Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

but nowhere; for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhere and before all things; but the whole is everywhere, and likewise nowhere. For those things that are able to participate in it encounter it as a whole and find it present to themselves as a whole, and it is wholly transcendent; for that which has participated has not ranked it within itself, but has participated from it as much as it was able to contain. And neither by imparting itself is it constrained by the participations of the many, being separate; nor do the participants receive defectively, since that which imparts is everywhere. 99 Everything unparticipated, insofar as it is unparticipated, in this respect does not subsist from another cause, but is itself the principle and cause of all participated things; and thus every principle in each series is ungenerated. For if it is unparticipated, it has obtained the primacy in its own series, and does not proceed from others; for it would no longer be first, if it received from another this property by which it is unparticipated. But if it is subordinate to others and proceeds from them, it does not proceed insofar as it is unparticipated, but insofar as it is participating. For from what it has originated, it surely participates in these, and that in which it participates is not primary; but that which exists unparticipatedly, this is primary; therefore, insofar as it is unparticipated, it is not from a cause. For insofar as it is from a cause, it is participating and not unparticipated; but insofar as it is unparticipated, it is the cause of participated things, but does not itself participate in others. 100 Every series of the wholes extends up to an unparticipated principle and cause, but all unparticipated things are dependent on the one principle of all things. For if each series has experienced something identical, there is in each something that leads which is the cause of the identity; for just as all beings are from one, so also is every series from one. But again, all the unparticipated monads are referred back to the One, because all are analogous to the One; therefore, insofar as these too have experienced something identical, the analogy to the One, in this respect their reference back to the One occurs. And insofar as they are all from the One, none of them is a principle, but as from that principle; but insofar as each is unparticipated, in this respect each is a principle. Therefore, being principles of certain things, they are dependent on the principle of all things. For the principle of all things is that in which all things have participated; but all things have participated only in the first, and of the others not all, but some. Wherefore that is simply first, but the others are first in relation to a certain order, but not simply first. 101 Of all things that participate in intellect, the unparticipated intellect is the leader, and of those in life, life, and of those in being, being; and of these themselves, being is before life, and life is before intellect. For because in each order of beings the unparticipated are before the participated, it is necessary that intellect be before intellectual things, and life before living things, and being before beings. And because the cause of the more numerous precedes that of the less numerous, among those being will be first; for it is present to all to which life and intellect are present (for every living thing and thing participating in intellection necessarily exists), but not the reverse (for not all beings live and have intellection). And life is second; for to all that have a share of intellect, a share of life is also present, but not the reverse; for many things live, but are left without a share of knowledge. And third is intellect; for everything that is cognitive in any way both lives and is. If, therefore, being is the cause of more things, and life of fewer, and intellect of still fewer, being is first, then life, then intellect. 102 All things that exist in any way are from limit and the unlimited through that which is primarily being; and all living things are self-moving through the first life; and all cognitive things participate in knowledge through the first intellect. For if the unparticipated in each series imparts its own property to all things under the same series, it is indeed clear that primary being also imparts to all things limit and unlimitedness together, being a mixture from these primarily; and life imparts the motion that is from itself (for the first life is a procession and motion from the stable hypostasis of being); and intellect imparts knowledge (for the summit of all knowledge is in intellect, and intellect is what is primarily cognitive). 103 All things are in all things, but appropriately in each; for in being there is both life and intellect, and in life there is being and intellection, and in intellect there is being and living, but in one case intellectually, in another vitally, in another existing as beings

δὲ οὐδαμοῦ· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ διεσπασμένον εἴη καὶ χωρίς, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι, τὸ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ καὶ πρὸ τῶν πάντων· ἀλλ' ὅλον πανταχοῦ, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ὡσαύτως. καὶ γὰρ τὰ μετέχειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενα ὅλῳ ἐντυγχάνει καὶ ὅλον ἑαυτοῖς εὑρίσκει παρόν, κἀκεῖνο ὅλον ἐξῄρηται· τὸ γὰρ μετασχὸν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατέταξεν, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου μετέσχεν ὅσον χωρῆσαι δεδύνηται. καὶ οὔτε τῷ μεταδιδόναι ἑαυτοῦ στενο χωρεῖται ταῖς τῶν πλειόνων μεθέξεσι, χωρὶς ὄν· οὔτε τὰ μετέ χοντα ἐλλιπῶς μεταλαγχάνει, πανταχοῦ ὄντος τοῦ μεταδιδόντος. 99 Πᾶν ἀμέθεκτον, ᾗ ἀμέθεκτόν ἐστι, ταύτῃ ἀπ' ἄλλης αἰτίας οὐχ ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ αἰτία τῶν μετεχομένων πάντων· καὶ οὕτως ἀρχὴ πᾶσα καθ' ἑκάστην σειρὰν ἀγένητος. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἀμέθεκτον, ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ σειρᾷ τὸ πρωτεῖον ἔλαχε, καὶ οὐ πρόεισιν ἀπ' ἄλλων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρῶτον ἔτι, τὴν ἰδιότητα ταύτην, καθ' ἥν ἐστιν ἀμέθεκτον, παρ' ἄλλου τινὸς ὑποδεχόμενον. εἰ δὲ ἄλλων ἐστὶ καταδεέστερον καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνων πρόεισιν, οὐχ ᾗ ἀμέθεκτόν ἐστι, ταύτῃ πρόεισιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ μετέχον. ἀφ' ὧν γὰρ ὥρμηται, τούτων δήπου μετέχει, καὶ ὧν μετέχει, ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι πρώτως· ὃ δὲ ἀμεθέκτως ἐστί, τοῦτο πρώτως ἐστίν· οὐκ ἄρα ᾗ ἀμέθεκτον, ταύτῃ ἀπ' αἰτίας ἐστίν. ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αἰτίας, μετέχον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀμέθεκτον· ᾗ δὲ ἀμέθεκτον, μετεχομένων αἴτιον, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ μετέχον ἄλλων. 100 Πᾶσα μὲν σειρὰ τῶν ὅλων εἰς ἀμέθεκτον ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν ἀνατείνεται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀμέθεκτα τῆς μιᾶς ἐξέχεται τῶν πάντων ἀρχῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἑκάστη σειρὰ ταὐτόν τι πέπονθεν, ἔστι τι ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἡγεμονοῦν τὸ τῆς ταυτότητος αἴτιον· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἀφ' ἑνός, οὕτω καὶ πᾶσα σειρὰ ἀφ' ἑνός. πᾶσαι δὲ αὖ αἱ ἀμέθεκτοι μονάδες εἰς τὸ ἓν ἀνάγονται, διότι πᾶσαι τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνάλογον· ᾗ οὖν ταὐτόν τι καὶ αὗται πεπόνθασι, τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἀναλογίαν, ταύτῃ εἰς τὸ ἓν αὐταῖς ἡ ἀναγωγὴ γίνεται. καὶ ᾗ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς πᾶσαι, οὐδεμία τούτων ἀρχή ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐκείνης· ᾗ δὲ ἑκάστη ἀμέθεκτος, ταύτῃ ἀρχὴ ἑκάστη. τινῶν οὖν ἀρχαὶ οὖσαι τῆς πάντων ἀρχῆς ἐξέχονται. πάντων γὰρ ἀρχή ἐστιν ἧς πάντα μετείληφε· μετείληφε δὲ μόνου πάντα τοῦ πρώτου, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τινά. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πρὸς τινὰ μὲν τάξιν ἐστὶ πρῶτα, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐ πρῶτα. 101 Πάντων τῶν νοῦ μετεχόντων ἡγεῖται ὁ ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς, καὶ τῶν τῆς ζωῆς ἡ ζωή, καὶ τῶν τοῦ ὄντος τὸ ὄν· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὂν πρὸ τῆς ζωῆς, ἡ δὲ ζωὴ πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ. διότι μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τάξει τῶν ὄντων πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμέθεκτα, δεῖ πρὸ τῶν νοερῶν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν καὶ πρὸ τῶν ζώντων τὴν ζωὴν καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων τὸ ὄν. διότι δὲ προηγεῖται τὸ τῶν πλειόνων αἴτιον ἢ τὸ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, ἐν ἐκείνοις τὸ μὲν ὂν ἔσται πρώτιστον· πᾶσι γὰρ πάρεστιν, οἷς ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς (ζῶν γὰρ πᾶν καὶ νοήσεως μετέχον ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης), οὐκ ἔμπαλιν δέ (οὐ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα πάντα ζῇ καὶ νοεῖ). δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ζωή· πᾶσι γάρ, οἷς νοῦ μέτεστι, καὶ ζωῆς μέτεστιν, οὐκ ἔμπαλιν δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ ζῇ μέν, γνώσεως δὲ ἄμοιρα ἀπολείπεται. τρίτος δὲ ὁ νοῦς· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γνωστικὸν ὁπωσοῦν καὶ ζῇ καὶ ἔστιν. εἰ οὖν πλειόνων αἴτιον τὸ ὄν, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἡ ζωή, καὶ ἔτι ἐλαττόνων ὁ νοῦς, πρώτιστον τὸ ὄν, εἶτα ζωή, εἶτα νοῦς. 102 Πάντα μὲν τὰ ὁπωσοῦν ὄντα ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπείρου διὰ τὸ πρώτως ὄν· πάντα δὲ τὰ ζῶντα ἑαυτῶν κινητικά ἐστι διὰ τὴν ζωὴν τὴν πρώτην· πάντα δὲ τὰ γνωστικὰ γνώσεως μετέχει διὰ τὸν νοῦν τὸν πρῶτον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην σειρὰν ἀμέθεκτον τῆς οἰκείας ἰδιότη τος πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν σειρὰν μεταδίδωσι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ πρώτιστον μεταδίδωσι πᾶσι πέρατος ἅμα καὶ ἀπειρίας, μικτὸν ὑπάρχον ἐκ τούτων πρώτως· καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τῆς παρ' ἑαυτῇ κινήσεως (καὶ γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ πρώτη πρόοδός ἐστι καὶ κίνησις ἀπὸ τῆς μονίμου τοῦ ὄντος ὑποστάσεως)· καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς γνώσεως (πάσης γὰρ γνώσεως ἡ ἀκρότης ἐστὶν ἐν νῷ, καὶ νοῦς τὸ πρώτως γνωστικόν). 103 Πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὅπου μὲν νοερῶς, ὅπου δὲ ζωτικῶς, ὅπου δὲ ὄντως ὄντα