Chap. XIX.—Of the Soul and Body, and of Providence.

But since he is made up, as we have said, of two parts, soul and body, the virtues are contained in the one, and vices in the other, and they mutually oppose each other. For the good properties of the soul, which consist in restraining lusts, are contrary to the body; and the good properties of the body, which consist in every kind of pleasure, are hostile to the soul. But if the virtue of the soul shall have resisted the desires, and suppressed them, he will be truly like to God. From which it is evident that the soul of man, which is capable of divine virtue, is not mortal. But there is this distinction, that since virtue is attended with bitterness, and the attraction of pleasure is sweet, great numbers are overcome and are drawn aside to the pleasantness; but they who have given themselves up to the body and earthly things are pressed to the earth, and are unable to attain to the favour of the divine bounty, because they have polluted themselves with the defilements of vices. But they who, following God, and in obedience to Him, have despised the desires of the body, and, preferring virtue to pleasures, have preserved innocence and righteousness, these God recognises as like to Himself.  

Since, therefore, He has laid down a most holy law, and wishes all men to be innocent and beneficent, is it possible that He should not be angry when He sees that His law is despised, that virtue is rejected, and pleasure made the object of pursuit? But if He is the governor of the world, as He might to be, He surely does not despise that which is even of the greatest importance in the whole world. If He has foresight, as it is befitting that God should have, it is plain that He consults the interests of the human race, in order that our life may be more abundantly supplied, and better, and safer. If He is the Father and God of all, He is undoubtedly delighted with the virtues of men, and provoked by their vices. Therefore He loves the just, and hates the wicked. There is no need (one says) of hatred; for He once for all has fixed a reward for the good, and punishment for the wicked. But if any one lives justly and innocently, and at the same time neither worships God nor has any regard for Him, as Aristides, and Timon,134    Others read “Cimon.” If the reading Timon be retained, the reference is not to Timon who is called “the Misanthrope,” but to Timon the philosopher of Phlius, who lived in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and belonged to the sect of the Sceptics.   and others of the philosophers, will he escape135    Cedetne huic impune.   with impunity, because, though he has obeyed the law of God, he has nevertheless despised God Himself? There is therefore something on account of which God may be angry with one rebelling against Him, as it were, in reliance upon His integrity. If He can be angry with this man on account of his pride, why not more so with the sinner, who has despised the law together with the Lawgiver? The judge cannot pardon offences, because he is subject to the will of another. But God can pardon, because He is Himself the arbitrator136    Disceptator.   and judge of His own law; and when He laid down this, He did not surely deprive Himself of all power, but He has the liberty of bestowing pardon.  

CAPUT XIX. De anima et corpore, deque Providentia.

Sed quoniam compactus est, ut diximus, e duobus, animo et corpore, in altero virtutes, in altero vitia continentur, et impugnant se invicem. Animi enim 0135B bona, quae sunt in continendis libidinibus, contraria sunt corpori; et corporis bona, quae sunt in omni genere voluptatum, inimica sunt animo. Sed si virtus animi repugnaverit cupiditatibus, easque compresserit, erit vere Deo similis. Unde apparet animam hominis, quae virtutem divinam capit, non esse mortalem. Sed discrimen illud est, quod cum virtus habeat 0136A amaritudinem, et sit dulcis illecebra voluptatis, vincuntur plurimi, et abstrahuntur ad suavitatem. Ii vero, qui se corpori rebusque terrenis addixerunt, premuntur in terram, nec assequi possunt divini muneris gratiam, quia se vitiorum labibus inquinaverunt. Qui autem Deum secuti, eique parentes, corporis desideria contempserint, et virtutem praeferentes voluptatibus, innocentiam justitiamque servaverint: hos Deus ut sui similes recognoscit.

Cum igitur sanctissimam legem posuerit, velitque universos, innocentes ac beneficos esse; potestne non irasci, cum videt contemni legem suam, abjici virtututem, appeti voluptatem? Quod si est mundi administrator, sicut esse debet, non utique contemnit id quod est in omni mundo vel maximum. Si est providus, 0136B ut oportet Deum, consulit utique generi humano, quo sit vita nostra et copiosior, et melior, et tutior. Si est pater ac Deus universorum, certe virtutibus hominum delectatur, et vitiis commovetur; ergo et justos diligit, et impios odit. Odio (inquit) opus non est; semel enim statuit bonis praemium, et malis poenam. Quod si aliquis juste innocenterque vivat, et idem Deum nec colat, nec curet omnino, ut Aristides, 0137A ut Aristides et Timon, caeterique philosophorum, cedetne huic impune, quod cum legi Dei obtemperarit, ipsum tamen spreverit? Est igitur aliquid, propter quod Deus possit irasci, tanquam fiducia integritatis adversus eum rebellanti. Si huic potest irasci propter superbiam, cur non magis peccatori, qui legem cum ipso pariter latore contempserit? Judex peccatis veniam dare non potest, quia voluntati servit alienae. Deus autem potest, quia est legis suae ipse disceptator et judex: quam cum poneret, non utique ademit sibi omnem potestatem, sed habet ignoscendi licentiam.