OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to the things that come to be from them, and this nature is created, then the nature of the principles is also created, even if the manner of coming-to-be is changed and is different from that of the things from the principles. 43. From the same argument. It is necessary for the first mover to be one and eternal. For it has been shown that it is necessary for motion to exist always. And if it is always, it is necessary for it to be continuous; for that which is always is continuous; for that which is successive is not continuous. And if it is continuous, it is one; and one motion is that which is produced by one mover and one thing moved; for if another and another thing should cause motion, the motion is not continuous but successive. If the first mover causes the motion of locomotion, and the motion of locomotion is of the heaven, and the heaven is a natural body, and a natural body has within itself naturally the principle of its motion according to nature, then the heaven is moved superfluously by the first mover in the motion of locomotion; which motion, even if the first mover did not move it, it would be moved by itself, because it is the fifth element, having neither weight moving it downwards, nor lightness moving it upwards, but another, unnamed power moving it around the center. If the first mover moves the heaven with the motion of locomotion neither according to nature (for to move thus is superfluous) nor contrary to nature (for motion contrary to nature is secondary to motion according to nature), then nothing moves the heaven. If all motion, as it happens now, so also happened previously, and it happens now according to a change of that which is about to be, and that which is about to be was not yet before it came to be, and that which first is not, but is later, all this is created, and it is not possible for that which is created to be without beginning and eternal, then motion is not eternal and without beginning. 44. From the same argument. It is clear that locomotion is first. For 'first', just as in other cases, so also in the case of motion would be said in several ways. A thing is said to be prior if, when it does not exist, the others will not exist, while it can exist without the others, and prior in time, and prior in substance. That it is necessary for locomotion to be first. For there is no necessity for that which is in locomotion either to grow or to be altered, nor indeed to come to be or to perish; but none of these is possible without the continuous motion, which the first mover causes. Further, it is first in time; for it is possible for the eternal things alone to be moved with this motion. But in the case of a single one of the things that have generation, it is necessary for locomotion to be the last of the motions; for after coming to be, first there is growth and alteration, but locomotion is the motion of things already perfected. But it is necessary for something else to be in locomotion previously, which will also be the cause of generation for the things that are generated, not being generated itself, such as the begetter of the begotten, since generation might seem to be the first of the motions for this reason, that the thing must first come to be.

εἶναι εὐθεῖαν. Aἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ γινομένων ἀΐδιοι εἶναι οὐ δύνανται. Eἰ γὰρ ἣν ἔχουσι φύσιν ταύτην μεταδιδόασι τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν γιγνομένοις, γενητὴ δὲ αὕτη, γενητὴ ἄρα καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν φύσις, εἰ καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς γε νέσεως ἐνήλλακται καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερος τῆς τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῶν. μγ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι ἓν καὶ ἀΐδιον τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν. ∆έ δεικται γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ κίνησιν εἶναι. Eἰ δὲ ἀεί, ἀνάγκη συνεχῆ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεχές· τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς οὐ συνεχές. Eἰ δὲ συνεχής, μία· μία δ' ἡ ὑφ' ἑνός τε κινοῦν τος καὶ ἑνὸς τοῦ κινουμένου· εἰ γὰρ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο κινήσει, οὐ συνεχὴς ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' ἐφεξῆς. Eἰ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν τὴν κατὰ φορὰν κίνησιν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ φορὰν κίνησίς ἐστι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ὁ δὲ οὐρανός ἐστι φυσικὸν σῶμα, τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν σῶμα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει φυσικῶς τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως τὴν ἀρχήν, περιττῶς ἄρα κινεῖται ὁ οὐρανὸς τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος τὴν κατὰ φορὰν κίνησιν· ἣν καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἐκίνει αὐτόν, ἐκινεῖτο ἂν αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πέμπτον στοιχεῖον μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχον κι νοῦσαν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω, μήτε κουφότητα κινοῦσαν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ ἑτέραν δύναμιν ἀνώνυμον κινοῦσαν αὐτὸν περὶ τὸ μέσον. Eἰ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν τὴν κατὰ φορὰν κίνησιν τὸν οὐρανὸν οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὸν κινεῖ (περιττὸν γὰρ τὸ οὕτως κινεῖν) οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν (δευτέρα γάρ ἐστι κίνησις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως), οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖ τι τὸν οὐρανόν. Eἰ πᾶσα κίνησις, ὡς γίνεται νῦν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγίνετο, γίνεται δὲ νῦν κατὰ μεταβολὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μέλλον γίνεσθαι πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι οὔπω ἦν, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ὄν, ὕστερον δέ, γενητὸν τοῦτο πᾶν, τὸ δὲ γενητὸν ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀΐδιον οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι, οὐκ ἄρα ἡ κίνησις ἀΐδιός τε καὶ ἄναρχος. μδ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ φορὰ πρώτη. Τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἑτέρων, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ κινήσεως ἂν λέγοιτο πλεοναχῶς. Λέγεται δὲ πρότερον, οὗ γε μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὸ χρόνῳ, καὶ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν. Ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὴν φορὰν εἶναι πρώτην. Oὐδὲ γὰρ μία ἀνάγκη οὔτε αὔξεσθαι οὔτε ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὸ φερόμενον, οὐδὲ δὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι· τούτων δὲ οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται τῆς συνεχοῦς μὴ οὔσης, ἣν κινεῖ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν. Ἔτι χρόνῳ πρώτη· τοῖς γὰρ ἀϊδίοις μόνον ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι ταύτην. Ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑνὸς μὲν τῶν ἐχόντων τὴν γένεσιν τὴν φορὰν ὑστάτην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῶν κινήσεων· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ γε νέσθαι πρῶτον αὔξησις καὶ ἀλλοίωσις, φορὰ δὲ ἤδη τε λειουμένων κίνησίς ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ ἕτερον ἀνάγκη κινούμενον εἶναι κατὰ φορὰν πρότερον, ὃ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἴτιον ἔσται τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οὐ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὸ γεννῆσαν τοῦ γεννηθέντος, ἐπεὶ δόξειεν ἂν ἡ γένεσις εἶναι πρώτη τῶν κινήσεων διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι γενέσθαι δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα πρῶτον.