OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things that come to be, which is itself not something that comes to be, and another before that. If this thing that is increasing is subject to generation, and locomotion increases by the quantity of its motion, locomotion is not eternal; for the body in locomotion has different places, in which, by extending the displacement of its own parts, its movement causes the increase of the motion of locomotion. If locomotion contains its increase in the quantity of its motion, how can it be said that locomotion is prior to the motion of increase? If it is impossible for that which has not begun and is not finite to receive increase by addition, then locomotion, which is always becoming greater in the quantity of its motion, is not without a beginning. If locomotion has its being in coming to be and ceasing to be, then locomotion is not eternal, whose being is always preceded by not-being; for every motion occurs through a change of that which is not yet, but is about to be. If all locomotion is finite with respect to the past, and everything finite has by necessity also begun, and everything that has begun is subject to generation, then locomotion is subject to generation. And if the locomotion is not prior to the body being moved, then the body being moved is also subject to generation. If among eternal things one only moves, and another only is moved eternally with the motion of locomotion, how is it not among the impossible things for that which is without a beginning to be moved with a motion that has a beginning? If that without which none of the others exist is first of the others both in substance and in time, how then is it ungenerated? For it was posited that the first mover is first of all and ungenerated, and moreover that the heaven and the things in the heaven, both appearing and moving, are all ungenerated; which is absurd, to say that something ungenerated is before some eternal thing among the eternal things. If the first mover moves the continuous motion, but it moves neither the motion according to nature nor the motion contrary to nature—the former as being superfluous, as was said, and the latter as being secondary to the motion according to nature—then nothing moves the continuous motion. If, of the eternally moving things, neither is the motion prior to the things being moved, nor are the things being moved prior to the motion, and every motion is according to a change of that which is not yet but is about to be, then all things being moved will have their being from a change of that which is not yet but is about to be. If in the case of one of the things that come to be, locomotion is the last of the motions, but it is necessary for another thing moving with locomotion to be prior, which is also the cause of generation, being ungenerated, how is it possible for the same thing to be the cause of generation according to nature and of generation beyond nature? For the one who first generated was not generated. And yet the thing moved previously was moved in this way at the generation of the thing that first came to be, as it was moved later at the generation of the things from that one. Either, then, that which is thus moved ungeneratedly is not the cause of all generation, or the first mover does not move the continuous motion, since a difference of generation is observed among the things that come to be,

Τὸ δὲ ἐφ' ἑνὸς μὲν ὁτουοῦν τῶν γιγνομένων οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον πρότερόν τι κινεῖσθαι τῶν γιγνο μένων, ὂν αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ γιγνόμενον, καὶ τούτου ἕτερον πρό τερον. Eἰ τὸ αὐξανόμενον τοῦτό ἐστι γενητόν, αὐξάνει δὲ ἡ φορὰ τῷ ποσῷ τῆς κινήσεως, οὐκ ἀΐδιος ἡ φορά· τὸ γὰρ φερόμενον σῶμα ἔχει τόπους διαφόρους, ἐν οἷς κατατεῖνον τὴν μετάστασιν τῶν αὑτοῦ μερῶν φερόμενον ποιεῖ τῆς κατὰ φορὰν κινήσεως τὴν αὔξησιν. Eἰ ἐν αὑτῇ ἔχει ἡ φορὰ τῷ ποσῷ τῆς κινήσεως τὴν αὔξησιν, πῶς λέγεται ἡ φορὰ τῆς κατ' αὔξησιν κινήσεως εἶναι πρώτη; Eἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἠργμένον καὶ πεπερασμένον δέξασθαι τῇ προσθήκῃ τὴν αὔξη σιν, οὐκ ἄρα ἄναρχος ἡ φορά, τῷ ποσῷ τῆς κινήσεως ἀεὶ μείζων γινομένη. Eἰ ἡ φορὰ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογί νεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδιος ἡ φορά, ἧς ἀεὶ προη γεῖται τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἶναι· πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις κατὰ μετα βολὴν γίνεται τοῦ μήπω ὄντος, ἀλλὰ μέλλοντος. Eἰ πᾶσα φορὰ τῷ παρελθόντι πεπερασμένον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ πεπερασμέ νον πᾶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἠργμένον, τὸ δὲ ἠργμένον πᾶν γε νητόν, γενητὴ ἄρα ἡ φορά. Καὶ εἰ ἡ φορὰ τοῦ φερομένου σώματος οὐκ ἔστι προτέρα, γενητὸν ἄρα καὶ τὸ φερόμενον. Eἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τὸ μὲν μόνον κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ μόνον κινεῖται ἀϊδίως τὴν κατὰ φορὰν κίνησιν, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ἄναρχον ἠργμένην κινεῖσθαι κίνησιν; Eἰ τὸ οὗ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο οὐσίᾳ τε καὶ χρόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων πρῶ τόν ἐστι, πῶς οὖν ἐστιν ἀγένητον; Ἐτέθη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν πάντων πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητον, ἔτι δὲ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ φαινόμενά τε καὶ κινούμενα εἶναι ἀγέ νητα πάντα· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον, τὸ λέγειν ἀγένητόν τι εἶναι πρό τινος ἀϊδίου ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις. Eἰ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν τὴν συνεχομένην κίνησιν κινεῖ, κινεῖ δὲ οὔτε τὴν κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, ἐκείνην μὲν ὡς περιττήν, καθὼς ἐῤ ῥέθη, ταύτην δὲ ὡς δευτέραν οὖσαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως, οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖ τὴν συνεχῆ κίνησιν οὐδέν. Eἰ τῶν ἀϊδίων κινουμένων οὔτε ἡ κίνησις προτέρα τῶν κινουμένων, οὔτε τὰ κινούμενα πρότερα τῆς κινήσεως, ἔστι δὲ ἡ κίνησις πᾶσα κατὰ μεταβολὴν τοῦ μήπω ὄντος ἀλλὰ μέλλοντος, ἔσται ἄρα τὰ κινούμενα πάντα ἐκ μεταβολῆς τοῦ μήπω ὄντος, ἀλλὰ μέλλοντος, τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα. Eἰ ἐφ' ἑνὸς τῶν γινομένων ἡ φορὰ ὑστάτη τῶν κινήσεων, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἕτερον κινούμενον κατὰ φορὰν εἶναι πρότερον, ὃ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἴτιον ἀγέ νητον ὄν, πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν γενέσεως αἴτιον εἶναι, καὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν γενέσεως; Ὁ γὰρ πρώ τως γεννήσας οὐκ ἐγεννήθη. Καίτοι τὸ πρότερον κινού μενον οὕτως ἐκινεῖτο ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως τοῦ πρώτως γινομέ νου, ὡς ὕστερον ἐκινήθη ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνου. Ἢ ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον τῆς πάσης γενέσεως τὸ οὕτως κι νούμενον ἀγενήτως, ἢ οὐ κινεῖ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν τὴν συνεχῆ κίνησιν, διαφορᾶς γενέσεως ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις θεωρουμένης,