active in some of the activities, as the sensible of sensation and the opinable of opinion, apart from mind and the intelligible; for the former is ours, but the latter is beyond us. Soul is a self-moving substance. A problem: if through definitions we know the accidents, as it were, and through these we know the definitions, the proof is circular. Solution: from the clear accidents we know the definitions, and from these we know the obscure accidents. Aristotle, being unable to define place clearly, found accidents: that it contains what is in place, that it is equal to it. He does the same for the void and the infinite, likewise also for the soul he takes the imaginative, the locomotive, the productive of life, and others. The definition does not have to include everything, but as many things as can essentially distinguish the nature of the thing. The "not without something" is threefold: either that which neither harms nor helps, as "the body in the light is not without a shadow", or that which is of necessity, as an instrument ("Achilles was bravest, but not without his ash spear"), or the impeding affection, as "having sailed in winter he was saved, but not without danger". 37 They argue against Aristotle: if there is an affection proper to the soul, that is, an activity, it also has a separable substance. The eye has its own activity, therefore it also has a separable substance. The "proper" is twofold: either that which is in something, but <also> needs the whole, like the walking of the foot, or that which does not need it, as the sweetness of the honey in the mead; for this is proper to it and separable. And the eye also needs the brain, pneuma, and the optic nerves. Another solution: sight is an activity of the eye not as a substance, but as an instrument; but of the soul as a substance. A second rule: those things whose activities are of the composite, that is, inseparable, of these the substance is also not separable. Behold, therefore, the pilot's activity is inseparable from the ship, but his substance is separable. Solution: the pilot acts both as a pilot and as a man. Therefore, the activities as pilot are inseparable from the ship and not proper to the pilot, but his activities as a man are proper to him. But we do not say that a separable substance must have all its activities as proper to it, but some, and on account of these it is separable; but in the case of an inseparable substance, all of them are also inseparable. Another solution: the connaturality of substances is one thing, and that of a pilot to a ship is another; for what is the connaturality of the one to the other? There being three things in physics, form, matter, and cause, how form is <in> matter, five methods are brought to bear on these: the physical, which will discuss
ἐντελέχειαν, ὡς ἰατροί, οἱ δὲ πρός τι, οἱ λόγον διπλάσιον ἢ ἡμιόλιον. Ἡ δύναμις εὑρίσκεται ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὡς ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἄνθρωπος,
ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ὡς οἱ παῖδες δυνάμει ἄνδρες, ἐν τῷ ποιῷ ὡς οἱ ψυχροὶ θερμοί, ἐν τῇ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῇ· ἀνατέλλων γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος δυνάμει
μεσουρανεῖ, δυνάμει δύνει. ἡ ὕλη μὲν μόνως ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδὲ ἕν· τὸ εἶδος μόνον ἐντελέχεια· τὸ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους
ἐν ἀμφοτέροις. δυνάμει πάντως ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ ποτὲ μὲν τοῦτο ἔχει δυνάμει, ποτὲ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἐνερ36 γείᾳ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἅμα καὶ τὸ
δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. τὰ θεῖα οὐδέποτε δυνάμει, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ. ∆ύνασθαι καὶ πολλὰς ψυχὰς λέγειν τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ καθ' ὃ διαφέρουσι τῷ εἴδει καὶ μίαν διὰ τὴν συμφυΐαν καὶ συμπάθειαν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ λογικαὶ δυνάμεις διαβαίνουσι μεχρὶ
καὶ τῶν φυτικῶν. Οἱ κρᾶσιν λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ αἰτιατὰ κρείττω ποιοῦσι τῶν αἰτίων· τὸ γὰρ ἄψυχον σῶμα ψυχῆς αἴτιον ποιοῦσι
καὶ τὸ ἄζων ζωῆς. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν γένος τῶν ψυχῶν, ἐπειδὴ <ἐν> ταύταις τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον θεωρεῖται· πρότερον γὰρ ἡ λογικὴ
καὶ ὅπου αὕτη καὶ αἱ λοιπαί, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν. ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς οὖν καὶ πρὸς ἓν ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγος. Φαίνεται ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης
δοξάζων τὰς πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἰδέας ἐν τῷ λέγειν «<ὥσπερ> ἡ τάξις ἐν τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις, ἡ ὑγεία ἐν τῷ νοσοῦντι
καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐνταῦθα τάξις <ἐν> θεῷ καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ». οἱ ὁρισμοὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς ἐννοηματικοῖς
(τὴν γὰρ ἔννοιαν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁριζόμεθα), ταῦτα δὲ ὑστερογενῆ. Σαφέστερα ἃ ἐνεργοῦσι ἔν τισι τῶν ἐνεργειῶν,
ὡς αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσεως καὶ δοξαστὸν δόξης, ἐκτὸς νοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ· οὗτος γὰρ ἡμέτερος, τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς. ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία αὐτοκίνητος.
Ἀπορία· εἰ διὰ τῶν ὁρισμῶν τὰ οἷον συμβεβηκότα γινώσκομεν καὶ διὰ τούτων τοὺς ὁρισμούς, διάλληλος <ἡ> δεῖξις. λύσις· ἐκ τῶν
ἐναργῶν συμβεβηκότων γινώσκομεν τοὺς ὅρους, ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἀφανῆ συμβεβηκότα. ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης μὴ δυνάμενος ὁρίσασθαι τὸν τόπον
σαφῶς εὗρε συμβεβηκότα τὸ περιέχειν τὸ ἐν τόπῳ, τὸ ἴσον εἶναι αὐτῷ. τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ κενοῦ καὶ ἀπείρου, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ
ψυχῆς λαμβάνει φανταστικόν, κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ζωῆς ποιητικὸν καὶ ἕτερα. οὐ πάντα ὀφείλει περιλαμβάνειν ὁ ὅρος, ἀλλ' ὅσα
δύναται διακρίνειν οὐσιωδῶς τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος. Τὸ οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς τριχῶς· ἢ τὸ μήτε βλάπτον ἢ ὠφελοῦν, ὡς «οὐκ ἄνευ σκιᾶς
τὸ ἐν φωτὶ σῶμα», ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὡς ὄργανον («ἠρίστευσεν Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ μελίας»), ἢ τὸ πάθος ἐμποδίζον, ὡς «ἐν χειμῶνι
πλεύσας ἐσώθη ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ κινδύνου». 37 Κατὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους λέγουσι· εἰ ἔστι πάθος ἴδιον ψυχῆς, ἤγουν ἐνέργεια, χωριστὴν
ἔχει καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν· ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἰδίαν ἔχει ἐνέργειαν, λοιπὸν οὖν καὶ χωριστὴν ἔχει οὐσίαν. τὸ ἴδιον διττόν· ἢ τὸ ὂν μὲν ἔν
τινι, δεόμενον <δὲ> καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ὡς βάδισις τοῦ ποδός, ἢ τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὡς ἡ γλυκύτης ἐν τῷ οἰνομέλιτι τοῦ μέλιτος· ἰδία
γὰρ τούτου καὶ χωριστή. καὶ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς δὲ δέεται ἐγκεφάλου, πνεύματος καὶ τῶν ὀπτικῶν νεύρων. ἑτέρα λύσις· ἡ ὅρασις ἐνέργεια
τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ οὐχ ὡς οὐσίας, ἀλλ' ὡς ὀργάνου· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ὡς οὐσίας. δεύτερος κανών· ὧν αἱ ἐνέργειαι τοῦ συναμφοτέρου, ἤγουν
ἀχώριστοι, τούτων οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία χωριστή. ἰδοὺ οὖν τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια ἀχώριστος τοῦ πλοίου, ἡ δὲ οὐσία χωριστή. λύσις·
ὁ κυβερνήτης ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ὡς κυβερνήτης καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος. αἱ μὲν οὖν ὡς κυβερνήτου ἐνέργειαι ἀχώριστοι τοῦ πλοίου καὶ οὐκ ἴδιαι
τοῦ κυβερνήτου, αἱ δὲ ὡς ἀνθρώπου ἴδιαι. οὐ λέγομεν δὲ ὅτι δεῖ τὴν χωριστὴν οὐσίαν πάσας ἔχειν τὰς ἐνεργείας ἰδίας, ἀλλά τινας,
καὶ διὰ ταύτας χωριστή· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀχωρίστου πάσας καὶ ἀχωρίστους. ἑτέρα λύσις· ἄλλη συμφυΐα οὐσιῶν καὶ ἄλλη κυβερνήτου πρὸς
ναῦν· τί γὰρ ἡ τούτου συμφυΐα πρὸς ἐκείνην; Τριῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, εἴδους, ὕλης καὶ αἰτίας, πῶς <ἐν> τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ εἶδος,
φέρονται τούτοις μέθοδοι πέντε· ἡ φυσική, ἥτις διαλέξεται