Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away from impartibility; for the finite is nearest to the impartible, but the infinite is farthest, having departed completely from the one. Therefore, what is infinite in power is not in an infinite in respect to multitude or magnitude, if indeed infinite power co-exists with impartibility, but what is infinite in multitude or magnitude is farthest from the impartible. If, therefore, being were infinite in magnitude or multitude, it would not be infinite in power; but surely it is infinite in power; therefore, it is not infinite in respect to multitude or magnitude. 87 Everything eternal is being, but not every being is eternal. For to generated things there belongs in a way a participation of being, inasmuch as these are not that which in no way is, and if what comes to be is not in no way being, it is in some way being. But the eternal in no way belongs to generated things, and especially to as many as have not even partaken of everlastingness throughout all time. But surely everything eternal always is; for it partakes of eternity, which gives the "to be always" to those by whom it may be partaken. Therefore being is partaken of by more things than eternity is. Therefore being is beyond eternity; for to those who partake of eternity, there is also [participation] of being; but to those who partake of being, not all also [partake] of eternity. 88 Everything that truly is, is either before eternity or in eternity or partaking of eternity. For that it is before eternity has been shown. But surely also in eternity; for eternity has the "always" with being. And partaking of eternity; for everything eternal is called eternal by participation both of the "always" and of being. For this has both by participation, both the "always" and being; but eternity has the "always" primarily, but being by participation; but being itself is primarily being. 89 Everything that truly is, is from limit and the infinite. For if it is infinite in power, it is clear that it is infinite, and in this respect it subsists from the infinite. But if it is impartible and uniform, in this respect it has partaken of limit; for what has partaken of one has been limited. But surely it is at once impartible and infinite in power. Therefore everything that truly is, is from limit and the infinite. 90 Of all things that have subsisted from limit and infinity, there pre-exist in themselves the first limit and the first infinity. For if of some beings those that are in themselves pre-subsist as common and principal causes of all things, and not of some, but of all things simply, it is necessary that before that which is from both there be the first limit and the primarily infinite. For in the mixture, limit is that which has partaken of infinity, and the infinite of limit; but the first of each is nothing other than what it is; it is not necessary, therefore, that the primarily infinite be limit-like, nor the first limit infinite-like; therefore, these are primary before the mixture. 91 Every power is either finite or infinite; but every finite power subsists from infinite power, and infinite power from the first infinity. For those powers that exist at some time are finite, having fallen away from the infinity of being always; but those of the always-beings are infinite, never abandoning their own existence. 92 The entire multitude of infinite powers is dependent on the one first infinity, which is not power as something participated, nor does it subsist in things that have power, but by itself, being the power not of some participant, but the cause of all beings. For even if the first being itself has power, it is not power-itself. For it also has limit; but the first power is infinity. For infinite powers are infinite through participation of infinity; infinity-itself, therefore, will be before all powers, through which being is infinite in power and all things have partaken of infinity. For infinity is neither the first (for that is the measure of all things, being the good and the one) nor being (for this is infinite, but not infinity); infinity, therefore, is between the first and being, the cause of all things infinite in power and the cause of all the infinity in beings. 93 Everything infinite among beings is infinite neither to those superior to it nor to itself. For to that to which each thing is infinite, to this it is also uncircumscribable. But everything among those is defined both by itself and by all those before it. It remains, then, that the infinite among those is infinite only to its inferiors, over which it is so extended in power as to be incomprehensible to them all. For even if they should be stretched up to it to any degree whatever, yet it has something at any rate from them

ἀνελάττωτον ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνέχει. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀπειρία καὶ ἡ κατὰ πλῆθος στέρησίς ἐστι πάντῃ τῆς ἀμερείας καὶ ἀπόπτωσις· ἐγγυτάτω μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀμεροῦς τὸ πεπερασμένον, πορρωτάτω δὲ τὸ ἄπειρον, πάντῃ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκβεβηκός. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν ἄπειρον ἐν ἀπείρῳ κατὰ πλῆθός ἐστιν ἢ μέγεθος, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν ἄπειρος δύναμις τῇ ἀμερείᾳ σύνεστι, τὸ δὲ πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ἄπειρον πορρωτάτω τοῦ ἀμεροῦς ἐστιν. εἰ οὖν τὸ ὂν μεγέθει ἦν ἢ πλήθει ἄπειρον, οὐκ ἂν ἀπειροδύναμον ἦν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἄπειρον κατὰ πλῆθός ἐστιν ἢ μέγεθος. 87 Πᾶν μὲν τὸ αἰώνιον ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὂν αἰώνιον. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς γενητοῖς ὑπάρχει πως τοῦ ὄντος μέθεξις, καθ' ὅσον οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τὸ γινόμενον οὐδαμῶς ὄν, ἔστι πως ὄν. τὸ δὲ αἰώνιον οὐδαμῇ τοῖς γενητοῖς ὑπάρχει, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅσα μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ χρόνον τὸν ὅλον ἀϊδιότητος μετείληφεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν πᾶν τὸ αἰώνιον ἀεὶ ἔστι· μετέχει γὰρ αἰῶνος, ὃς τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι δίδωσιν ὑφ' ὧν ἂν μετέχηται. τὸ ἄρα ὂν ὑπὸ πλειόνων μετέχεται ἢ ὁ αἰών. ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸ ὄν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ αἰῶνος μέτεστι, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος· οἷς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος, οὐ πᾶσι καὶ αἰῶνος. 88 Πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἢ πρὸ αἰῶνός ἐστιν ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι ἢ μετέχον αἰῶνος. ὅτι μὲν γάρ ἐστι πρὸ αἰῶνος, δέδεικται. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι· ὁ γὰρ αἰὼν τὸ ἀεὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἔχει. καὶ μετέχον αἰῶνος· τὸ γὰρ αἰώνιον πᾶν μεθέξει καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος αἰώνιον λέγεται. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἄμφω ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὄν· ὁ δὲ αἰὼν τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ πρώτως, τὸ δὲ ὂν κατὰ μέθεξιν· τὸ δὲ ὂν αὐτὸ πρώτως ὄν ἐστιν. 89 Πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπείρου. εἰ γὰρ ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἄπειρόν ἐστι, καὶ ταύτῃ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὑφέστηκεν. εἰ δὲ ἀμερὲς καὶ ἑνοειδές, ταύτῃ πέρατος μετείληφε· τὸ γὰρ ἑνὸς μετασχὸν πεπέρασται. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀμερὲς ἅμα καὶ ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστιν. ἐκ πέρατος ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπείρου πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν. 90 Πάντων τῶν ἐκ πέρατος καὶ ἀπειρίας ὑποστάντων προϋπάρχει καθ' αὑτὰ τὸ πρῶτον πέρας καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἀπειρία. εἰ γὰρ τῶν τινὸς ὄντων τὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντα προϋφέστηκεν ὡς κοινὰ πάντων καὶ ἀρχηγικὰ αἴτια καὶ μὴ τινῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἁπλῶς, δεῖ πρὸ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον πέρας καὶ τὸ πρώτως ἄπειρον. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μικτῷ πέρας ἀπειρίας ἐστὶ μετειληφὸς καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον πέρατος· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἑκάστου οὐκ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὅ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα δεῖ περατοειδὲς εἶναι τὸ πρώτως ἄπειρον καὶ ἀπειροειδὲς τὸ πρῶτον πέρας· πρὸ τοῦ μικτοῦ ἄρα ταῦτα πρώτως. 91 Πᾶσα δύναμις ἢ πεπερασμένη ἐστὶν ἢ ἄπειρος· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πεπερασμένη πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου δυνάμεως ὑφέστηκεν, ἡ δὲ ἄπειρος δύναμις ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἀπειρίας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ποτὲ οὖσαι δυνάμεις πεπερασμέναι εἰσί, τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀπειρίας ἀποπεσοῦσαι· αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἄπειροι, μηδέποτε τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολείπουσαι ὕπαρξιν. 92 Πᾶν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀπείρων δυνάμεων μιᾶς ἐξῆπται τῆς πρώτης ἀπειρίας, ἥτις οὐχ ὡς μετεχομένη δύναμίς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς δυναμένοις ὑφέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτήν, οὐ τινὸς οὖσα δύναμις τοῦ μετέχοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντων αἰτία τῶν ὄντων. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον ἔχει δύναμιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτοδύναμις. ἔχει γὰρ καὶ πέρας· ἡ δὲ πρώτη δύναμις ἀπειρία ἐστίν. αἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι δυνάμεις διὰ μετουσίαν ἀπειρίας ἄπειροι· ἡ οὖν αὐτοαπειρία πρὸ πασῶν ἔσται δυνάμεων, δι' ἣν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἀπειροδύναμον καὶ πάντα μετέσχεν ἀπειρίας. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἡ ἀπειρία (μέτρον γὰρ πάντων ἐκεῖνο, τἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον καὶ ἕν) οὔτε τὸ ὄν (ἄπειρον γὰρ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπειρία)· μεταξὺ ἄρα τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἡ ἀπειρία, πάντων αἰτία τῶν ἀπειροδυνάμων καὶ αἰτία πάσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀπειρίας. 93 Πᾶν τὸ ἄπειρον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὔτε τοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις ἄπειρόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἑαυτῷ. ᾧ γὰρ ἄπειρον ἕκαστον, τούτῳ καὶ ἀπερίγραφον ὑπάρχει. πᾶν δὲ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἑαυτῷ τε ὥρισται καὶ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ πᾶσι. μόνοις δὴ λείπεται τοῖς καταδεεστέροις ἄπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἄπειρον, ὧν ὑπερήπλωται τῇ δυνάμει τοσοῦτον ὥστε πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἀπερίληπτον ὑπάρχειν. κἂν γὰρ ἐφ' ὁσονοῦν ἐκεῖνα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀνατείνηται, ἀλλ' ἔχει τι πάντως ἀπ' αὐτῶν