of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did he declare what seemed best to him. But coming to this present response, in which he attempts to show the world is ungenerated, he first mentions the ancients, who said the world was generated; whom he said were worthy of just blame, for having said the world was generated, if they had not by their other statements overturned their own statements, which said the world was generated. But this is not an acquittal from just blame, but rather productive of great and just blame, to posit both the affirmation and the negation on the generation of the world, and for them to fight themselves with their own words. And let these things have been said for a refutation of the respondent's not having justly used statements that fight with one another, for the purpose of a proof establishing that the world is ungenerated. But let us examine those statements of the ancients, in which they demonstrably declare the world to be ungenerated, as the respondent says. For, he says, that also from this argument the world is shown to be ungenerated, and this is surely clear to everyone. But if someone should wish to say that some of the ancients call the world generated, if they pay attention to the words superficially, they would justly blame those who say this; but if they will understand accurately the depth of what was said, they will find accurately and clearly that these men declare the world to be ungenerated. For they themselves, saying that both the paradigmatic and the efficient cause are ungenerated, it is clear that they also clearly declare the world, being a creation of these, to be ungenerated. If it is established by the ancients that the world is generated, and understood superficially the established text remains unchanged, but understood deeply it changes into its opposite, why did the respondent not, using the paradigmatic and efficient cause, which is established by the ancients, with similar attentions of the superficial to the deep that change to the opposite, change the generated world, which is established by the ancients, into the ungenerated, so that he might free from just blame those who said this? But if it is absurd to do this, one must understand the words of the ancients by the natures of the things, and not by different attentions that change what is established into its opposite. If the paradigm is one thing and that which is according to the paradigm is another (for the paradigm is simple, but that which is according to the paradigm is composite), and that which is thus one thing and another is of necessity at one time and another time, and that which is at one time and another time, before and after, cannot exist at the same time by nature, therefore the paradigm and that which is according to the paradigm are not simultaneous by nature. The respondent at one time says the world is the common creation of both the paradigmatic and the efficient cause, and says: It is clear that also the world, being a creation of these; but at another time, a creation of the efficient cause, but an image of the paradigmatic one. And

γνωρίμων τοῦ κόσμου ἐδογμάτισε τὴν ἀγενεσίαν, οὔτε διὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ταύτην ἔθηκεν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν αὐθεντίαν τὸ δοκοῦν αὑτῷ ἀπεφήνατο. Ἐλθὼν δὲ εἰς τὴν παροῦσαν ταύτην ἀπόκρισιν, ἐν ᾗ πειρᾶται δεῖξαι τὸν κόσμον ἀγένητον, πρῶτον μέμνηται τῶν παλαιῶν, γενητὸν εἰρηκό των τὸν κόσμον· οὓς δικαίας μέμψεως ἔλεξεν ἀξίους, γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον εἰρηκότας, εἰ μὴ ταῖς ἑτέραις αὑτῶν φωναῖς τὰς οἰκείας αὑτῶν φωνὰς ἀνέτρεψαν, λεγούσας τὸν κόσμον γενητόν. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ δικαίας ἐστὶ μέμψεως ἀπαλλακτικόν, ἀλλὰ ποιητικὸν μᾶλλον τῆς μεγάλης καὶ δικαίας μέμψεως, τὸ θεῖ ναι ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως τὴν φάσιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, καὶ τὸ τοῖς οἰκείοις λόγοις μάχεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω εἰς ἔλεγχον τοῦ μὴ δικαίως κεχρῆσθαι τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον ταῖς ἀλλήλαις μαχομέναις φωναῖς, πρὸς ἀπό δειξιν συστατικὴν τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι ἀγένητον. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐξετάσωμεν τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἐκείνων φωνάς, ἐν αἷς δε δειγμένως τὸν κόσμον ἀγένητον ἀποφαίνουσι, καθά φησιν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος. Ὅτι δέ, φησί, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου δείκνυται ὁ κό σμος ἀγένητος, καὶ τοῦτο παντί που δῆλον. Ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τις ἐθέλοι λέγειν ὥς τινες τῶν παλαιῶν τὸν κόσμον γενητὸν καλοῦσιν, εἰ μὲν ἐπιπολαίως προσέχουσι τοῖς λόγοις, μέμ ψοιντο ἂν δικαίως τοὺς τοῦτο λέγοντας· εἰ δὲ τὸ βάθος κατα νοήσουσιν ἀκριβῶς τῶν λεχθέντων, εὑρήσουσιν ἀκριβῶς καὶ σαφῶς ἀγένητον τούτους τὸν κόσμον ἀποφαινομένους. Aὐτοὶ γάρ, λέγοντες τήν τε παραδειγματικὴν καὶ ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν ἀγένητον εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν κόσμον, δημιούργημα τού των ὄντα, σαφῶς ἀγένητον ἀποφαίνουσιν. Eἰ κεῖται τοῖς πα λαιοῖς τὸ γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, καὶ ἐπιπολαίως μὲν νοούμενον τὸ κείμενον μένει ἀμετάβλητον, βαθέως δὲ νοού μενον εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον μεταπίπτει, διὰ τί μὴ τὴν παρα δειγματικήν τε καὶ ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν κειμένην τοῖς πα λαιοῖς, ταῖς ὁμοίαις προσοχαῖς τοῦ ἐπιπολαίως τῷ βαθέως χρησαμένου εἰς ἀντικείμενον μεταβαλλομέναις χρησάμενος ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος τὸν γενητὸν κόσμον, τὸν κείμενον τοῖς παλαιοῖς, εἰς τὸν ἀγένητον μετέβαλεν, ἵνα τοὺς τοῦτο εἰρηκότας δικαίας μέμψεως ἀπαλλάξῃ; Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἄτοπον, χρὴ ταῖς τῶν πραγμάτων φύσεσι νοῆσαι τῶν παλαιῶν τοὺς λόγους, καὶ μὴ ταῖς διαφόροις προσοχαῖς μεταβαλλούσαις τὰ κείμενα εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα. Eἰ ἄλλο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ ἄλλο τὸ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα (ἁπλοῦν γὰρ τὸ παράδειγμα, σύνθετον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα), τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄλ λοτε καὶ ἄλλοτε, τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἄλλοτε, πρότερον καὶ ὕστε ρον, οὐ δύναται ἅμα εἶναι τῇ φύσει, οὐκ ἄρα ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα. Ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ποτὲ μὲν κοινὸν δημιούργημα λέγει τὸν κόσμον τῆς τε παρα δειγματικῆς αἰτίας καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς, καί φησι· ∆ῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν κόσμον, δημιούργημα τούτων ὄντα· ποτὲ δὲ τῆς μὲν ποιητικῆς δημιούργητα, τῆς δὲ παραδειγματικῆς εἰκόνα. Καὶ