CHAP. XX. ----A reply to those who say that the whole world, including man, was made not for man, but for the irrational creatures; for the irrational creatures live with less toil than men; further, that they are wiser than we are, and are both dear to God, and have a conception of God, and foreknow the future; wherein we shall also oppose transmigration of souls, and have something to say concerning augury and the trickery connected with it. From Book IV. against Celsus.

1. He, Celsus I mean, then says, "But, not to confine my remarks to the Jews, for that is not my aim, but that I may deal with the whole of nature, as I promised, I will explain more clearly what I have said." What modest man who reads this and is conscious of human weakness, would not shrink from the offensiveness of a man who promises to give an account of the whole of nature, and so pretentious as Celsus in daring to give such a title to his book? Let us see, then, what it is he promises to tell us about the whole of nature, and what light he throws upon the subject.

2. Well, he proceeds to blame us at great length for alleging that God has made all things for man. And, drawing on the stories of animals and the sagacity they show, he wishes to prove that everything exists no more for the sake of men than for the sake of the irrational creatures. Here he seems to me to talk like those men who from hatred of the people they dislike, blame them for the very qualities for which their own friends are praised. For as enmity so blinds these men that they are not aware of accusing their friends when they think they are abusing their enemies: the same way, Celsus in this confusion of thought has not seen that he is blaming the Philosophers of the Porch, inasmuch as not unwisely they give man the first place, and in general prefer rational nature to all irrational beings, and maintain that for the sake of the rational creation chiefly, Providence has made everything. And rational creatures, inasmuch as they are the leading objects of Providence, are regarded as children begotten; but irrational and lifeless creatures are like the after-birth.391 I moreover think that as in our towns the inspectors of provisions and of the market exercise their office only for the sake of men, but even dogs and other irrational creatures enjoy the abundance as well: so Providence chiefly provides for the rational creatures, but it follows also that the irrational creatures enjoy what exists for the sake of men. And as a man is in error if he says that the clerks of the markets provide no more for men than dogs, for that the dogs as well as men enjoy the abundance of what is on sale: so Celsus and they who are of his mind are much more guilty of impiety towards God, "Who provides for the rational creatures; for they pretend to ask. "What more is done for man's support than for plants, and trees, and roots,392 and thorns?"

3. For, in the first place, now more clearly showing his Epicurean views, he thinks that "thunder and lightning and rain are not works of God." And, secondly, he says that "if one were to grant that these are works of God, they exist no more for us men than they do for plants, and trees, and roots, and thorns"; thus, like a true Epicurean, allowing that they are the result of chance and not designed by Providence. If they are no more useful to men than they are to plants, and trees, roots, and thorns, it is clear that they are not the gift of Providence, or that they come from a Providence which no more provides for us than for trees, or a root, or a thorn. But the impiety is obvious whichever way you take it; and it is silly to oppose such views by withstanding a man who accuses us of impiety; for any one may see, from what has been said, who it is that is guilty of impiety. Then he adds, "Even if you say that these (he clearly means the plants, trees, roots, and thorns) grow for men, what reason is there for saying that they grow more for the sake of men than for the sake of the wildest irrational creatures?" I wish Celsus would tell us plainly that the great variety in the produce of the earth is not the work of Providence, but that a fortuitous concourse of atoms is the cause of so many qualities, and that we are indebted to chance for so many kinds of plants, and trees, and grass,393 resembling one another; and that no reason designed them to begin with, and that they do not spring from an infinitely marvellous understanding. But we Christian people, who are dedicated to the service of the Creator of these things, the only God, even herein find motives for gratitude to the Maker of them all, because He prepared so fair a home for us, and, for our sakes, for the animals which serve us; "He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man: that he may bring forth food out of the earth; and wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread that strengtheneth man's heart." 394 And if He also prepared food for the most savage beasts, it is no wonder; for these beasts, as some philosophers have maintained, were meant to be a training school for the rational creature. And one of our wise men somewhere says, "Say not, what is this? wherefore is that? for all things have been made for their uses"; and, "Say not, what is this? wherefore is that? for at time convenient they shall be sought out." 395

4. After this, Celsus wishing to show that Providence has not made the things that grow upon the earth any more for us than for the most savage beasts, says, "We wear ourselves out with unceasing toil, and yet with all our labour hardly get a living; but everything grows for the beasts without their ploughing and sowing." 396 He does not see that because God wished man's intelligence everywhere to find a field for exercise, so that it might not remain idle and without some conception of the arts, He made man a creature of many wants, intending him to be driven by his very necessities to discover various arts, some for his sustenance, others for his protection. For it was better that men who were not likely to search and study Divine things should be in want, so that they should have to use their understanding in discovering these various arts, than that they should through abundance altogether neglect their understanding. One result of the scarcity of the necessaries of life was agriculture, another vine-dressing, another the different styles of gardening, another the crafts of the carpenter and the smith, which furnish tools to the arts which minister to man's sustenance. And the want of protection brought weaving, which followed wool-carding and spinning, and also building; and thus man's intelligence rose even to architecture. And the lack of necessaries led also to the transport of commodities from certain places, through seamanship and the shipmaster's skill, to those who were without them; so that for these reasons, as well as others, a man might marvel at Providence for having made the rational creature, to its advantage, more necessitous than the irrational creatures. For the irrational creatures have their food prepared for them, because they have no means of cultivating the arts; and they have a natural protection, for they are covered with hair, or wings, or horny scales, or shells.

5. But some advocate of the dignity of man, he tells us, may object that the irrational creatures were created for man's sake. "If any one should call us lords of creation because we hunt and feast on the other creatures, we will ask in return, Is it not nearer the truth to say that we exist for their sakes, because they hunt and devour us? The fact is we must have nets and weapons, and a lot of men, and dogs, to assist us in our sport, while nature gave them their own weapons as soon as they were born, thus making us an easy prey to them." Now here, again, you see how the gift of understanding is a great help to us, and better than any weapon which the wild beasts seem to have. We, at any rate, though our bodily strength is far less than that of the animals, and very far less than that of some of them, gain the mastery over them through our understanding, and hunt even such huge beasts as elephants. Some animals which were intended by nature to be domesticated, we tame by our gentleness; but in dealing with those which cannot be domesticated, or which it would appear useless to domesticate, we consult our own safety, and when we like we keep them shut up, or when we want them for food we , just as we do the animals that are not wild. So then, the Creator has made all things to serve the rational creature, and to be in subjection to his rational intelligence. We want dogs for such purposes as guarding the flocks, or cattle, or herds of goats, or our houses; and cattle for tilling the land; while we use other beasts for drawing vehicles or carrying loads. So we may say that lions and bears, pards and boars, and all such animals, are given to us to exercise and develop our manhood.

6. Then, in defiance of mankind, who perceive their own superiority over the irrational creatures, he says, "In reply to your contention, that God has given us the power to capture and make full use of the wild beasts, we shall take up this position. It is probable that before towns were built, or crafts invented, or such-like social arrangements were made, before weapons and nets were devised, men were carried off and devoured by the wild beasts, while the beasts were only by the rarest chance captured by men." Now, in answer to this, observe that even though men capture the beasts and the beasts carry off men, there is a wide difference between men who prevail by intelligence, and the beasts whose savage and cruel nature gives them the mastery over men, and who do not use their intelligence to secure safety from them. When Celsus makes the remark about a time when there were no towns, nor arts, nor such means of social , he must, I think, have forgotten what he said before to the effect that "the world was uncreated and incorruptible, and that only the dwellers upon earth were exposed to deluges and conflagrations, and that their misfortunes did not end there." 397 As it is not for those who suppose the world to be eternal to talk of its beginning, so neither may they speak of a time when there were no towns of any sort and arts had not been discovered. Now, for argument's sake, let us allow that he and we are herein agreed, though he is not at all consistent with himself in what he said before. But has this anything at all to do with men's being at the first captured and eaten by the wild beasts, while as yet the beasts were not captured by men? Certainly, if the world came into being through the wisdom of Providence, and God is ruler over all, the small sparks 398 of the human race must at first have been guarded by a higher power, so that at first there was between the Divine Nature and men. The poet of Ascra 399 thought so, for he said----

"Then the feasts were common, and seats 400 common, 

To immortal gods and mortal men."

7. And the Divine Word according to Moses, introducing the first men, makes them hear a more Divine voice, and oracles, and sometimes see the angels of God coming to visit them. It is surely probable that at the beginning of the world human nature received more assistance than afterwards; until such time as, having advanced in understanding, and the other manly qualities, and having discovered various arts, men were able to live independent lives, and did not continually need guardians and governors, with miraculous manifestation of the service rendered to the will of God. It is consequently false to say that at the beginning "men were caught and eaten by the beasts, but the beasts were hardly ever captured by men." And this shows the falsity also of what Celsus thus expresses: "So that in this respect at least God subjected men to the beasts, rather than beasts to men." For God did not subject men to the beasts, but God gave the beasts to be taken by the intelligence of men, and by the arts which intelligence suggests for their destruction. For not without God's help did men devise the means of saving themselves from the beasts, and of maintaining their dominion over them.

8. The noble critic, overlooking the fact that so many philosophers bring Providence into their arguments and affirm that it does everything for the sake of the rational creatures, does his best to destroy 401 their doctrines, which are of use in showing the agreement of Christian teaching and philosophy in these respects; nor does he perceive what an injury and hindrance it is to piety to accept the view that with God there is no difference between man and ants or bees. Because he does not observe this, Celsus says: "If men seem to excel the irrational creatures, inasmuch as they dwell in towns, and have some form of government, and magistracies, and authorities, it is nothing to the purpose, for ants and bees have all this as well. Bees, at any rate, have their queen with her followers and attendants; they have also their wars and victories and capture the vanquished; they have their towns and even suburbs, the division of labour, and courts for trying the idle and bad members of the community; anyway, they drive the drones away and punish them." Now here, again, Celsus has not seen where the difference lies between what is accomplished by thought and reason, and what results from an irrational nature and a creature's mere make. No original gift of reason in the creatures accounts for these doings, for they have not reason; but the Most Ancient One, He Who is both Son of God and King of the subject universe, has created an irrational nature which by its very lack of reason helps the creatures not deemed worthy of reason. Towns, then, arose among men along with many arts and a legal system; and forms of government, and magistracies, and human authorities, whether those which are properly so called because they secure good habits and activities, or those less properly so named, according as the former are imitated as far as possible; for it was by contemplating these habits and activities that legislators succeeded in establishing the best forms of government, magistracies, and authorities. But nothing like this can be found among the irrational creatures, though Celsus may transfer to ants and bees the names derived from reason, and institutions based on reason, "town," "government," "magistracies," "authorities." Even so we must not receive 402 ants or bees, for they do not reason when they thus act; but we must admire the Divine nature, extending as it does to irrational creatures what I may call the imitation of the rational, perhaps to put rational creatures to the blush; so that when they look at the ants, they may become more diligent and may husband their own blessings better; and when they observe the bees, they may obey their authorities, and may take their share in such duties of government as tend to promote the welfare of the citizens.

9. Perhaps the so-called "wars" of bees are intended as a lesson in just and regular warfare among men, if the necessity should arise. And bees have no "towns" and "suburbs"; but their hives and hexagonal cells, their works, and their division of labour, are for the sake of men, who require honey for many purposes, for the healing of their bodies and for wholesome food. And we must not compare the treatment of the drones by the bees to the courts for prosecuting the idlers and bad characters in our towns, and to the punishments inflicted on them. But, as I said before, while we must admire the nature of the bees in these respects, we must allow that man is able to consider the details of everything, and to arrange everything, for he co-operates with Providence, and not only accomplishes the works of God's Providence, but also those of his own foresight. 

10. After speaking of bees, so that as far as possible he may disparage the towns, forms of government, magistracies, authorities, and patriotic warfare, not only of us Christians but of mankind generally, Celsus proceeds to introduce an elaborate eulogy of ants, in order that by thus eulogising the ants he may upset the superiority of man in the management of his food supplies, and show his contempt for the provision which man makes for his winter quarters, as being nothing more than the irrational foresight of the ants where Celsus thinks they show it. Would not Celsus, so far as it depends upon him, turn any one of the simpler sort, and such as are not qualified to look into things all round, from helping a heavily-laden fellow-man, and from sharing his toil, by telling us that the ants when they see a fellow-ant labouring with a load help him to carry it? He who needs the instruction of the Word, and does not by any means give ear to it, will say, "It seems we are no better than the ants even when we help those who are weary with their heavy burdens; why go on doing so to no purpose?" Ants, indeed, since they are irrational creatures, would not be puffed up with pride because their works were compared to those of men; but men being able to learn through reason how their social life is belittled, might, if it depended on Celsus and his arguments, suffer injury; for Celsus does not see that in wishing to turn his readers from Christianity, he is also diverting the sympathy of those who are not Christians from the most heavily laden of his fellow-men. If he were a public-spirited philosopher, he ought not only to refrain from destroying at the same time both Christianity and the beneficent practices of human life, but he should, if possible, support the excellence which Christianity has in common with the rest of mankind. Supposing, however, that the ants do tear off the shoots of the corn they have in store, to prevent its swelling, so that it may last through the year for food, we must not imagine that this is the result of reasoning in ants, but must rather believe that Nature, mother of all things, has so constituted even irrational creatures as not to leave even the least without some trace of Nature's reason. It cannot be that Celsus----in a moment of forgetfulness, for in many things he likes to follow Plato----wishes to indicate that all souls are of the same kind, and that the soul of man no way differs from that of ants and bees; that would be not only to bring down the soul from the vaults of heaven to the human body, but also to everything else. Christians will not assent to these views, for they have already grasped the truth that man's soul was made in the image of God; and they see that it is impossible for a nature created in the image of God to altogether obliterate its characteristics, and take others, copies of I know not what, in irrational creatures.

11. And since Celsus says also that "when ants die the survivors choose a burial ground, and that there they have their family memorials," I must answer that the more he praises the irrational creatures, so much the more, in spite of himself, he exalts the work of that reason which ordered 403 all things, and shows the cleverness of man, which is able by reason to order the natural advantages of the irrational creatures. Why do I say "irrational," seeing that Celsus thinks that the creatures so named by the general consent of mankind are not irrational? Nor does he who promised to discuss the whole range of nature, and boasted of his truthfulness in the title of his book, think that ants, at all events, are without reason. For he speaks of ants talking to one another, and makes the following remarks: "It really is a fact that when they meet they talk to one another, and this is why they never miss their way; so then they have a full measure of reason, and some general notions, and a voice, know what accidents are, and express what they mean." It is indeed true that when two persons talk to one another they use a voice which expresses some meaning, and frequently describes what are called "accidents"; but would it not be very ridiculous to say we find that sort of thing in ants?

12. And he is not ashamed to add (that he may fully show the indecency of his opinions to those who shall come after him), "Come! if one were to look down from heaven upon the earth, what difference would there seem to be between the doings of us men and those of ants and bees?" Now picture a spectator looking down from heaven, as Celsus supposes, and seeing the doings of men and ants: does he look upon the bodies of men and ants, and not perceive that in men the ruling principle is rational and set in action by reasoning power, and that, on the contrary, in ants the ruling principle is irrational, set in action without the help of reason, by impulse and fancy, along with some secret contrivance of nature? But it is absurd to suppose that any one who saw from heaven what is done upon earth should wish to look upon the bodies of men and ants from such a distance, and not be much more desirous to see the nature of the ruling principles and the source of impulses, whether rational or irrational. And if he once sees the source of all impulses, he will of course see also the difference, and the superiority of man not only to ants but also to elephants. For the spectator from heaven will discover in the irrational creatures, whatever their size, no other principle than, if I may so call it, irrationality; while in the rational creatures he will see reason, the common property of all men, and of beings heavenly and Divine, and perhaps also of the Supreme God Himself; and it is on account of reason that man is said to have been made in the image of God, for reason is the image of the Supreme God Himself. 404

13. Next, as if he were doing his utmost to degrade the human race and make it resemble irrational natures, and as if he were reluctant to give up anything at all related of irrational creatures which shows their dignity, he says that some of them have magical powers as well as men; so that not even in this respect can men claim special distinction, or dream of having superiority over the brute creation. This is what he tells us: "If men pique themselves on magic, the fact is that serpents and eagles are wiser than men in this respect also; they, at all events, are acquainted with many antidotes and means of averting mischief, and specially with the virtue of certain stones in saving their nestlings; when men come upon these stones they think they have got hold of something wonderful." Now, in the first place, I cannot understand how he applies the name "magic" to the, shall we say? experience, or kind of instinct the animals have in using the antidotes which nature provides, for the name has another familiar application; it may be that he forgets himself, and, like a true Epicurean, wishes to disparage the use of such arts altogether because it belongs to the profession of magic. However, let us grant that men do pride themselves on their knowledge of these things, whether they are magicians or not. Does it follow that serpents are wiser on this showing than men, because they use fennel to clear their sight and quicken their movements, the truth being that they take this natural remedy not because they calculate (the effect), but because they are so constituted? Men do not arrive at such methods, like serpents, through the mere promptings of nature, but partly by experiment, partly by reason, and sometimes by calculation and by following the rules of science. Even supposing that eagles do find and carry to the nest what is called the "eagle stone" to keep their nestlings safe, does it follow that eagles are wise, or wiser than men, who because they have the faculty of reason, discover by experiment what is given to the eagles as a natural remedy, and use it intelligently? Suppose that other antidotes come to be known by the animals, is this any proof that in them it is not nature but reason that makes the discovery? If reason made the discovery, there would not have been one discovery, or two or three, confined to snakes, and something different among eagles, and so on with the other creatures; the discoveries would have been as numerous as they are among men. But the fact that the remedies are exclusively adapted to the particular nature of each animal, shows that the animals have not wisdom or reason, but that for their good they are naturally disposed to such remedies through the creative power of the Divine reason.405

14. If, indeed, I wished to join issue with Celsus on these lines, I might quote the words of Solomon in the Proverbs: "There be four things which be little upon the earth, but they are exceedingly wise: the ants are a people not strong, yet they provide their meat in the summer; the conies are but a feeble folk, yet make they their houses in the rocks; the locusts have no king, yet go they forth all of them by bands at one word of command; the lizard taketh hold with her hands, and though easily taken, yet is she in the strongholds of kings." 406 But the words are not clear, and I therefore do not avail myself of them; in accordance with the title of the book (it is called "Proverbs ") I regard them as "dark sayings" and look for the meaning. For the inspired writers are wont to distinguish the many ways of conveying a deeper meaning than the literal, and one of them is the Proverb. Hence it is that even in our Gospels our Saviour is reported to have said, "These things have I spoken unto you in proverbs: the hour cometh when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs." 407 Now it is not the ants we see that are wiser than the wise, but the ants proverbially indicated. And we say the same of the other animals. But Celsus thinks the books of Jesus and Christians are very simple common-place productions, and he supposes that they who treat them allegorically do violence to the meaning of the writers. Let this suffice to show how futile it is for Celsus to slander us; and let it be the reputation of his argument to prove that snakes and eagles are wiser than men.

15. And wishing to show at still greater length that even man's conceptions of God are no more remarkable than the mortal side of his nature, but that some of the irrational creatures have thoughts of God, concerning Whom the acutest thinkers everywhere, Greek and Barbarian, have entertained such discordant opinions, he says, "If man because he has got hold of some Divine thoughts is supposed to surpass other animals, let me remind those who are of this opinion that many other animals will put in a claim to the same thing; and with very good reason; for what is more Divine than to foreknow and foreshow the future? Well, men learn the art from other animals, and specially from birds; and as many as profess to know what they point out are Soothsayers. Now, if birds, or any other oracular creatures gifted by God with foreknowledge, teach us by signs, it seems that they have naturally a closer with God, and are wiser than men and dearer to God. And intelligent men tell us that the birds have their assemblies, obviously more sacred than ours; and, further, that somehow or other they discover what the birds say, and that they give real proof of the discovery whenever they previously declare what the birds said, viz. that the birds would go away to some place and do this and that, and then show that the birds did go there and do what they foretold. And as for elephants, nothing could surpass their fidelity to oaths or be truer to Divine things, just because, I suppose, they have some knowledge of God." Now, here observe how often he begs the question, and takes for granted what is still speculative matter, the fact being that both Greeks and Barbarians have either discovered, or learned from certain demons, the ways of birds and other creatures, from which they are said to derive their powers of divination. In the first place, it is open to question whether there is any such art of augury, and, in general, any basis for divination by means of animals, or not. Secondly, among those who admit that there is an art of divination through birds, it is not agreed as to why the divination takes that form; for some say that it is from demons or gods of divination that the animals receive their impulses, the birds to different flights and cries, the other animals to such and such movements; while others hold that the souls of these animals are more divine than others, and are adapted to the purpose; which is most improbable.

16. If Celsus wished to prove by the foregoing that the irrational creatures have a Divine nature and are wiser than man, he ought to have fully shown that there is such an art as divination; then, he should have more clearly shown how it can be defended; then have given clear grounds for rejecting the arguments of those who would do away with such arts; and, lastly, should have decisively upset the arguments of those who say that it is from demons or gods the animals derive their divination impulses. Then would be the time for dealing with the question, whether the soul of irrational creatures is more Divine than that of men. If he had thus shown a philosophic spirit in treating such important matters, we would have withstood his plausible assertions to the best of our power; we would have upset his statement that the irrational creatures are wiser than men, and we would have proved how false it is that they have more sacred conceptions of God than we have, and that they hold certain sacred assemblies.408 But, as things are, the man who reproaches us with believing in the Supreme God expects us to believe that the souls of birds have more divine and clearer conceptions than men. If this be indeed true, birds have clearer conceptions of God than Celsus has, and no wonder if they surpass Celsus who so belittles man. Celsus certainly does his best to make it look as though the birds have greater and diviner conceptions, I do not say than we Christians have, or the Jews, who use the same Scriptures as ourselves, but than even the Greeks had, who treated of God and the Divine nature, for they were men. So, according to Celsus, the race of divining birds, forsooth, understand the nature of God better than Pherecydes,409 and Pythagoras, and Socrates, and Plato. And it seems that we must go and be taught by the birds, in order that, as, according to Celsus, they teach us by means of divination what is going to happen, so they may also rid men of their doubts respecting the Divine Being, by passing on the clear conception of Him to which they have attained. It follows that Celsus, holding as he does that birds are superior to men, should go to the birds for instruction, and not to one of those distinguished Greek philosophers.

17. But we must add a few remarks, out of many, in answer to the foregoing, for we wish to utterly refute the false opinions of Celsus and prove his ingratitude to his Maker; for Celsus, being a man, and being in honour, understandeth not;410 wherefore, he is not even like the birds and other irrational creatures which he considers to have the gift of divination; but yielding them the preeminence, he goes further than the Egyptians, who worship the irrational creatures as gods, and places himself, and, so far as he can, the whole human race, beneath the irrational creatures, for he believes that men have lower and meaner conceptions of God. Let our inquiry, then, be chiefly directed to the point whether there really is, or is not, an art of divination by birds, and the other animals believed to be "divining," for both ways the argument is to be treated with respect; on the one hand, it presses us not to accept any such thing as divination, lest the rational creatures should forsake the oracles of demons and resort to birds; on the other hand, it brings much clear evidence to show that many people have been preserved from the greatest dangers because they believed in divination by birds. For our present purpose let us allow that augury is a reality: my object is to show any persons who are prepossessed in its favour, that even if this is conceded, the superiority of man over the irrational creatures, and over the very creatures with powers of divination, is incomparably great. Let me then say that even though there were in them a Divine nature capable of predicting the future, and so passing rich, that out of its superfluity it could disclose the future to any man who wished to know it, we must suppose that these creatures would much sooner know their own affairs. But if they knew their own affairs they would have taken care not to fly to any place where men set snares and nets to catch them, or archers make them a target and shoot them on the wing. And certainly, if eagles knew beforehand the designs upon their young ones, whether of serpents climbing to them and killing them, or of men trying to take them either for sport or to serve some other purpose, they would not have made their nests where they were likely to be exposed to these attacks; and, in general, not a single living creature could ever have been captured by men, inasmuch as it was more Divine and wiser than men. 

18. Moreover, if birds of omen converse with one another;411 if, as Celsus says, the divining birds and the other irrational creatures having a Divine nature and conceptions of God, and having the knowledge of the future, disclosed this knowledge to others, the sparrow in Homer would not have made her nest where the serpent would destroy her and her little ones; and the serpent would not, as the same poet relates, have failed to guard itself against being caught by the eagle. Homer, that marvellous poet, thus tells the story of the sparrow----

"Behold a wonder! by Olympian Jove 

Sent forth to light, a snake, with blood-red back, 

Of aspect fearful, issuing from beneath 

The altars, glided to the plane-tree straight. 

There on the topmost bough, beneath the leaves 

Cowering, a sparrow's callow nestlings lay; 

Eight fledglings, and the parent bird the ninth. 

All the eight nestlings, uttering piercing cries, 

The snake devoured; and as the mother flew, 

Lamenting o'er her offspring, round and round, 

Uncoiling, caught her, shrieking, by the wing! 

Then, when the sparrow's nestlings and herself 

The snake had swallowed, by the God, who first 

Sent him to light, a miracle was wrought: 

For Jove, the deep-designing Saturn's son, 

Turned him to stone; we stood, and wondering gazed."412  

Respecting the eagle he says----

"A soaring eagle in his talons bore 

A dragon, huge of size, of blood-red line, 

Alive, and breathing still, nor yet subdued; 

For, twisting backward, through the breast he pierced 

His bearer, near the neck; he, stung with pain, 

Let fall his prey, which dropped amid the crowd; 

Then screaming, on the blast was borne away. 

The Trojans, shuddering, in their midst beheld 

The spotted serpent, dire portent of Jove." 413

Shall we say that the eagle was a divining bird, but that the serpent, though the augurs make use of the creature, had not the gift of divination? The arbitrary distinction is easily refuted, and is not the supposition that both had the gift easily disproved? Would not the serpent, if he had possessed divining power, have taken care that the eagle did not treat him so? One might produce countless other instances to show that the animals have not in themselves a divining soul. But, as the poet says, and most men agree, "Olympian Jove himself sent him to the light"; 414 and if Apollo also uses a hawk as his messenger, something symbolical is intended, for a falcon is said to be Apollo's swift messenger.415

19. Our view is that certain worthless demons (Titans or Giants, if I may say so), having sinned against the true God and the angels in heaven, and, having fallen from heaven, wallow in the grosser bodily existences and the unclean things of earth; they have some insight into the future, and inasmuch as they are not encumbered with earthly bodies, and are set on that sort of thing (for they desire to seduce the human race from their allegiance to the real God), they conceal themselves in the more rapacious and savage beasts, and others of a craftier kind, and make them at any time do what they choose; or they turn the fancies of such creatures to such and such nights and movements; so that men, caught in the snare of that divining power which is in the irrational creatures, may not seek Him Who embraceth all, nor try to discover the pure form of worship, but may sink by their speculations to the level of the birds and serpents upon earth, and still lower to foxes and wolves. For it has been observed by the experts that the clearest indications of the future are given through such creatures as these; it may be because the demons cannot so fully "possess" the gentler animals as they can the wild ones, which they closely resemble in wickedness, though the wickedness is not really wickedness in such animals.

20. And nothing in Moses appears to me more marvellous than what I am about to mention. Because he understands the different natures of animals, and has either learnt from God the facts about them and the demons which have affinity with each, or has by exercising his own wisdom made the discovery, all the animals which he classifies as unclean are those considered by the Egyptians and the rest of mankind to be connected with divination, while those not so connected are, generally speaking, clean animals. Amongst the unclean Moses places the wolf, the fox, the serpent, the eagle, the hawk, and such-like.416 And, speaking generally, you will find, not only in the Law but in the Prophets, that these animals are taken to represent the worst qualities, while there is no instance of a wolf or a fox being mentioned in connection with anything good. There seems to be, then, a fellowship between such kind of demons and each kind of animals. And as among men some are stronger than others, and not at all on account of their moral character: so some demons in things indifferent may be stronger than others; and some of them may use certain animals to deceive men, according to the pleasure of him who in the words of our Scriptures is called "the prince of this world";417 and different ones may show the future by means of another kind of animal. And observe that the demons are so filthy that even weasels are seized by them for revealing the future. Now judge for yourself which is the best view to take, that God over All, and His Son, impel the birds and other creatures for divination, or that they who give the impulse to such animals, and not to men, though men are present, are worthless, and, as our sacred Scriptures call them, "unclean" demons.

21. But if the soul of birds is really Divine because the future is foretold by means of them, must we not much more admit that wherever omens are received by men, the soul of the medium through which the omens are heard is Divine? According to such teachers as these, we must believe that the slave in Homer who ground the corn was "divine"; for, speaking of the suitors, she said----

"Would that they might eat their last meal here!" 418

She was "divine": the great Ulysses, the friend of Homer's Athene, was not "divine," but understanding the omens given by the "divine" slave he rejoiced; in the words of the poet, "The noble Ulysses rejoiced at the omen." 419 Again, observe that if the birds really have a Divine soul and perceptions of God, or, as Celsus says, "the gods," when we men sneeze, we sneeze, of course, because we have a certain divinity and divining faculty of soul. For many testify to this; and the poet accordingly says----

"Telemachus sneezed as the prayer was offered." 420

Wherefore, also, Penelope says----

"Do you not see that my son sneezed as you spoke?"

22. The true God, however, in imparting a knowledge of the future employs neither irrational creatures nor ordinary men, but the holiest and purest souls of men, such as He inspires with prophetic power. And this explains why amongst the other wonderful precepts of the law of Moses we must place such prohibitions as "Ye shall not practise augury, nor observe birds." 421 And in another place, "For the nations, which the Lord thy God shall destroy from before thy face, will hearken to omens and divinations; but the Lord thy God gave not so unto thee." 422 And elsewhere, "The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a prophet from among thy brethren." 423 On one occasion God wished by means of an augur to turn His people from the practice of augury, and therefore caused a spirit in the augur to say, "Surely there is no augury with Jacob, nor is there divination with Israel; at the due season shall it be told to Jacob and to Israel, what God will perform." 424 Just because we are acquainted with these and similar passages, we wish to observe the mystical command, "Keep thy heart with all diligence," 425 lest some demon usurp the throne of reason, or some hostile spirit turn our imagination to follow his desires. And we pray that "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God" 426 may shine in our hearts, the Spirit of God dwelling in our imagination and impressing on us the things of God; "for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." 427

23. And we ought to know that the knowledge of the future is not necessarily Divine: for in itself it is a thing indifferent, and is found among both bad and good men. Physicians, at all events, by their medical knowledge know certain things beforehand, though they may be men of bad character; and so, also, shipmasters, though they may be rascals, know the signs of the weather, tempestuous winds, and atmospheric changes, through their peculiar experience and observation. I suppose no one will say that because they have this knowledge they are "divine," no matter what rascals they are. So then, when Celsus says, "What can be pronounced more Divine than to foreknow and foreshow the future?" he implies what is false. It is also false that "many of the animals have claims to Divine conceptions," for no irrational creature has a conception of God. It is also false that "the irrational creatures have a closer intimacy with God"; for the fact is that bad men, however high their attainments, are far from intimacy with God. We maintain that only the truly wise and the sincerely godly approach at all near to intimacy with God: such men as our Prophets and Moses, to whom on account of the great purity of his character the Word has borne witness, saying, "Moses alone shall draw near to God, the rest shall not draw nigh." 428 Is it not impiety for the man who accuses us of impiety, to say that "the irrational creatures are not only wiser than man, but are also dearer to God?" And who would not shrink from heeding a man who says that the serpent, the fox, the wolf, the eagle, and the hawk are dearer to God than human kind? He will have to admit that if these creatures are dearer to God than men, these same creatures are obviously dearer to God than Socrates, and Plato, and Pythagoras, and Pherecydes, and the other exponents of God and the Divine nature, whose praises he sang not long before. One might really offer up a prayer for Celsus, and say, "If these creatures are dearer to God than men, may you be as dear to God as they are, and may you come to resemble those creatures which, according to you, are dearer to God than men!" And let him not suppose that such a prayer is really an imprecation; for who would not pray that he may become altogether such as they who, he is persuaded, are dearer to God than others, so that he, like them, may become dear to God?

24. And wishing to show that the assemblies of the irrational creatures are more sacred than ours, Celsus ascribes what he relates, not to ordinary mortals, but to "intelligent" men; though in truth only the good are intelligent, for no bad man is intelligent. Well, he speaks after this fashion: "Intelligent men say that the creatures have their assemblies, obviously more sacred than ours; and that they somehow discover what is said and show that they actually have the knowledge, inasmuch as they announce beforehand that the birds said they would go away and do this or that, and then show that they did go away and do what they had already foretold." In reality, no "intelligent" person tells such stories, and no wise man says that the assemblies of the irrational creatures are more sacred than those of men. If, however, for the sake of testing the statements of Celsus, we examine what they lead to, it appears, according to him, that the assemblies of the irrational creatures are more sacred than those of the venerable Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, and the Philosophers in general, which, on the face of it, is not only unseemly, but most absurd. But if we are to believe that certain men, who have derived their information from the inarticulate cry of the birds, announce beforehand that the birds will go to some place and do this or that, we shall maintain that the information has been given to men by demons through certain signs, for the purpose of men being deceived by demons, and their understanding dragged down from heaven and from God to earth and places lower still.

25. I do not know how Celsus came to hear tell of an oath being taken by elephants, and that they show more fidelity towards the Divine Being than we men, and that they have a knowledge of God. I know a good many marvellous stories about the animal and its docility, but I am not aware that any one has spoken of an elephant's oaths, unless, perhaps, Celsus calls their docility and the sort of covenant they make once for all with men, the keeping of an oath; but that again is absurd. There are instances, though rare, of elephants, after seeming to be tamed, fiercely attacking men and killing them, and of their being therefore condemned to death as of no further use. And. to prove his point, as he thinks, that the stork has more piety than men, our opponent adduces what is related about its loving and cherishing its parents and bringing them food. I must therefore add that even this conduct of the storks does not proceed from a regard to what is right, nor from reasoning, but from nature, it being nature's aim in fashioning them, to set an example in irrational creatures strong enough to shame men into showing gratitude to their parents. If Celsus had known the vast difference between doing these things with the aid of reason and doing them without the aid of reason, and by the mere impulses of nature, he would never have said that storks have more piety than men. Further, as if determined to uphold the piety of irrational creatures, Celsus adduces the fable of the Arabian creature, the Phoenix, which is said to visit Egypt at long intervals, and to bring its father, dead and buried in a globe of myrrh, and deposit the remains at the temple of the Sun. Now, even supposing what is here related to be true, it may be the result of natural processes; for Divine Providence has even in the different constitutions of living creatures given proof to man of the rich variety to be found in the ordering of the world, a variety extending even to the birds; and it brought into being a unique creature, not that men might marvel at the creature, but at its Creator.

26. To all this Celsus adds the following: "Just as all things have not been made for the sake of lion, eagle, or dolphin, so neither have they for the sake of man; but the aim was that this world, as God's work, might be a complete and perfect unity;429 and this is why all the parts have been proportioned, not to one another, except in a secondary sense, but to the whole, and God cares for the whole; and Providence never forsakes it, nor does it degenerate, nor does God in process of time turn it again to Himself, nor is He angry on account of men any more than on account of apes or flies; nor does He threaten these creatures, each of which has in its turn received its appointed lot." Let us, if only briefly, meet these allegations. I suppose I have already said enough to show how everything has been made for man, and for every rational creature; for it is chiefly on account of the rational creature that everything has been created. Celsus may tell us that the world exists no more for man than it does for the lion, or the other creatures which he mentions; hut we shall maintain that the Creator has made these things not for the lion, the eagle, or the dolphin, but all things for the sake of the rational creature; and this is so, in the words of Celsus, "in order that this world may be, as God's work, a complete and perfect unity"; for we must acknowledge the good sense of this. But God's care is not merely universal, as Celsus thinks, but while He cares for the whole, He has a special care for every rational creature. And a general Providence will never fail; for it is His plan, even though there be a general deterioration because of the sinning rational portion, to purify all creation, and in process of time to turn it back to Himself. It is true that God is never angry on account of apes and flies; but inasmuch as men have transgressed the promptings of nature,430 He brings upon them judgment and chastisement, and threatens them through the Prophets and the Saviour Who came to save the whole human race; that through His threatening they who hear may be turned, and they who neglect the words intended to turn them may fitly pay the penalty which it is proper that God should, according to His own will, and as is expedient for the whole, inflict on those who need such painful treatment and correction. But our fourth book is now large enough, and we will therefore here end the discourse. God grant through His Son, Who is God the Word, and Wisdom, and Truth, and Righteousness, and whatsoever else the sacred Scriptures say of His Divinity, that we may begin the fifth volume to the profit of our readers, and finish it well, with the help of His Word abiding in our soul!

[1] Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας μὴ διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα γεγονέναι τὸν ἅπαντα κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους: ἐπεὶ ἀπονώτερον ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἄλογα ζῇ, καὶ ὅτι σοφώτερα ἡμῶν ὄντα θεοφιλῆ τέ ἐστι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχει θεοῦ καὶ προγινώσκει τὰ μέλλοντα. ἐν οἷς καὶ κατὰ μετεμψυχώσεως, καὶ περὶ οἰωνιστικῆς καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν ἀπάτης. τόμου τετάρτου κατὰ Κέλσου. Μετὰ ταῦτά φησιν, δηλονότι ὁ Κέλσος: ‘Ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ περὶ μόνων Ἰουδαίων, οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο λέγω, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, ὅπερ ἐπηγγειλάμην, ὁ λόγος ᾖ: σαφέστερον ἐμφανιῶ τὰ προειρημένα.’ τίς δ' οὐκ ἂν τούτοις ἐντυγχάνων μέτριος καὶ αἰσθανόμενος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀσθενείας οὐκ ἂν περισταίη τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τοῦ περὶ ὅλης τῆς φύσεως ἐπαγγειλαμένου ἀποδοῦναι λόγον, καὶ ἀλαζονευσαμένου ὁμοίως ᾗ ἐτόλμησεν ἐπιγράψαι ἐπιγραφῇ τοῦ βιβλίου; ἴδωμεν δὴ τίνα ἐστὶν ἃ περὶ ὅλης τῆς φύσεως ἐπαγγέλλεται λέξειν, καὶ τίνα ἐμφανίσειν.
[2] Διὰ πολλῶν δὴ ἑξῆς ἐγκαλεῖ ἡμῖν, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φάσκουσι πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὸν θεόν. καὶ βούλεται ἐκ τῆς περὶ τῶν ζώων ἱστορίας καὶ τῆς ἐμφαινομένης αὐτοῖς ἀγχινοίας δεικνύναι, ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπων ἢ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἕνεκεν γέγονε τὰ πάντα. καὶ δοκεῖ μοι ὅμοιόν τι εἰπεῖν τοῖς διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς μισουμένους ἔχθος κατηγοροῦσιν αὐτῶν, ἐφ' οἷς οἱ φίλτατοι αὐτῶν ἐπαινοῦνται. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων τυφλοῖ τὸ ἔχθος πρὸς τὸ μὴ συνορᾷν ὅτι καὶ φιλτάτων κατηγοροῦσι, δι' ὧν κακῶς λέγειν νομίζουσι τοὺς ἐχθρούς: τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ Κέλσος συγχυθεὶς τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἑώρακεν ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς φιλοσόφων κατηγορεῖ, ὡς οὐ κακῶς προταττόντων τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς τὴν λογικὴν φύσιν πάντων τῶν ἀλόγων, καὶ διὰ ταύτην λεγόντων προηγουμένως τὴν πρόνοιαν πάντα πεποιηκέναι. καὶ λόγον μὲν ἔχει τὰ λογικὰ, ἅπερ ἐστὶ προηγούμενα, παιδίων γεννωμένων: τὰ δ' ἄλογα καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα χορίου συγκτιζομένου τῷ παιδίῳ. καὶ ἡγοῦμαί γε ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἱ προνοούμενοι τῶν ὠνίων καὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο προνοοῦνται ἢ διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, παραπολαύουσι δὲ τῆς δαψιλείας καὶ κύνες καὶ ἄλλα τῶν ἀλόγων: οὕτως ἡ πρόνοια τῶν μὲν λογικῶν προηγουμένως προνοεῖ, ἐπηκολούθησε δὲ τὸ καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἀπολαύειν τῶν δι' ἀνθρώπους γινομένων. καὶ ὥσπερ ἁμαρτάνει ὁ λέγων τοὺς ἀγορανόμους προνοεῖν οὐ μᾶλλον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ τῶν κυνῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ κύνες παραπολαύουσι τῆς δαψιλείας τῶν ὠνίων: οὕτω πολλῷ μᾶλλον Κέλσος καὶ οἱ τὰ αὐτὰ φρονοῦντες αὐτῷ ἀσεβοῦσιν εἰς τὸν προνοοῦντα τῶν λογικῶν θεὸν, φάσκοντες ‘τί μᾶλλον ἀνθρώποις γίνεσθαι ταῦτα πρὸς τροφὴν, ἢ τοῖς φυτοῖς δένδροις τε καὶ πόαις καὶ ἀκάνθαις;’ [3] Οἴεται γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν ‘μὴ ἔργα θεοῦ εἶναι βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ ὑετούς,’ ἤδη σαφέστερον Ἐπικουρίζων: δεύτερον δέ φησιν ὅτι ‘εἰ καὶ διδῴη τις ταῦτα ἔργα εἶναι θεοῦ, οὐ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ταῦτα γίνεται πρὸς τροφὴν, ἢ τοῖς φυτοῖς δένδροις τε καὶ πόαις καὶ ἀκάνθαις:’ συντυχικῶς διδοὺς καὶ οὐ κατὰ πρόνοιαν, ὡς ἀληθῶς Ἐπικούρειος, ταῦτα συμβαίνειν. εἰ γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν, ἢ φυτοῖς καὶ δένδροις καὶ πόαις καὶ ἀκάνθαις, ταῦτ' ἐστὶ χρήσιμα: δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἀπὸ προνοίας ταῦτ' ἔρχεται: ἢ ἀπὸ προνοίας οὐ μᾶλλον ἡμῶν προνοουμένης, ἢ δένδρων καὶ πόας καὶ ἀκάνθης. ἑκάτερον δ' αὐτόθεν ἀσεβές: καὶ τὸ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀντιλέγειν, ἱστάμενον πρὸς τὸν ἀσέβειαν ἡμῶν κατηγοροῦντα, εὔηθες. παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, τίς ὁ ἀσεβής. εἶτά φησιν ὅτι ‘κἂν ταῦτα λέγῃς ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι (δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὰ φυτὰ καὶ δένδρα καὶ πόας καὶ ἀκάνθας), τί μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἀνθρώποις φήσεις φύεσθαι, ἢ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις;’ σαφῶς οὖν λεγέτω ὁ Κέλσος ὅτι ἡ τοσαύτη τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς φυομένων διαφορὰ οὐ προνοίας ἐστὶν ἔργον: ἀλλὰ συντυχία τις ἀτόμων τὰς τοσαύτας ποιότητας πεποίηκε: καὶ κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰ τοσαῦτα εἴδη φυτῶν καὶ δένδρων καὶ πόας παραπλήσιά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις: καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς λόγος τεχνικὸς ὑπέστησεν αὐτὰ, οὐδ' ἀπὸ νοῦ ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν πάντα θαυμασμὸν ὑπερβεβηκότος. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς, οἱ τῷ ταῦτα κτίσαντι μόνῳ ἀνακείμενοι θεῷ χριστιανοὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις χάριν οἴδαμεν τῷ καὶ τούτων δημιουργῷ, ὅτι ἡμῖν τηλικαύτην ἑστίαν ηὐτρέπισε, καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς τοῖς δουλεύουσιν ἡμῖν ζώοις: Ὁ ἐξανατέλλων χόρτον τοῖς κτήνεσι καὶ χλόην τῇ δουλείᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῦ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἄρτον ἐκ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἵν' οἶνος εὐφραίνῃ καρδίαν ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἱλαρύνηται πρόσωπον ἐν ἐλαίῳ, καὶ ἄρτος στηρίζῃ καρδίαν ἀνθρώπου. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις τῶν ζώων τροφὰς κατεσκεύασεν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν: καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ ζῶα καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων εἰρήκασι γυμνασίου ἕνεκα γεγονέναι τῷ λογικῷ ζώῳ. φησὶ δέ που τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς τις σοφῶν: Μὴ εἴπῃς, τί τοῦτο; εἰς τί τοῦτο; πάντα γὰρ εἰς χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔκτισται: καὶ Μὴ εἴπῃς: τί τοῦτο; εἰς τί τοῦτο; πάντα γὰρ ἐν καιρῷ αὐτῶν ζητηθήσεται.
[4] Ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις ὁ Κέλσος, θέλων μὴ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν τὴν πρόνοιαν πεποιηκέναι τὰ φυόμενα ἐπὶ γῆς, ἢ τοῖς τῶν ζώων ἀγριωτάτοις, φησίν: ‘Ἡμεῖς μέν γε κάμνοντες καὶ προσταλαιπωροῦντες μόλις καὶ ἐπιπόνως τρεφόμεθα: τοῖς δ' ἄσπαρτα καὶ ἀνήροτα πάντα φύονται:’ οὐχ ὁρῶν ὅτι πανταχοῦ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σύνεσιν γυμνάζεσθαι βουλόμενος ὁ θεὸς, ἵνα μὴ μένῃ ἀργὴ καὶ ἀνεπινόητος τῶν τεχνῶν, πεποίηκε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιδεῆ: ἵνα δι' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιδεὲς αὐτοῦ ἀναγκασθῇ εὑρεῖν τέχνας, τινὰς μὲν διὰ τὴν τροφὴν ἄλλας δὲ διὰ τὴν σκέπην. καὶ γὰρ κρεῖττον ἦν τοῖς μὴ μέλλουσι τὰ θεῖα ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ ἀπορεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῇ συνέσει χρήσασθαι πρὸς εὕρεσιν τεχνῶν, ἤπερ ἐκ τοῦ εὐπορεῖν πάντη τῆς συνέσεως ἀμελεῖν. ἡ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον γοῦν χρειῶν ἀπορία συνέστησε τοῦτο μὲν γεωργικὴν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀμπελουργικὴν, τοῦτο δὲ τὰς περὶ τοὺς κήπους τέχνας, τοῦτο δὲ τεκτονικὴν καὶ χαλκευτικὴν, ποιητικὰς ἐργαλείων ταῖς ὑπηρετουμέναις τέχναις τὰ πρὸς τροφήν: ἡ δὲ τῆς σκέπης ἀπορία τοῦτο μὲν ὑφαντικὴν τὴν μετὰ τὴν ξαντικὴν καὶ τὴν νηστικὴν εἰσήγαγε, τοῦτο δὲ οἰκοδομικήν: καὶ οὕτως ἀναβέβηκεν ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἐπὶ ἀρχιτεκτονικήν. ἡ δὲ τῶν χρειῶν ἔνδεια πεποίηκε καὶ τὰ ἐν ἑτέροις τόποις γεννώμενα φέρεσθαι διὰ ναυτικῆς καὶ κυβερνητικῆς πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας ἐκεῖνα: ὥστε καὶ τούτων ἕνεκεν θαυμάσαι τις ἂν τὴν πρόνοιαν, συμφερόντως παρὰ τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα ἐνδεὲς ποιήσασαν τὸ λογικόν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλογα ἑτοίμην ἔχει τὴν τροφὴν, ἅτε οὐδ' ἀφορμὴν πρὸς τέχνας ἔχοντα: καὶ φυσικὴν δ' ἔχει τὴν σκέπην, τετρίχωται γὰρ ἢ ἐπτέρωται ἢ πεφολίδωται ἢ ὀστράκωται.
[5] Ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἑαυτῷ ἀνθυποφέρει τὰ ὡς ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα, ὅτι δι' αὐτοὺς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα δεδημιούργηται, καί φησιν ὅτι ‘Εἴ τις ἡμᾶς λέγοι ἄρχοντας τῶν ζώων, ἐπεὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα θηρῶμέν τε καὶ δαινύμεθα, φήσομεν ὅτι τί δ' οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς δι' ἐκεῖνα γεγόναμεν, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνα θηρᾶται ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐσθίει; ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῖν μὲν ἀρκύων καὶ ὅπλων δεῖ, καὶ ἀνθρώπων πλειόνων βοηθῶν καὶ κυνῶν κατὰ τῶν θηρευομένων: ἐκείνοις δ' αὐτίκα καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ ἡ φύσις ὅπλα δέδωκεν, εὐχερῶς ἡμᾶς ὑπάγουσα ἐκείνοις.’ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὁρᾷς τίνα τρόπον ἡ σύνεσις μέγα βοήθημα ἡμῖν δέδοται καὶ παντὸς ὅπλου κρεῖττον, οὗ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὰ θηρία. ἡμεῖς γοῦν οἱ πολλῷ τῷ σώματι τῶν ζώων ἀσθενέστεροι, τινῶν δὲ καὶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν βραχύτεροι, κρατοῦμεν διὰ τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν θηρίων, καὶ τοὺς τηλικούτους ἐλέφαντας θηρεύομεν: τὰ μὲν πεφυκότα τιθασσεύεσθαι ὑποτάσσοντες τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἡμερότητι: κατὰ δὲ τῶν μὴ πεφυκότων, ἢ μὴ δοκούντων ἡμῖν χρείαν παρέχειν ἐκ τῆς τιθασσείας, οὕτω μετὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστάμεθα ἀσφαλείας, ὥστε, ὅτε μὲν βουλόμεθα, ἔχομεν τὰ τηλικαῦτα θηρία κατακεκλεισμένα: ὅτε δὲ χρῄζομεν τροφῆς τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων αὐτῶν, οὕτως αὐτὰ ἀναιροῦμεν ὡς καὶ τὰ μὴ ἄγρια τῶν ζώων. δοῦλα οὖν πάντα τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς αὐτοῦ συνέσεως κατεσκεύασεν ὁ δημιουργός. καὶ εἰς ἄλλα μὲν κυνῶν χρῄζομεν, φέρ' εἰπεῖν, εἰς φυλακὴν ποιμνίων ἢ βουκολίων ἢ αἰπολίων ἢ οἰκιῶν: εἰς ἄλλα δὲ βοῶν, οἷον εἰς γεωργίαν: εἰς ἄλλα δ' ὑποζυγίοις χρώμεθα ἢ ἀχθοφόροις. οὕτως εἰς γυμνάσιον τῶν τῆς ἀνδρείας ἐν ἡμῖν σπερμάτων δεδόσθαι ἡμῖν λέγεται τὸ λεόντων καὶ ἄρκτων, παρδάλεών τε καὶ συῶν, καὶ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων γένος.
[6] Εἶτα λέγει πρὸς τὸ τῶν αἰσθανομένων τῆς ἑαυτῶν ὑπεροχῆς ἀνθρώπων γένος, ἣν ὑπερέχει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, ὅτι ‘Πρὸς ὃ ὑμεῖς φατὲ, ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἡμῖν δέδωκεν αἱρεῖν τὰ θηρία δύνασθαι καὶ καταχρήσασθαι, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι, ὡς εἰκὸς, πρὶν πόλεις εἶναι καὶ τέχνας καὶ τοιαύτας ἐπιμιξίας καὶ ὅπλα καὶ δίκτυα, ἄνθρωποι μὲν ὑπὸ θηρίων ἡρπάζοντο καὶ ἠσθίοντο, θηρία δ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἥκιστα ἡλίσκετο.’ ὅρα δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ὅτι εἰ καὶ αἱροῦσιν ἄνθρωποι θηρία καὶ θηρία ἀνθρώπους ἁρπάζει, πολλή ἐστι διαφορὰ τῶν συνέσει κρατούντων παρὰ τὰ ἀγριότητι καὶ ὠμότητι περιγινόμενα τῶν οὐ χρωμένων τῇ συνέσει πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν ὑπὸ θηρίων παθεῖν. τὸ δέ: ‘πρὶν πόλεις εἶναι καὶ τέχνας καὶ τοιαύτας ἐπιμιξίας:’ ἐπιλελησμένου οἶμαι εἶναι ὧν ἀνωτέρω προεῖπεν, ὡς ‘ἀγενήτου ὄντος τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἀφθάρτου, καὶ μόνων τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς κατακλυσμοὺς καὶ ἐκπυρώσεις πασχόντων, καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα τούτοις περιπιπτόντων.’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν τοῖς ἀγένητον ὑφισταμένοις τὸν κόσμον ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ χρόνον ὅτ' οὐδαμῶς ἦσαν πόλεις οὐδὲ τέχναι πω εὕρηντο. ἀλλ' ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα ἡμῖν μὲν συνᾳδόντως αὐτῷ συγχωρεῖν, αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λελεγμένοις οὐκέτι: τί οὖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πάντως κατ' ἀρχὰς τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ θηρίων ἁρπάζεσθαι καὶ ἐσθίεσθαι, μηκέτι δὲ τὰ θηρία ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἁλίσκεσθαι; εἴπερ γὰρ κατὰ πρόνοιαν ὁ κόσμος γεγένηται, καὶ θεὸς ἐφέστηκε τοῖς ὅλοις: ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὰ ζώπυρα τοῦ γένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀρξάμενα ὑπό τινα γεγονέναι φρουρὰν τὴν ἀπὸ κρειττόνων, ὥστε κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐπιμιξίαν γεγονέναι τῆς θείας φύσεως πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἅπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀσκραῖος ποιητὴς ἐννοῶν εἶπε: Ξυναὶ γὰρ τότε δαῖτες ἔσαν, ξυνοὶ δὲ θόωκοι Ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι καταθνητοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις.
[7] Καὶ ὁ θεῖος δὲ κατὰ Μωσέα λόγος εἰσήγαγε τοὺς πρώτους ἀκούοντας θειοτέρας φωνῆς καὶ χρησμῶν, καὶ ὁρῶντας ἔσθ' ὅτε ἀγγέλων θεοῦ ἐπιδημίας γεγενημένας πρὸς αὐτούς. καὶ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ πλεῖον βεβοηθῆσθαι τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν: ἕως, προκοπῆς γενομένης εἰς σύνεσιν καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὴν εὕρεσιν τῶν τεχνῶν, δυνηθῶσι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ζῇν, οὐ χρῄζοντες ἀεὶ ἐπιτροπευόντων καὶ οἰκονομούντων αὐτοὺς μετὰ παραδόξου ἐπιφανείας τῶν ὑπηρετουμένων τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήματι. ἀκόλουθον δὲ τούτοις τὸ ψεῦδος εἶναι ὅτι κατ' ἀρχὰς ‘ἄνθρωποι μὲν ὑπὸ θηρίων ἡρπάζοντο καὶ ἠσθίοντο, θηρία δ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἥκιστα ἡλίσκετο.’ ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κέλσου οὕτως λεγόμενον: ‘Ὥστε ταύτῃ γε ὁ θεὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μᾶλλον τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπέβαλεν.’ οὐ γὰρ ὑπέβαλε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοῖς θηρίοις ὁ θεὸς, ἀλλὰ τῇ συνέσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁλωτὰ δέδωκεν εἶναι τὰ θηρία, καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ συνέσεως ὑφισταμέναις κατ' ἐκείνων τέχναις. οὐ γὰρ ἀθεεὶ ἐμηχανήσαντο σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωτηρίαν ἀπὸ τῶν θηρίων καὶ τὴν κατ' ἐκείνων ἐπικράτειαν.
[8] Οὐχ ὁρῶν δ' ὁ γεννάδας, ὅσων φιλοσόφων τὴν πρόνοιαν εἰσαγόντων καὶ διὰ τὰ λογικὰ πάντα ποιεῖν αὐτὴν λεγόντων συναναιρεῖ, τὸ ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, χρήσιμα δόγματα τῇ χριστιανῶν κατὰ ταῦτα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν συμφωνίᾳ, οὐδ' ὅση βλάβη κωλυτικὴ γίνεται εὐσεβείας ἐκ τοῦ παραδέξασθαι ὅτι οὐδὲν μυρμήκων ἢ μελισσῶν διαφέρει ὁ ἄνθρωπος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, φησὶν ὅτι ‘Εἰ διὰ τοῦθ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διαφέρειν δοκοῦσι τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπεὶ πόλεις ᾤκησαν καὶ χρῶνται πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἡγεμονίαις: τοῦτ' οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἐστί: καὶ γὰρ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ αἱ μέλισσαι. μελίσσαις γοῦν ἔστιν ἡγεμὼν, ἔστι δ' ἀκολουθία τε καὶ θεραπεία, καὶ πόλεμοι καὶ νῖκαι καὶ τῶν ἡττημένων αἱρέσεις, καὶ πόλεις καὶ προπόλεις γε, καὶ ἔργων διαδοχὴ, καὶ δίκαι κατὰ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ πονηρῶν: τοὺς γοῦν κηφῆνας ἀπελαύνουσί τε καὶ κολάζουσιν.’ οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἑώρακε τίνι διαφέρει τὰ ἀπὸ λόγου καὶ λογικῆς ἐπιτελούμενα τῶν ἀπ' ἀλόγου φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς ψιλῆς γινομένων: ὧν τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδεὶς μὲν ἐνυπάρχων τοῖς ποιοῦσι λόγος ἀναδέχεται: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχουσιν αὐτόν: ὁ πρεσβύτατος δὲ καὶ υἱὸς μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ πάντων δὲ τῶν ὑποκειμένων βασιλεὺς φύσιν ἄλογον πεποίηκε βοηθοῦσαν ὡς ἄλογον τοῖς οὐκ ἀξιωθεῖσι λόγου. πόλεις οὖν παρ' ἀνθρώποις μετὰ πολλῶν ὑπέστησαν τεχνῶν καὶ διατάξεως νόμων: πολιτεῖαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἡγεμονίαι ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἤτοι αἳ κυρίως εἰσὶν οὕτω καλούμεναι, σπουδαῖαί τινες ἕξεις καὶ ἐνέργειαι, ἢ καὶ αἱ καταχρηστικώτερον οὕτως ὀνομαζόμεναι πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκείνων μίμησιν: ἐκείναις γὰρ ἐνορῶντες οἱ ἐπιτετευγμένως νομοθετήσαντες συνεστήσαντο τὰς ἀρίστας πολιτείας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας. ὧν οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν: κἂν ὁ Κέλσος τὰ λογικὰ ὀνόματα καὶ ἐπὶ λογικῶν τεταγμένα, πόλιν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ ἡγεμονίας, ἀναφέρῃ καὶ ἐπὶ μύρμηκας καὶ μελίσσας: ἐφ' οἷς οὐδαμῶς μὲν τοὺς μύρμηκας ἢ τὰς μελίσσας ἀποδεκτέον: οὐ γὰρ σὺν λογισμῷ ποιοῦσι: τὴν θείαν δὲ φύσιν θαυμαστέον, μέχρι τῶν ἀλόγων ἐκτείνασαν τὸ οἱονεὶ πρὸς τὰ λογικὰ μίμημα: τάχα πρὸς δυσωπίαν τῶν λογικῶν: ἵν' ἐνορῶντες μύρμηξιν ἐργατικώτεροι γίνωνται καὶ ταμιευτικώτεροι τῶν ἑαυτοῖς χρησίμων, κατανοοῦντές τε μελίσσας πείθωνται μὲν ἡγεμονίαις διαιρῶνται δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα τῆς πολιτείας ἔργα πρὸς σωτηρίαν τῶν πόλεων.
[9] Τάχα δὲ καὶ οἱ οἱονεὶ πόλεμοι τῶν μελισσῶν διδασκαλία ἔγκειται πρὸς τὸ δικαίους καὶ τεταγμένους πολέμους, εἴ ποτε δέοι, γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἀνθρώποις. καὶ οὐ πόλεις μὲν καὶ προπόλεις ἐν μελίσσαις: ἀλλ' οἱ σίμβλοι καὶ τὰ ἑξάγωνα καὶ τὰ μελισσῶν ἔργα καὶ ἡ παρ' ἐκείναις διαδοχὴ αὐτῶν, διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς πολλὰ τοῦ μέλιτος χρῄζοντας, θεραπείας τε σωμάτων πεπονθότων καὶ τροφὴν καθαρτήριον. οὐ παραβλητέον δὲ τὰ κατὰ τῶν κηφήνων ὑπὸ τῶν μελισσῶν ἐπιτελούμενα, ταῖς κατὰ τῶν ἀργῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ πονηρῶν δίκαις, καὶ ταῖς κατ' αὐτῶν κολάσεσιν. ἀλλ', ὡς προεῖπον, τὴν μὲν φύσιν ἐν τούτοις θαυμαστέον: τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον, ἐπιλογίσασθαι τὰ περὶ πάντων δυνάμενον καὶ κοσμῆσαι τὰ πάντων, ἅτε συνεργοῦντα τῇ προνοίᾳ, ἀποδεκτέον: καὶ οὐ μόνης προνοίας θεοῦ ἔργα ἐπιτελοῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ.
[10] Εἰπὼν δ' ὁ Κέλσος περὶ τῶν μελισσῶν, ἵνα τὸ ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἐξευτελίσῃ ἡμῶν οὐ χριστιανῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν πατρίδων πολέμους, ἑξῆς ἐπιφέρει διεξιὼν μυρμήκων ἐγκώμιον: ὅπως τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων ἐγκωμίῳ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τὴν τροφὴν οἰκονομικὸν καταβάλῃ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ πρὸς τοὺς μύρμηκας, καὶ τὸ τῶν χειμαδίων προνοητικὸν καταρρίψῃ, ὡς οὐδὲν πλέον ἔχον τῆς ἀλόγου τῶν μυρμήκων ἐν οἷς ἐκεῖνος νομίζει προνοίας. τίνα δ' οὐκ ἂν τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐκ ἐπισταμένων ἐνορᾷν τῇ φύσει πάντων πραγμάτων ἀποτρέψαι, τὸ ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, ὁ Κέλσος ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῖς βαρουμένοις ὑπὸ φορτίων βοηθεῖν καὶ κοινωνεῖν ἐκείνοις τῶν καμάτων, λέγων περὶ μυρμήκων ὡς ‘ἂν ἀλλήλοις τῶν φορτίων, ἐπειδάν τινα κάμνοντα ἴδωσιν, ἐπιλαμβάνωνται’; ἐρεῖ γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος τῆς διὰ λόγου παιδεύσεως καὶ μηδαμῶς ἐπαΐων αὐτῆς: Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν μηδὲν διαφέρομεν μυρμήκων καὶ ὅτε τοῖς κάμνουσι διὰ τὸ φέρειν βαρύτατα φορτία βοηθοῦμεν, τί μάτην τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιοῦμεν; καὶ οἱ μὲν μύρμηκες, ἅτε ἄλογα ζῶα τυγχάνοντες, οὐκ ἂν ἐπαρθεῖεν πρὸς τὸ μέγα φρονῆσαι διὰ τὸ παραβαλέσθαι ἀνθρώποις τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν: οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸν λόγον ἀκοῦσαι δυνηθέντες τίνα τρόπον εὐτελίζεται αὐτῶν τὸ κοινωνικὸν, βλαβεῖεν ἂν τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ Κέλσῳ καὶ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἰδόντι ὅτι χριστιανισμοῦ ἀποτρέψαι θέλων τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας αὐτοῦ τῇ γραφῇ ἀποτρέπει καὶ τῶν οὐ χριστιανῶν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς φέροντας τὰ βαρύτατα τῶν φορτίων συμπαθές. ἐχρῆν δ' αὐτὸν, εἴπερ ἦν καὶ φιλόσοφος αἰσθανόμενος τοῦ κοινωνικοῦ, πρὸς τῷ μὴ συναναιρεῖν τῷ χριστιανισμῷ τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ συνεργεῖν, εἰ οἷόν τ' ἦν, τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐν χριστιανισμῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καλοῖς. εἰ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀποτιθεμένων καρπῶν τὰς ἐκφύσεις ἀπεκτιθέασιν οἱ μύρμηκες, ἵνα μὴ σπαργῷεν μένοιεν δὲ δι' ἔτους αὐτοῖς εἰς τροφήν: οὐ λογισμὸν εἶναι ἐν μύρμηξι τούτων αἴτιον ὑπονοητέον, ἀλλὰ τὴν παμμήτορα φύσιν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα κοσμήσασαν, ὡς μηδὲ τοὐλάχιστον καταλιπεῖν μηδαμῶς φέρον ἴχνος τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως λόγου. εἰ μὴ ἄρα διὰ τούτων λεληθότως βούλεται ὁ Κέλσος, καὶ γὰρ ἐν πολλοῖς Πλατωνίζειν θέλει, ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι πᾶσαν ψυχὴν, καὶ μηδὲν διαφέρειν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆς τῶν μυρμήκων καὶ τῶν μελισσῶν: ὅπερ κατάγοντός ἐστι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁψίδων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπά. τούτοις δ' οὐ πείσονται χριστιανοὶ, προκατειληφότες τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα γεγονέναι θεοῦ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν, καὶ ὁρῶντες ὅτι ἀμήχανόν ἐστι τὴν κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ δεδημιουργημένην φύσιν πάντη ἀπαλεῖψαι τοὺς χαρακτῆρας αὐτῆς, καὶ ἄλλους ἀναλαβεῖν οὐκ οἶδα κατ' εἰκόνας τίνων γεγενημένους ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις.
[11] Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ‘τοῖς ἀποθνήσκουσι μύρμηξί’ φησι ‘τοὺς ζῶντας ἴδιόν τι ἀποκρίνειν χωρίον, κἀκεῖνο αὐτοῖς εἶναι πάτρια μνήματα:’ λεκτέον ὅτι, ὅσῳ πλείονα λέγει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἐγκώμια, τοσούτῳ πλεῖον, κἂν μὴ θέλῃ, αὔξει τὸ τοῦ πάντα κοσμήσαντος λόγου ἔργον, καὶ δείκνυσι τὴν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐντρέχειαν δυναμένην κοσμεῖν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὰ πλεονεκτήματα τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἀλόγων. τί δὲ λέγω τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπεὶ Κέλσῳ δοκεῖ μηδ' ἄλογα εἶναι τὰ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς πάντων ἐννοίας ἄλογα καλούμενα; οὐδὲ τοὺς μύρμηκας γοῦν οἴεται εἶναι ἀλόγους ὁ περὶ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ἐπαγγειλάμενος λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν τῇ ἐπιγραφῇ τοῦ βιβλίου αὐχήσας. φησὶ γὰρ περὶ τῶν μυρμήκων ὡς διαλεγομένων ἀλλήλοις τοιαῦτα: ‘Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀπαντῶντες ἀλλήλοις διαλέγονται, ὅθεν οὐδὲ τῶν ὁδῶν ἁμαρτάνουσιν: οὐκοῦν καὶ λόγου συμπλήρωσίς ἐστι παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι καθολικῶν τινῶν καὶ φωνὴ καὶ τυγχάνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα.’ τὸ γὰρ διαλέγεσθαί τινα πρὸς ἕτερον ἐν φωνῇ γίνεται δηλούσῃ τι σημαινόμενον, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν καλουμένων τυγχανόντων ἀπαγγελλούσῃ: ἅπερ καὶ ἐν μύρμηξι λέγειν εἶναι, πῶς οὐ πάντων ἂν εἴη καταγελαστότατον;
[12] Καὶ οὐκ αἰδεῖταί γε ἐπιφέρων τούτοις, ἵνα καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν ἐσομένοις ἐπιδεικνύηται τὴν τῶν δογμάτων ἑαυτοῦ ἀσχημοσύνην, λέγων: ‘Φέρ' οὖν, εἴ τις ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἐπιβλέποι, τί ἂν δόξαι διαφέρειν τὰ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ μυρμήκων καὶ μελισσῶν δρώμενα;’ ὁ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ δὴ ἐπὶ γῆν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν αὐτοῦ βλέπων τὰ δρώμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν μυρμήκων γινόμενα, πότερον ἐνορᾷ μὲν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μυρμήκων σώμασιν, οὐ κατανοεῖ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ λογισμῷ κινούμενον, πάλιν τε αὖ τὸ ἄλογον ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς καὶ φαντασίας ἀλόγως κινούμενον μετά τινος φυσικῆς ὑποκατασκευῆς; ἀλλ' ἄτοπον τὸν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ βλέποντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐνορᾷν μὲν θέλειν σώμασιν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μυρμήκων ἀπὸ τοσούτου διαστήματος, μὴ πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον βλέπειν ἡγεμονικῶν φύσεις καὶ πηγὴν ὁρμῶν λογικὴν ἢ ἄλογον. εἰ δ' ἅπαξ βλέπει τὴν πασῶν ὁρμῶν πηγήν, δηλονότι καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἴδοι ἂν καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοὺς μύρμηκας ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας. ὁ γὰρ βλέπων ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀλόγοις, κἂν μεγάλα ᾖ αὐτῶν τὰ σώματα, οὐκ ἄλλην ὄψεται ἀρχὴν ἢ τὴν, ἵν' οὕτως ὀνομάσω, ἀλογίαν: ἐν δὲ τοῖς λογικοῖς, λόγον τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἐπουράνια τάχα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, δι' ὃν κατ' εἰκόνα γεγονέναι ὠνόμασται τοῦ θεοῦ: εἰκὼν γὰρ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεοῦ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ.
[13] Ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις, ὡσπερεὶ ἐπὶ πλειόνων καταβιβάσαι ἀγωνιζόμενος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ ἐξομοιῶσαι τοῖς ἀλόγοις, καὶ μηδὲν ὅ τι καταλιπεῖν θέλων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἱστορουμένων ἐμφαινόντων τὸ μεῖζον, καὶ τὰ τῆς γοητείας φησὶν εἶναι καὶ ἔν τισι τῶν ἀλόγων: ὡς μηδ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐξαιρέτως σεμνύνεσθαι, μηδὲ θέλειν ἔχειν τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα ὑπεροχήν. καί φησι ταῦτα: ‘Εἰ δέ τι καὶ ἐπὶ γοητείᾳ φρονοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἤδη καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο σοφώτεροι ὄφεις καὶ ἀετοί: πολλὰ γοῦν ἴσασιν ἀλεξιφάρμακα καὶ ἀλεξίκακα, καὶ δὴ καὶ λίθων τινῶν δυνάμεις ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν νεοσσῶν: οἷς ἂν ἐπιτύχωσιν ἄνθρωποι, θαυμαστόν τι κτῆμα ἔχειν νομίζουσι.’ καὶ πρῶτόν γε οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως τὴν τῶν ζώων περὶ τὰ φυσικὰ ἀλεξιφάρμακα εἴτε ἐμπειρίαν εἴτε φυσικήν τινα κατάληψιν γοητείαν ὠνόμασεν: ἐπ' ἄλλου γὰρ τέτριπται τὸ τῆς γοητείας τάσσεσθαι ὄνομα: εἰ μὴ ἄρα λεληθότως διαβάλλειν βούλεται ὡς Ἐπικούρειος πᾶσαν τὴν τῶν τοιούτων χρῆσιν, ὡς ἐν ἐπαγγελίᾳ γοήτων κειμένην. πλὴν ἀλλὰ δεδόσθω αὐτῷ τὸ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τῇ τούτων γνώσει μέγα, εἴτε γόητας ὄντας εἴτε καὶ μή: πῶς ὅτι σοφώτεροι κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν ὄφεις τῷ μαράθῳ εἰς ὀξυωπίαν καὶ ταχύτητα κινήσεως χρώμενοι, μόνον τοῦτο φυσικὸν οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιλογισμοῦ καταλαμβάνοντες ἀλλ' ἐκ κατασκευῆς; ἄνθρωποι δὲ οὐκ ἀπὸ ψιλῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμοίως ὄφεσιν ἔρχονται: ἀλλὰ πῆ μὲν ἐκ πείρας πῆ δὲ καὶ ἐκ λόγου, ἔσθ' ὅτε δ' ἐξ ἐπιλογισμοῦ καὶ κατ' ἐπιστήμην. ὡς εἰ καὶ ἀετοὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ καλιᾷ νεοσσῶν τὸν λεγόμενον ἀετίτην λίθον εὑρόντες φέρουσιν ἐπ' αὐτὴν, πόθεν ὅτι σοφοὶ ἀετοὶ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφώτεροι, τῶν ἐκ πείρας τὸ τοῖς ἀετοῖς δοθὲν φυσικὸν βοήθημα εὑρόντων διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν καὶ μετὰ νοῦ χρησαμένων; ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ὑπὸ τῶν ζώων γιγνώσκεσθαι ἀλεξιφάρμακα, τί οὖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ μὴ φύσιν ἀλλὰ λόγον εἶναι τὸν εὑρίσκοντα ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς ζώοις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἦν ὁ εὑρίσκων, οὐκ ἂν ἀποτεταγμένως τόδε τι μόνον εὑρίσκετο ἐν ὄφεσιν, ἔστω καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον, καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐν ἀετῷ καὶ οὕτως ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ζώοις: ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ἂν, ὅσα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις. νυνὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀποτεταγμένως πρός τινα ἑκάστου φύσιν ζώου νενευκέναι βοηθήματα, ὅτι οὐ σοφία οὐδὲ λόγος ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλά τις φυσικὴ πρὸς τὰ τοιάδε σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν τῶν ζώων κατασκευὴ, ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου γεγενημένη.
[14] Καί τοί γε εἰ ἐβουλόμην ὁμόσε χωρεῖν τῷ Κέλσῳ κατὰ ταῦτα, ἐχρησάμην ἂν Σολομῶντος λέξει ἀπὸ τῶν Παροιμιῶν οὕτως ἐχούσῃ: Τέσσαρα δ' ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ταῦτα δέ ἐστι σοφώτερα τῶν σοφῶν: οἱ μύρμηκες οἷς μὴ ἔστιν ἰσχὺς, οἳ ἑτοιμάζονται ἐν θέρει τὴν τροφήν: καὶ οἱ χοιρογρύλιοι, ἔθνος οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν, οἳ ἐποιήσαντο ἐν πέτραις τοὺς ἑαυτῶν οἴκους: ἀβασίλευτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀκρὶς, καὶ στρατεύει ἀπὸ ἑνὸς κελεύσματος εὐτάκτως: καὶ ἀσκαλαβώτης χερσὶν ἐρειδόμενος καὶ εὐάλωτος ὢν, οἰκεῖ ἐν ὀχυρώμασι βασιλέως. ἀλλ' οὐ συγχρῶμαι ὡς σαφέσι τοῖς ῥητοῖς, ἀκολούθως δὲ τῇ ἐπιγραφῇ (ἐπιγέγραπται γὰρ τὸ βιβλίον Παροιμίαι) ζητῶ ταῦτα, ὡς αἰνίγματα. ἔθος γὰρ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις τὰ ἕτερον μέν τι αὐτόθεν δηλοῦντα, ἕτερον δὲ ἐν ὑπονοίᾳ ἀπαγγέλλοντα, διαιρεῖν εἰς εἴδη πολλὰ, ὧν ἓν εἶναι τὰς παροιμίας. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις ἡμῶν γέγραπται ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν εἰρηκέναι: Ταῦτ' ἐν παροιμίαις λελάληκα ὑμῖν: ἔρχεται ὥρα ὅτε οὐκέτι ἐν παροιμίαις λαλήσω ὑμῖν. οὐχ οἱ αἰσθητοὶ τοίνυν μύρμηκες σοφώτεροι καὶ τῶν σοφῶν εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' οἱ δηλούμενοι ὡς ἐν εἴδει παροιμιῶν. οὕτω δὲ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων: ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἁπλούστατα νομίζει εἶναι καὶ ἰδιωτικὰ ὁ Κέλσος τὰ Ἰουδαίων καὶ χριστιανῶν βιβλία, καὶ οἴεται τοὺς ἀλληγοροῦντας αὐτὰ βιαζομένους τὸ βούλημα τῶν γραψάντων τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἐληλέγχθω οὖν καὶ διὰ τούτων ὁ Κέλσος μάτην ἡμᾶς διαβάλλων: ἐληλέγχθω δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ περὶ ὄφεων καὶ ἀετῶν λόγος, ἀποφῃνάμενος εἶναι τούτους ἀνθρώπων σοφωτέρους.
[15] Θέλων δ' ἔτι διὰ πλειόνων μηδὲ τὰς περὶ τοῦ θείου ἐννοίας ἐξαιρέτους εἶναι παρὰ τὰ θνητὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τινὰ ἀποφῇναι ἐννοοῦντα περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, περὶ οὗ τοιαῦται διαφωνίαι γεγόνασι καὶ τοῖς ὀξυτέροις τῶν πανταχοῦ ἀνθρώπων, Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, φησὶν ὅτι ‘Εἰ δ', ὅτι θείας ἐννοίας ἄνθρωπος ἐπείληπται, νομίζεται ὑπερέχειν τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων: ἴστωσαν οἱ τοῦτο φάσκοντες ὅτι καὶ τούτου πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀντιποιηθήσεται: καὶ μάλα εἰκότως, τί γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις θειότερον τοῦ τὰ μέλλοντα προγιγνώσκειν τε καὶ προδηλοῦν; τοῦτο τοίνυν ἄνθρωποι παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, καὶ μάλιστα παρ' ὀρνίθων, μανθάνουσι: καὶ ὅσοι τῆς ἐκείνων ἐνδείξεως ἐπαΐουσιν, οὗτοι μαντικοί. εἰ δ' ὄρνιθες ἄρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ζῶα μαντικὰ ἐκ θεοῦ προγινώσκοντα διὰ συμβόλων ἡμᾶς διδάσκει, τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας ἐκεῖνα πεφυκέναι, καὶ εἶναι σοφώτερα καὶ θεοφιλέστερα. φασὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ συνετοὶ καὶ ὁμιλίας ἐκείνοις εἶναι, δηλονότι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἱερωτέρας: καὶ αὐτοί που γνωρίζειν τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἔργῳ δεικνύειν ὅτι γνωρίζουσιν, ὅταν προειπόντες ὅτι ἔφασαν οἱ ὄρνιθες ὡς ἀπίασί ποι καὶ ποιήσουσι τόδε ἢ τόδε δεικνύωσιν ἀπελθόντας ἐκεῖ καὶ ποιοῦντας ἃ δὴ προεῖπον. ἐλεφάντων δὲ οὐδὲν εὐορκότερον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ θεῖα πιστότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ, πάντως δήπου διότι γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ ἔχουσιν.’ ὅρα δὲ ἐν τούτοις, ὅσα ζητούμενα παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὐ μόνον Ἑλλήνων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν βαρβάροις εἴθ' εὑρόντων εἴτε παρά τινων δαιμόνων μαθόντων τὰ περὶ οἰωνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ἀφ' ὧν μαντεῖαί τινες ἀνθρώποις γίνεσθαι λέγονται, συναρπάζει καὶ ὡς ὁμολογούμενα ἐκτίθεται. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐζήτηται πότερον ἔστι τις τέχνη οἰωνιστικὴ καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς ἡ διὰ ζώων μαντικὴ, ἢ οὐκ ἔστι: δεύτερον δὲ παρὰ τοῖς παραδεξαμένοις εἶναι τὴν δι' ὀρνίθων μαντικὴν οὐ συμπεφώνηται ἡ αἰτία τοῦ τρόπου τῆς μαντείας: ἐπειδήπερ οἱ μὲν ἀπό τινων δαιμόνων ἢ θεῶν μαντικῶν φασὶ γίνεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις τοῖς ζώοις, ὄρνισι μὲν εἰς διαφόρους πτήσεις καὶ εἰς διαφόρους φωνὰς, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς εἰς τὰς τοιασδὶ κινήσεις ἢ τοιασδί: ἄλλοι δὲ θειοτέρας αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐπιτηδείους εἶναι τὰς ψυχάς: ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπιθανώτατον.
[16] Ἐχρῆν οὖν τὸν Κέλσον, διὰ τῶν προκειμένων βουλόμενον θειότερα καὶ σοφώτερα ἀποδεῖξαι τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, κατασκευάσαι διὰ πλειόνων ὡς ὑπάρχουσαν τὴν τοιανδὶ μαντικήν: καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐναργεστέρως ἀποδεῖξαι: καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς ἀποδοκιμάσαι μὲν τοὺς λόγους τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὰς τοιασδὶ μαντείας: ἀποδεικτικῶς δ' ἀνατρέψαι καὶ τοὺς λόγους τῶν εἰπόντων ἀπὸ δαιμόνων ἢ θεῶν γίνεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις τοῖς ζώοις πρὸς τὸ μαντεύσασθαι: καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κατασκευάσαι περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ψυχῆς ὡς θειοτέρας. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τὰ πιθανὰ αὐτοῦ ἐπιδειξαμένου φιλόσοφον περὶ τῶν τηλικούτων ἕξιν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἡμῖν ἐνέστημεν: ἀνατρέποντες μὲν τὸ ὅτι σοφώτερα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα τῶν ἀνθρώπων: ψευδοποιοῦντες δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐννοίας ἔχει τοῦ θείου ἱερωτέρας ἡμῶν, καὶ ὅτι ὁμιλίας ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἱεράς τινας. νυνὶ δ' ὁ ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν, ὅτι πιστεύομεν τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, ἀξιοῖ ἡμᾶς πιστεύειν ὅτι αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν ὀρνίθων θειοτέρας ἔχουσιν ἐννοίας καὶ τρανοτέρας ἀνθρώπων. ὅπερ εἰ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὄρνιθες μᾶλλον τρανοτέρας Κέλσου ἔχουσι περὶ θεοῦ ἐννοίας. καὶ οὐ θαυμαστὸν εἰ Κέλσου, τοῦ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξευτελίζοντος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅσον ἐπὶ Κέλσῳ οἱ ὄρνιθες μείζονας καὶ θειοτέρας ἔχουσιν ἐννοίας, οὐ λέγω ἡμῶν χριστιανῶν ἢ τῶν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἡμῖν γραφαῖς χρωμένων Ἰουδαίων, ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι θεολόγων: ἄνθρωποι γὰρ ἦσαν. μᾶλλον οὖν κατὰ Κέλσον κατείληφε τὴν τοῦ θείου φύσιν τὸ τῶν δῆθεν μαντικῶν ὀρνίθων γένος, ἢ Φερεκύδης καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων. καὶ ἐχρῆν γε ἡμᾶς πρὸς τοὺς ὄρνιθας φοιτᾷν διδασκάλους: ἵν', ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν Κέλσου ὑπόληψιν διδάσκουσιν ἡμᾶς μαντικῶς τὰ ἐσόμενα, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἀμφιβάλλειν περὶ τοῦ θείου ἀπαλλάξωσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἣν κατειλήφασι τρανὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἔννοιαν παραδιδόντες. Κέλσῳ μὲν οὖν ἀκολουθεῖ, τῷ διαφέρειν ἡγουμένῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ὄρνιθας, διδασκάλοις αὐτὸν χρᾶσθαι ὄρνισι καὶ μηδενὶ οὕτως τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων παρ' Ἕλλησιν.
[17] Ἡμῖν δ' ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ προκείμενα ἀπὸ πολλῶν λεκτέον, διελέγχουσι τὴν ἀχάριστον ψευδοδοξίαν πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα αὐτόν: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ Κέλσος ὢν, ἐν τιμῇ ὢν, οὐ συνῆκε: διὸ οὐδὲ παρασυνεβλήθη τοῖς ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀλόγοις ζώοις, οἷς νομίζει εἶναι μαντικοῖς: ἀλλ' ἐκείνοις παραχωρήσας τὰ πρωτεῖα, ὑπὲρ Αἰγυπτίους τοὺς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα ὡς θεοὺς προσκυνοῦντας ἑαυτὸν ὑπέταξε, τὸ δ' ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὡς χεῖρον καὶ ἔλαττον νοοῦν περὶ τοῦ θείου, τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις. προηγουμένως μὲν οὖν ζητείσθω, πότερον ὑπάρχει ἡ δι' ὀρνίθων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων πεπιστευμένων εἶναι μαντικῶν μαντικὴ, ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχει. καὶ γὰρ οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητός ἐστιν εἰς ἑκάτερα ἐπιχειρούμενος ὁ λόγος: ὅπου μὲν δυσωπῶν μὴ παραδέξασθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἵνα μὴ τὸ λογικὸν ἀντὶ τῶν δαιμονίων χρηστηρίων ὄρνισι χρήσηται, καταλιπὸν ἐκεῖνα: ὅπου δὲ διὰ μαρτυρουμένης ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἐναργείας παριστὰς, ὅτι πολλοὶ ἀπὸ μεγίστων διεσώθησαν κινδύνων, πεισθέντες τῇ δι' ὀρνίθων μαντικῇ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος δεδόσθω ὑπαρκτὸν εἶναι τὴν οἰωνιστικήν: ἵνα καὶ οὕτω δείξω τοῖς προκαταληφθεῖσιν, ὅτι καὶ τούτου διδομένου πολλή ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα καὶ παρ' αὐτὰ τὰ μαντικὰ ὑπεροχὴ, καὶ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα συγκριτή. λεκτέον οὖν ὅτι, εἴπερ τις θεία φύσις ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν μελλόντων προγνωστικὴ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον πλουσία ὡς ἐκ περιουσίας καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δηλοῦν τὰ ἐσόμενα: δηλονότι πολὺ πρότερον τὰ περὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐγίνωσκον: γινώσκοντα δὲ τὰ περὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐφυλάξατο ἂν ἀναπτῆναι κατὰ τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου, ἐφ' οὗ παγίδας καὶ δίκτυα ἄνθρωποι ἔστησαν κατ' αὐτῶν, ἢ τοξόται σκοπῷ χρώμενοι τοῖς ἱπταμένοις βέλη ἐπ' αὐτὰ ἀπέλυον. πάντως δ' ἂν καὶ προγιγνώσκοντες ἀετοὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν νεοσσῶν ἐπιβουλὴν, εἴτε τῶν ἀναβαινόντων πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὄφεων καὶ διαφθειρόντων αὐτοὺς, εἴτε καί τινων ἀνθρώπων εἴτ' εἰς παιδιὰν εἴτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλην τινὰ χρείαν καὶ θεραπείαν λαμβανόντων αὐτοὺς, οὐκ ἂν ἐνόσσευσαν ἔνθα ἔμελλον ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι: καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τῶν ζώων τι τούτων ἁλωτὸν ἀνθρώποις ἦν, ὡς ἀνθρώπων θειότερον καὶ σοφώτερον.
[18] Ἀλλὰ καὶ, εἴπερ οἰωνοὶ οἰωνοῖς μάχονται, [εἰ] ὥς φησιν ὁ Κέλσος, θείαν φύσιν ἔχοντες οἱ μαντικοὶ ὄρνεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄλογα ζῶα καὶ ἐννοίας τοῦ θείου καὶ πρόγνωσιν περὶ μελλόντων, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἑτέροις προεδήλουν: οὔτ' ἂν ἡ καθ' Ὅμηρον στρουθὸς ἐνόσσευσεν ὅπου δράκων ἔμελλεν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἀφανίσειν: οὔτ' ἂν ὁ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ποιητὴν δράκων οὐκ ἐφυλάξατο ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀετοῦ ληφθῆναι. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐν ποιήσει θαυμαστὸς Ὅμηρος περὶ μὲν τοῦ προτέρου τοιαῦτα: Ἔνθ' ἐφάνη μέγα σῆμα: δράκων ἐπὶ νῶτα δαφοινὸς Σμερδαλέος, τὸν δ' αὐτὸς Ὀλύμπιος ἧκε φόωσδε, Βωμοῦ ὑπαΐξας, πρός ῥα πλατάνιστον ὄρουσεν. Ἔνθα δ' ἔσαν στρουθοῖο νεοσσοὶ, νήπια τέκνα, Ὄζῳ ἐπ' ἀκροτάτῳ πετάλοις ὑποπεπτηῶτες, Ὀκτώ: ἀτὰρ μήτηρ ἐνάτη ἦν, ἣ τέκε τέκνα. Ἔνθ' ὅγε τοὺς ἐλεεινὰ κατήσθιε τετριγῶτας: Μήτηρ δ' ἀμφεποτᾶτο ὀδυρομένη φίλα τέκνα: Τὴν δ' ἐλελιξάμενος πτέρυγος λάβεν ἀμφιαχυῖαν. Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ τέκν' ἔφαγε στρουθοῖο καὶ αὐτήν: Τὸν μὲν ἀρίζηλον θῆκεν θεὸς, ὅσπερ ἔφηνεν: Λᾶαν γάρ μιν ἔθηκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω. Ἡμεῖς δ' ἑσταότες θαυμάζομεν οἷον ἐτύχθη. Ὡς οὖν δεινὰ πέλωρα θεῶν εἰσῆλθ' ἑκατόμβας. περὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὅτι Ὄρνις γάρ σφιν ἐπῆλθε περησέμεναι μεμαῶσιν, Αἰετὸς ὑψιπέτης, ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ λαὸν ἐέργων, Φοινήεντα δράκοντα φέρων ὀνύχεσσι πέλωρον, Ζωὸν, ἔτ' ἀσπαίροντα: ὁ δ' οὔπω λήθετο χάρμης. Κόψε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔχοντα κατὰ στῆθος παρὰ δειρὴν, Ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω: ὁ δ' ἀπὸ ἕθεν ἧκε χαμᾶζε, Ἀλγήσας ὀδύνῃσι, μέσῳ δ' ἐνὶ κάββαλ' ὁμίλῳ: Αὐτὸς δὲ κλάγξας πέτετο πνοιῇς ἀνέμοιο. Τρῶες δ' ἐρρίγησαν, ὅπως ἴδον αἰόλον ὄφιν Κείμενον ἐν μέσσοισι, Διὸς τέρας αἰγιόχοιο. Ἆρ' οὖν ὁ μὲν ἀετὸς ἦν μαντικὸς, ὁ δὲ δράκων, ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ χρῶνται τῷ ζώῳ οἱ οἰωνοσκόποι, οὐκ ἦν μαντικός; τί δὲ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀποκληρωτικὸν εὐέλεγκτόν ἐστιν, οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι μαντικοὺς ἐλεγχθείη ἄν; οὐκ ἂν γὰρ ὁ δράκων ὢν μαντικὸς οὐκ ἐφυλάξατο τάδε τινὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀετοῦ παθεῖν; καὶ ἄλλα δ' ἂν μυρία τοιαῦτα εὕροι τις παραδείγματα, παριστάντα ὅτι οὐ τὰ ζῶα μέν ἐστιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντα μαντικὴν ψυχήν: ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ‘αὐτὸς Ὀλύμπιος ἧκε φόωσδε:’ κατὰ δέ τι σημεῖον καὶ Ἀπόλλων ἀγγέλῳ χρῆται ἱέρακι: κίρκος γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνος εἶναι λέγεται ταχὺς ἄγγελος.
[19] Κατὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς δαίμονές τινες φαῦλοι καὶ (ἵν' οὕτως ὀνομάσω) τιτανικοὶ ἢ γιγάντιοι, ἀσεβεῖς πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς θεῖον καὶ τοὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀγγέλους γεγενημένοι, καὶ πεσόντες ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ περὶ τὰ παχύτερα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἀκάθαρτα ἐπὶ γῆς καλινδούμενοι: ἔχοντές τι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων διορατικὸν, ἅτε γυμνοὶ τῶν γηΐνων σωμάτων τυγχάνοντες, καὶ περὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔργον καταγινόμενοι, βουλόμενοι ἀπάγειν τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, ὑποδύονται τῶν ζώων τὰ ἁρπακτικώτερα καὶ ἀγριώτερα καὶ ἄλλα πανουργότερα, καὶ κινοῦσιν αὐτὰ πρὸς ὃ βούλονται, ὅτε βούλονται: ἢ τὰς φαντασίας τῶν τοιωνδὶ ζώων τρέπουσιν ἐπὶ πτήσεις καὶ κινήσεις τοιάσδε: ἵν' ἄνθρωποι, διὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ἁλισκόμενοι μαντικῆς, θεὸν μὲν τὸν περιέχοντα τὰ ὅλα μὴ ζητῶσι μηδὲ τὴν καθαρὰν θεοσέβειαν ἐξετάζωσι, πέσωσι δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τοὺς ὄρνεις καὶ τοὺς δράκοντας, ἔτι δ' ἀλώπεκας καὶ λύκους. καὶ γὰρ παρατετήρηται τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα δεινοῖς, ὅτι αἱ ἐναργέστεραι προγνώσεις διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ζώων γίγνονται: ἅτε μὴ δυναμένων τῶν δαιμόνων ἐν τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις τῶν ζώων τοσοῦτον, ὅσον δύνανται διὰ τὸ παραπλήσιον τῆς κακίας, καὶ οὐ κακίαν μὲν οἱονεὶ δὲ κακίαν οὖσαν ἐν τοῖς τοιοισδὶ τῶν ζώων, ἐνεργῆσαι τάδε τὰ ζῶα.
[20] Ὅθεν εἴπερ ἄλλο τι Μωσέως τεθαύμακα, καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον θαύματος εἶναι ἀποφανοῦμαι ἄξιον, ὅτι φύσεις κατανοήσας ζώων διαφόρους, καὶ εἴτ' ἀπὸ τοῦ θείου μαθὼν τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ζώῳ συγγενῶν δαιμόνων, εἴτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβαίνων τῇ σοφίᾳ εὑρὼν, ἐν τῇ περὶ ζώων διατάξει πάντα μὲν ἀκάθαρτα ἔφησεν εἶναι τὰ νομιζόμενα παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι μαντικὰ, ὡς ἐπίπαν δὲ εἶναι καθαρὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἐν ἀκαθάρτοις παρὰ Μωσῇ ἐστὶ λύκος καὶ ἀλώπηξ καὶ δράκων, ἀετός τε καὶ ἱέραξ, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις. καὶ ὡς ἐπίπαν οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς προφήταις εὕροις ἂν ταῦτα τὰ ζῶα εἰς παράδειγμα τῶν κακίστων παραλαμβανόμενα, οὐδέ ποτε δὲ εἰς χρηστὸν πρᾶγμα ὀνομαζόμενον λύκον ἢ ἀλώπεκα. ἔοικεν οὖν τις εἶναι ἑκάστῳ δαιμόνων εἴδει κοινωνία πρὸς ἕκαστον εἶδος ζώων. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἄνθρωποι ἀνθρώπων ἰσχυρότεροί τινές εἰσιν, οὐ πάντως διὰ τὸ ἦθος: τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δαίμονες δαιμόνων εἶεν ἂν ἐν μέσοις δυνατώτεροι: καὶ οἵδε μὲν τοῖσδε τοῖς ζώοις χρώμενοι εἰς ἀπάτην τῶν ἀνθρώπων, κατὰ τὸ βούλημα τοῦ καλουμένου ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἡμῶν ἄρχοντος τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἄλλου εἴδους προδηλοῦντες. καὶ ὅρα ἐφ' ὅσον εἰσὶν οἱ δαίμονες μιαροὶ, ὡς καὶ γαλᾶς ὑπό τινων παραλαμβάνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ δηλοῦν τὰ μέλλοντα. καὶ σὺ δὲ παρὰ σαυτῷ κρῖνον ὁπότερόν ἐστι βέλτιον παραδέξασθαι, ὅτι ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς καὶ ὁ τούτου υἱὸς κινοῦσι τοὺς ὄρνιθας καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εἰς μαντικὴν, ἢ οἱ κινοῦντες τὰ τοιαδὶ τῶν ζώων, καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπους παρόντων ἀνθρώπων, δαίμονές εἰσι φαῦλοι καὶ, ὡς ὠνόμασε τὰ ἱερὰ ἡμῶν γράμματα, ἀκάθαρτοι.
[21] Εἴπερ δὲ θεία ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ὀρνίθων ψυχὴ διὰ τὸ δι' αὐτῶν προλέγεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα: πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον, ὅπου κλῃδόνες ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων λαμβάνονται, θείαν εἶναι φήσομεν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκείνων, δι' ὧν αἱ κλῃδόνες ἀκούονται; θεία οὖν τις ἦν κατὰ τοὺς τοιούσδε ἡ παρὰ τῷ Ὁμήρῳ ἀλετρὶς, περὶ τῶν μνηστήρων εἰποῦσα: Ὕστατα καὶ πύματα νῦν ἐνθάδε δειπνήσειαν. κἀκείνη μὲν θεία ἦν: ὁ δὲ τηλικοῦτος Ὀδυσσεὺς, ὁ τῆς Ὁμηρικῆς Ἀθηνᾶς φίλος, οὐκ ἦν θεῖος, ἀλλὰ συνεὶς τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς θείας ἀλετρίδος εἰρημένων κλῃδόνων ἔχαιρεν, ὡς ὁ ποιητής φησι: Χαῖρε δὲ κλῃδόνι δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς. ἤδη δὲ ὅρα, εἴπερ οἱ ὄρνιθες θείαν ἔχουσι ψυχὴν καὶ αἰσθάνονται τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ, ὡς ὁ Κέλσος ὀνομάζει, τῶν θεῶν: δηλονότι καὶ ἡμεῖς πταρνύμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀπό τινος ἐν ἡμῖν οὔσης θειότητος καὶ μαντικῆς περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πταρνύμεθα. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο μαρτυρεῖται ὑπὸ πολλῶν: διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει τό: Ὁ δ' ἐπέπταρεν εὐχομένοιο. διὸ καὶ ἡ Πηνελόπη φησίν: Οὐχ ὁράᾳς, ὅ μοι υἱὸς ἐπέπταρε σοῖσιν ἔπεσσιν;
[22] Τὸ δ' ἀληθῶς θεῖον εἰς τὴν τῶν περὶ μελλόντων γνῶσιν οὔτε τοῖς ἀλόγοις χρῆται ζώοις, οὔτε τοῖς τυχοῦσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων: ἀλλὰ ψυχαῖς ἀνθρώπων ἱερωτάταις καὶ καθαρωτάταις, ἅστινας θεοφορεῖ καὶ προφήτας ποιεῖ. διόπερ εἴ τι ἄλλο θαυμασίως εἴρηται ἐν τῷ Μωσέως νόμῳ, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τούτοις κατατακτέον: Οὐκ οἰωνιεῖσθε οὐδ' ὀρνιθοσκοπήσετε. καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ: Τὰ γὰρ ἔθνη, οὓς κύριος ὁ θεός σου ἐξολοθρεύσει ἀπὸ προσώπου σου, οὗτοι κλῃδόνων καὶ μαντειῶν ἀκούσονται: σοὶ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔδωκε κύριος ὁ θεός σου. εἶθ' ἑξῆς φησί: Προφήτην ἀναστήσει σοι κύριος ὁ θεός σου ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν σου. βουληθεὶς δέ ποτε ὁ θεὸς δι' οἰωνοσκόπου ἀποτρέψαι ἀπὸ τῆς οἰωνιστικῆς, πεποίηκε πνεῦμα ἐν τῷ οἰωνοσκόπῳ εἰπεῖν: Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οἰωνισμὸς ἐν Ἰακὼβ, οὐδὲ μαντεία ἐν Ἰσραήλ: κατὰ καιρὸν ῥηθήσεται τῷ Ἰακὼβ καὶ τῷ Ἰσραὴλ, τί ἐπιτελέσει ὁ θεός. ταῦτα δὴ γιγνώσκοντες ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια, τηρεῖν βουλόμεθα μυστικῶς εἰρημένην ἐντολὴν τήν: Πάσῃ φυλακῇ τήρει σὴν καρδίαν: ἵνα μὴ ἐπιβῇ τι τῶν δαιμονίων τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ ἡμῶν, ἢ πνεῦμά τι τῶν ἐναντίων πρὸς ἃ βούλεται τρέψῃ τὸ φανταστικὸν ἡμῶν. εὐχόμεθα δὲ λάμψαι ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν τὸν φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπιδημοῦντος ἡμῶν τῷ φανταστικῷ πνεύματος θεοῦ καὶ φαντάζοντος ἡμᾶς τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ: ἐπεὶ ὅσοι πνεύματι θεοῦ ἄγονται, οὗτοι υἱοί εἰσι θεοῦ.
[23] Χρὴ δ' εἰδέναι ὅτι τὸ τὰ μέλλοντα προγιγνώσκειν οὐ πάντως θεῖόν ἐστι: καθ' αὑτὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐστὶ, καὶ πίπτον εἰς φαύλους καὶ ἀστείους. καὶ ἰατροὶ γοῦν ἀπὸ ἰατρικῆς προγιγνώσκουσί τινα, κἂν φαῦλοι τὸ ἦθος τυγχάνωσιν: οὕτω δὲ καὶ κυβερνῆται, κἂν μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες, προγιγνώσκουσιν ἐπισημασίας καὶ ἀνέμων σφοδρότητας καὶ τροπὰς περὶ τὸ περιέχον ἔκ τινος πείρας καὶ παρατηρήσεως: καὶ οὐ δή που παρὰ τοῦτο θείους τις αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσει, ἐὰν τύχωσι μοχθηροὶ εἶναι τὸ ἦθος. ψεῦδος οὖν τὸ παρὰ τῷ Κέλσῳ λεγόμενον, τό: ‘Τί ἂν φαίη τις θειότερον τοῦ τὰ μέλλοντα προγιγνώσκειν τε καὶ προδηλοῦν;’ ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ ‘πολλὰ τῶν ζώων ἀντιποιεῖσθαι θείας ἐννοίας:’ οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων ἔννοιαν ἔχει τοῦ θεοῦ. ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ ‘ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα:’ ὅπου γε καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ ἔτι φαῦλοι, κἂν ἐπ' ἄκρον προκόπτωσι, πόρρω εἰσὶ τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας. μόνοι δὴ ἄρα οἱ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν σοφοὶ καὶ ἀψευδῶς εὐσεβεῖς ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας εἰσίν: ὁποῖοί εἰσιν οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς προφῆται καὶ Μωσῆς, ᾧ μεμαρτύρηκε διὰ τὴν πολλὴν καθαρότητα ὁ λόγος εἰπών: Ἐγγιεῖ Μωσῆς μόνος πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ οὐκ ἐγγιοῦσι. πῶς δὲ ἀσεβῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀσέβειαν ἡμῖν ἐγκαλοῦντος εἴρηται τὸ ‘οὐ μόνον σοφώτερα εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοφιλέστερα’; καὶ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀποτραπείη προσέχων ἀνθρώπῳ λέγοντι δράκοντα καὶ ἀλώπεκα καὶ λύκον καὶ ἀετὸν καὶ ἱέρακα τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως εἶναι θεοφιλέστερα; ἀκολουθεῖ δ' αὐτῷ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι, εἴπερ θεοφιλέστερα τάδε τὰ ζῶα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Φερεκύδου καὶ ὧν πρὸ βραχέος ὕμνησε θεολόγων θεοφιλέστερά ἐστι ταῦτα τὰ ζῶα. καὶ ἐπεύξαιτό γε ἄν τις αὐτῷ λέγων: Εἴπερ θεοφιλέστερά ἐστι τάδε τὰ ζῶα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, γένοιο μετ' ἐκείνων θεοφιλὴς καὶ ἐξομοιωθείης τοῖς κατὰ σὲ ἀνθρώπων θεοφιλεστέροις. καὶ μὴ ὑπολαμβανέτω γε ἀρὰν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον: τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εὔξαιτο οἷς πείθεται εἶναι θεοφιλεστέροις γενέσθαι πάντη παραπλήσιος, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἐκεῖνοι γένηται θεοφιλής;
[24] Θέλων δὲ τὰς ὁμιλίας τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἱερωτέρας ὁ Κέλσος, οὐ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἀνατίθησι τὴν ἱστορίαν ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τοῖς συνετοῖς. συνετοὶ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειάν εἰσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι, οὐδεὶς γὰρ φαῦλος συνετός. λέγει τοίνυν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅτι ‘φασὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ συνετοὶ καὶ ὁμιλίας ἐκείνοις εἶναι, δηλονότι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἱερωτέρας: καὶ αὐτοί που γνωρίζειν τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ ἔργῳ δεικνύειν ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ὅταν προειπόντες ὅτι ἔφασαν οἱ ὄρνιθες ὅτι ἀπίασί ποι καὶ ποιήσουσι τόδε ἢ τόδε, δεικνύωσιν ἀπελθόντας ἐκεῖ καὶ ποιοῦντας ἃ ἤδη προεῖπον.’ κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐδεὶς συνετὸς τοιαῦτα ἱστόρησε, καὶ οὐδεὶς σοφὸς ἱερωτέρας εἶπεν εἶναι τὰς τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ὁμιλίας τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐξετάσαι τὰ Κέλσου τἀκόλουθον σκοπῶμεν, δῆλον ὅτι κατ' αὐτὸν ἱερώτεραι τῶν σεμνῶν Φερεκύδου καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὁμιλιῶν εἰσὶν αἱ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων: ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτόθεν οὐ μόνον ἀπεμφαῖνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀτοπώτατον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ πιστεύσωμέν τινας ἐκ τῆς ἀσήμου φωνῆς τῶν ὀρνίθων μαθόντας, ὅτι ἀπίασί ποι οἱ ὄρνιθες καὶ ποιήσουσι τόδε ἢ τόδε, προδηλοῦν: καὶ τοῦτ' ἐροῦμεν ἀπὸ τῶν δαιμόνων συμβολικῶς ἀνθρώποις δεδηλῶσθαι, κατὰ σκοπὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἀπατηθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμόνων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ κατασπασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὸν νοῦν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεοῦ ἐπὶ γῆν καὶ τὰ ἔτι κατωτέρω.
[25] Οὐκ οἶδα δ' ὅπως ὁ Κέλσος καὶ ὅρκου ἐλεφάντων ἤκουσε, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶν οὗτοι πιστότεροι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἡμῶν καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχουσι τοῦ θεοῦ. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ οἶδα περὶ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ζώου καὶ τῆς ἡμερότητος ἱστορούμενα, οὐ μὴν καὶ περὶ ὅρκων ἐλέφαντος σύνοιδα εἰρῆσθαι παρά τινι: εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ ἥμερον καὶ τὴν ὡσπερεὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους αὐτῶν συνθήκην, ἅπαξ γενομένων ὑπ' αὐτοῖς, εὐορκίαν τηρουμένην ὠνόμασεν, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ ψεῦδός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ σπανίως, ἀλλ' οὖν γε ἱστόρηται, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ἡμερότητα ἐξηγριώθησαν ἐλέφαντες κατὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ φόνους ἐποίησαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κατεδικάσθησαν ἀναιρεθῆναι, ὡς οὐκέτι χρήσιμοι. ἐπεὶ δὲ παραλαμβάνει μετὰ ταῦτα, εἰς τὸ κατασκευάσαι, ὡς οἴεται, εὐσεβεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς πελαργοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὰ περὶ τοῦ ζώου ἱστορούμενα ἀντιπελαργοῦντος καὶ τροφὰς φέροντος τοῖς γεγεννηκόσι: λεκτέον ὅτι καὶ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀπὸ θεωρήματος τοῦ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος ποιοῦσιν οἱ πελαργοὶ οὐδ' ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ φύσεως, βουληθείσης τῆς κατασκευαζούσης αὐτοὺς φύσεως παράδειγμα ἐν ἀλόγοις ζώοις δυσωπῆσαι δυνάμενον ἀνθρώπους ἐκθέσθαι περὶ τοῦ χάριτας ἀποτιννύειν τοῖς γεγεννηκόσιν. εἰ δὲ ᾔδει Κέλσος ὅσῳ διαφέρει λόγῳ ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοῦ ἀλόγως καὶ φυσικῶς αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖν, οὐκ ἂν εὐσεβεστέρους εἶπε τοὺς πελαργοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔτι δὲ, ὡς ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἱστάμενος ὁ Κέλσος, παραλαμβάνει τὸ Ἀράβιον ζῶον, τὸν φοίνικα, διὰ πολλῶν ἐτῶν ἐπιδημοῦν Αἰγύπτῳ, καὶ φέρον ἀποθανόντα τὸν πατέρα καὶ ταφέντα ἐν σφαίρᾳ σμύρνης, καὶ ἐπιτιθὲν ὅπου τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου τέμενος. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἱστόρηται μὲν, δύναται δὲ, ἐάνπερ ᾖ ἀληθὲς, καὶ αὐτὸ φυσικὸν τυγχάνειν: ἐπιδαψιλευσαμένης τῆς θείας προνοίας καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν ζώων παραστῆσαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸ ποικίλον τῆς τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κατασκευῆς φθάνον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρνεα: καὶ ζῶόν τι μονογενὲς ὑπέστησεν, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσῃ θαυμασθῆναι οὐ τὸ ζῶον, ἀλλὰ τὸν πεποιηκότα αὐτό.
[26] Ἐπεὶ οὖν τούτοις πᾶσιν ἐπιφέρει ὁ Κέλσος τό: ‘Οὔκουν ἀνθρώπῳ πεποίηται τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ λέοντι οὐδὲ ἀετῷ οὐδὲ δελφῖνι: ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὡς ἂν θεοῦ ἔργον ὁλόκληρον καὶ τέλειον ἐξ ἁπάντων γένηται: τούτου χάριν μεμέτρηται τὰ πάντα οὐκ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὅλου: καὶ μέλει τῷ θεῷ τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τοῦτ' οὔποτε ἀπολείπει πρόνοια, οὐδὲ κάκιον γίνεται, οὐδὲ διὰ χρόνου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ θεὸς ἐπιστρέφει, οὐδ' ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα ὀργίζεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ πιθήκων οὐδὲ μυῶν: οὐδὲ τούτοις ἀπειλεῖ, ὧν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ μέρει τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν εἴληφε:’ φέρε κἂν διὰ βραχέων πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀπαντήσωμεν. οἶμαι δὴ ἀποδεδειχέναι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, πῶς ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ παντὶ λογικῷ τὰ πάντα πεποίηται: προηγουμένως γὰρ διὰ τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον τὰ πάντα δεδημιούργηται. Κέλσος μὲν οὖν λεγέτω ὅτι οὕτως οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡς οὐδὲ λέοντι οὐδ' οἷς ὀνομάζει: ἡμεῖς δ' ἐροῦμεν, οὐ λέοντι ὁ δημιουργὸς οὐδὲ ἀετῷ οὐδὲ δελφῖνι ταῦτα πεποίηκεν: ἀλλὰ πάντα διὰ τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον, καὶ ‘ὅπως ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὡς ἂν θεοῦ ἔργον ὁλόκληρον καὶ τέλειον ἐξ ἁπάντων γένηται.’ τούτῳ γὰρ συγκαταθετέον ὡς καλῶς εἰρημένῳ. μέλει δὲ τῷ θεῷ οὐχ ὡς Κέλσος οἴεται μόνου τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ ὅλον ἐξαιρέτως παντὸς λογικοῦ. καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπολείψει πρόνοια τὸ ὅλον: οἰκονομεῖ γὰρ, κἂν κάκιον γένηται διὰ τὸ λογικὸν ἁμαρτάνον μέρος τι τοῦ ὅλου, καθάρσιον αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ χρόνου ἐπιστρέφειν τὸ ὅλον πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πιθήκων μὲν ἕνεκα ὀργίζεται οὐδὲ μυῶν: ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἐπάγει, ἅτε παραβᾶσι τὰς φυσικὰς ἀφορμὰς, δίκην καὶ κόλασιν, καὶ τούτοις διὰ προφητῶν ἀπειλεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιδημήσαντος ὅλῳ τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωτῆρος: ἵνα διὰ τῆς ἀπειλῆς ἐπιστραφῶσι μὲν οἱ ἀκούσαντες, οἱ δὲ ἀμελήσαντες τῶν ἐπιστρεπτικῶν λόγων δίκας κατ' ἀξίαν τίσωσιν, ἃς πρέπον θεὸν ἐπιτιθέναι κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ συμφερόντως τῷ παντὶ βούλημα τοῖς τοιαύτης καὶ οὕτως ἐπιπόνου δεομένοις θεραπείας καὶ διορθώσεως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τόμου αὐτάρκη περιγραφὴν εἰληφότος, αὐτοῦ που καταπαύσομεν τὸν λόγον. θεὸς δὲ δῴη διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὅς ἐστι θεὸς λόγος καὶ σοφία καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ πᾶν ὅ τί ποτε θεολογοῦσαι φασὶν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ ἱεραὶ γραφαὶ, ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῦ πέμπτου τόμου ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῶν ἐντευξομένων, καὶ διανύσαι κἀκεῖνον μετὰ τῆς τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν ἐπιδημίας καλῶς.