Chapter XVIII.—Plato Suggested Certain Errors to the Gnostics.  Functions of the Soul.

I turn now to the department of our intellectual faculties, such as Plato has handed it over to the heretics, distinct from our bodily functions, having obtained the knowledge of them before death.132    Said ironically, as if rallying Plato for inconsistency between his theory here and the fact. He asks in the Phædo, What, then, (do you think) concerning the actual possession of knowledge? Will the body be a hindrance to it or not, if one shall admit it as an associate in the search after knowledge? I have a similar question to ask: Have the faculties of their sight and hearing any truth and reality for human beings or not?  Is it not the case, that even the poets are always muttering against us, that we can never hear or see anything for certain? He remembered, no doubt, what Epicharmus the comic poet had said: “It is the mind which sees, the mind that hears—all else is blind and deaf.” To the same purport he says again, that man is the wisest whose mental power is the clearest; who never applies the sense of sight, nor adds to his mind the help of any such faculty, but employs the intellect itself in unmixed serenity when he indulges in contemplation for the purpose of acquiring an unalloyed insight into the nature of things; divorcing himself with all his might from his eyes and ears and (as one must express himself) from the whole of his body, on the ground of its disturbing the soul, and not allowing it to possess either truth or wisdom, whenever it is brought into communication with it. We see, then, that in opposition to the bodily senses another faculty is provided of a much more serviceable character, even the powers of the soul, which produce an understanding of that truth whose realities are not palpable nor open to the bodily senses, but are very remote from men’s everyday knowledge, lying in secret—in the heights above, and in the presence of God Himself. For Plato maintains that there are certain invisible substances, incorporeal, celestial,133    Supermundiales “placed above this world.” divine, and eternal, which they call ideas, that is to say, (archetypal) forms, which are the patterns and causes of those objects of nature which are manifest to us, and lie under our corporeal senses: the former, (according to Plato,) are the actual verities, and the latter the images and likenesses of them. Well, now, are there not here gleams of the heretical principles of the Gnostics and the Valentinians? It is from this philosophy that they eagerly adopt the difference between the bodily senses and the intellectual faculties,—a distinction which they actually apply to the parable of the ten virgins: making the five foolish virgins to symbolize the five bodily senses, seeing that these are so silly and so easy to be deceived; and the wise virgin to express the meaning of the intellectual faculties, which are so wise as to attain to that mysterious and supernal truth, which is placed in the pleroma. (Here, then, we have) the mystic original of the ideas of these heretics. For in this philosophy lie both their Æons and their genealogies. Thus, too, do they divide sensation, both into the intellectual powers from their spiritual seed, and the sensuous faculties from the animal, which cannot by any means comprehend spiritual things. From the former germ spring invisible things; from the latter, visible things which are grovelling and temporary, and which are obvious to the senses, placed as they are in palpable forms.134    Imaginibus. It is because of these views that we have in a former passage stated as a preliminary fact, that the mind is nothing else than an apparatus or instrument of the soul,135    See above, c. xii. p. 192. and that the spirit is no other faculty, separate from the soul, but is the soul itself exercised in respiration; although that influence which either God on the one hand, or the devil on the other, has breathed upon it, must be regarded in the light of an additional element.136    Above, c. xi. p. 191. And now, with respect to the difference between the intellectual powers and the sensuous faculties, we only admit it so far as the natural diversity between them requires of us. (There is, of course, a difference) between things corporeal and things spiritual, between visible and invisible beings, between objects which are manifest to the view and those which are hidden from it; because the one class are attributed to sensation, and the other to the intellect. But yet both the one and the other must be regarded as inherent in the soul, and as obedient to it, seeing that it embraces bodily objects by means of the body, in exactly the same way that it conceives incorporeal objects by help of the mind, except that it is even exercising sensation when it is employing the intellect. For is it not true, that to employ the senses is to use the intellect? And to employ the intellect amounts to a use of the senses?137    Intelligere sentire est. What indeed can sensation be, but the understanding of that which is the object of the sensation? And what can the intellect or understanding be, but the seeing of that which is the object understood? Why adopt such excruciating means of torturing simple knowledge and crucifying the truth? Who can show me the sense which does not understand the object of its sensation, or the intellect which perceives not the object which it understands, in so clear a way as to prove to me that the one can do without the other? If corporeal things are the objects of sense, and incorporeal ones objects of the intellect, it is the classes of the objects which are different, not the domicile or abode of sense and intellect; in other words, not the soul (anima) and the mind (animus). By what, in short, are corporeal things perceived?  If it is by the soul,138    Oehler has “anima;” we should rather have expected “animo,” which is another reading. then the mind is a sensuous faculty, and not merely an intellectual power; for whilst it understands, it also perceives, because without the perception there is no understanding. If, however, corporeal things are perceived by the soul, then it follows that the soul’s power is an intellectual one, and not merely a sensuous faculty; for while it perceives it also understands, because without understanding there is no perceiving. And then, again, by what are incorporeal things understood? If it is by the mind,139    “Animo” this time. where will be the soul? If it is by the soul, where will be the mind? For things which differ ought to be mutually absent from each other, when they are occupied in their respective functions and duties. It must be your opinion, indeed, that the mind is absent from the soul on certain occasions; for (you suppose) that we are so made and constituted as not to know that we have seen or heard something, on the hypothesis140    Subjunctive verb, “fuerit.” that the mind was absent at the time. I must therefore maintain that the very soul itself neither saw nor heard, since it was at the given moment absent with its active power—that is to say, the mind. The truth is, that whenever a man is out of his mind,141    Dementit. it is his soul that is demented—not because the mind is absent, but because it is a fellow-sufferer (with the soul) at the time.142    The opposite opinion was held by Tertullian’s opponents, who distinguished between the mind and the soul. They said, that when a man was out of his mind, his mind left him, but that his soul remained. (Lactantius, De Opif. xviii.; Instit. Div. vii. 12; La Cerda). Indeed, it is the soul which is principally affected by casualties of such a kind.  Whence is this fact confirmed? It is confirmed from the following consideration: that after the soul’s departure, the mind is no longer found in a man: it always follows the soul; nor does it at last remain behind it alone, after death. Now, since it follows the soul, it is also indissolubly attached to it; just as the understanding is attached to the soul, which is followed by the mind, with which the understanding is indissolubly connected. Granted now that the understanding is superior to the senses, and a better discoverer of mysteries, what matters it, so long as it is only a peculiar faculty of the soul, just as the senses themselves are? It does not at all affect my argument, unless the understanding were held to be superior to the senses, for the purpose of deducing from the allegation of such superiority its separate condition likewise. After thus combating their alleged difference, I have also to refute this question of superiority, previous to my approaching the belief (which heresy propounds) in a superior god. On this point, however, of a (superior) god, we shall have to measure swords with the heretics on their own ground.143    See his treatise, Against Marcion. Our present subject concerns the soul, and the point is to prevent the insidious ascription of a superiority to the intellect or understanding. Now, although the objects which are touched by the intellect are of a higher nature, since they are spiritual, than those which are embraced by the senses, since these are corporeal, it will still be only a superiority in the objects—as of lofty ones contrasted with humble—not in the faculties of the intellect against the senses. For how can the intellect be superior to the senses, when it is these which educate it for the discovery of various truths? It is a fact, that these truths are learned by means of palpable forms; in other words, invisible things are discovered by the help of visible ones, even as the apostle tells us in his epistle: “For the invisible things of Him are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made;”144    Rom. i. 20. and as Plato too might inform our heretics:  “The things which appear are the image145    Facies. of the things which are concealed from view,”146    Timæus, pp. 29, 30, 37, 38. whence it must needs follow that this world is by all means an image of some other: so that the intellect evidently uses the senses for its own guidance, and authority, and mainstay; and without the senses truth could not be attained.  How, then, can a thing be superior to that which is instrumental to its existence, which is also indispensable to it, and to whose help it owes everything which it acquires? Two conclusions therefore follow from what we have said: (1) That the intellect is not to be preferred above the senses, on the (supposed) ground that the agent through which a thing exists is inferior to the thing itself; and (2) that the intellect must not be separated from the senses, since the instrument by which a thing’s existence is sustained is associated with the thing itself.

CAPUT XVIII.

Convertor ad intellectualium partem, quemadmodum illam Plato a corporalibus separatam haereticis commendaverit, agnitionem ante mortem consecutus. 0677B Ait enim in Phaedone : Quid tum erga ipsam prudentiae possessionem? Utrumne impedimentum erit corpus, annon, si quis illud socium adsumpserit in quaestionem? Tale quid dico, habetne veritatem aliquam visio et auditio hominibus, annon? Annon etiam poetae haec nobis semper obmussant, quod neque audiamus certum, neque videamus? Meminerat scilicet et Epicharmi Comici: Animus cernit, animus audit, reliqua surda et caeca sunt. Itaque rursus, illum ergo ait supersapere, qui mente maxime sapiat, neque visionem proponens, neque ullum ejusmodi sensum attrahens animo, sed ipsa mente sincera utens in recogitando, ad capiendum sincerum quodque rerum, segressus potissimum ab oculis et auribus, et, quod dicendum sit, a toto corpore, ut turbante, et 0677C non permittente animae possidere veritatem atque prudentiam, quando communicat. Videmus igitur adversus sensus corporales aliam portendi paraturam, ut multo idoniorem, vires scilicet animae, intellectum operantes ejus veritatis, cujus res non sint coram, nec subjaceant corporalibus sensibus, sed absint longe a communi conscientia, in arcano, et in superioribus, 0678A et apud ipsum Deum. Vult enim Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporales, supermundiales, divinas et aeternas, quas appellat Ideas, id est formas, exempla, et caussas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus sensibus; et illas quidem esse veritates, haec autem imagines earum. Relucentne jam haeretica semina Gnosticorum et Valentinianorum? Hinc enim arripiunt differentiam corporalium sensuum, et intellectualium virium, quam etiam parabolae decem virginum (Matt. XXIV) adtemperant: ut quinque stultae sensus corporales figuraverint, stultos videlicet, quia deceptui faciles; sapientes autem intellectualium virium notam expresserint, sapientiam scilicet, quia contingentium veritatem illam arcanam et supernam, et apud pleroma constitutam, 0678B haereticarum idearum sacramenta: hoc enim sunt et aeones, et genealogiae illorum. Itaque et sensum dividunt: et intellectualibus quidem, a spiritali suo semine; sensualibus vero, ab animali, quia spiritalia nullo modo capiat; et illius quidem esse invisibilia, hujus vero visibilia, et humilia, et temporalia, quae sensu conveniantur, in imaginibus constituta. Ob haec ergo praestruximus neque animum aliud quid esse, quam animae suggestum et structum; neque spiritum extraneum quid, quam animae suggestum et structum; neque spiritum extraneum quid, quam quod et ipsa per flatum. Caeterum accessioni deputandum, quod aut Deus postea, aut diabolus adspiraret. Et nunc ad differentiam sensualium et intellectualium, non aliud admittimus, quam rerum diversitates, 0678C corporalium et spiritalium, visibilium et invisibilium, publicatarum et arcanarum; quod illae sensui, istae intellectui adtribuantur; apud animam tamen et istis et illis obsequio deputatis, quae perinde per corpus corporalia sentiat, quemadmodum per animum incorporalia intelligat, salvo eo, ut etiam sentiat dum intelligit. Non enim et sentire intelligere est, et intelligere 0679A sentire est? Aut quid erit sensus, nisi ejus rei quae sentitur intellectus? Quis erit intellectus, nisi ejus rei quae intelligitur sensus? Unde ista tormenta cruciandae simplicitatis, et suspendendae veritatis? Quis mihi exhibebit sensum non intelligentem quod sentit, aut intellectum non sentientem quod intelligit, ut probet alterum sine altero posse? Si corporalia quidem sentiuntur, incorporalia vero intelliguntur, rerum genera diversa sunt, non domicilia sensus et intellectus, id est, non anima et animus. Denique, a quo sentiuntur corporalia? Si ab animo, ergo jam et sensualis est animus, non tantum intellectualis: nam dum intelligit, sentit; quia si non sentit, nec intelligit. Si vero ab anima corporalia sentiuntur, jam ergo intellectualis est vis animae, 0679B non tantum sensualis: nam dum sentit, intelligit; quia si non intelligit, nec sentit. Proinde, a quo intelliguntur incorporalia? si ab animo, ubi erit anima? si ab anima, ubi erit animus? Quae enim distant, abesse invicem debent, cum suis muneribus operantur. Putabis quidem abesse animum ab anima, si quando animo ita afficimur, ut nesciamus nos vidisse quid, vel audisse, quia alibi fuerit animus; adeo contendam, imo ipsam animam nec vidisse, nec audisse, quia alibi fuerit cum sua vi, id est, animo. Nam et cum dementit homo, dementit anima, non peregrinante, sed compatiente tunc animo. Caeterum, animae principaliter casus est. Hoc inde firmatur, quod, anima digressa, nec animus in homine inveniatur: ita illam ubique sequitur, a qua nec in fine 0679C subremanet. Cum vero sequitur et addicitur, perinde intellectus animae addicitur, quam sequitur animus cui addicitur intellectus. Sit nunc et potior sensu intellectus, et potior cognitor sacramentorum: dummodo et ipse propria vis animae, quod et sensus, nihil mea interest, nisi cum idcirco praefertur sensui intellectus, ut ex hoc quoque separatior habeatur, 0680A quo potior adfirmatur. Tunc mihi post differentiam, etiam praelatio retundenda est, perventuro usque ad potioris Dei persuasionem. Sed de Deo, suo quoque campo, experiemur cum haereticis. Nunc de anima titulus, et intellectu non insidiose praeferendo locus. Nam etsi potiora sunt quae intellectu attinguntur, ut spiritalia, quam quae sensu, ut corporalia, rerum erit praelatio, sublimiorum scilicet adversus humiliores, non intellectus adversus sensum. Quomodo enim praeferatur sensui intellectus, a quo informatur ad cognitionem veritatum? Si enim veritates per imagines adprehenduntur, id est invisibilia per visibilia noscuntur, quia et Apostolus nobis scribit (Rom. I, 20): Invisibilia enim ejus a conditione mundi de factitamentis intellecta visuntur; et 0680B Plato haereticis: Facies occultorum, ea quae apparent; et necesse est omnino hunc mundum imaginem quamdam esse alterius alicujus. Videtur intellectus duce uti sensu, et auctore, et principali fundamento, nec sine illo veritates posse contingi: quomodo ergo potior erit eo per quem est, quo eget, cui debet totum quod attingit? Ita utrumque concluditur: neque praeferendum sensui intellectum; per quem enim quid constat, inferius ipso est; neque separandum a sensu: per quod enim quid est, cum ipso est.