John of Damascus, Against Manichaeans

from the good to the evil and to cast away the good and to be in the non-existence of the good, which is evil, did he make him? Orthodox: If he foreknew him, he foreknew him as one who would certainly be; for foreknowledge of what will not certainly be is not foreknowledge, but ignorance and error. Manichaean: Did God make him willingly? Orthodox: Yes, willingly. Manichaean: And why, being good, did he will to make him who would become evil? Orthodox: God made him good; but he himself voluntarily turned away and cast away the good. Manichaean: Why did he cast away the good? Orthodox: Because he was made with free will. Manichaean: And why did he make him with free will and changeable? Orthodox: Every creature is by nature changeable; for those whose generation began from a change, it is necessary that they be changeable by nature. Is not the production from non-being into being a change? Therefore, only the divine is unchangeable by nature, as being uncreated and ever-existing. But creatures, as many as are rational, are voluntarily changeable, being changed by the will, but the rest according to the body. And with free will, because not by necessity; for every rational being has free will. For to what purpose would a rational being be used if it did not have free will? Or how will it be in virtue or be good if it does not have free will? For that which comes about by force or by necessity of nature is not virtue; whence also irrational creatures do not have virtue. But to abolish the virtue of the good because of some indolence, is not of a just one. Manichaean: He ought then to have made only those who were going to be virtuous, so that only the good may be and only virtue may prevail. Orthodox: God alone is perfectly good, and in comparison to him all things are imperfect, being and being called good in this respect, insofar as they partake of him, and in comparison with one another. For that which partakes more of the good, both is and is called more good; and that which partakes less, less; and that which partakes not at all, is not good at all. And that which is not good at all, is completely evil. And being itself is good; for being is from God who is good, so that the devil, in being, according to being itself, is good. 70 Manichaean: Why does the Lord say: "It were good for that man if that man had not been born?" Orthodox: Since it is fitting for the good to give good things, but for the one receiving it is a shame and reproach not to guard the good things he received, not because of the giver, but because of himself and his own indolence. And God, being good, cannot not provide good things, that is, he does not will it; but he who does not will to receive is the cause for himself, making it better for himself not to receive than to receive. It is not just, therefore, nor good, that because this one does not will to receive, the good one be hindered from doing good and giving good things. For thus evil would conquer the good, if God by his goodness brings things from non-being into being, but the fact that it would become evil by voluntarily turning from good hindered the good creation of the good one. Wherefore the Lord did not say: It were profitable if that man had not been born, but: "It were profitable for that man." It is good both by nature and by justice for the good one to do good and to give good things, but he who received and did not guard them has made the receiving a reproach to himself; for he himself who does not will the good, also, what good he has, he does not will nor delight in. For to be is not in our power, but from God alone, but to be good is from God and from ourselves. God, therefore, that which is his, gives being and well-being, but we, that which is in our power, to guard the good things given, we either do or do not. But that which is of God alone, whether we will it or not, he himself gives as good, so that in some way the good may be in us. 71 God always provides good things also to the devil, but he does not will to receive them. And in the age to come God gives good things to all; for he is a fountain of good things gushing forth goodness to all, but each one, according as he has prepared himself to be receptive, partakes

τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀποβάλλεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἀνυπαρξίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κακόν, ἐποίησεν αὐτόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ προεγίνωσκεν αὐτόν, ὡς πάντως ἐσόμενον προεγίνωσκεν αὐτόν· ἡ γὰρ μὴ πάντως ἐσομένου πρόγνωσις οὐ πρόγνωσίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀγνωσία καὶ πλάνη. Μανιχαῖος· Θέλων ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ναί, θέλων. Μανιχαῖος· Καὶ διὰ τί ἠθέλησε ποιῆσαι αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸς ὤν, τὸν κακὸν ἐσόμενον; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς καλόν· αὐτὸς δὲ ἑκουσίως ἐτράπη καὶ ἀπεβάλετο τὸ ἀγαθόν. Μανιχαῖος· ∆ιὰ τί ἀπεβάλετο τὸ ἀγαθόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅτι αὐτεξούσιος ἐγένετο. Μανιχαῖος· Καὶ διὰ τί ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τρεπτόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Τρεπτὸν μὲν ἅπαν κτίσμα κατὰ φύσιν· ὧν γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἀπὸ τροπῆς ἤρξατο, ταῦτα ἀνάγκη κατὰ φύσιν τρεπτὰ εἶναι. Ἦ οὐ τροπὴ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγωγή; Μόνον οὖν φύσει ἄτρεπτον τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἄκτιστον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν. Τὰ δὲ κτίσματα, ὅσα μὲν λογικά, ἐθελότρεπτα, τῷ θελήματι τρεπόμενα, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ κατὰ σῶμα. Αὐτεξούσιον δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πᾶν γὰρ λογικὸν αὐτεξούσιον. Εἰς τί γὰρ τῷ λογικῷ χρήσηται μὴ ὢν αὐτεξούσιος; Ἢ πῶς ἐν ἀρετῇ γενήσεται ἢ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται μὴ ὢν αὐτεξούσιος; Τὸ γὰρ βίᾳ γινόμενον ἢ ἀνάγκῃ φύσεως οὐκ ἀρετή· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἔχει ἀρετὴν τὰ ἄλογα. Τὸ δὲ διά τινα ῥαθυμίαν ἀνελεῖν τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀρετήν, οὐ δικαίου. Μανιχαῖος· Ὤφειλεν οὖν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐναρέτους ἔσεσθαι μόνους ποιῆσαι, ἵνα μόνον ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μόνη ἡ ἀρετὴ πολιτεύηται. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τέλειον ἀγαθὸν ὁ θεὸς μόνος, τῇ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν συγκρίσει πάντα ἀτελῆ, κατὰ τοῦτο ὄντα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, καθ' ὅσον αὐτοῦ μετέχουσι, καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίσει. Ὅπερ γὰρ πλέον μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πλέον ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τε καὶ λέγεται· ὅπερ δὲ ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον· ὅπερ δὲ οὐδ' ὅλως, ἀγαθὸν οὐδ' ὅλως. Τὸ δὲ οὐδ' ὅλως ἀγαθόν, παντελῶς κακόν. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ εἶναι, ἀγαθόν· ἐκ θεοῦ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ εἶναι, ὥστε ὢν ὁ διάβολος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθός ἐστι. 70 Μανιχαῖος· ∆ιὰ τί λέγει ὁ κύριος· «Καλὸν ἦν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος;» Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐπειδὴ τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ πρέπει τὸ διδόναι τὰ ἀγαθά, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνοντι αἰσχύνη καὶ ὄνειδος τὸ μὴ φυλάξαι, ἃ ἔλαβεν ἀγαθά, οὐ διὰ τὸν διδοῦντα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ῥαθυμίαν. Καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐ δύναται μὴ παρέχειν τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀγαθὸς ὤν, τουτέστιν οὐ θέλει· ὁ δὲ μὴ θέλων λαβεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ αἴτιος, ἑαυτῷ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν κρεῖττον ποιῶν τοῦ λαβεῖν. Οὐ δίκαιον οὖν οὐδὲ καλόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ θέλειν τοῦτον λαβεῖν κωλυθῆναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ διδόναι τὰ ἀγαθά. Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἡ κακία ἐνίκα τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθότητι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἔσεσθαι ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἑκουσίως τρεπόμενον ἐκώλυσε τὴν ἀγαθὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δημιουργίαν. ∆ιὸ οὐκ εἶπεν ὁ κύριος· Συνέφερεν, εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλά· «Συνέφερε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ.» Καλὸν μὲν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸν ἀγαθὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ διδόναι τὰ ἀγαθά, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν καὶ μὴ φυλάξας ἐπονείδιστον ἑαυτῷ τὸ λαβεῖν ἐποίησεν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ μὴ θέλων τὸ ἀγαθὸν καί, ὃ ἔχει ἀγαθόν, οὐ θέλει οὐδὲ ἥδεται. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ μόνου, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἡμῶν. Ὁ θεὸς οὖν, ὅπερ αὐτοῦ ἐστι, δίδωσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι, τὸ φυλάξαι τὰ δοθέντα ἀγαθά, ἢ ποιοῦμεν ἢ οὔ. Ὅπερ δὲ μόνου θεοῦ ἐστι, καὶ θελόντων καὶ μὴ θελόντων ἡμῶν αὐτὸς δίδωσιν ὡς ἀγαθός, ἵνα κἂν ποσῶς ᾖ ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν. 71 Ὁ θεὸς καὶ τῷ διαβόλῳ ἀεὶ παρέχει τὰ ἀγαθά, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος οὐ θέλει λαβεῖν. Καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι πᾶσι δίδωσιν ὁ θεὸς τὰ ἀγαθά· πηγὴ γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν πᾶσι βρύουσα τὴν ἀγαθότητα, ἕκαστος δέ, καθὼς ἑαυτὸν κατεσκεύασε δεκτικόν, μετέχει