OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation. But if this is so, then it is not true that the world is their creation. If the creator creates the world by a paradigm, he creates it by willing, but if he creates it by his being, the paradigm is superfluous, since God's being is sufficient for the making of that which is made, and it sets aside the will; for those things are not willed which would come to be even if the maker did not will it. For such is the work of those who make by their being. God himself is unbegotten, but he begot the paradigm from his own mind, and he created the world from matter according to the paradigm. But if according to the respondent, because the world is the creation of the unbegotten creator, for this reason it is also itself unbegotten, then the paradigm will also be unbegotten, since it is the offspring of the unbegotten. But if it is absurd to say that the offspring is unbegotten, then it is also absurd to say that the created is uncreated. If because the creator is uncreated it is necessary for the creation also to be uncreated, it is clear that in this way it is necessary for the creation also to be uncreated; for the creator is uncreated. But if this is absurd, then it is also absurd to say that the world is uncreated. The "made by a creator" differs from the "created" in word only, but does not differ in fact; wherefore they are universally convertible with each other because they are on an equal footing; for if anything is created, this is of necessity also made by a creator, and if anything is made by a creator, this is of necessity also created. But since it is impossible for the world to be uncreated and created (for in every case either the affirmation or the negation must be true), how then is it possible for the world to be made by a creator and uncreated? For the same thing to be twice in another is necessarily at different times; for instance the paradigm is in God and in matter, and in God it is unmade, but made in matter, and in God it is not the world but the paradigm of the world, but in matter it is the world. But if at different times, and in different ways, then necessarily there is a before and an after. And if there is a before and an after, it is clear that it is not co-eternal. It has been demonstrated by the ancients that the so-called relative terms exist simultaneously by nature. Since, therefore, the image is relative to the paradigm and the paradigm to the image and the creation to the creator and the creator to the creation, such things will exist simultaneously by nature; if then the creator and the paradigm are uncreated, the world is also uncreated, being an image of the paradigm, and a creation of the creator. By those ancients by whom it was demonstrated that relative terms are simultaneous by nature, by them the definition of an image has been given. An image, he says, is that whose generation is through imitation. But if according to the respondent the world is uncreated, it is clear that the world has lost the name of image, both the name and the reality; for in uncreatedness it is impossible for the world to preserve the definition of an image. The one who says the creation is uncreated, because its creator is uncreated

δῆλον ἐκ τούτου, ὅτι οὔτε τῷ δημιουργῷ πρὸς τὶ ἐστὶ καθὸ εἰκὼν ὁ κόσμος, οὔτε τῷ παραδείγματι καθὸ δημιούργημα. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθὲς τὸ τούτων εἶναι δημιούργημα τὸν κόσμον. Eἰ τῷ παραδείγματι δημιουργεῖ ὁ δημιουργὸς τὸν κόσμον, βουλόμενος αὐτὸν δημιουργεῖ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῷ εἶναι αὐτὸν δημιουργεῖ, περιττὸν τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἀρκοῦντος πρὸς ποίησιν τοῦ ποιουμένου, καὶ παράγει τὸ βούλημα· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται βουλητὰ ἃ καὶ μὴ βουλομένου τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐγίνετο. Τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ ἔργον τῶν τῷ εἶναι ποιούντων. Ὁ θεὸς μὲν αὐτός ἐστιν ἀγένητος, τὸ δὲ παρά δειγμα ἐγέννησεν ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ διανοίας, τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἐδη μιούργησεν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα. Ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον, ἐπειδὴ δημιούργημα τοῦ ἀγενήτου δη μιουργοῦ ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγένητός ἐστιν, ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα ἀγένητον, ἐπεὶ γέννημα τοῦ ἀγε νήτου ἐστίν. Eἰ δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ λέγειν ἀγένητον τὸ γέννημα, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν ἀγένητον τὸ γενητόν. Eἰ διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀγένητον ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα εἶναι ἀγέ νητον, δῆλον ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδημιούρ γητον τὸ δημιούργημα· ἀδημιούργητος γὰρ ὁ δημιουργός. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν τὸν κόσμον ἀγέ νητον. Τὸ δημιουργητὸν τοῦ γενητοῦ λέξει μόνῃ διαφέρει, πράγματι δὲ οὐ διαφέρει· διὸ καθ' ὅλου ἀντιστρέφει ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἐπ' ἴσης· εἴ τι γὰρ γενητόν, τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγ κης καὶ δημιουργητόν, καὶ εἴ τι δημιουργητόν, τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγ κης καὶ γενητόν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸν κόσμον εἶναι ἀγένητον καὶ γενητόν (ἐπὶ παντὸς γὰρ ἢ τὴν φάσιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι δεῖ ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν), πῶς ἄρα τὸν κόσμον δυνατὸν εἶναι δημιουργητὸν καὶ ἀγένητον; Τὸ δὶς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄλλοτε καὶ ἄλλοτε· οἷον τὸ παράδειγμά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ μὲν ἀποίητον, ποιητὸν δὲ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ μὲν οὐ κόσμος ἀλλὰ τοῦ κόσμου παράδειγμα, ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ δὲ κόσμος. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄλλοτε καὶ ἄλλοτε, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. Eἰ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συναΐδιον. Τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἀποδέδεικται τὰ καλούμενα πρὸς τὶ ἅμα τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἥ τε εἰκὼν πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα πρὸς τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα πρὸς τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ δημιούργημα, ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρξει· εἰ τοίνυν ἀγένητος ὁ δημιουρ γὸς καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀγένητος καὶ ὁ κόσμος, τοῦ μὲν παρα δείγματος εἰκὼν ὤν, τοῦ δὲ δημιουργοῦ δημιούργημα. Oἷς παλαιοῖς ἀποδέδεικται τὰ πρὸς τὶ ἅμα τῇ φύσει, αὐτοῖς ἀπο δέδοται τῆς εἰκόνος ὁ λόγος. Eἰκών, φησίν, ἔστιν ἧς ἡ γένεσις διὰ μιμήσεως. Ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον ἀγένητός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, δῆλον ὅτι ἀπώλεσεν ὁ κόσμος τῆς εἰκόνος τὸ ὄνομα, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἐν ἀγενεσίᾳ γὰρ ἀδύ νατον τῷ κόσμῳ σώζειν τῆς εἰκόνος τὸν λόγον. Ὁ λέγων τὸ δημιούργημα ἀγένητον, ἐπειδὴ ὁ δημιουργὸς αὐτοῦ ἀγένητός