OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is impossible for that which formerly was not, but later is, to be co-eternal with that which always is, how, if the world is created, is it co-eternal with God? Greek response to the Christians. That it is indeed impossible for that which is in time (for this is what “formerly not being, but later being” means) to be eternal and co-eternal with that which always is, is clear. But that from this argument the world is shown to be uncreated, this too is surely clear to everyone. But if someone should wish to say that some of the ancients call the world created, if they should examine the arguments superficially, they would justly blame those who say this; but if they should understand precisely the depth of what was said, they will find precisely and clearly that these men declare the world to be uncreated. For they themselves, saying that both the paradigmatic and the efficient cause are uncreated, it is clear that they also clearly declare the world, being the creation of these, to be uncreated. For it has been demonstrated by the ancients that the so-called relatives exist simultaneously by nature. Since, therefore, both the image is relative to the paradigm and the paradigm to the image, and the creation to the creator and the creator to the creation, they will exist simultaneously by nature; if, then, the creator is uncreated and the paradigm uncreated, so too is the world, being an image of the paradigm, and a creation of the creator. And that relatives exist simultaneously by nature has been clearly demonstrated and confessed by all, and is easy to know from this very fact. For the right and the left are among the relatives. Just as, therefore, it is not possible for the right to exist without the left existing, nor the left without the right, so it is not possible for the creator to exist without the creation or the creation without the creator. If therefore the creator is uncreated, the creation is also uncreated. But if someone should wish to say that the creator existed before, and the creation came to be later, he will fall into another absurdity. For he will be found to be saying the creator exists in potentiality and not in actuality (which is nothing other than saying God is imperfect), and in addition to this, the creation no less co-exists with the creator, this too being in potentiality just as the creator, since relatives everywhere exist on an equal footing. If, then, the creator is in potentiality, the creation is also in potentiality; but if the creator is in actuality and perfect, so likewise is the creation. It is clearly evident to everyone, therefore, that the creation co-exists with the creator, insofar as he is creator. A refutation of the response that was not correctly made. As the respondent, having shown in his other responses the world to be uncreated, so also in the present response he professes to show the world to be uncreated; and yet in his other responses neither from the manifest and

εληλυθότος τὴν ἔμφασιν, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐρ γασίᾳ τοῦ χρόνου πάντα τὰ μέρη ὑπάρχοντα; Τετάρτη ἐρώτησις χριστιανικὴ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Eἰ ἀδύνατον τῷ πρώην μὲν οὐκ ὄντι, ὕστερον δὲ ὄντι, συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, πῶς, εἰ γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος, συναΐδιός ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ; Ἀπόκρισις ἑλληνικὴ πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς. Ὅτι· μὲν ἀδύνατον τὸ ἔγχρονον (τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ πάλαι μὲν μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον δὲ ὄν) ἀΐδιον εἶναι καὶ συναΐδιον τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, δῆλον. Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου δείκνυται ὁ κόσμος ἀγένητος, καὶ τοῦτο παντί που δῆλον. Ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἐθέλοι λέγειν ὥς τινες τῶν παλαιῶν τὸν κόσμον γενητὸν κα λοῦσιν, εἰ μὲν ἐπιπολαίως σκέψοιντο τοὺς λόγους, μέμψοιντο ἂν δικαίως τοὺς τοῦτο λέγοντας· εἰ δὲ τὸ βάθος κατανοήσωσιν ἀκριβῶς τῶν λεχθέντων, εὑρήσουσιν ἀκριβῶς καὶ σαφῶς ἀγέ νητον τούτους τὸν κόσμον ἀποφαινομένους. Aὐτοὶ γάρ, λέ γοντες τήν τε παραδειγματικὴν καὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν ἀγέ νητον εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν κόσμον, δημιούργημα τούτων ὄντα, σαφῶς ἀγένητον ἀποφαίνουσι. Τοῖς γὰρ παλαιοῖς ἀπο δέδεικται τὰ καλούμενα πρὸς τὶ ἅμα τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἥ τε εἰκὼν πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα πρὸς τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα πρὸς τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ δημιούργημα, ἅμα τῇ φύσει ὑπάρξει· εἰ τοίνυν ἀγένητος ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα ἀγένητον, καὶ ὁ κόσμος, τοῦ μὲν παραδείγματος εἰκὼν ὤν, τοῦ δὲ δη μιουργοῦ δημιούργημα. Ὅτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὶ ἅμα τῇ φύσει ὑπάρ χει, σαφῶς πᾶσιν ἀποδέδεικται καὶ ὡμολόγηται, καὶ αὐτόθεν ·ᾴδιον γινώσκειν. Τὸ γὰρ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερὸν τῶν πρὸς τί. Ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ δεξιὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἀρι στεροῦ μηδὲ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ἐκτὸς τοῦ δεξιοῦ, οὕτως οὐκ ἐνδέχε ται τὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ δημιουργήματος ἢ τὸ δη μιούργημα ἄνευ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ. Eἰ οὖν ἀγένητος ὁ δημιουρ γός, ἀγένητον καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα. Eἰ δέ τις θέλοι λέγειν ὅτι πρότερον μὲν ἦν ὁ δημιουργός, ὕστερον δὲ γέγονε τὸ δημιούρ γημα, καὶ ἄλλῳ περιπεσεῖται ἀτόπῳ. Eὑρεθήσεται γὰρ δυ νάμει εἶναι λέγων τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ (ὅπερ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸν θεὸν ἀτελῆ λέγειν), καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδὲν ἧττον συνυφίστασθαι τῷ δημιουργῷ τὸ δημιούργημα, δυνάμει ὂν καὶ τοῦτο ὥσπερ ὁ δημιουργός, ἁπανταχοῦ τῶν πρὸς τὶ ὑφισταμένων ἐπ' ἴσης. Eἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς δυνάμει, καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα δυνάμει· εἰ δὲ ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ τέλειος, καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα ὁμοίως. Σαφῶς τοίνυν παντὶ δῆλον ὑπάρχει τὸ συνυφίστασθαι τῷ δημιουργῷ, καθὰ δη μιουργός, τὸ δημιούργημα. Ἔλεγχος τῆς ἀποκρίσεως οὐκ ὀρθῶς γεγενημένης. Ὡς δείξας ἀποκρινάμενος ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις αὑτοῦ ἀπο κρίσεσι τὸν κόσμον ἀγένητον, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ ἀπο κρίσει ἐπαγγέλλεται δεῖξαι τὸν κόσμον ἀγένητον· καίτοι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις αὑτοῦ ἀποκρίσεσιν οὔτε ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τε καὶ