time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning; and just as there is nothing of the past in the future, so there is nothing of the future in the present. But if the now is and is present, but the future is not yet, neither being nor present, then the present now is not the beginning of the future time, but that which is to be the future now is the beginning of the future, which is neither some midpoint, having time on both sides, but on one side, nor a beginning and an end, the same now, but of different times, such as the beginning of the future and the end of the past; but one now is a beginning and another an end, but of the same time. Otherwise, if it is impossible for the now to be now, unless it was previously future and not-being, then it is impossible for the now to be co-eternal. For if everything that was previously not-being, but is later, is created, and the now is also such, then the now is created; and if the now is, then necessarily so is all time, of which the now is the beginning and the end; and if time is, then necessarily so is motion, of which time is the measure; and if motion is, then necessarily the moving body is also created. 42. From the same argument. But in general to think this principle is sufficient, that it is always so or comes to be so, is not to suppose correctly, to which Democritus traces the causes concerning nature, that it also came to be so previously. And he does not think it right to seek a beginning for that which is eternal, speaking correctly in some cases, but not correctly in all. For the triangle also always has its angles equal to two right angles, but nevertheless there is some other eternal cause of this eternity; of the principles, however, there is no cause, since they are eternal. If, therefore, as it comes to be now, so also it came to be previously, it is not correct to suppose a beginning for things that always come to be according to nature, then necessarily it is correct to suppose the beginning of things that come to be according to nature is that which has not come to be so as it comes to be now, but otherwise; wherefore it is just to seek the beginning even of that which always comes to be. An animal comes to be from an animal in one way, and an animal has come to be from a non-animal in another way; and the animal from a non-animal has neither come to be according to nature nor does it always come to be, but the animal from an animal comes to be both always and according to nature, from which it took its beginning of coming to be from an animal that was not from an animal. And this is so for all things that always come to be according to nature, not only for some; for it is impossible for things from created beginnings to have the same generation that the beginnings had. Eternity in created things cannot be without a beginning. For the triangle also always has its three angles equal to two right angles, having as its created beginning the straight line, whose definition is a line stretched to the utmost. For this is the cause of the triangle having its three angles equal to two right angles; and if this does not exist it is not possible for a triangle to exist, but if a triangle does not exist it is possible

νεσθαι χρόνος, οὕτως γέγονε καὶ ὁ παρελθών. Ἀλλ' ὁ μέλλων γίνεσθαι χρόνος, ὥσπερ τὴν μέλλουσαν γένεσιν ἔχει, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν· καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲν τοῦ παρελθόντος ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, οὕτως οὐδὲν τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ νῦν ὄν ἐστι καὶ πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μέλλον οὔπω ἐστὶν οὔτε ὂν οὔτε παρόν, οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ παρὸν νῦν ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι νῦν ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὃ οὔτε μεσότης τις ἐστίν, ἔχον ἐπ' ἀμφότερα χρόνον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ θάτερον, οὔτε ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν νῦν, ἄλλου δὲ καὶ ἄλλου χρόνου, οἷον ἀρχὴ μὲν τοῦ μέλλοντος, τελευτὴ δὲ τοῦ παρελθόντος· ἀλλ' ἄλλο μὲν νῦν ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλο τελευτή, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ χρόνου. Ἄλλως δὲ εἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ νῦν εἶναι νῦν, ἐὰν μὴ πρότερον ᾖ μέλλον καὶ οὐκ ὄν, ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ νῦν συναΐδιον εἶναι. Eἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ πρότερον οὐκ ὄν, ὕστερον δέ, γενητὸν τοῦτο, τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν, γενητὸν ἄρα τὸ νῦν· εἰ δὲ τὸ νῦν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὁ πᾶς χρόνος, οὗ ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ νῦν· καὶ εἰ ὁ χρόνος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἡ κίνησις, ἧς ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός· καὶ εἰ ἡ κίνησις, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμά ἐστι γενητόν. μβ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ νομίζειν ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἱκανήν, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἔστιν οὕτως ἢ γίνεται, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν, ἐφ' ὃ ∆ημόκριτος ἀνάγει τὰς περὶ φύσεως αἰτίας, ὅτι οὕτως καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγίνετο· τοῦ δὲ ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀξιοῖ ἀρχὴν ζητεῖν, λέγων ἐπί τινων ὀρθῶς, ὅτι δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἀεὶ τὰς γωνίας ἴσας, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστί τι τῆς ἀϊδιότητος ταύτης ἕτε ρον αἴτιον ἀΐδιον· τῶν μέντοι ἀρχῶν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον ἀϊδίων οὐσῶν. Eἰ τοίνυν ὡς γίνεται νῦν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγί νετο, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένων τὸ μὴ οὕτως γεγονός, ὡς τὸ νῦν γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἑτέρως· διὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ γινομένου ζητεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. Ἄλλως γίνεται ζῶον ἐκ ζώου, καὶ ἄλλως γέγονε ζῶον ἐκ μὴ ζώου· καὶ τὸ μὲν ζῶον ἐκ μὴ ζώου οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν γέγονεν οὔτε ἀεὶ γίνεται, τὸ δὲ ζῶον ἐκ ζώου ἀεί τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γίνεται, ἐξ ὅτου ἔλαβεν ἀρχὴν τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐκ ζώου τοῦ μὴ ἐκ ζώου. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένων, οὐκ ἐπὶ τινῶν μόνον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῶν γενητῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν γένεσιν, ἣν ἐσχήκασιν αἱ ἀρχαί. Ἡ ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς ἀϊ διότης ἄναρχος εἶναι οὐ δύναται. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τρίγωνον ἀεὶ ταῖς δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας, ἀρχὴν ἔχον γενητὴν τὴν εὐθεῖαν, ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ γραμμὴ ἄκρως τετα μένη. Aὕτη γάρ ἐστιν αἰτία τοῦ τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρ θαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας· καὶ ταύτης μὲν οὐκ οὔσης οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τρίγωνον, τριγώνου δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἐνδέχεται