ARTICLE III

In the Third Article We Ask: DOES GOD KNOW THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF?

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

1. The known is a perfection of the knower. But nothing distinct from God Himself can be His perfection; otherwise, something would be more noble than He is. Therefore, He can know nothing distinct from Himself.

2. But it was said that in so far as a thing or creature is known by God, it is one with Him.--On the contrary, a creature is one with God only inasmuch as it is in Him. Hence, if God knows a creature only as it is one with Him, He will know it only as it is in Him, and not as it is in its own nature.

3. If the divine intellect knows a creature, it knows it either through its essence or through something extrinsic. If it knows it through some extrinsic medium, then, since every medium of knowing is a perfection of the knower, because it is his form as knower (as is evident of the species of a stone in the pupil of the eye), it would follow that something extrinsic to God would be one of His perfections. But this is absurd. On the other hand, if He knows a creature through His own essence, since His essence is something distinct from the creature, it will follow that from knowing one thing He will know another. Now, every intellect that knows one thing from another is one which discourses and reasons. Consequently, there is discursive thought in the divine intellect, and, therefore, imperfection. But this is absurd.

4. The medium through which a thing is known ought to be proportionate to that which is known through it. But the divine essence is not proportionate to a creature since it infinitely surpasses it, and there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite. Therefore, by knowing His own essence, God cannot know a creature.

5. The Philosopher proves that God knows only Himself. Now, only means "not with something else." Therefore, He does not know things other than Himself.

6. If God knows things other than Himself, since He knows Himself, He knows either Himself and other things also under the same formal aspect or Himself under one formal aspect and other things under another. If He knows both under the same formal aspect, then, since He knows Himself through His own essence, it follows that He knows other things through their essence. But this is impossible. However, if He knows one under one formal aspect and the other under another, then, since the knowledge of the knower is specified by the formal aspect under which the thing is known, there would be multiplicity and diversity in the divine cognition; but this is repugnant to the divine simplicity. Therefore, God does not know a creature in any way whatsoever.

7. A creature is farther removed from God than the person of the Father is from the nature of the Godhead. But God does not know that He is God in the same act that He knows that He is the Father, for, when it is said that He knows He is the Father, the notion of Father is included, which is not included in the statement, "He knows that He is God." Much more is it true, then, that, if God knows a creature, He will know Himself under a different formality than that under which He will know the creature. This, however, would be absurd, as is proved above in the sixth difficulty.

8. The principles of being and of knowing are the same. But, as Augustine says, the Father is not the Father by the same principle that He is God. Therefore, the Father does not know that He is the Father by the same principle that He knows He is God, and much more so the Father does not know Himself and a creature by the same principle--if He does know any creatures.

9. Knowledge is an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But the least possible likeness exists between God and a creature. Therefore, God has the least possible knowledge, or none at all, of creatures.

10. Whatever God knows He beholds. But, as Augustine says: "God does not behold anything outside Himself." Therefore, He does not know anything outside Himself.

11. A creature is compared to God as a point to a line. Hence, Trismegistus says: "God is an intelligible sphere, whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference is nowhere"; and by its center, as Alanus explains, he means a creature. Now, a line loses none of its quantity if a point is taken from it. Hence, the divine perfection loses none of its perfection if knowledge of a creature is taken from it. But whatever is in God pertains to His perfection, since nothing is in Him as an accident. Consequently, He does not have any knowledge of creatures.

12. Whatever God knows He knows from eternity, since His knowledge does not vary. Now, whatever He knows is a being, for knowledge is only of being. Hence, whatever He knows existed from eternity. But no creature existed from eternity. Consequently, He knows no creature.

13. Whatever is perfected by something else has a passive potency in regard to that thing, because perfection is, as it were, a form of that which is perfected. But God does not have any passive potency in Himself, for this is a principle of change, which is far removed from God. Therefore, God is not perfected by anything other than Himself. Now, the perfection of a knower depends on the object of his knowledge, for his perfection consists in his actual knowing; and this is only something that can be known. Therefore, God does not know anything other than Himself.

14. As is said in the Metaphysics, "The mover is prior by nature to what is moved." But, as is said in the same place, just as the object of sense moves the sense, so the object of the intellect moves the intellect. Therefore, if God were to know something other than Himself, it would follow that something were prior to Him. But this is absurd.

15. Whatever is known causes some delight in the knower. Hence, it is said in the Metaphysics: "All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is the delight of the senses . . ." as some books have this passage. If, therefore, God knew something other than Himself, that something would be a cause of delight in Him. But this is absurd.

16. Nothing is known except through the nature of being. But a creature possesses more non-existence than existence, as is evident from Ambrose and from the sayings of many saints. Hence, a creature is more unknown than known to God.

17. Nothing is apprehended unless it has the character of truth, just as nothing is desired unless it has the character of goodness. But in Scripture visible creatures are compared to lies, as is evident in Ecclesiasticus (34:2): "The man that giveth heed to lying visions is like to him that catcheth at a shadow and followeth after the wind." Therefore, creatures are more unknown than known.

18. However, it was noted that a creature is said to be a non-being only in comparison with God.--On the contrary, a creature is known by God only in so far as it is compared with Him. Therefore, if a creature, as compared with God, is a lie and a non-being, then it is unknowable and cannot be known by God in any way whatsoever.

19. Nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in sense. But in God there is no sensitive cognition, because this is material. Therefore, He does not know created things, since they were not previously in His sense.

20. Things are known most thoroughly by a knowledge of their causes, especially of those that are the cause of the thing's act of existence. But of the four causes, the efficient and final are the causes of a thing's becoming. Form and matter, however, are causes of a thing's existence because they enter into the thing's constitution. God, however, is only the efficient and final cause of things; hence, what He knows about creatures is very little.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Epistle to the Hebrews (4:13) says: "All things are naked and open to his eyes . . . "

2'. When one of two related things is known, the other is known. But a principle and that which arises from the principle are said to be related. Therefore, since God is the principle of things through His essence, by knowing His essence He knows creatures.

3'. God is omnipotent. For the same reasons, He should be said to be omniscient. Hence, He knows not only delightful but also useful things.

4'. Anaxagoras affirmed the existence of an intellect that was unmixed so that it could know all things; and for this he is praised by the Philosopher. But the divine intellect is unmixed and pure in the highest possible degree. Therefore, God knows all things in the highest possible degree, not only Himself but things other than Himself.

5'. The more simple a substance is, the more it can comprehend a number of forms. Now, God is the most simple substance there is. Hence, He can comprehend the forms of all things, and consequently He knows all things, not merely Himself.

6'. A cause always contains the perfection of its effect in a higher degree. But God is the cause of knowing for all who know; for He is the "light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" (John 1:9). Therefore, He knows creatures in the highest possible degree.

7'. Augustine proves that nothing is loved unless it is known. But God "loveth all things that are" (Wisdom 11:25). Hence, He knows all things.

8'. The Psalmist asks rhetorically: "He that formed the eye, doth he not consider?" (Psalms 93:9), implying the answer "Yes." Consequently, God Himself, who has made all things, considers and knows all things.

9'. The following is also found in the Psalms (32:15): "He who hath made the hearts of every one of them: who understandeth all their works." Now, the person referred to is God, the maker of hearts. Therefore, He knows the works of men, and thus things other than Himself.

10'. The same conclusion must be drawn from what is said elsewhere in the Psalms (135:5): "Who made the heavens in understanding"; for, as the Psalmist says, He knew the heavens which He created.

11'. When a cause, especially a formal cause, is known, the effect is known. Now, God is the formal exemplary cause of creatures. Therefore, since He knows Himself, He also knows creatures.

REPLY:

Undoubtedly, it must be granted that God knows not only Himself but also all other things. This can be proved in the following manner. Whatever naturally tends toward another must have this tendency from someone directing it toward its end; otherwise, it would tend toward it merely by chance. Now, in the things of nature we find a natural appetite by which each and every thing tends toward its end. Hence, we must affirm the existence of some intellect above natural things, which has ordained natural things to their end and implanted in them a natural appetite or inclination. But a thing cannot be ordained to any end unless the thing itself is known, together with the end to which it is ordained. Hence, there must be a knowledge of natural things in the divine intellect from which the origin and the order of nature come. The Psalmist suggests this proof when he says: "He that formed the eye, doth he not consider?" (Psalms 93:9); for, as Rabbi Moses points out, it is as if the Psalmist had said: "Does He not consider the nature of the eye--who has made it to be proportioned to its end, which is its act of seeing?" But now we must further consider the manner by which He knows creatures.

It should be understood, therefore, that, since every agent acts to the extent that it is in act, that which is effected by the agent must in some way exist in the agent. This is the reason why every agent causes something similar to itself. Now, whatever is in another is in it according to the manner of the recipient. Hence, if the active principle is material, the effect is in it somehow materially, because it is, as it were, in a material power. If the active principle is immaterial, however, its effect will also be in it immaterially.

Now, as we have said earlier, a thing is known by another in so far as it is received immaterially by that other. Consequently, active material principles do not know their effects, because these latter do not exist in them in a manner in which they could be known; but in immaterial active principles the effects are present in a manner in which they are knowable, since they are there immaterially. Therefore, every immaterial active principle knows its own effect. This is why it is said in The Causes: "An intelligence knows what is below it in so far as it is its cause." Therefore, since God is the immaterial active principle of things, it follows that in Him there is knowledge of things.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The known is a perfection of the knower, not by its substance (for the thing is outside the knower), but rather by the likeness by which it is known; for a perfection exists in the perfected--and the likeness of the stone, not the stone, exists in the soul. Now, the likeness of the thing known exists in the intellect in two ways: sometimes as something other than the knower himself, at other times as the very essence of the knower. For example, our intellect, by knowing itself, knows other intellects in so far as it is itself a likeness of other intellects; but the likeness of a stone in the intellect is not the very essence of intellect; in fact, this likeness is received somewhat as a form is received in matter. Now, this form, which is other than the intellect, is sometimes the cause of the thing whose likeness it is. We have an evident example of this in the practical intellect, whose form is the cause of the thing done. But sometimes this form is the effect of the thing, as is clearly the case with our speculative intellect when it receives its knowledge from things.

Therefore, whenever an intellect knows a thing through a likeness which is not the essence of the knower, then the intellect is perfected by something other than itself; but if that likeness should happen to be the cause of the thing, in that case the intellect will be perfected only by the likeness, and not at all by the thing whose likeness it is. For example, a house is not the perfection of the artistic conception, but rather the contrary. On the other hand, if the likeness is caused by the thing, then the perfection of the intellect will be, as it were, the thing in an active sense, but its likeness in a formal sense. However, when the likeness of the thing known is the very essence of the knower, the intellect is not perfected by something other than itself--except, perhaps, actively, as would be the case if its essence were produced by another. But because the knowledge of the divine intellect is not caused by things and neither the likeness by which it knows the thing nor its own essence is caused by another, it by no means follows from the fact that God knows things other than Himself that His intellect is perfected by something else.

2. God does not know other things only inasmuch as they exist in Him, if inasmuch as refers to His knowledge from the point of view of the thing known, because, in regard to things, He knows not only the act of being which they have inasmuch as they are one with Him, but also the act of being which they have outside of Him, and by which they are distinguished from Him. However, if inasmuch as specifies His knowledge from the point of view of the knower, then it is true that God knows things only inasmuch as they are in Him; for He knows them from their likeness, which is identical in reality with Himself.

3. The manner in which God knows creatures is by their existence within Himself. An effect existing in any efficient cause whatsoever is not other than that cause if there is question of a thing which is a cause in itself. For example, a house existing in the conception of the artist is not other than that conception itself; for an effect is in an active principle simply inasmuch as the active principle produces an effect similar to itself, and this active principle is the very thing by which the artist acts. Consequently, if some active principle acts only through its form, its effect is in it in so far as it has that form, and its effect will not exist in the principle as something distinct from its form. Similarly, since God acts through His essence, His effect is not in Him as something distinct from His essence; but it is entirely one with it. Therefore, His knowledge of an effect is not distinct from His own essence.

Nevertheless, from the fact that He knows His effect by knowing His own essence, it does not follow that there is any discursive reasoning in His intellect; for an intellect is said to reason from one thing to another only if it apprehends each by distinct apprehensions. Thus, the human intellect apprehends a cause and an effect by distinct acts; and since it knows an effect through its cause, it is said to reason from the cause to the effect. When, however, the knowing power is directed by the same act to the medium by which it knows and to the thing known, then there is no discursive process in knowing. For example, when sight knows a stone by means of the species of stone in this sense, or when it knows by means of a mirror a thing reflected in the mirror, it is not said to reason discursively; for to be directed to the likeness of a thing is the same as to be directed to the thing which is known through this likeness. It is in this manner that God knows His effects through His essence--just as a thing is known through its likeness. Therefore, with one cognition He knows Himself and other things. Dionysius agrees when he speaks as follows: "God does not have a proper knowledge of Himself and another general knowledge that comprehends all existing things." Consequently, there is no discourse in God's intellect.

4. A thing is said to be proportionate to another in two ways. In one way, a proportion is noted between the two things. For example, we say that four is proportioned to two since its proportion to two is double. In the second way, they are proportioned as by a proportionality. For example, we say that six and eight are proportionate because, just as six is the double of three, so eight is the double of four; for proportionality is a similarity of proportions. Now, since in every proportion a relation is noted between those things that are said to be proportioned because of some definite excess of one over the other, it is impossible for any infinite to be proportionate to a finite by way of proportion. When, however, things are said to be proportionate by way of proportionality, their relation to each other is not considered. All that is considered is the similarity of the relation of two things to two other things. Thus, nothing prevents an infinite from being proportionate to an infinite; for, just as a particular finite is equal to a certain finite, so an infinite is equal to another infinite. In this way, there should be a medium that is proportionate to that which is known by the medium. Consequently, just as the medium is related to the act of demonstrating, so that which is known through the medium is related to the act of being demonstrated. Thus, nothing prevents the divine essence from being the medium by which a creature is known.

5. A thing is understood intellectually in two ways. First, it is understood in itself, as happens when the regard of the beholder is shaped directly by the thing itself, which is understood or known. Second, a thing is seen in something else; and, when this latter is known, it itself is known. God, therefore, knows only Himself in Himself; but He does not know other things in themselves except by knowing His own essence. This is what the Philosopher meant when he said that God knows only Himself; and the following statement of Dionysius is quite in agreement: "God knows things that come to be, not by a knowledge of such things, but by His knowledge of Himself."

6. If the formal aspect under which knowledge occurs is considered here from the point of view of the knower, then God knows Himself and other things under the same formal aspect; for the knower, the act of knowing, and the medium of knowing are all the same. But, if we consider the formal aspect from the point of view of the thing known, then He does not know Himself and other things under the same formal aspect; for the relation of Himself and of other things to the medium by which He knows is not the same; for He is the same as that medium by His essence, while other things are "the same" as the medium merely because of their resemblance to it. Therefore, He knows Himself through His essence, but other things through a likeness. However, that which is His essence and that which is the likeness of other things is the same reality.

7. If we consider the knower, it is entirely true that God knows that He is God and that He is the Father by the same act of knowing. But He does not know both by the same act of knowing if we consider that which is known; for He knows that He is God by the Godhead, and that He is the Father by His paternity. This latter, according to our manner of understanding, is not the same as the Godhead, although they are one in reality.

8. If we consider only the thing known, that which is the principle of its existence is also the principle of its being known, because a thing is knowable by means of its principles. But if we consider the knower, then that by which a thing is known is a likeness of the thing or of its principles. This likeness is not a principle of the existence of the thing, except in practical knowledge.

9. There are two ways of considering the mutual likeness between two things. First, we can consider them inasmuch as they agree in a common nature. Such a likeness between the knower and the known is not required; indeed, we sometimes see that the smaller the likeness, the sharper the cognition. For example, there is less resemblance between the intellectual likeness of a stone and the stone than there is between the sense likeness and the stone, for the intellectual likeness is farther removed from matter; yet the intellect knows more profoundly than sense.

Secondly, the likeness between two things can be considered from the point of view of representation. Such a likeness of the knower to the thing known is necessary. Therefore, although there is the least possible likeness between a creature and God in regard to agreement in nature, there is, on the other hand, the greatest possible likeness between them inasmuch as the divine essence most clearly represents the creature. Consequently, the divine intellect knows a thing most perfectly.

10. The statement that God beholds nothing outside Himself should be taken as referring to that in which God beholds, not to that which He beholds; for that in which He beholds all things is Himself.

11. Although a line loses none of its quantity if an actual point is taken from it, if we take from a line its essential property of terminating in a point, the very substance of the line perishes. The same principle is also true of God; for, while nothing will be detracted from God if a creature of His is supposed as not existing, His perfection will be destroyed if His power of producing a creature is taken from Him. For He knows things, not only inasmuch as they actually exist, but also inasmuch as they are within His power.

12. Although knowledge has only being for its object, it is not necessary that what is known should be a real being at the time in which it is known; for, just as we know things that are distant in place, we also know things distant in time, as is evident from our knowledge of things past. Hence, it is not inconsistent to affirm a knowledge of God that is about things that are not eternal.

13. The word perfection, if taken strictly, cannot be used of God, for nothing is perfected unless it is made. Perfection, however, is used more negatively of God than positively. Hence, He is said to be perfect because nothing at all is lacking to Him, not because there is something in Him which was in potency to perfection and is perfected by something else which is its act. Consequently, there is no passive potency in God.

14. What is understood or sensed moves the sense or intellect only if the sense knowledge or intellectual knowledge is received from things. Divine cognition is not of this kind; hence, the argument does not follow.

15. According to the Philosopher, the delight of the intellect arises from its agreeable operation. Hence, he says: "God delights in one simple operation." Therefore, the object of the intellect is the cause of intellectual delight in so far as it is the cause of an intellectual operation; and it is this in so far as it produces its likeness in the intellect, so that by it the activity of the intellect may be informed. Hence, it is clear that the thing which is understood causes delight in the intellect only when the intellect's knowledge is received from things. This is not true of the divine intellect.

16. The term to be, taken simply and absolutely, is understood only of the divine existence. This is also true of the good; and for this reason it is said in Luke (18:19): "None is good but God alone." Hence, the more closely a creature approaches God, the more it possesses of the act of existence; the further it is from Him, the more it possesses of non-existence. But, since a creature approaches God only in so far as it participates in a finite act of existence, yet its distance from God is always infinite, it is said to have more non-existence than existence. However, since the act of existing which it has is from God, it is known by God.

17. In line with the preceding answer, a visible creature possesses truth only in so far as it approaches the first truth. As Avicenna says, it possesses falsity in so far as it falls short of it.

18. A thing is compared to God in two ways: first, according to a common measurement, and then a creature, when compared with God, is found to be almost nothing at all; second, according to its dependence upon God, from whom it receives its act of existing. In this latter way, it is compared with God only with respect to its act of existing, and in this way, also, it can be known by God.

19. That axiom is to be understood as applying only to our intellect, which receives its knowledge from things. For a thing is led by gradual steps from its own material conditions to the immateriality of the intellect through the mediation of the immateriality of sense. Consequently, whatever is in our intellect must have previously been in the senses. This, however, does not take place in the divine intellect.

20. It is true, as Avicenna says, that a natural agent is a cause only of becoming. This is evident from the fact that, when such a cause ceases to exist, a thing does not cease to be, but merely ceases to become. But since the divine agent imparts the act of existence to things, He is the cause of their existence, although He does not enter into their constitution. Yet He has a certain resemblance to the essential principles which enter into the constitution of a thing, and for this reason He knows not only the becoming of a thing, but also its act of existing and its essential principles.