On Lying.

 1. There is a great question about Lying, which often arises in the midst of our every day business, and gives us much trouble, that we may not either

 2. Setting aside, therefore, jokes, which have never been accounted lies, seeing they bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the very mood of the

 3. For which purpose we must see what a lie is. For not every one who says a false thing lies, if he believes or opines that to be true which he says.

 4. But it may be a very nice question whether in the absence of all will to deceive, lying is altogether absent. Thus, put the case that a person shal

 5. But whether a lie be at some times useful, is a much greater and more concerning question. Whether, as above, it be a lie, when a person has no wil

 6. On the other hand, those who say that we must never lie, plead much more strongly, using first the Divine authority, because in the very Decalogue

 7. Neither do they confess that they are awed by those citations from the Old Testament which are alleged as examples of lies: for there, every incide

 8. For this reason, from the books of the New Testament, except the figurative pre-significations used by our Lord, if thou consider the life and mann

 9. But if no authority for lying can be alleged, neither from the ancient Books, be it because that is not a lie which is received to have been done o

 10. As concerning purity of body here indeed a very honorable regard seems to come in the way, and to demand a lie in its behalf to wit, that if the

 11. But if any man supposes that the reason why it is right for a person to tell a lie for another is, that he may live the while, or not be offended

 12. Thus has the question been on both sides considered and treated and still it is not easy to pass sentence: but we must further lend diligent hear

 13. In which proposition these points may well deserve to be questioned: whether such consent is to be accounted as a deed: or whether that is to be c

 14. “How,” sayest thou, “is it not his doing as well as theirs, when they would not do this, if he would do that?” Why, at this rate we go housebreaki

 15. The whole stress, then, of this question comes to this whether it be true universally that no sin of another, committed upon thee, is to be imput

 16. Or, are some lies, also, to be excepted, so that it were better to suffer this than to commit those? If so, then not every thing that is done in o

 17. But yet if the option were proposed to the man who chose to burn incense to idols rather than yield his body to abominable lust, that, if he wishe

 18. This being from the very first and most firmly established, touching other lies the question proceeds more securely. But by consequence we must al

 19. These sorts of lies having been without any hesitation condemned, next follows a sort, as it were by steps rising to something better, which is co

 20. But haply some may think that there is an exception to be added that there be some honest lies which not only hurt no man, but profit some man, e

 21. If this be absurd, what shall we say? Is it so, that there is no “false witness,” but when one tells a lie either to invent a crime against some m

 22. What then, if a homicide seek refuge with a Christian, or if he see where the homicide have taken refuge, and be questioned of this matter by him

 23. This did a former Bishop of the Church of Thagasta, Firmus by name, and even more firm in will. For, when he was asked by command of the emperor,

 24. But one sometimes comes to a case of this kind, that we are not interrogated where the person is who is sought, nor forced to betray him, if he is

 25. For first to be eschewed is that capital lie and far to be fled from, which is done in doctrine of religion to which lie a man ought by no consid

 26. Touching which matter, there will be some place open for consideration, if first the divine authorities which forbid a lie be diligently discussed

 27. As, when we read in the Gospel, “Thou hast received a blow in the face, make ready the other cheek.” Now as an example of patience can none be fou

 28. It is also written, “But I say unto you, Swear not at all.” But the Apostle himself has used oaths in his Epistles. And so he shows how that is to

 29. As that, “Take no thought for the morrow,” and, “Take therefore no thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or what ye shall put on.” No

 30. Moreover, it was said to the Apostles that they should take nothing with them for their journey, but should live by the Gospel. And in a certain p

 31. Thus then what is written, “The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul ” of what mouth it speaketh, is the question. For in general when the Scripture

 32. Manifestly also in the Gospel we find the mouth of the heart: so that in one place the Lord is found to have mentioned the mouth both of the body

 33. But, like as it is asked of what mouth the Scripture saith, “The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul,” so it may be asked, of what lie. For it seem

 34. For what is written in another place, “Wish not to use every lie ” they say is not of force for this, that a person is not to use any lie. Therefo

 35. Moreover what is written “Thou wilt destroy all that speak leasing:” one saith that no lie is here excepted, but all condemned. Another saith: Yea

 36. For, concerning false witness, which is set down in the ten commands of the Law, it can indeed in no wise be contended that love of truth may at h

 37. Likewise, touching that which is written, “A son which receiveth the word shall be far from destruction: but receiving, he receiveth it for himsel

 38. Certain it is, albeit all this disputation go from side to side, some asserting that it is never right to lie, and to this effect reciting divine

 39. And all these sins, truly, whether such whereby an injury is done to men in the comforts of this life, or whereby men corrupt themselves and hurt

 40. Now the things which are to be kept safe for sanctity’s sake are these: pudicity of body, and chastity of soul, and verity of doctrine. Pudicity o

 41. There resulteth then from all these this sentence, that a lie which doth not violate the doctrine of piety, nor piety itself, nor innocence, nor b

 42. It clearly appears then, all being discussed, that those testimonies of Scripture have none other meaning than that we must never at all tell a li

 43. So great blindness, moreover, hath occupied men’s minds, that to them it is too little if we pronounce some lies not to be sins but they must nee

22. What then, if a homicide seek refuge with a Christian, or if he see where the homicide have taken refuge, and be questioned of this matter by him who seeks, in order to bring to punishment a man, the slayer of man? Is he to tell a lie? For how does he not hide a sin by lying, when he for whom he lies has been guilty of a heinous sin? Or is it because he is not questioned concerning his sin, but about the place where he is concealed? So then to lie in order to hide a person’s sin is evil; but to lie in order to hide the sinner is not evil? “Yea, surely:” says some one: “for a man sins not in avoiding punishment, but in doing something worthy of punishment. Moreover, it pertaineth to Christian discipline neither to despair of any man’s amendment, nor to bar against any man the way of repentance.” What if thou be led to the judge, and then questioned concerning the very place where the other is in hiding? Art thou prepared to say, either, “He is not there,” when thou knowest him to be there; or, “I know not, and have not seen,” what thou knowest and hast seen? Art thou then prepared to bear false witness, and to slay thy soul that a manslayer may not be slain? Or, up to the presence of the judge wilt thou lie, but when the judge questions thee, then speak truth that thou be not a false witness? So then thou art going to slay a man thyself by betraying him. Surely the betrayer too is one whom the divine Scripture detesteth. Or haply is he no betrayer, who in answer to the judge’s interrogation gives true information; but would be a betrayar, if, unasked, he should delate a man to his destruction? Put the case with respect to a just and innocent man, that thou know where he is in hiding, and be questioned by the judge; which man, however, has been ordered to be taken to execution by a higher power, so that he who interrogates is charged with the execution of the law, not the author of the sentence? Will it be no false witness that thou shall lie for an innocent man, because the interrogator is not a judge, but only charged with the execution? What if the author of the law interrogate thee, or any unjust judge, making quest of an innocent man to bring him to punishment? What wilt thou do? wilt thou be false witness, or betrayer? Or will he be a betrayer, who to a just judge shall ultroneously delate a lurking homicide; and he not so, who to an unjust judge, interrogating him of the hiding-place of an innocent man whom he seeks to slay, shall inform against the person who has thrown himself upon his honor? Or between the crime of false witness and that of betrayal, wilt thou remain doubtful and unable to make up thy mind? Or by holding thy peace or professing that thou wilt not tell, wilt thou make up thy mind to avoid both? Then why not do this before thou come to the judge, that thou mayest shun the lie also? For, having kept clear of a lie, thou wilt escape all false witness; whether every lie be false witness, or not every: but by keeping clear of all false witness in thy sense of the word, thou wilt not escape all lying. How much braver then, how much more excellent, to say, “I will neither betray nor lie?”

22. Quid ergo, si ad christianum homicida confugiat, aut videat quo confugit; et de hac re interrogetur ab eo qui ad supplicium quaerit hominem hominis interfectorem? mentiendum est? Quomodo enim non tegit peccatum mentiendo, cum ille pro quo mentitur, peccatum sceleratum admiserit? An quia non de peccato ejus interrogatur, sed de loco ubi lateat? Ergo mentiri ad tegendum cujusquam peccatum, malum est; mentiri autem ad tegendum peccatorem, non est malum? Ita sane, ait quispiam: non enim tunc peccat quisquam, cum evitat supplicium; sed cum facit aliquid dignum supplicio. Pertinet autem ad disciplinam christianam, ut neque de cujusquam correctione desperetur, neque cuiquam poenitendi aditus intercludatur. Quid, si ad judicem ductus de ipso loco ubi se ille occultet interrogeris? dicturus es, aut, Non ibi est, ubi eum scis esse; aut, Non novi et non vidi, quod nosti et vidisti? Dicturus ergo es falsum testimonium, et occisurus animam tuam, ne occidatur homicida? An usque ad conspectum judicis mentieris, judice autem quaerente jam verum dices, ne sis falsus testis? Ipse igitur hominem proditione occisurus es. Etiam proditorem quippe divina Scriptura detestatur. An forte proditor non est, qui judici interroganti verum indicat; esset autem proditor, si quemquam ad exitium ultro deferret? Quid, si de justo atque innocente ubi lateat sciens a judice interrogeris, qui tamen ad mortem a majore potestate jussus est rapi, ut ille qui interrogat exsecutor sit legis, non conditor? an ideo non erit falsum testimonium quod pro innocente mentieris, quia nec ille judex, sed exsecutor interrogat? Quid, si ipse conditor legis interroget, aut quilibet judex iniquus ad supplicium quaerens innocentem? quid facies? falsus testis, an proditor eris? An ille erit proditor, qui justo judici latentem homicidam ultro detulerit; et ille non erit, qui judici injusto ubi lateat innocens quem quaerit occidere, interroganti indicaverit eum qui se fidei ejus commiserat? An inter crimen falsi testimonii et proditionis dubius incertusque remanebis? An tacendo, vel profitendo te non esse dicturum, certus utrumque vitabis? Cur ergo non hoc facias, priusquam ad judicem venias, 0504 ut caveas etiam mendacium? Evitato enim mendacio, omne testimonium falsum effugies; sive omne mendacium sit falsum testimonium, sive non omne: evitato autem falso testimonio quod tu esse intelligis, non effugies omne mendacium. Quanto ergo fortius, quanto excellentius dices: Nec prodam, nec mentiar?