Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

set apart; and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things; and if it unfolds the powers within it, yet it has something insurmountable through union, coiled together, transcending their unfolding. But that which contains and defines itself would not be infinite to itself; nor much more to those superior to it, having a share of the infinity in them; for the powers of more universal things are more infinite, being more universal and ranked nearer to the primary infinity. 94 All eternity is a kind of infinity; but not all infinity is eternity. For many infinite things do not have infinity because they are eternal, as for example infinity in respect of quantity and infinity in respect of magnitude and the infinity of matter and whatever else is of such a kind, being infinite either because it is impassable or because of the indefiniteness of its substance. That eternity is infinity is clear; for that which never fails is infinite; and this is the eternal, having its hypostasis unfailing. Therefore, infinity is prior to eternity; for that which is constitutive of more things and more universal is more causal. Therefore, the first infinity is beyond eternity [and self-infinity is prior to eternity]. 95 Every power that is more unified than that which is multiplied is more infinite. For if the first infinity is nearest to the one, then of powers, that which is more akin to the one is more greatly infinite than that which departs from it; for being multiplied it loses its unicity, in which, by remaining, it had its superiority to others, being held together through its indivisibility. For even in divisible things, powers when brought together are multiplied, but when divided are obscured. 96 The power of every finite body, being infinite, is incorporeal. For if it were corporeal, if this body were infinite, there would be an infinite in a finite. But if it is finite, it is not then insofar as it is a body that it is a power; for if, as body, it is finite, but as power, infinite, it will not be power insofar as it is body. Therefore, the infinite power present in a finite body is incorporeal. 97 Every ruling cause in each series imparts its own property to the entire series; and what that cause is primarily, this the series is in a secondary degree. For if it leads the whole series, and all coordinate things are ordered with reference to it, it is surely clear that it gives to all the one form, according to which they are ordered under the same series. For either all things have participated in the likeness to it without a cause, or from it comes the sameness in all. But 'without a cause' is impossible; for 'without a cause' is also 'spontaneous'; but the spontaneous could never occur in things where there is order and sequence and that which is always in the same way. Therefore from that cause the whole series receives the property of that cause's hypostasis. And if from it, it is manifest that this is with a remission and the subordination appropriate to secondary things. For either the property exists similarly both in the leader and in the others—and how then does one lead, while the others have received their hypostasis after it? —or dissimilarly; and if this, it is clear that from the one comes the sameness to the multitude, but not the reverse, and the distinctive property of the series, which pre-exists primarily in the one, exists secondarily in the multitude. 98 Every separate cause is everywhere and nowhere at the same time. For by the impartation of its own power it is everywhere; for this is a cause, that which fills things naturally disposed to partake of it and is the principle of all secondary things and is present to all by the fertile processions of its illuminations. But by its substance which is unmixed with things in place and by its transcendent purity it is nowhere; for if it is separate from its effects, it is established above all things in like manner and is in none of the things inferior to itself. For if it were only everywhere, it would not be prevented from being a cause and being in all its participants, but it would not be separately before all things; or if it were nowhere, apart from being everywhere, it would not be prevented from being before all things and being none of the inferior things, but it would not be in all things as causes are naturally in their effects, by their own ungrudging impartations. Therefore, in order that, being a cause, it may be in all things that can participate, and being separate, it may be by itself before all things that are filled by it, it is everywhere and nowhere at the same time. And not partly everywhere, partly

ἐξῃρημένον· κἂν εἰσίῃ πάντα εἰς αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἔχει τι κρύφιον τοῖς δευτέροις καὶ ἀκατάληπτον· κἂν ἐξελίττῃ τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ἔχει τι δι' ἕνωσιν ἀνυπέρβλητον, συνεσπειραμένον, ἐκβεβηκὸς τῆς ἐκείνων ἀνελίξεως. ἑαυτὸ δὲ συνέχον καὶ ὁρίζον οὐκ ἂν ἑαυτῷ ἄπειρον ὑπάρχοι· οὐδὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον τοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις, μοῖραν ἔχον τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀπειρίας· ἀπειρότεραι γὰρ αἱ τῶν ὁλικωτέρων δυνάμεις, ὁλικώτεραι οὖσαι καὶ ἐγγυτέρω τεταγμέναι τῆς πρωτίστης ἀπειρίας. 94 Πᾶσα μὲν ἀϊδιότης ἀπειρία τίς ἐστιν· οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀπειρία ἀϊδιότης. πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀπείρων οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἔχει τὸ ἄπειρον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀπειρία καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ πηλίκον καὶ ἡ τῆς ὕλης ἀπειρία καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀδιεξίτητον ἄπειρον ὑπάρχον ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς οὐσίας. ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἀϊδιότης ἀπειρία δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ μηδέποτε ἐπιλεῖπον ἄπειρον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀεί, τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀνέκλειπτον ἔχον. ἡ ἄρα ἀπειρία πρὸ τῆς ἀϊδιότητός ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ πλειόνων ὑποστατικὸν καὶ ὁλικώτερον αἰτιώτερόν ἐστιν. ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τοῦ αἰῶνος ἡ πρώτη ἀπειρία [καὶ ἡ αὐτοαπειρία πρὸ αἰῶνος]. 95 Πᾶσα δύναμις ἑνικωτέρα οὖσα τῆς πληθυνομένης ἀπει ροτέρα. εἰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη ἀπειρία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐγγυτάτω, καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἡ τῷ ἑνὶ συγγενεστέρα τῆς ἀφισταμένης ἐκείνου μειζόνως ἄπειρος· πληθυνομένη γὰρ ἀπόλλυσι τὸ ἑνοειδές, ἐν ᾧ μένουσα τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας εἶχεν ὑπεροχήν, συνεχομένη διὰ τὴν ἀμέρειαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεριστοῖς αἱ δυνάμεις συναγόμεναι μὲν πολλαπλασιάζονται, μεριζόμεναι δὲ ἀμυδροῦνται. 96 Παντὸς πεπερασμένου σώματος ἡ δύναμις, ἄπειρος οὖσα, ἀσώματός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ σωματική, εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο ἄπειρον, ἔσται ἐν πεπερασμένῳ ἄπειρον. εἰ δὲ πεπερασμένον, οὐ καθὸ σῶμα ἄρα, κατὰ τοῦτο δύναμίς ἐστιν· εἰ γάρ, ᾗ σῶμα, πεπέρασται, ᾗ δὲ δύναμις, ἄπειρος, οὐκ ἔσται, καθὸ σῶμα, δύναμις. ἀσώματος ἄρα ἡ ἐν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ σώματι δύναμις ἐνοῦσα ἄπειρος. 97 Πᾶν τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην σειρὰν ἀρχικὸν αἴτιον τῇ σειρᾷ πάσῃ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ μεταδίδωσιν ἰδιότητος· καὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο πρώτως, τοῦτό ἐστιν αὔτη καθ' ὕφεσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἡγεῖται τῆς ὅλης σειρᾶς, καὶ πάντα τὰ σύστοιχα πρὸς αὐτὸ συντέτακται, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι πᾶσι τὴν μίαν ἰδέαν, καθ' ἣν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν τέτακται σειράν, ἐκεῖνο δίδωσιν. ἢ γὰρ ἀναιτίως πάντα τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο μετέσχεν ὁμοιότητος ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὸ ταὐτὸν ἐν πᾶσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀναιτίως ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀναιτίως καὶ αὐτόματον· τὸ δὲ αὐτόματον ἐν οἷς τάξις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλλη λουχία καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἄρα τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς ἐκείνου ὑποστάσεως πᾶσα δέχεται ἡ σειρά. εἰ δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, φανερὸν ὅτι μετὰ ὑφέσεως καὶ τῆς προσ ηκούσης τοῖς δευτέροις ὑποβάσεως. ἢ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔν τε τῷ ἡγουμένῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ ἰδιότης ὑπάρχει-καὶ πῶς ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἡγεῖται, τὰ δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνο τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλαχεν; -ἢ ἀνομοίως· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὡς ἀφ' ἑνὸς τῷ πλήθει τὸ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔμπαλιν, καὶ δευτέρως ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πλήθει τὸ πρώτως ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ προϋπάρχον ἰδίωμα τῆς σειρᾶς ἐξαίρετον. 98 Πᾶν αἴτιον χωριστὸν πανταχοῦ ἐστιν ἅμα καὶ οὐδαμοῦ. τῇ μὲν γὰρ μεταδόσει τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεώς ἐστι πανταχοῦ· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον, τὸ πληρωτικὸν τῶν μεταλαγχάνειν αὐτοῦ πεφυκότων καὶ ἀρχικὸν τῶν δευτέρων πάντων καὶ παρὸν πᾶσι ταῖς τῶν ἐλλάμψεων γονίμοις προόδοις. τῇ δὲ ἀμίκτῳ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐξῃρημένῃ καθαρότητι οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ χωριστόν ἐστι τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων, ὑπερίδρυται πάντων ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν οὐδενί ἐστι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ καταδεεστέρων. εἴτε γὰρ πανταχοῦ μόνον ἦν, αἴτιον μὲν εἶναι οὐκ ἐκωλύετο καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι τοῖς μετέχουσι, πρὸ πάντων δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἦν χωριστῶς· εἴτε οὐδαμοῦ, τοῦ πανταχοῦ χωρίς, πρὸ πάντων μὲν εἶναι οὐκ ἐκωλύετο καὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων, ἐν πᾶσι δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἦν ὡς τὰ αἴτια πέφυκεν ἐν τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς εἶναι, ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀφθόνοις μεταδόσεσιν. ἵν' οὖν καὶ αἴτιον ὑπάρχον ἐν πᾶσιν ᾖ τοῖς δυναμένοις μετέχειν, καὶ χωριστὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸ πάντων ᾖ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πληρουμένων, πανταχοῦ ἐστιν ἅμα καὶ οὐδαμοῦ. καὶ οὐ μέρει μὲν πανταχοῦ, μέρει