ARTICLE 5

Whether the will is the subject of virtue.

1. Objections: It would seem that it is:

 a. There are virtues in other powers, so

    a fortiori, in the will    obj. 1, 3, 4, 11.

 b. Friendship and charity are virtues in

    the will       obj. 5 and 6.

 c. Happiness, which is the supreme good for

    the will, is attained by virtue   obj. 2, 7, 8.

 d. Sin is in the will, hence its contrary,

    virtue, is there also     obj. 9 and 10.

2. On the contrary

 a. It would seem that there is no virtue in

    the will, because the will is rational

    neither essentially nor by participation 1.

 b. There is no need for virtue in the will

    to rectify the lower powers, since these

    powers have their own virtue   2.

3. Body

 a. The will needs no virtue to order it to the good which is proportionate to it, because the object of the will, by its very nature as a power, is the good.

 b. However, the will does need virtue to tend to a good which exceeds

  (1) the good of the human species: this good is supernatural, to which the will is elevated by the virtues of faith, hope, charity, etc.

  (2) the good of an individual: i.e., another's good, which man seeks by the virtues of liberality, justice, etc.

 c. That certain virtues, e.g., justice and charity, although in the appetitive part, are not in the lower appetites, is clear from the fact that they act without passion.