Chapter XXI.

What, then, is justice? We distinctly remember what in the course of our argument we said in the commencement of this treatise; namely, that man was fashioned in imitation of the Divine nature, preserving his resemblance to the Deity as well in other excellences as in possession of freedom of the will, yet being of necessity of a nature subject to change. For it was not possible that a being who derived his origin from an alteration should be altogether free from this liability. For the passing from a state of non-existence into that of existence is a kind of alteration; when being, that is, by the exercise of Divine power takes the place of nonentity. In the following special respect, too, alteration is necessarily observable in man, namely, because man was an imitation of the Divine nature, and unless some distinctive difference had been occasioned, the imitating subject would be entirely the same as that which it resembles; but in this instance, it is to be observed, there is a difference between that which “was made in the image” and its pattern; namely this, that the one is not subject to change, while the other is (for, as has been described, it has come into existence through an alteration), and being thus subject to alteration does not always continue in its existing state. For alteration is a kind of movement ever advancing from the present state to another; and there are two forms of this movement; the one being ever towards what is good, and in this the advance has no check, because no goal of the course to be traversed61    of the course to be traversed: τοῦ διεξοδευομένου. Glauber remarks that the Latin translation here, “ejus qui transit,” gives no sense, and rightly takes the word as a passive. Krabinger also translates, “ejus quod evolvitur.” Here again there is unconscious Platonism: αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν is eternal. can be reached, while the other is in the direction of the contrary, and of it this is the essence, that it has no subsistence; for, as has been before stated, the contrary state to goodness conveys some such notion of opposition, as when we say, for instance, that that which is is logically opposed to that which is not, and that existence is so opposed to non-existence. Since, then, by reason of this impulse and movement of changeful alteration it is not possible that the nature of the subject of this change should remain self-centred and unmoved, but there is always something towards which the will is tending, the appetency for moral beauty naturally drawing it on to movement, this beauty is in one instance really such in its nature, in another it is not so, only blossoming with an illusive appearance of beauty; and the criterion of these two kinds is the mind that dwells within us. Under these circumstances it is a matter of risk whether we happen to choose the real beauty, or whether we are diverted from its choice by some deception arising from appearance, and thus drift away to the opposite; as happened, we are told in the heathen fable, to the dog which looked askance at the reflection in the water of what it carried in its mouth, but let go the real food, and, opening its mouth wide to swallow the image of it, still hungered. Since, then, the mind has been disappointed in its craving for the real good, and diverted to that which is not such, being persuaded, through the deception of the great advocate and inventor of vice, that that was beauty which was just the opposite (for this deception would never have succeeded, had not the glamour of beauty been spread over the hook of vice like a bait),—the man, I say, on the one hand, who had enslaved himself by indulgence to the enemy of his life, being of his own accord in this unfortunate condition,—I ask you to investigate, on the other hand, those qualities which suit and go along with our conception of the Deity, such as goodness, wisdom, power, immortality, and all else that has the stamp of superiority. As good, then, the Deity entertains pity for fallen man; as wise He is not ignorant of the means for his recovery; while a just decision must also form part of that wisdom; for no one would ascribe that genuine justice to the absence of wisdom.

[21] Τίς οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη; μεμνήμεθα πάντως τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τοῦ λόγου διῃρημένων ὅτι μίμημα τῆς θείας φύσεως κατεσκευάσθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τοῖς τε λοιποῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ τῆς προαιρέσεως τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον διασώζων ὁμοίωσιν, τρεπτῆς δὲ φύσεως ὢν κατ' ἀνάγκην: οὐ γὰρ ἐνεδέχετο τὸν ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι σχόντα μὴ τρεπτὸν εἶναι πάντως: ἡ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδος ἀλλοίωσίς τίς ἐστι, τῆς ἀνυπαρξίας κατὰ θείαν δύναμιν εἰς οὐσίαν μεθισταμένης, καὶ ἄλλως δὲ τῆς τροπῆς ἀναγκαίως ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρουμένης, ἐπειδὴ μίμημα τῆς θείας φύσεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦν: τὸ δὲ μιμούμενον, εἰ μὴ ἐν ἑτερότητι τύχοι τινί, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη πάντως ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ ἀφωμοίωται. ἐν τούτῳ τοίνυν τῆς ἑτερότητος τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα γενομένου πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον οὔσης, ἐν τῷ τὸ μὲν ἄτρεπτον εἶναι τῇ φύσει, τὸ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀλλοιώσεως μὲν ὑποστῆναι κατὰ τὸν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον, ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ μὴ πάντως ἐν τῷ εἶναι μένειν: ἡ δὲ ἀλλοίωσις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν εἰς ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν εἰς ἀεὶ προιοῦσα: δύο δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης εἴδη κινήσεως: τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον, ἐν ᾧ ἡ πρόοδος στάσιν οὐκ ἔχει, διότι πέρας οὐδὲν τοῦ διεξοδευομένου καταλαμβάνεται: τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον, οὗ ἡ ὑπόστασις ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑφεστάναι ἐστίν: ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐναντίωσις, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται, τοιοῦτόν τινα νοῦν κατὰ τὴν ἀντιδιαστολὴν ἔχει, καθάπερ φαμὲν τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν ἀντιδιαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τῇ ἀνυπαρξίᾳ τὴν ὕπαρξιν: ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κατὰ τὴν τρεπτήν τε καὶ ἀλλοιώτην ὁρμήν τε καὶ κίνησιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν φύσιν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μένειν ἀκίνητον, ἀλλ' ἐπί τι πάντως ἡ προαίρεσις ἵεται, τῆς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἐπιθυμίας αὐτὴν φυσικῶς ἐφελκομένης εἰς κίνησιν: καλὸν δὲ τὸ μέν τι ἀληθῶς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστί, τὸ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐπηνθισμένον τινὶ καλοῦ φαντασίᾳ: κριτήριον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς, ἔνδοθεν ἡμῖν ἐνιδρυμένος, ἐν ᾧ κινδυνεύεται ἢ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν τοῦ ὄντως καλοῦ, ἢ τὸ παρατραπέντας αὐτοῦ διά τινος τῆς κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀπάτης ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἡμᾶς ἀπορρυῆναι, οἷόν τι παθεῖν ὁ ἔξωθεν μῦθός φησιν ἀπιδοῦσαν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τὴν κύνα πρὸς τὴν σκιὰν οὗ διὰ στόματος ἔφερε, μεθεῖναι μὲν τὴν ἀληθῆ τροφήν, περιχανοῦσαν δὲ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς εἴδωλον ἐν λιμῷ γενέσθαι: ἐπεὶ οὖν τῆς πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθὸν ἐπιθυμίας διαψευσθεὶς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν παρηνέχθη, δι' ἀπάτης τοῦ τῆς κακίας συμβούλου τε καὶ εὑρετοῦ καλὸν ἀναπεισθεὶς εἶναι τὸ τῷ καλῷ ἐναντίον: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐνήργησεν ἡ ἀπάτη, μὴ δελέατος δίκην τῷ τῆς κακίας ἀγκίστρῳ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασίας περιπλασθείσης: ἐν ταύτῃ τοίνυν γεγονότος ἑκουσίως τῇ συμφορᾷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἑαυτὸν δι' ἡδονῆς τῷ ἐχθρῷ τῆς ζωῆς ὑποζεύξαντος, πάντα μοι κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀναζήτει τὰ ταῖς θείαις ὑπολήψεσι πρέποντα, τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ σοφόν, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ δυνατόν, τὸ ἄφθαρτον καὶ εἴ τι τῆς τοῦ κρείττονος σημασίας ἐστίν. οὐκοῦν ὡς ἀγαθὸς οἶκτον λαμβάνει τοῦ διαπεπτωκότος, ὡς σοφὸς οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἀνακλήσεως. σοφίας δ' ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις: οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἀφροσύνῃ τὴν ἀληθῆ δικαιοσύνην προσάψειεν.