Chapter XIX.—Man Would Be More Unfavourably Situated Than the Beasts If There Were No Resurrection.

In replying, then, to those who acknowledge a divine superintendence, and admit the same principles as we do, yet somehow depart from their own admissions, one may use such arguments as those which have been adduced, and many more than these, should he be disposed to amplify what has been said only concisely and in a cursory manner. But in dealing with those who differ from us concerning primary truths, it will perhaps be well to lay down another principle antecedent to these, joining with them in doubting of the things to which their opinions relate, and examining the matter along with them in this manner—whether the life of men, and their entire course of existence, is overlooked, and a sort of dense darkness is poured down upon the earth, hiding in ignorance and silence both the men themselves and their actions; or whether it is much safer to be of opinion that the Maker presides over the things which He Himself has made, inspecting all things whatsoever which exist, or come into existence, Judge of both deeds and purposes. For if no judgment whatever were to be passed on the actions of men, men would have no advantage over the irrational creatures, but rather would fare worse than these do, inasmuch as they keep in subjection their passions, and concern themselves about piety, and righteousness, and the other virtues; and a life after the manner of brutes would be the best, virtue would be absurd, the threat of judgment a matter for broad laughter, indulgence in every kind of pleasure the highest good, and the common resolve of all these and their one law would be that maxim, so dear to the intemperate and lewd, “Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.” For the termination of such a life is not even pleasure, as some suppose, but utter insensibility. But if the Maker of men takes any concern about His own works, and the distinction is anywhere to be found between those who have lived well and ill, it must be either in the present life, while men are still living who have conducted themselves virtuously or viciously, or after death, when men are in a state of separation and dissolution. But according to neither of these suppositions can we find a just judgment taking place; for neither do the good in the present life obtain the rewards of virtue, nor yet do the bad receive the wages of vice. I pass over the fact, that so long as the nature we at present possess is preserved, the moral nature is not able to bear a punishment commensurate with the more numerous or more serious faults. For the robber, or ruler, or tyrant, who has unjustly put to death myriads on myriads, could not by one death make restitution for these deeds; and the man who holds no true opinion concerning God, but lives in all outrage and blasphemy, despises divine things, breaks the laws, commits outrage against boys and women alike, razes cities unjustly, burns houses with their inhabitants, and devastates a country, and at the same time destroys inhabitants of cities and peoples, and even an entire nation—how in a mortal body could he endure a penalty adequate to these crimes, since death prevents the deserved punishment, and the mortal nature does not suffice for any single one of his deeds? It is proved, therefore, that neither in the present life is there a judgment according to men’s deserts, nor after death.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας τὴν πρόνοιαν καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμῖν παραδεξαμένους ἀρχάς, εἶτα τῶν οἰκείων ὑποθέσεων οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐκπίπτοντας, τοιούτοις χρήσαιτ' ἄν τις λόγοις καὶ πολλῷ πλείοσι τούτων, εἴ γε πλατύνειν ἐθέλοι τὰ συντόμως καὶ κατ' ἐπιδρομὴν εἰρημένα. πρὸς δέ γε τοὺς περὶ τῶν πρώτων διαφερομένους ἴσως ἂν ἔχοι καλῶς ἑτέραν ὑποθέσθαι πρὸ τούτων ἀρχήν, συνδιαποροῦντας αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν δοξάζουσιν καὶ τοιαῦτα συνδιασκεπτομένους· ἆρά γε πάντῃ καθάπαξ ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρῶπται ζωὴ καὶ σύμπας ὁ βίος, ζόφος δέ τις βαθὺς κατακέχυται τῆς γῆς ἀγνοίᾳ καὶ σιγῇ κρύπτων αὐτούς τε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὰς τούτων πράξεις, ἢ πολὺ τούτων ἀσφαλέστερον τὸ δοξάζειν ὅτι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ποιήμασιν ἐφέστηκεν ὁ ποιήσας, πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἔφορος, ἔργων τε καὶ βουλευμάτων κριτής. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμία μηδαμοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώποις πεπραγμένων γίνοιτο κρίσις, οὐδὲν ἕξουσι πλεῖον τῶν ἀλόγων ἄνθρωποι· μᾶλλον δὲ κἀκείνων πράξουσιν ἀθλιώτερον οἱ τὰ πάθη δουλαγωγοῦντες καὶ φροντίζοντες εὐσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἢ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς, ὁ δὲ κτηνώδης ἢ θηριώδης βίος ἄριστος, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀνόητος, δίκης δὲ ἀπειλὴ γέλως πλατύς, τὸ δὲ πᾶσαν θεραπεύειν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθῶν τὸ μέγιστον, δόγμα δὲ κοινὸν τούτων ἁπάντων καὶ νόμος εἷς τὸ τοῖς ἀκολάστοις καὶ λάγνοις φίλον “φάγωμεν [δὲ] καὶ πίωμεν, αὔριον γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκομεν”. τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου βίου τέλος οὐδὲ ἡδονὴ κατά τινας, ἀλλ' ἀναισθησία παντελής. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τις τῷ ποιήσαντι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῶν ἰδίων ποιημάτων φροντὶς καὶ σῴζεταί που τῶν εὖ ἢ κακῶς βεβιωμένων ἡ δικαία κρίσις, ἤτοι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον ζώντων ἔτι τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κακίαν βεβιωκότων ἢ μετὰ θάνατον ἐν χωρισμῷ καὶ διαλύσει τυγχανόντων. ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων εὑρεῖν δυνατὸν σῳζομένην τὴν δικαίαν κρίσιν· οὔτε γὰρ οἱ σπουδαῖοι κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν φέρονται τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπίχειρα οὔτε μὴν οἱ φαῦλοι τὰ τῆς κακίας. παρίημι γὰρ λέγειν ὅτι σῳζομένης τῆς φύσεως ἐν ᾗ νῦν ἐσμέν, οὐδ' ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ἐνεγκεῖν οἵα τε τὴν σύμμετρον δίκην πλειόνων ἢ βαρυτέρων φερομένην πλημμελημάτων. ὅ τε γὰρ μυρίους ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἀνελὼν ἀδίκως λῃστὴς ἢ δυνάστης ἢ τύραννος οὐκ ἂν ἑνὶ θανάτῳ λύσειεν τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις δίκην ὅ τε μηδὲν περὶ θεοῦ δοξάζων ἀληθές, ὕβρει δὲ πάσῃ καὶ βλασφημίᾳ συζῶν καὶ παρορῶν μὲν τὰ θεῖα, καταλύων δὲ νόμους, ὑβρίσας δὲ παῖδας ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναῖκας, κατασκάψας δὲ πόλεις ἀδίκως, ἐμπρήσας δὲ οἴκους μετὰ τῶν ἐνοικούντων καὶ δῃώσας χώραν καὶ τούτοις συναφανίσας δήμους καὶ λαοὺς ἢ καὶ σύμπαν ἔθνος, πῶς ἂν ἐν φθαρτῷ τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὴν τούτοις σύμμετρον ἀρκέσειεν δίκην, προλαμβάνοντος τοῦ θανάτου τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ μηδὲ πρὸς ἕν τι τῶν εἰργασμένων τῆς θνητῆς ἐξαρκούσης φύσεως; οὔτ' οὖν κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν ἡ κατ' ἀξίαν δείκνυται κρίσις οὔτε μετὰ θάνατον.