On The Virtues (In General)

 ARTICLE 1

 ARTICLE 2

 ARTICLE 3

 ARTICLE 4

 ARTICLE 5

 ARTICLE 6

 ARTICLE 7

 ARTICLE 8

 ARTICLE 9

 ARTICLE 10

 ARTICLE 11

 ARTICLE 12

 ARTICLE 13

 APPENDIX I Outline Synopsis of the Articles

 ARTICLE 1

 ARTICLE 2

 ARTICLE 3

 ARTICLE 4

 ARTICLE 5

 ARTICLE 6

 ARTICLE 7

 ARTICLE 8

 ARTICLE 9

 ARTICLE 10

 ARTICLE 11

 ARTICLE 12

 ARTICLE 13

 APPENDIX II Detached Notes

 ARTICLE 1

 ARTICLE 2

 ARTICLE 3

 ARTICLE 4

 ARTICLE 5

 ARTICLE 6

 ARTICLE 7

 ARTICLE 8

 ARTICLE 9

 ARTICLE 10

 ARTICLE 11

 ARTICLE 12

 ARTICLE 13

ARTICLE 8

Whether virtues are in us by nature.

1. Objections: It would seem that they are:

 a. The authority of Scripture, theologians

    and philosophers.     obj. 1 to 5.

 b. The beginnings of virtue are natural  obj. 6, 9, 13, 20.

 c. Nature is sufficient for virtue   obj. 7-8, 14-15, 18-19.

 d. Virtue, like nature, is determined

    to one        obj. 10 and 11.

 e. Malice is natural; therefore, virtue is

    also natural      obj. 12 and 16.

 f. It is natural that the lower powers be

    subject to reason, and this is the work

    of virtue       obj. 17.

2. On the contrary

 a. We both acquire and lose virtues  1 and 2.

 b. Virtues are not found in all men  3.

 c. By virtue we acquire merit    4.

3. Body

 a. Three opinions on the presence of virtue in man:

  (1) in us by nature--Plato.

  (2) in us from an extrinsic agent intellect--others.

  (3) there is an aptitude in us by nature, but not the perfection of virtue--Aristotle.

 b. This aptitude is in man both by an active and a passive principle, according to both the

  (1) specific nature of man:

   (a) in the intellect, both possible and agent, there are first principles, both speculative and practical.

   (b) in the will

    1. active principle: to the last end.

    2. passive principle: in potency to this or that particular good.

   (c) in the sense appetites: naturally inclined to obey reason.

  (2) and the nature of an individual: in whom there will be a natural inclination to this or that virtue, which aptitude will be perfected by the rule of reason.

 c. Reason will find the mean for all the virtues, subject the inferior in man to the superior, and from a natural inclination to the ultimate end, order all means and proximate ends.