OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If "before" and "after" is ungenerated, then there will be a time when the ungenerated is not ungenerated; which is absurd, for the ungenerated at some time not to be. 45. From the same discourse. But in the continuous there are indeed infinite halves, but not in actuality but in potentiality. If indeed nothing is infinite in actuality, it is clear that neither motion nor time is infinite. Since both motion and time are finite in the past, they necessarily have a beginning; and since they have a beginning, they are also necessarily generated; and if motion and time are generated, then necessarily also the body that is moved, which always has its being in being moved; and if always for the time that is taken it is possible for half of it to be taken from the future and to be added to the past, yet not even so is it possible for time ever to be infinite in actuality in the past. 40. Of Aristotle from the first book of On the Heavens. *) It is necessary for there to be some simple body, which is of a nature to be borne in a circular motion according to its own nature. What need is there then for the first mover to move such a body, which is moved in a circular motion according to its own nature? 47. From the same discourse. It is clear that there exists by nature some other substance of a body besides those constituted here, more divine and prior to all of these. If this body eternally and without beginning is moved around the earth, the substance which is here, how can it be prior to the earth, without which it would not be moved in its circular motion? And if the eternal and the ungenerated and the useful for the constitution of things that come to be here, as it belongs to such a body, so it belongs to the earth, why is that body more honorable and prior to the earth? 48. From the same discourse. But the body borne in a circle cannot have weight or lightness. If that which does not have weight and lightness cannot be tangible (for the tangible is among those things having weight and lightness), how does it possess that which cannot exist without them, yet does not possess them? And how by its own motion does it produce a certain heating power of the air, just as the bodies here that have weight and lightness, which by their own motions accomplish heating effects? 49. From the same discourse. But the contrarieties of locomotion are according to the contrarieties of places; for if they were equal, there would be no motion of them, and if the one motion prevailed, the other would not exist. So that if both existed, the other body would exist in vain, not being moved in its own motion; for in vain this shoe sa

καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν γέγονε, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν. Eἰ ἔστιν ἀγένητον τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἔσται ἄρα ὅτε τὸ ἀγένητον οὐκ ἀγένητον· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον, τὸ ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἀγένητον. με. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεχεῖ ἔνεστι μὲν ἄπειρα ἡμίσεα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει. Eἰ ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ κίνησις οὐδὲ ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἄπειρος. Κινήσεώς τε καὶ χρόνου τῷ παρελθόντι πεπερασμένων ὄντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰσὶν ἠργμένοι· ἠργμένων δὲ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰσὶ καὶ γενητοί· εἰ δὲ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος εἰσὶ γενητοί, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα καὶ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα, τὸ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχον· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ληφθέντα χρόνον τούτου τὰ ἡμίσεα ἐνδέχεται ληφθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ μέλλοντος καὶ προστεθῆναι τῷ παρελθόντι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὕτως ἐνδέχεται τὸν χρόνον τῷ παρελθόντι ἄπει ρον εἶναι ἐντελεχείᾳ ποτέ. μ. Ἀριστοτέλους ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ πρώτου λόγου. *) Ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι σῶμα ἁπλοῦν, ὃ πέφυκε φέρε σθαι τὴν κύκλῳ κίνησιν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν. Τίς οὖν χρεία τοῦ πρώτως κινοῦντος κινεῖν τοιοῦτον σῶμα, τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν τὴν κύκλῳ κινούμενον κίνησιν; μζ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Φανερὸν ὅτι πέφυκέ τις οὐσία σώματος ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς ἐνταῦθα συσταθείσας, θειοτέρα καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἁπάντων. Eἰ τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα ἀϊδίως καὶ ἀνάρχως περὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν ἐνταῦθα οὖσαν οὐσίαν κινεῖται, πῶς δύναται τῆς γῆς εἶναι πρότερον, ἧς χωρὶς οὐκ ἂν ἐκινεῖτο τὴν κύκλῳ κίνησιν; Καὶ εἰ τὸ ἀΐδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς σύ στασιν τῶν ἐνταῦθα γιγνομένων, ὡς πρόσεστι τῷ τοιούτῳ σώματι, οὕτως πρόσεστι τῇ γῇ, διὰ τί τὸ σῶμα ἐκεῖνο τι μιώτερον καὶ πρότερον τῆς γῆς; μη. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τὸ δὲ κύκλῳ σῶμα φερόμενον ἀδύνατον ἔχειν βάρος ἢ κουφότητα. Eἰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἁπτόν (ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἔχουσι βάρος καὶ κουφότητά ἐστι τὸ ἁπτόν), πῶς τὸ ἐκείνων ἄνευ μὴ δυνάμενον εἶναι ἔχει, ἐκεῖνα δὲ οὐκ ἔχει; Πῶς δὲ τῇ αὑτοῦ κινήσει θερμαντικήν τινα δύναμιν ἀέρος ἀποτελεῖ, καθάπερ τὰ ἐνταῦθα σώματα τὰ ἔχοντα βαρύτητα καὶ κουφότητα, τὰ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν κινήσεσι θερμαντικὰς ἐκτελοῦντα ἐνεργείας; μθ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Aἱ δὲ τῆς φορᾶς ἐναντιώσεις κατὰ τὰς τῶν τόπων εἰσὶν ἐναντιώσεις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσαι ἦσαν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κίνησις αὐτῶν, εἰ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα κίνησις ἐπεκράτει, ἡ ἑτέρα οὐκ ἂν ἦν. Ὥστε εἰ ἀμφότερα ἦν, μάτην ἂν ἦν θάτερον σῶμα μὴ κι νούμενον τὴν αὑτοῦ κίνησιν· μάτην γὰρ ὑπόδημα τοῦτο λέ