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a wise argument, an unconquerable ally of the truth, 15Β_102 I will make the first-fruit of my own; as priding myself on your provisions for the journey.

1. If the body by its own nature is motionless; and the soul is also a body, even if the most fine-particled, as they say, insofar as it is a body, it will not be moved. And if these things are so, whence is our motion? And this to infinity, until we come to an incorporeal creation. But if they say that in the first instance we are moved by God; since I know most of our motions to be absurd and shameful, they will by all necessity declare the divine to be the cause of these too.

2. Another. And again, if every corporeal existence, however it may be, according to the true account, being defined by quantity and quality, in bulk and form, and surface and shape, terminates the contemplation of itself, as being defined by necessary limits. For one investigating this could not imagine anything outside of these; but the soul is also a body, it is certainly circumscribed either from these, or these, or some of them, or one of these, or by these, or by some of them, or by one of these; but surely it is circumscribed neither from these, nor by these things, nor some things, nor any one of these, nor by these things, nor by some things, nor by any one of these; therefore the soul is not a body.

3. Another. If therefore for them the soul is not disputed to exist; but being, it exists as none of the things which the mind comprehends, from which, or which are, bodies; not color, not shape, not resistance, not weight, not size, not the three dimensions; and in short being absolutely none of the things comprehended concerning corporeal nature; that which is none of these, as the argument has shown, will certainly be incorporeal, if indeed it exists.

15Β_104 4. 0428 Another. Furthermore, if all contraction and expansion and division belong to bodies; but that which is free from all contraction and expansion and any division whatsoever, is certainly incorporeal, therefore the soul is incorporeal, as being entirely unsusceptible of all these things.

5. Another. Since all corporeal substance is divided into animate and inanimate; and the soul is also a body, it will certainly be either animate or inanimate. But if it is animate, it will be animated certainly by an animating substance, or power, or else accident. But to say that a soul is animated, just as that light is illuminated, or fire is heated, is utterly ridiculous. And if we say that a substance animates the soul, we shall again say that it is either body or incorporeal. And if it is body, the preceding argument will admit the same ever absurd lines of reasoning from absurdities, until it is mutually agreed that the soul is incorporeal. But if we say that a power, that is, a quality, animates the soul, which is life-giving and motive of the substance, it will be involuntary and insubstantial. In addition, the distinction between ruling and being ruled will be reversed and against nature; if indeed the soul, created by nature to rule a body, as an incorporeal substance, should, as a body according to them, be ruled by that which is not a substance—I mean, by the qualitative power—it which is and subsists as a substance, and is the common preconception of all. But if we say it is an inanimate body, it will be without sensation and without imagination, and irrational and without thought. But surely all these things are about the soul, and in the soul, and exist and are seen; therefore the soul is not a body. For we do not refuse to say, knowing well, that it has this, a body of another substance; but to declare that it is a body, as being at once most rash and most uneducated, we entirely avoid; not being ignorant that 'to be' differs greatly from 'to have'.

But if because they say the Divine is incorporeal, fearing a fear that is not, 15Β_106 they do not accept to call the soul incorporeal, so that they may not bring it to equality with God; let them also cut away the rest of our attributes, so that the contest of their folly may be complete for them, all that we have from God as partakers; or God from us, as working and giving, or

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τῆς ἀληθείας σύμμαχον ἀκαταγώνιστον 15Β_102 σοφόν ἐπιχείρημα, τῶν οἰκείων ἀπαρχήν ποιήσομαι· ὡς ἐφοδικοῖς τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐναβρυνόμενος.

α´. Εἰ τό σῶμα τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει ἀκίνητον· σῶμα δέ καί ἡ ψυχή, εἰ καί τό λεπτομερέστατον, ὥς φασι, καθό σῶμα, οὐ κινηθήσεται. Καί εἰ ταῦθ᾿ οὕτως ἔχει, πόθεν ἡμῖν ἡ κίνησις; Καί τοῦτο ἐπ᾿ ἄπειρον, ἕως οὗ ἔλθωμεν εἰς ἀσώματον κτίσμα. Εἰ δέ ἀπό τοῦ Θεοῦ φήσουσι κατά πρῶτον λόγον ἡμᾶς κινεῖσθαι· ἐπειδή τάς πλείους ἡμῶν κινήσεις ἀτόπους ἐπίσταμαι καί αἰσχράς, αἴτιον πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί τούτων ἀποφανοῦνται τό θεῖον.

β´. Ἄλλο. Καί πάλιν, εἰ πᾶσα καί ὁπωσδήποτε οὖσα σωματική ὕπαρξις κατά τόν ἀληθῆ λόγον, τῷ ποσῷ τε καί τῷ ποιῷ διειλημμένη, ἐν ὄγκῳ καί εἴδει, καί ἐπιφανείᾳ καί σχήματι, τήν περί ἑαυτῆς περατοῖ θεωρίαν, ὡς ἀναγκαίοις διειλημένη πέρασιν. Οὐ γάρ τι τούτων ἐκτός ἔχοι φαντάζεσθαι ὁ ταύτην διερευνώμενος· σῶμα δέ καί ἡ ψυχή, ἤ ἐκ τούτων , ἤ ταῦτα, ἤ τινα, ἤ τούτων τι, ἤ τούτοις, ἤ τισιν, ἤ τινι τούτων περιγραπτός πάντως ἐστί· ἀλλά μή οὔτε ἐκ τούτων, οὔτε ταῦτα, οὔτε τινά, οὔτε τι τούτων, οὔτε τούτοις, οὔτε τισίν, οὔτε τινί τούτων ἐστί περιγραπτός· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή.

γ´. Ἄλλο. Εἰ τοίνυν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μή ἀμφιβέβληται ἡ ψυχή· οὖσα δέ οὐδέν ὑπάρχειν ὧν καταλαμβάνει ἡ ἔννοια, ἐξ ὧν, ἤ ἅ ὑπάρχει τά σώματα· οὐ χρῶμα, οὐ σχῆμα, οὐκ ἀντιτυπία, οὐ βάρος, οὐ πηλικότης , οὐχ ἡ εἰς τρία διάστασις· καί ἁπλῶς ὅλως οὐδέν οὖσα τῶν περί τήν σωματικήν φύσιν καταλαμβανομένων· ἡ μηδέν οὖσα τούτων, ὡς ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος, ἀσώματος ἔσται πάντως, εἴπερ ἐστίν.

15Β_104 δ´. 0428 Ἄλλο. Ἔτι, εἰ πᾶσα συστολή καί διαστολή καί τομή τῶν σωμάτων ἐστί· τό δέ πάσης συστολῆς καί διαστολῆς καί τῆς οἱασοῦν τομῆς ἐλεύθερον, πάντως ἀσώματον, ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ἀσώματος, ὡς τούτων πάντων παντελῶς ἀνεπίδεκτος.

ε´. Ἄλλο. Εἰ πάσης τῆς σωματικῆς οὐσίας, εἴς τε τό ἔμψυχον καί τό ἄψυχον διῃρημένης· σῶμα δέ καί ἡ ψυχή, ἤ ἔμψυχον, ἤ ἄψυχον ἔσται πάντως. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν ἔμψυχον, διά ψυχούσης πάντως, ἤ οὐσίας, ἤ δυνάμεως, ἤτη συμβεβηκότος ψυχωθήσεται. Ψυχήν δέ ψυχοῦσαθαι λέγειν, ὥσπερ καί φῶς φωτίζεσθαι, ἤ θερμαίνεσθαι τό πῦρ, παντελῶς καταγέλαστον. Καί εἰ μέν οὐσίαν ψυχοῦν τήν ψυχήν εἴπωμεν, ἤ σῶμα ἤ ἀσώματον αὐτήν πάλιν λέξομεν. Καί εἰ μέν σῶμα, τάς αὐτάς ἀεί τῶν λογισμῶν ἀτόπους ἐξ ἀτόπων ἐφόδους, ὁ πρίν τούτου δέξεται λόγος, μέχρις οὗ ἀσώματον τήν ψυχήν εἶναι συνδιομολογηθῇ. Εἰ δέ δύναμιν, ἤτοι ποιότητα ψυχοῦν τήν ψυχήν εἴπωμεν, τῆς οὐσίας ζωοποιητικόν τε καί κινητικόν, τό ἀκούσιον ἔσται καί ἀνυπόστατον. Πρός τό, καί ἐναλλάξ καί παρά φύσιν τήν κατά τό ἄρχειν καί ἄρχεσθαι εἶναι διαφοράν· εἴπερ σώματος ἄρχειν κατά φύσιν δημιουργηθεῖσα ἡ ψυχή, ὡς ἀσώματος οὐσία, ὡς σῶμα κατ᾿ αὐτούς ὑπό τοῦ μή κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ὄντος· τῆς κατά τό ποιόν λέγω δυνάμεως, ἀρχθήσεται· ἡ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν οὖσά τε καί ὑφεστῶσα, καί τήν κοινήν πάντων πρόληψιν. Εἰ δέ ἄψυχον εἴπωμεν σῶμα, ἀναίσθητον καί ἀφαντασίαστον, ἄλογόν τε καί ἀδιανόητον ἔσται. Ἀλλά μήν ταῦτα πάντα περί τήν ψυχήν, καί ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καί ἔστι καί ὁρᾶται· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή. Σῶμα μέν γάρ ἔχειν τοῦτο αὐτήν ἑτερούσιον, καλῶς εἰδότες λέγειν οὐ παραιτούμεθα· σῶμα δέ αὐτήν εἶναι ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ὡς θρασύτατόν τε ἅμα καί ἀπαιδευτότατον, παντελῶς ἀποφεύγομεν· πολύ διαφέρειν τοῦ ἔχειν τό εἶναι οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες.

Εἰ δέ ὅτι ἀσώματον λέγουσι τό Θεῖον, τόν μή ὄντα φοβούμενοι 15Β_106 φόβον, ἀσώματον εἰπεῖν τήν ψυχήν οὐ καταδέχονται, ἵνα μή εἰς ἴσον αὐτήν τῷ Θεῷ ἐνέγκωσι· καί τά λοιπά ἡμῶν περικοπτέτωσαν, ἵν᾿ ᾗ αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀπονοίας τέλειον τό ἀγώνισμα, ὅσα ἐκ Θεοῦ ὡς μετέχοντες· ἤ Θεός ἐξ ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐνεργῶν καί διδούς, ἤ