OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but having made one world he ceased the making, so God is beyond reproach for the incompleteness of power, because he did not make the world at the same time as he himself was, but when he willed. The self-brought-forth differs in no way from the self-generated; but if God is self-brought-forth and the world is self-brought-forth, both God and the world will be self-generated. If, just as we see the curdling happen to the milk all at once, so being comes to the world all at once, then the world is generated and changeable from non-substance into substance; for "comes to be" indicates "to be generated." If God is self-brought-forth and the world is self-brought-forth, the self-bringing-forth of each will be the beginning of the existence of each. How then are God and the world without beginning and eternal, having their own self-bringings-forth as the beginnings of their own existence? "Self-brought-forth" has the meaning of production, of that which is produced from itself. But since everything that is produced is produced either by its presence according to a transition from place to place, or by its substance is produced according to a making that leads from non-existence into existence, and none of these apply to God, it is clear that the respondent did not correctly name him self-brought-forth; for the self-brought-forth differs in no way from the other-brought-forth in being brought forth at all. If it is impossible for the ungenerated to be created, it is impossible for the world to be ungenerated and for God to have created it. But if the world differs from God in being created, of necessity it also differs in being generated; for the world is created, but God is uncreated. If that which co-exists with the ungenerated by a necessity of nature is uncreated, how then is it not false that "God made a created world," it being uncreated and ungenerated according to him? If the world is self-brought-forth and not created, of necessity it is also self-made. The self-generated and self-made differs in no way from the self-brought-forth. But if both God and the world are self-brought-forth, they will be self-generated and self-made. But if this is absurd, then it is also absurd to say that the God who is without beginning and eternal is self-brought-forth, and that the created world is ungenerated and self-brought-forth. If the world is self-brought-forth, it is not God-brought-forth; and if not God-brought-forth, neither did God bring it forth. How then is the respondent, when he says that God brings forth, but the world is self-brought-forth, not saying things that are false and incompatible? "Much more, then," he says, "must one think that God makes all things at once and without time, being himself one, but by the infinity of his power bringing forth different things, and these being completely self-brought-forth." And if "to make" is equivalent in meaning to "will make," how does he who removes from God "will make," as having the sense of future time, now apply to him "to make," which has the same sense of time? But if, along with the sense of future time, "to make" also has [the sense] of the pres

πρῶτα γὰρ τὰ ἁπλᾶ, ὕστερον δὲ τὰ σύνθετα. Ὥσπερ ἀδιά βλητος ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὴ ποιή σας πλείους κόσμους, ἀλλὰ ποιήσας ἕνα κόσμον ἔπαυσε τὴν ποίησιν, οὕτως ἀδιάβλητος ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τῷ ἀτελεῖ τῆς δυνά μεως, ὅτι μὴ ἅμα τῷ εἶναι αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ὅτε ἐβούλετο. Oὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ αὐτοπάρακτον τοῦ αὐτο γενοῦς· ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτοπάρακτος ὁ θεὸς καὶ αὐτοπάρακτος ὁ κόσμος, ἔσονται αὐτογένητοι ὅ τε θεὸς καὶ ὁ κόσμος. Eἰ, ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν ἀθρόως τὴν πῆξιν τῷ γάλακτι παραγινομέ νην, οὕτως ἀθρόως παραγίνεται τῷ κόσμῳ τὸ εἶναι, γε νητὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος καὶ μεταβλητὸς ἐκ τοῦ ἀνουσίου εἰς οὐσίαν· τὸ γὰρ παραγίνεται τὸ γενέσθαι δηλοῖ. Eἰ αὐτο πάρακτος ὁ θεὸς καὶ αὐτοπάρακτος ὁ κόσμος, ἡ αὐτοπαραξία ἑκατέρου ἑκατέρου ἔσται ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑπάρξεως. Πῶς οὖν ἄναρ χος καὶ ἀΐδιος ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ κόσμος, τὰς αὐτοπαραξίας ἔχον τες αὑτῶν ἀρχὰς τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὑτῶν; Τὸ αὐτοπάρακτον παραγωγῆς ἔχει σημασίαν τοῦ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ παραγομένου. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ παραγόμενον ἢ τῇ παρουσίᾳ παράγεται κατὰ μετάστασιν ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, ἢ τῇ οὐσίᾳ παράγεται κατὰ ποίησιν ἄγουσαν ἐκ τῆς ἀνυπαρξίας εἰς ὕπαρξιν, μηδὲν δὲ τούτων πρόσεστι τῷ θεῷ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ὠνόμασεν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος αὐτοπάρακτον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτοπά ρακτον τοῦ ἑτεροπαράκτου τῷ ὅλως αὐτοπαράκτῳ οὐδὲν δια φέρει. Eἰ ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ ἀγένητον ποιητόν, ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ἀγένητον καὶ τὸν ποιήσαντα αὐτὸν θεόν. Eἰ δὲ τῷ ποιητῷ διαφέρει ὁ κόσμος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τῷ γενητῷ διαφέρει· ποιητὸς γὰρ ὁ κόσμος, ἀποίητος δὲ ὁ θεός. Eἰ ὁ φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ τῷ ἀγενήτῳ συνυφιστάμενος ἀποίητός ἐστι, πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ Ἐποίησε ποιητὸν κόσμον ὁ θεός, ἀποίητον ὄντα καὶ ἀγένητον κατ' αὐτόν; Eἰ αὐτοπάρακτός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος καὶ οὐ ποιητός, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αὐτοποίητός ἐστιν. Τοῦ αὐτοπαράκτου τὸ αὐτογένητον καὶ αὐτοποίητον οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτοπάρακτος ὅ τε θεὸς καὶ ὁ κόσμος, αὐτογένητοι καὶ αὐτοποίητοι ἔσον ται. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν αὐτο πάρακτον μὲν τὸν ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀΐδιον θεόν, ἀγένητον δὲ καὶ αὐτοπάρακτον τὸν ποιητὸν κόσμον. Eἰ αὐτοπάρακτός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, οὐκ ἔστι θεοπάρακτος· καὶ εἰ μὴ θεοπά ρακτος, οὐδὲ παρήγαγεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός. Πῶς οὖν ὁ ἀποκρι νάμενος, ὅταν λέγῃ προάγοντα μὲν τὸν θεόν, αὐτοπάρακτον δὲ τὸν κόσμον, οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀσύμβατα λέγων; Πολλῷ τοίνυν, φησί, τὸν θεὸν μᾶλλον οἰητέον ἀθρόως καὶ ἀχρόνως πάντα ποιεῖν, αὐτὸν μὲν ὄντα ἕν, τῇ δὲ ἀπειρίᾳ τῆς δυνά μεως τὰ διάφορα προάγοντα, καὶ αὐτὰ παντελῶς αὐτοπά ρακτα τυγχάνοντα. Καὶ εἰ ἰσοδυναμεῖ τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ ποιή σειν, πῶς ὁ ἀναιρῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ποιήσειν, ὡς ἔμφασιν μὲν ἔχον τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου, νῦν τίθησιν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον τοῦ χρόνου ἔμφασιν; Eἰ δὲ σὺν τῇ ἐμφάσει τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου ἔχει τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ παρ