ARTICLE 4

Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue.

1. Objections: It would seem that they cannot.

 a. Virtues cannot be in the sense appetites

    because these powers

  (1) cannot be the subject of vice  obj. 1.

  (2) are corruptible, while virtue is

      incorruptible.     obj. 3.

  (3) use a corporeal organ   obj. 4.

  (4) are not active principles   obj. 11.

  (5) lack the perfection of doing good

          --at least the irascible part  obj. 9 and 13.

 b. There can be no virtue in the sense

    cognitive powers      obj. 6.

 c. Virtue must be in reason    obj. 2, 5, 10, 12.

 d. The rebellion of the flesh can never

    be entirely put down     obj. 7 and 8.

2. On the contrary

 a. Fortitude and temperance are in the

    sense appetites      1 and 3.

 b. The sinful movements of sensuality are

    in the sense appetites; hence virtue

    must also be there.     2.

3. Body

 a. All agree that there are virtues in the sense appetites, whether the latter are of two types, as some hold, or not.

 b. Human virtue will reside in powers which can elicit human acts, i.e., acts directed by reason. Man's powers are of three kinds:

  (1) First movers: the intellect and will.

  (2) Moved movers: the sense appetites, which have their own natural inclinations, and so do not obey reason slavishly, although they do have a natural aptitude for obeying reason.

  (3) Powers which are only moved: the external bodily members, which obey reason unfailingly, because they are so determined, hence they do not need and cannot have habits.

 c. The lower appetites must be perfected by habits proper to them, else the perfection of man's higher faculties is of no avail as regards acts of these lower powers.