Two books of soliloquies.

 As I had been long revolving with myself matters many and various, and had been for many days sedulously inquiring both concerning myself and my chief

 2. O God, Framer of the universe, grant me first rightly to invoke Thee then to show myself worthy to be heard by Thee lastly, deign to set me free.

 3. Thee I invoke, O God, the Truth, in whom and from whom and through whom all things are true which anywhere are true. God, the Wisdom, in whom and f

 4. Whatever has been said by me, Thou the only God, do Thou come to my help, the one true and eternal substance, where is no discord, no confusion, no

 5. Henceforth Thee alone do I love, Thee alone I follow, Thee alone I seek, Thee alone am I prepared to serve, for Thou alone art Lord by a just title

 Translation absent.

 7. A . Behold I have prayed to God. R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A

 8. R . I allow so much: but yet if any one should say to thee, I will give thee to know God as well as thou dost know Alypius, wouldst thou not give t

 9. But let that go, and now answer to this: if those things which Plato and Plotinus have said concerning God are true, is it enough for thee to know

 10. R. It is then plain to you that a line cannot possibly be longitudinally divided into two? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 11. A. Pardon me, however vehemently thou urge and argue, yet I dare not say that I wish so to know God as I know these things. For not only the objec

 12. R. Thou art moved to good effect. For the Reason which is talking with thee promises so to demonstrate God to thy mind, as the sun demonstrates hi

 13. When therefore the mind has come to have sound eyes, what next? A. That she look. R.

 14. Therefore when the soul has obtained to see, that is, to apprehend God, let us see whether those three things are still necessary to her. Why shou

 15. Now listen, so far as the present time requires, while from that similitude of sensible things I now teach also something concerning God. Namely,

 16. But why do we delay? Let us set out: but first let us see (for this comes first) whether we are in a sound state. A. Do thou see to it, if either

 17. R. Do you not see that these eyes of the body, even when sound, are often so smitten by the light of this visible sun, as to be compelled to turn

 18. R. Thou hast made great progress: yet those things which remain in order to the seeing of that light, very greatly impede. But I am aiming at some

 19. R. You speak as if I were now inquiring what you hope. I am not inquiring what, denied, delights not, but what delights, obtained. For an extingui

 20. But I ask of thee, why thou dost desire, either that the persons whom thou affectest should live, or that they should live with thee. A. That toge

 21. R. We have pain of body left, which perhaps moves thee of its proper force. A. R.

 22. Now let us inquire concerning this, what sort of lover of wisdom thou art, whom thou desirest to behold with most chaste view and embrace, and to

 23. R. Such lovers assuredly it is, whom Wisdom ought to have. Such lovers does she seek, the love of whom has in it nothing but what is pure. But the

 24. And, another day having come, A. Give now, I pray, if thou canst, that order. Lead by what way thou wilt, through what things thou wilt, how thou

 25. R. In this way too the bodily eye might say: I shall not love the darkness, when I shall have seen the sun. For this too seems, as it were, to per

 26. A. Peace, I pray thee, peace. Why tormentest thou me? Why diggest thou so remorselessly and descendest so deep? Now I weep intolerably, henceforth

 27. R. Let us conclude, if you will, this first volume, that in a second we may attempt some such way as may commodiously offer itself. For this dispo

 28. R. What? When a chaste person dies, do you judge that Chastity dies also? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 29. R. Does this proposition seem to you to be true: Whatever is, is compelled to be somewhere? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 30. A. I thank thee much, and will diligently and cautiously review these things in my own mind, and moreover with thee, when we are in quiet, if no d

 Book II.

 1. A. Long enough has our work been intermitted, and impatient is Love, nor have tears a measure, unless to Love is given what is loved: wherefore, le

 2. A. I see a very plain and compendious order. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 3. R. Now I will have you answer me, does the soul seem to you to feel and perceive, or the body? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R

 4. R. Give answer now to this, whether it appears to you possible that at some time hereafter falsity should not be. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 5. A. O leaden dagger! For thou mightest conclude that man is immortal if I had granted thee that this universe can never be without man, and that thi

 6. R. Do any corporeal, that is, sensible things, appear to you to be capable of comprehension in the intellect? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 7. R. Give now still greater heed. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 8. R. Define therefore the True. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 9. R. God, to whom we have commended ourselves, without doubt will render help, and set us free from these straits, if only we believe, and entreat Hi

 10. R. First let us again and yet again ventilate this question, What is falsity? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 11. R. But all this forest of facts, unless I am mistaken, may be divided into two kinds. For it lies partly in equal, partly in inferior things. They

 12. R. We must, however, wait patiently, until the remaining senses also make report to us that falsity dwells in the similitude of the true. For in t

 13. R. Now give heed, while we run over the same things once more, that what we are endeavoring to show may come more plainly to view. A. R. A. R. A.

 14. R. It is ridiculous if you are ashamed, as if it were not for this very reason that we have chosen this mode of discourse: which, since we are tal

 15. A. Thou speakest rightly but what I have granted amiss I altogether fail to see: unless perchance that that is rightly called false which has som

 16. R. Attend rather for never can I be persuaded, that we have implored the Divine aid in vain. For I see that, having tried all things as far as we

 17. A. Proceed, I pray for now perchance thou hast begun to teach concerning falsities not falsely: but now I am considering of what sort that class

 18. A. Thou speakest rightly but I wonder why thou wouldst separate from this class those poems and jests, and other imitative trifles. R. A. R. A. R

 19. R. What then think you? Is the science of debate true, or false? A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 20. R. How as to Grammar itself? if it is true, is it not so far true as it is a discipline? For the name of Discipline signifies something to be lear

 21. R. Tell me now what science contains the principles of definitions, divisions and partitions. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 22. R. Attend therefore to the few things that remain. A. R. A. R. A.

 23. But as to thy question, who would grant, or to whom could it appear possible, that that which is in the subject should remain, while the subject p

 24. R. Groan not, the human mind is immortal. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 25. A. And now I am ready to plunge into the expected joys, but yet I am held hesitating by two thoughts. For, first, it makes me uneasy that we have

 26. R. Thou mayest note that it is not for naught that our reasoning has taken so wide a round. For we were inquiring what is Truth, which not even no

 27. What shall we say to this, that we have entreated God and do entreat, that He will show us a way, not to riches, not to bodily pleasures, not to p

 28. R. From this truth, as I remember, that Truth cannot perish, we have concluded, that not only if the whole world should perish, but even if Truth

 29. R. Is Truth then so called for any other reason than as being that by which everything is true which is true? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 30. R. You apprehend the matter well. But consider this, whether we can also with propriety call silver by the name of false lead. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 31. A. Go on to what remains for of this I am well convinced. R A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A R. A. R. A. R. A.

 32. R. What sayest thou concerning the rest? A. R. A R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 33. R. What need is there any longer than that we should inquire concerning the science of disputation? For whether the figures of Geometry are in the

 34. A. It is as thou sayest, and I willingly yield compliance with thine injunctions. But this at least I would entreat, before thou decreest a term t

 35. R. Such are those who are well instructed in the liberal arts since they by learning disinter them, buried in oblivion, doubtless, within themsel

 36. These points will be treated with more pains and greater subtilty, when we shall have begun to discuss the faculty of intelligence, which part of

20. But I ask of thee, why thou dost desire, either that the persons whom thou affectest should live, or that they should live with thee. A. That together and concordantly we might inquire out God and our souls. For so, whichever first discovers aught, easily introduces his companions into it. R. What if these will not inquire? A. I would persuade them into the love of it. R. What if you could not, be it that they suppose themselves to have already found, or think that such things are beyond discovery, or that they are entangled in cares and cravings of other things? A. We will use our best endeavors, I with them, and they with me. R. What if even their presence impedes you in your inquiries? would you not choose and endeavor that they should not be with you, rather than be with you on such terms? A. I own it is as thou sayest. R. It is not therefore on its own account that you crave either their life or presence, but as an auxiliary in the discovery of wisdom? A. I thoroughly agree to that. R. Further: if you were certain that your own life were an impediment to your comprehension of wisdom, should you desire its continuance? A. I should utterly eschew it. R. Furthermore: if thou wert taught, that either in this body or after leaving it thou couldst equally well attain unto wisdom, wouldst thou care whether it was in this or another life that thou didst enjoy that which thou supremely affectest? A. If I ascertained that I was to experience nothing worse, which would lead me back from the point to which I had made progress, I should not care. R. Then thy present dread of death rests on the fear of being involved in some worse evil, whereby the Divine cognition may be borne away from thee. A. Not solely such a possible loss do I dread, if I have any right understanding of the fact, but also lest access should be barred me into those things which I am now eager to explore; although what I already possess, I believe will remain with me. R. Therefore not for the sake of this life in itself, but for the sake of wisdom thou dost desire the continuance of this life. A. It is the truth.

CAPUT XII. Nihil expetendum nisi quatenus conducit ad summum bonum, nihil horrendum nisi quatenus avocat.

20. Sed quaero abs te, cur eos homines quos diligis, vel vivere, vel tecum vivere cupias? A. Ut animas nostras et Deum simul concorditer inquiramus. Ita enim facile cui priori contingit inventio, caeteros eo sine labore perducit. R. Quid, si nolunt haec illi quaerere? A. Persuadebo ut velint. R. Quid, si non possis, vel quod se invenisse jam, vel quod ista non posse inveniri arbitrantur, vel quod aliarum rerum curis et desiderio praepediuntur? A. Habebo eos, et ipsi me, sicut possumus. R. Quid, si te ab inquirendo etiam impediat eorum praesentia? nonne laborabis atque optabis, si aliter esse non possunt, non tecum esse potius quam sic esse? A. Fateor, ita est ut dicis. R. Non igitur eorum vel vitam vel praesentiam propter seipsam, sed propter inveniendam sapientiam cupis? A. Prorsus assentior. R. Quid? ipsam vitam tuam si tibi certum esset impedimento esse ad comprehendendam sapientiam, velles eam manere? A. Omnino eam fugerem. R. Quid? si docereris, tam te relicto isto corpore, quam in ipso constitutum, posse ad sapientiam pervenire, curares utrum hic, an in alia vita eo quod diligis fruereris? A. Si nihil me pejus excepturum intelligerem, quod retroageret ab eo quo progressus sum, non curarem. R. Nunc ergo propterea mori times, ne aliquo pejore malo involvaris, quo tibi auferatur divina cognitio. A. Non solum ne auferatur timeo, si quid forte percepi, sed etiam ne intercludatur mihi aditus eorum quibus percipiendis inhio; quamvis quod jam teneo, mecum mansurum putem. R. Non igitur et vitam istam propter seipsam, sed propter sapientiam vis manere. A. Sic est.