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sun. For wisdom is in its shadow as the shadow of silver. That shadow of wisdom is that of the world. And so that I may use a scientific theorem, the shadow of the science of geometry is the diagrams. For those sensible theorems lead to science. And by "shadow" in these things he means not a sketch produced from a body 209 in this manner, but that which is before the types of the image. The shadow of an image is a kind of obscure sketch. Therefore, the one who is about to take up silver receives a shadow; I do not mean a sensible one, but the word. For in many places this too is demonstrated, that there is praiseworthy silver and blameworthy silver according to what is at hand and what is called "the tongue of the righteous." For when it is said: "The tongue of the righteous is silver refined by fire," he says that the tongue of the righteous is itself silver. For when ···ηση and energy ····· ····· ····· ·····τ̣εζεον τα̣······ησαιω ····λ̣ην to receive the spirit ····· ····· ····· ····· ··· silver ····· ·· But otherwise those who have silver are spoken of blameworthily; "Reprobate silver," it says, therefore, "call them, because the Lord has rejected them." And again: "Silver given with deceit must be regarded as a potsherd." If this is so, he utters a wise deceit, not having it thus "purified sevenfold" or sanctified, not qualified by it, as the one having such a word refined by fire.

For this one does not utter an earthly word, and one having its nature from the earth, about wisdom ······ υνοθ·····χ̣ο̣μενη. First, it partook of an earthly nature. For human wisdom is in a shadow and on the earth ····· ····· ···η is of the ············ he says that its shadow is in wisdom, as the wisdom of silver, because wisdom is in its shadow. If, therefore, wisdom is praiseworthy, its shadow is also most excellent. Since... what then is "in the shadow of wisdom"? And the one speaking in the shadow of the gospel is in the original gospel itself, or the one in the shadow of the law. And the abundance of the knowledge of wisdom will give life to the one who has it. And this is good, to always receive in progress the contemplation of wisdom. "will give life to the one who has it." For this reason it is to be preferred and is good, because it makes the one who partakes of it alive—"the one who has it," he means the one wise according to it—for wisdom is a cause of life. It never brings death to the soul. See the works of God; for who will be able to straighten what God has made crooked? Many among the Greeks also have opposed those who say the world was constituted by chance, such as Epicurus, and according to some, Democritus. 210 For they think that this world did not come from God, since they do not posit providence. Since it is entirely necessary that the one who exercises providence should provide for his own works, and God is the one who exercises providence, he provides for the world, which he himself made. Grant the rest: what he himself constructed, this he also preserves by providence, so that it may have uprightness. Some therefore object, saying: "If the world was made best, what is the use of basilisks being in it? If indeed it is granted at all that it is useful, there must be both the basilisk and the others, such as the rhinoceros." And it pleases the Epicurean for there to be blame rather than praise. For these reasons, he does away with providence altogether. But there are those who contradict those who believe this atheistic dogma. Who would have said to the world that a part of the world needs straightening? How otherwise would it have come into being? How would it have accomplished it? How could it be a world without parts? If these things, what are the parts? For they are not shown to be superfluous and excessive, if the world can be constituted from them. But we say with a plausible proof an argument that can persuade that wild beasts also have been created for uses. And these contribute to hunting. On the basis of a first common right reason, it is possible to say that all things are for human beings. Many of these contribute to their aid and ε̣····· ····· ··ν of those receiving ······· and to be about to ·· πολ···· to receive. From this can be shown the generation according to which they have come to be, so that for only

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ἥλιος. ὅτι ἐν σκιᾷ αὐτῆς ἡ σοφία ὡς σκιὰ τοῦ ἀργ̣υ̣ρ̣ίου̣. ἡ σκιὰ τῆς σοφίας ἐκείνη ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου. καὶ ἵνα καὶ θεωρήματι ε᾿̣πιστ̣η̣μονικῷ χρήσωμαι, ἡ σκιὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς γεωμετρικῆς αἱ κα̣τ̣α̣ γραφαί εἰσιν. χειραγωγοῦσιν γ̣ὰρ εἰς τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἱ θεωρίαι ἐκ̣εῖναι α̣ἱ αι᾿̣σθητικαί. σκιὰν δὲ ἐν τούτοις λέγει οὐ γραφὴν ἀποτελουμένην ἀπὸ σ̣ώματ̣ος τοῦ 209 ὧδε ἔχοντος, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸ τύπων τ̣ῆς εἰκόνος. ἡ σκιὰ δὲ εἰκόνος σκια γραφία τι´̣ς ἐστιν ᾐνιγμένη. ὁ μέλλων οὖν ἀναλαμβάνειν ἀρ̣γύριον δέχετ̣αι σκιάν· ου᾿̣ αἰσθητὸν λέγω, ἀλ̣λ̣ὰ τὸν λόγον. πολλαχοῦ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυται, ὅτι ἐπαινε̣τ̣όν ἐστιν ἀργύριον καὶ ψεκτὸν κατὰ τὸ πρόχειρον καὶ τὴν "γλῶσσαν δικαίου" λεγο´̣μενον. ὁ´̣ταν γὰρ λέγηται· "ἄργυρος πεπυρωμένος γλῶσσα δικαίου", λέγει τὴν δικαίου̣ γλῶσσαν αὐτοῦ ἄργυρον. ὅταν γὰρ ···ηση καὶ ἐνέργειαν ····· ····· ····· ·····τ̣εζεον τα̣······ησαιω ····λ̣ην λαβεῖν τὸ π̣νεῦ μα ····· ····· ····· ····· ··· ἀ´̣ργυρον ····· ·· ἄλλως δε`̣ οἱ ἔχοντες ἀργύριον ψεκτῶς λέγονται· "ἀρ̣γύριον" ο̣ὖν, φησίν, "ἀποδεδοκιμα̣σμένον καλέσατε αυ᾿̣τούς, ὅτι ἀπεδοκίμασεν αὐτοὺς κύριος". καὶ πάλιν· "ἀργύρι ον μετὰ δόλου διδόμενον ὡ´̣σπερ ὄστρακον ἡγη̣τέον". ἐὰν τοῦτο, σοφὸν δό λον προφέρει, οὐχ οὕτως "καθαρισθὲν ἑπταπλασίως" ἔχων ἢ ἡγιασμένον, οὐ κατ' αυ᾿̣τ̣ὸ πεποιωμένος, ὡς ὁ πεπυρ̣ωμένον ἔχων τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον̣.

οὑ῀̣ το̣ς γὰρ οὐ λόγον γεώδη καὶ ἐκ τῆς γ̣ῆς ἔχοντα τ̣ὴν φυ´̣σιν προ̣φέρει περὶ σοφι´̣ας ······ υνοθ·····χ̣ο̣μενη. πρῶτον μὲν γεώδη φ̣ύσ̣ιν μ̣ε̣τέ λαβεν. ἐν σκιᾷ γάρ ε᾿̣στιν ἡ σοφία ἡ ἀν̣θρωπίνη καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς̣ ····· ····· ···η ἐστιν τοῦ ············ λέγει ὅτι ἡ σκιὰ αὐτῆς ἐν σοφία, ὡς σοφία του῀̣ α᾿̣ρ̣γ̣υ̣ρ̣ι´̣ου, ὁ´̣τ̣ι ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς σκιᾷ ἡ σοφία. ἐὰν οὖν ἐπαινε τὴ ᾖν ἡ σοφία, καὶ ἡ σκιὰ αὐτῆς βέλτιστός ἐστιν. ἐπερ· τὸ οὖν "ἐν σκιᾷ σοφίας"; ὁ λέγων δὲ ἐν τῇ σκιᾷ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ὢν ἐν αὐτῷ πρωτοτύπῳ εὐαγγελίῳ ἐστὶν ἢ ὁ ἐν τῇ σκιᾷ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ περισσεία γνώσεως τῆς σοφίας ζῳοποιήσει τὸν παρ' αὐτῆς. καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν ἐστ̣ιν τὸ ἀεὶ ἀπολαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς προκοπαῖς θεω ρίας τῆς σοφίας. "ζῳοποιήσει τὸν παρ' αὐτῆς". διὰ τοῦτο προκριτέα ἐστὶν καὶ ἀγαθή, ὅτι τὸν μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ζῶντα ποιεῖ-"τὸν παρ' αὐ τῆς", τὸν κατ' αὐτὴν σοφὸν λέγει-ἡ γὰρ σοφία ζωῆς παραιτία ἐστίν. οὐ δέποτε θάνατον ψυχῇ ἐπιφέρει. ἰδὲ τὰ ποιήματα τοῦ θεοῦ· ὅτι τίς δυνήσεται τοῦ κοσμῆ σαι, ὃν ἂν ὁ θεὸς διαστρέψῃ αὐτόν; πολλοὶ καὶ παρ' Ἕλλησιν ἀντέστησαν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συνεστηκότα τὸν κόσμον λέγουσιν, οἷός ἐστιν Ἐπίκουρος, κατά τινας καὶ ∆ημόκριτος. 210 ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οἴο̣νται μὴ ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦτον το`̣ν κόσμον γεγονέναι, ἐπεὶ μὴ τίθενται πρόνοιαν. ἐπεὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν προνοούμενον τῶν ἰδίων π̣οιημάτων προνο εῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ θεός ἐστιν ο῾̣ προνοούμενος, προνοε̣ῖται τοῦ κόσμου̣, ὃν ἐποίησεν αὐτός. δίδου τὰ ἄλλα· ὃν αὐτὸς̣ κατεσκεύασεν, το̣ῦτον καὶ φυ λάττει ἐκ̣ π̣ρονοίας, ἵν' ὄρθωσι̣ν ἔχ̣ῃ. ἐνκαλοῦσιν ο̣ὖν τινες ὅτι· "ε̣ι᾿̣ ἄριστος ἐποιήθη ὁ κόσμος, τί τὸ χρήσι μον τοῦ εἶναι βασιλίσκους; ἐάν̣ γε ὅλως δοθῇ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι, δεῖ καὶ τὸν βασιλίσκον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οἷον ο῾̣ ῥινοκ̣έρως". κ̣α̣ὶ μᾶλλον ψόγον γ̣ι´̣ν̣ε σθαι ἀρέσκει τῷ ἐπικουρίζ̣οντι ἢ ἔπαινον. τούτων ἕνεκα καθόλου δὴ αἴ ρει τὴν πρόνοιαν. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ ἀντιλέγον̣τες τοῖς τοῦτο τὸ ἄθεον δόγμα̣ π̣ι̣στεύουσιν. τίς ἂν πρὸς τὸν κόσμον εἶπεν̣ ὁ´̣τι μ̣έρος τοῦ κόςμου ὀρ θώσεως δεῖται; πῶς ἂν ἄλλως ἦν γεγονὸς α̣υ᾿̣τ̣ο´̣; πῶς ἂν αὐτὸ ἠ´̣νυσ̣εν; πῶς ἂν ἐδύνατο κόσμος εἶναι ἄνευ μερῶν; ἐὰν τάδε, τίνα τὰ μέρη; οὐδὲ γὰρ δείκνυνται παρέλκοντα καὶ περισσά, ἐὰν ἐξ αὐτῶν συνστῆναι ὁ κόσμο̣ς δύνηται. λε´̣γομεν δὲ πιθανῇ ἀποδείξει πεῖσ̣αι μὲν δυναμένην αἰτίαν καὶ τὰ ἄγρια δ̣ε̣δημιουργῆσθαι̣ εἰς χρείας̣. κ̣αὶ πρὸς θήρευσιν συντελεῖ ταῦτα. ἐπὶ πρώτῳ κοινῷ ὀρθ̣ῷ λόγῳ δ̣υνατὸν λέγειν τ̣ὰ π̣άντα εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. πολλὰ ἐκ τούτ̣ων συντελεῖ πρ̣ὸς βοήθειαν ἐκ̣είνων καὶ ε̣····· ····· ··ν παραλαμβανόντω̣ν ······· καὶ μέλ̣λ̣ε̣ι̣ν̣ ·· πολ···· παραλαβει῀̣ν. ἐκ τούτου̣ δ̣υ´̣ν̣α̣τ̣αι̣ γ̣ε´̣ν̣ε̣σ̣ι̣ς̣ δηλοῦσθαι καθ' ἣν γέγοναν, ἵνα μόνοις