Chap. XVIII.—Of the Punishment of Faults, that It Cannot Take Place Without Anger.

What need is there, they say, of anger, since faults can be corrected without this affection? But there is no one who can calmly see any one committing an offence. This may perhaps be possible in him who presides over the laws, because the deed is not committed before his eyes, but it is brought before him as a doubtful matter from another quarter. Nor can any wickedness be so manifest, that there is no place for a defence; and therefore it is possible that a judge may not be moved against him who may possibly be found to be innocent; and when the detected crime shall have come to light, he now no longer uses his own opinion, but that of the laws. It may be granted that he does that which he does without anger; for he has that which he may follow. We, undoubtedly, when an offence is committed by our household at home, whether we see or perceive it, must be indignant; for the very sight of a sin is unbecoming. For he who is altogether unmoved either approves of faults, which is more disgraceful and unjust, or avoids the trouble of reproving them, which a tranquil spirit and a quiet mind despises and refuses, unless anger shall have aroused and incited it. But when any one is moved, and yet through unseasonable leniency grants pardon more frequently than is necessary, or at all times, he evidently both destroys the life of those whose audacity he is fostering for greater crimes, and furnishes himself with a perpetual source of annoyances. Therefore the restraining of one’s anger in the case of sins is faulty.  

Archytas of Tarentum is praised, who, when he had found everything ruined128    Corrupta esse omnia.   on his estate, rebuking the fault of his bailiff, said, “Wretch, I would have beaten you to death if I had not been angry.” They consider this to be a singular example of forbearance; but influenced by authority, they do not see how foolishly he spoke and acted. For if (as Plato says) no prudent man punishes because there is an offence, but to prevent the occurrence of an offence, it is evident how evil an example this wise man put forth. For if slaves shall perceive that their master uses violence when he is not angry, and abstains from violence129    Parcere.   when he is angry, it is evident that they will not commit slight offences, lest they should be beaten; but will commit the greatest offences, that they may arouse the anger of the perverse man, and escape with impunity. But I should praise him if, when he was enraged, he had given space to his anger, that the excitement of his mind might calm down through the interval of time, and his chastisement might be confined within moderate limits. Therefore, on account of the magnitude of the anger, punishment ought not to have been inflicted, but to have been delayed, lest it should inflict130    Inureret, i.e., should burn in, or brand.   upon the offender pain greater than is just, or occasion an outburst of fury in the punisher. But how, how is it equitable or wise, that any one should be punished on account of a slight offence, and should be unpunished on account of a very great one? But if he had learned the nature and causes of things, he never would have professed so unsuitable a forbearance, that a wicked slave should rejoice that his master has been angry with him. For as God has furnished the human body with many and various senses which are necessary for the use of life, so also He has assigned to the soul various affections by which the course of life might be regulated; and as He has given desire for the sake of producing offspring, so has He given anger for the sake of restraining faults.  

But they who are ignorant of the ends of good and evil things, as they employ sensual desire for the purposes of corruption and pleasure, in the same manner make use of anger and passion for the inflicting of injury, while they are angry with those whom they regard with hatred. Therefore they are angry even with those who commit no offence, even with their equals, or even with their superiors. Hence they daily rush to monstrous131    Immania, i.e., of an inhuman character.   deeds; hence tragedies often arise. Therefore Archytas would be deserving of praise, if, when he had been enraged against any citizen or equal who injured him, he had curbed himself, and by forbearance mitigated the impetuosity of his fury. This self-restraint is glorious, by which any great evil which impends is restrained; but it is a fault not to check the faults of slaves and children; for through their escaping without punishment they will proceed to greater evil. In this case anger is not to be restrained; but even if it is in a state of inactivity,132    Jacet.   it must be aroused. But that which we say respecting man, we also say respecting God, who made man like to Himself. I omit making mention of the figure of God, because the Stoics say that God has no form, and another great subject will arise if we should wish to refute them. I only speak respecting the soul. If it belongs133    Deo subjacet.   to God to reflect, to be wise, to understand, to foresee. to excel, and of all animals man alone has these qualities, it follows that he was made after the likeness of God; but on this account he goes on to vice, because, being mingled with frailty derived from earth, he is unable to preserve pure and uncontaminated that which he has received from God, unless he is imbued with the precepts of justice by the same God.  

CAPUT XVIII. De peccatis vindicandis, sine ira fieri non posse.

Quid opus est, inquiunt, ira, cum sine hoc affectu peccata corrigi possint? Atqui nullus est, qui peccantem possit videre tranquille: possit fortasse, qui legibus praesidet, quia facinus non sub oculis ejus admittitur, sed defertur aliunde tanquam dubium, nec 0132A unquam potest esse scelus tam clarum, ut defensioni locus non sit; et ideo potest judex non moveri adversus eum, qui potest innocens inveniri. Cumque detectum facinus in lucem venerit, jam non sua, sed legum sententia utitur. Potest concedi, ut sine ira faciat, quod facit; habet enim quod sequatur. Nos certe, cum domi peccatur a nostris, sive id cernimus, sive sentimus, indignari necesse est; ipse enim peccati aspectus indignus est. Nam qui non movetur omnino, aut probat delicta, quod est turpius et injustius, aut molestiam castigandi fugit, quam sedatus animus et quieta mens aspernatur ac renuit, nisi stimulaverit ira et incitaverit. Qui autem cum moveatur, tamen intempestiva lenitate, vel saepius quam necesse est, vel etiam semper ignoscit, is plane et illorum 0132B vitam perdit, quorum audaciam nutrit ad facinora majora, et sibi ipsi aeternam molestiarum materiam subministrat. Vitiosa est ergo in peccatis irae suae cohibitio.

Laudatur Archytas Tarentinus, qui cum in agro corrupta esse omnia comperisset, villici sui culpam redarguens, Miserum te, inquit, quem jam verberibus necassem, nisi iratus essem. Unicum hoc exemplum temperantiae putant: sed auctoritate ducti non vident quam inepta et locutus fuerit, et fecerit. Nam si (ut ait Plato) nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur, apparet quam malum vir sapiens 0133A proposuerit exemplum. Si enim senserint servi dominum suum saevire cum non irascitur, tum parcere cum irascitur, non peccabunt utique leviter, ne verberentur; sed quantum poterunt gravissime, ut stomachum ejus incitent atque impune discedant. Ego vero laudarem, si cum fuisset iratus, dedisset irae suae spatium, ut residente per intervallum temporis animi tumore, haberet modum castigatio. Non ergo propter irae magnitudinem donanda erat poena, sed differenda, ne aut peccanti majorem justo dolorem inureret, aut castiganti furorem. Nunc vero quae tandem aequitas, aut quae sapientia est, ut aliquis ob exiguum delictum puniatur, ob maximum non puniatur? quod si naturam rerum causasque didicisset, nunquam tam importunam continentiam profiteretur, ut nequam servus iratum sibi fuisse dominum gratularetur. Nam 0133B sicut corpus humanum Deus multis et variis sensibus ad usum vitae necessariis instruxit, sic et animo varios attribuit affectus, quibus vitae ratio constaret, 0134A ut libidinem prodendae sobolis gratia dedit, sic iram cohibendorum causa delictorum.

Verum ii qui nesciunt fines bonorum ac malorum, sicut libidine utuntur ad corruptelas et ad voluptates, sic ira et affectu ad nocendum, dum iis quos odio habent irascuntur. Ergo etiam non peccantibus irascuntur, etiam paribus aut etiam superioribus. Hinc quotidie ad immania facinora prosilitur: hinc tragoediae saepe nascuntur. Esset igitur laudandus Archytas, si, cum alicui civi et pari facienti sibi injuriam fuisset iratus, repressisset se tamen et patientia furoris impetum mitigasset. Haec sui cohibitio gloriosa est, qua compescitur aliquod imminens magnum malum. Servorum autem filiorumque peccata non coercere, peccatum est; evadent enim ad majus malum per impunitatem. Hic non cohibenda ira, sed etiam, si jacet, 0134B excitanda est. Quod autem de homine dicimus, id etiam de Deo, qui hominem similem sui fecit. Omitto de figura Dei dicere, quia stoici negant habere ullam 0135A formam Deum; et ingens alia materia nascetur, si eos coarguere velimus: de animo tantum loquor. Si Deo subjacet cogitare, sapere, intelligere, providere, praestare, ex omnibus autem animalibus homo solus haec habet; ergo ad Dei similitudinem factus est: sed ideo procedit in vitium, quia de terrena fragilitate permistus, non potest id quod a Deo sumpsit, incorruptum purumque servare, nisi ab eodem Deo justitiae praeceptis imbuatur.