24

let us take an example. For these also make cities not out of cities 7.22.17 and likewise temples not out of temples. But if, because substances underlie these things, you think they make them out of existing things, you are mistaken in your reasoning. For neither is it the substance that makes the city or again the temples, but the art applied to the substance; and art does not come from some pre-existing art in the substances, but comes into being from not being in 7.22.18 them. But you seem to me to reply to the argument thus, that the artisan makes the art in the substance from the art which he possesses. And to this it seems to me well to say this, that not even in man does it come from some pre-existing art. For it is not possible to impart art as existing by itself; for it is one of the accidents 7.22.19 and one of those things that receive being then, whenever they come to be in a substance. For man will exist even without architecture; but it will not exist, unless man exists first. Hence it is necessary to say that the arts naturally come into being in men from non-being. If, therefore, we have shown this to be so in the case of men, how would it not be fitting to say that God is able to make not only qualities from non-being, but also substances? For by the fact that it has appeared possible for something to come into being from non-being 7.22.20 it is shown that substances also are so. But since you have a desire to inquire about the origin of evils, I will come to the discussion of these matters. And I wish to ask you a few things: do evils seem to you to be substances or qualities of substances? It seems to me well to say qualities of substances. 7.22.21 And was matter without quality and without form? So I stated beforehand in my argument. Therefore, if evils are qualities of substances, and matter was without quality, and you said that God is the maker of qualities, God will also be the creator of evils. Since, therefore, not even so is it possible to say that God is not the cause of evils, it seems to me superfluous to attribute matter to him. But if you have anything to say to this, begin your argument. 7.22.22 If our inquiry were conducted out of a love of contention, I would not think it right to define evils a second time; but since we are conducting the examination of the arguments rather for the sake of friendship and the benefit of our neighbor, I ask you to allow me to define these matters from the beginning. I think my own purpose has long been clear to you, and my earnestness in our discussions, that I do not wish to win by speaking falsehood plausibly, but for the truth to be shown after careful examination, and I know clearly that you are also of this disposition; therefore, whatever method you think you can use to find the truth, use it without any hesitation. For you will not only benefit yourself by using the better argument, but certainly me as well concerning what I do not know. 7.22.23 It seems clear to me that evils are also certain substances; for I do not see them existing outside of substances. Since, then, my friend, you also say that evils are substances, it is necessary to examine the definition of substance. Does substance seem to you to be a certain bodily constitution? It does. 7.22.24 And does the bodily constitution exist itself by itself, not needing anything in which it must come to be in order to receive its being? So it is. 7.22.25 But does it seem to you that evils are the activities of someone? So it appears to me. 7.22.26 And do the activities receive their being then, whenever the one acting is present? So it is. 7.22.27 And when the one acting is not, will that which he does ever be? It will not be. 7.22.28 Therefore, if substance is a certain bodily constitution, and the bodily constitution does not need anything in which it must come to be in order to receive its being, but evils are the activities of someone, and the activities need something in which they come to be in order to receive their being, then 7.22.29 evils will not be substances. But if evils are substances, and murder is an evil, murder will be a substance; but indeed murder is the activity of someone, therefore murder is not a substance. But if you wish to say that those who act are substance, I agree too. For example, the man who is a murderer, in the respect that he is a man, is a substance; but the murder which he commits 7.22.30 is not a substance, but a work of the substance. And we sometimes say the man

24

παράδειγμα λάβωμεν. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ποιοῦσι πόλεις οὐκ ἐκ πόλεων 7.22.17 καὶ ναοὺς ὁμοίως οὐκ ἐκ ναῶν. εἰ δ', ὅτι τούτοις οὐσίαι ὑπόκεινται, οἴει ἐξ ὄντων αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ποιεῖν, σφάλλῃ τῷ λόγῳ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ποιοῦσα τὴν πόλιν ἢ αὖ πάλιν τοὺς ναούς, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τέχνη· ἡ δὲ τέχνη οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης τινὸς ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις τέχνης γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ οὔσης ἐν 7.22.18 αὐταῖς γίνεται. ἀπαντήσειν δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὕτως τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι ὁ τεχνίτης ἐξ ἧς ἔχει τέχνης τὴν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τέχνην ποιεῖ. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι τοῦτ' εὖ ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔκ τινος ὑποκειμένης τέχνης γίνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἔνεστιν αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὖσαν δοῦναι τὴν τέχνην· τῶν γὰρ συμβεβηκό7.22.19 των ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν τότε τὸ εἶναι λαμβανόντων, ὁπόταν ἐν οὐσίᾳ γίνωνται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς ἔσται· ἡ δ' οὐκ ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πρότερον ἄνθρωπος ᾖ. ὅθεν τὰς τέχνας ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων εἰς ἀνθρώπους πεφυκέναι γίνεσθαι λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐδείξαμεν, πῶς οὐχὶ προσῆκε τὸν θεὸν μὴ μόνον ποιότητας ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων φάναι δύνασθαι ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐσίας; τῷ γὰρ δυνατὸν φανῆναι γίνεσθαί τι ἐξ οὐκ ὄν7.22.20 των τὸ καὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὕτως ἔχειν δείκνυται. ἐπεὶ δὲ πόθος ἐστί σοι περὶ τῆς τῶν κακῶν γενέσεως ζητεῖν, ἐπὶ τὸν τούτων ἐλεύσομαι λόγον. καί σου βραχέα πυθέσθαι βούλομαι· τὰ κακὰ πότερον οὐσίαι σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ ποιότητες οὐσιῶν; Ποιότητας οὐσιῶν εὖ ἔχειν λέγειν μοι δοκεῖ. 7.22.21 Ἡ δὲ ὕλη ἄποιος ἦν καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος; Οὕτως προλαβὼν ἐξεῖπον τῷ λόγῳ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ κακὰ ποιότητες ὑπάρχουσιν οὐσιῶν, ἡ δὲ ὕλη ἄποιος ἦν, τῶν δὲ ποιοτήτων ποιητὴν εἶπας τὸν θεὸν εἶναι, ἔσται καὶ τῶν κακῶν δημιουργὸς ὁ θεός. ὅτε τοίνυν οὐδ' οὕτως ἀναίτιον τῶν κακῶν δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν τὸν θεόν, ὕλην αὐτῷ προσάπτειν περιττὸν εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ. εἰ δέ τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχεις, ἄρχου τοῦ λόγου. 7.22.22 Εἰ μὲν ἐκ φιλονεικίας ἡμῖν ἡ ζήτησις ἐγίνετο, οὐκ ἂν δεύτερον περὶ τῶν κακῶν ἠξίουν ὁρίζεσθαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν πλησίον ὠφελείας τὴν ἐξέτασιν ποιούμεθα τῶν λόγων, ἄνωθεν περὶ τούτων ὁρίζεσθαι ἀξιῶ συγχωρεῖν. Τὴν μὲν προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐμὴν ἐκ πολλοῦ σοι φανερὰν εἶναι δοκῶ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σπουδήν, ὅτι οὐ πιθανῶς εἰπὼν ψεῦδος νικῆσαι θέλω, ἀλλὰ δειχθῆναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν μετὰ ἀκριβοῦς ἐξετάσεως, καὶ σὲ δὲ οὕτως διακεῖσθαι σαφῶς ἐπίσταμαι· ὅθεν οἵῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενος νομίζεις δύνασθαι τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρεῖν, τούτῳ χρῆσαι μηδὲν δυσωπούμενος. οὐ γὰρ σεαυτὸν ὠφελήσεις μόνον χρησάμενος τῷ κρείττονι, ἀλλὰ πάντως κἀμὲ περὶ ὧν ἀγνοῶ. 7.22.23 Σαφῶς παραστῆναί μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας ὑπάρχειν τινάς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκτὸς οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ ὄντα βλέπω. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν, ὦ οὗτος, καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας εἶναι λέγεις, ἀνάγκη τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐξετάζειν λόγον. δοκεῖ σοι τὴν οὐσίαν σωματικήν τινα σύστασιν εἶναι; ∆οκεῖ. 7.22.24 Ἡ δὲ σωματικὴ σύστασις αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπάρχει οὐ δεομένη τινός, οὗ γενομένου τὸ εἶναι λήψεται; Οὕτως ἔχει. 7.22.25 ∆οκεῖ δέ σοι τὰ κακὰ ἐνεργείας εἶναί τινος; Οὕτω μοι φαίνεται. 7.22.26 Αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι τότε τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσιν, ὁπόταν ὁ ἐνεργῶν παρῇ; Οὕτως ἔχει. 7.22.27 Οὐκ ὄντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος, οὐδ' ὅπερ ἐνεργεῖ ἔσται ποτέ; Οὐκ ἔσται. 7.22.28 Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἡ οὐσία σωματική τίς ἐστι σύστασις, ἡ δὲ σωματικὴ σύστασις οὐ δεῖταί τινος, ἐν ᾧ γενομένη τὸ εἶναι λήψεται, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐνέργειαι ὑπάρχουσί τινος, αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι δέονταί τινος, ἐν ᾧ γενόμεναι τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσιν, οὐκ 7.22.29 ἔσονται οὐσίαι τὰ κακά. εἰ δὲ οὐσίαι τὰ κακά, κακὸν δὲ ὁ φόνος, οὐσία ἔσται ὁ φόνος· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φόνος ἐνέργεια ὑπάρχει τινός, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα οὐσία ὁ φόνος. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἐνεργοῦντα οὐσίαν εἶναι θέλεις, σύμφημι κἀγώ. οἷον ἄνθρωπος ὁ φονεύς, καθ' ὃν μὲν λόγον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὑπάρχει οὐσία· ὁ δὲ φόνος ὃν ποιεῖ 7.22.30 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἔργον τῆς οὐσίας. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποτὲ