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he says, in which God was manifested; and establishing this clearly through the subsequent contests, concerning which, unless someone considers the careful examination of vanities superfluous, we will briefly touch upon what has been said. For again, having poured out a multitude of insults on the treatise, he proposes such an argument against 3,1.184 us, saying that those who affirm the union of flesh and the assumption of man to be the same thing are wrong. But I, even if what is said seems rather rustic, will not hide the truth, that our common way of speaking does not precisely establish either of the things said. For what is the difference between the union of flesh and the assumption of man, is not easy to interpret thus offhand, because union is understood in many ways, both in number and in form and in nature and in practices and in studies and in the properties and practices of vice or virtue. What, then, is the union of the flesh, whether united to itself or to another, we need those who interpret the argument to say. And how the assumption of man happens, what kind of man and from where and how and by whom and in what manner was assumed, is equally among the things unknown to us as the previous point. For until someone brings forth the argument concerning the mystery, seasoning it with the divine salt of scripture, we will leave the salt of worldly wisdom that has lost its savor to be disregarded by the faithful. Which of the evangelists narrated a union of flesh? Which of the apostolic narratives taught the assumption of man thus, verbatim? What law, what prophets, what divinely-inspired word, what conciliar decree handed down such a thing to us? From these two sayings, then, he assigns one to us, and says the other is his own; but which of these he makes his own, we are still in doubt. For we either appropriate neither, or both, because we find no difference in the one from the other. For the union happens in relation to something, and the assumption is entirely of something; and each signifies a relation to another, and he who has assumed is united to the one assumed, and that which is united has been united through assumption. 3,1.185

But he says we speak of two persons, the God and the man assumed by God; but he says he does not hold this, but affirms that the one who was incarnate and exists is not another besides the incorporeal one, but the same one in the likeness of our life in the flesh. Still through incoherent things he goes through his nonsense for us. His fleshly god does not have a simple nature; for no one would perceive simplicity in the flesh; and that which is not simple cannot be incomposite. But this one he says is one just as each of us is, from spirit, he says, and soul and body. Now for the first time we have been taught the new form of number, having learned that things divided into three heterogeneous parts are a monad. But let the argument about the spirit he has fabricated be set aside; but according to the crasser division of man, as many of us were taught to divide, confessing that the constitution of man is from an intelligent soul and body, how can we say the two are one, when the Apostle clearly sees two men in each, when he says, "Though our outward man is decaying," meaning the body, "yet our inward man is being renewed day by day," alluding to the soul. And yet if there were three men according to Apollinarius, he would have made two invisible and one visible, so that even if in our own example he strengthens his own argument by calling the two one, Paul refutes him by dividing man in its dual meaning. Since therefore through the human example he establishes the argument of his own dogma, with the refutation of this, that is also certainly refuted along with it; and what he says is such as this: "Just as man is one, from spirit and soul and body." I, therefore, would have required him to establish this first, of what kind of body and from where 3,1.186 taken and when formed and of what sort of soul, whether rational or human or irrational, that is, if the

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λέγει, ἐν ᾗ ὁ θεὸς ἐφανερώθη· καὶ τοῦτο σαφῶς διὰ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἀγώνων κατασκευάζων, ἐφ' ὧν εἰ μή τις περιττὸν ἡγοῖτο τὴν ἐπιμελῆ τῶν ματαίων ἐξέτασιν, δι' ὀλίγων τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπιδραμούμεθα. πάλιν γὰρ πλῆθος ὕβρεων ἐπαντλήσας τῇ συγγραφῇ τοιοῦτον καθ' 3,1.184 ἡμῶν λόγον προτείνεται, ἀδικεῖν λέγων τοὺς ταὐτὸν εἶναι φάσκοντας σαρκὸς ἕνωσιν καὶ ἀνθρώπου πρόσληψιν. ἐγὼ δὲ κἂν ἀγροικότερον εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐκ ἐπικρύ ψομαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι οὐθέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἰδιωτισμὸς δι' ἀκριβείας συνίστησιν. τί γὰρ διαφέρει σαρκὸς ἕνωσις καὶ ἀνθρώπου πρόσληψις, οὑτωσὶ κατὰ τὸ πρόχειρον ἑρμηνεύειν οὐκ εὔπορον, διότι πολλαχῶς νοεῖται ἡ ἕνωσις καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ εἴδει καὶ φύσει καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ τοῖς κατὰ κακίαν ἢ ἀρετὴν ἰδιώμασι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν. τίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς σαρκὸς ἕνωσις, εἴτε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν εἴτε πρὸς ἕτερον ἑνουμένης, τῶν ἑρμηνευόντων τὸν λόγον δεόμεθα. ἥ τε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πρόσληψις πῶς γίνεται, ποίου καὶ πόθεν καὶ πῶς καὶ παρὰ τίνος καὶ τίνα τρόπον προσειλημμένου, ἐπίσης τῷ προλαβόντι ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀγ νοουμένοις ἐστίν. ἕως γὰρ ἂν μὴ τῷ θείῳ τῆς γραφῆς ἅλατι τὸν περὶ τοῦ μυστηρίου λόγον τις ἐπαρτύων προφέρῃ, τὸ μεμωραμμένον τῆς ἔξω σοφίας ἅλας παρεῖσθαι παρὰ τῶν πιστῶν καταλείψομεν. τίς τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν σαρκὸς ἕνωσιν διηγήσατο; ποῖον δὲ τῶν ἀποστολικῶν διηγημάτων τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πρόσληψιν οὑτωσὶ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδίδαξε; τίς νό μος, ποῖοι προφῆται, τίς θεόπνευστος λόγος, ποῖον συνόδου δόγμα τοιοῦτόν τι ἡμῖν παρακατέθετο; ἐκ τούτων τοίνυν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων τὸ μὲν ἡμῖν προσνέμει, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον εἶναι λέγει· πότερον δὲ τούτων ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖται, μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀμφιβάλλομεν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἢ οὐθέτερον οἰκειούμεθα ἢ ἀμ φότερα διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐν θατέρῳ πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον διαφορὰν ἐξευρίσκειν. ἥ τε γὰρ ἕνωσις πρός τι γίνεται ἥ τε πρόσληψις τινὸς πάντως ἐστίν· ἑκάτερον δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν ἀποσημαίνει καὶ ὁ προσλαβὼν ἥνωται τῷ προσληφθέντι καὶ τὸ ἑνωθὲν διὰ προσλήψεως ἥνωται. 3,1.185

Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς φησι δύο πρόσωπα λέγειν, τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ προσληφθέντα ἄνθρωπον· αὐτὸν δέ φησι μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ φάσκειν τὸν σαρκωθέντα καὶ ὄντα οὐχ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν ἀσώ ματον, ἀλλὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέρας τῆς ἐν σαρκὶ ζωῆς. ἔτι διὰ τῶν ἀσυστάτων ἡμῖν τοὺς φληνάφους διέξεισιν. ὁ σάρκινος αὐτοῦ θεὸς ἁπλοῦς εἶναι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν θεωρή σειε· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἀσύνθετον εἶναι οὐ δύναται. ἀλλ' οὗτος εἶναι τὸ ἓν λέγει ὡς καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστον, ἐκ πνεύ ματος, φησί, καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. νῦν πρώτως τὸ καινὸν εἶδος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐδιδάχθημεν, μαθόντες ὅτι τὰ εἰς τρία ἑτερογενῆ διῃρημένα μονάς ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τοῦ ἀναπλασθέντος αὐτῷ πνεύματος ὑπερκείσθω λόγος· κατὰ δὲ τὴν παχυμερεστέραν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τομήν, καθὼς οἱ πολλοὶ διαιρεῖν ἐδιδάχθημεν, ἐκ νοερᾶς ψυχῆς καὶ σώ ματος εἶναι τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σύστασιν ὁμολογοῦντες πῶς εἴπωμεν τὰ δύο ἕν, τοῦ ἀποστόλου σαφῶς δύο ἀνθρώπους περὶ ἕκαστον βλέποντος, ἐν οἷς φησιν Εἰ καὶ ὁ ἔξωθεν ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος διαφθείρεται, τὸ σῶμα λέγων, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔσωθεν ἀνακαινοῦται ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ, τὴν ψυχὴν αἰνισσόμενος. καίτοι εἰ τρεῖς ἦσαν κατὰ τὸν Ἀπολινάριον ἄνθρωποι, δύο πάντως ἂν τοὺς ἀφανεῖς καὶ ἕνα ἐποίησε τὸν φαινόμενον, ὥστε κἂν ἐν τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς ὑποδείγματι κρατύνῃ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον ἓν ὀνομάζων τὰ δύο, παραγράφεται αὐτὸν ὁ Παῦλος διαιρῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν τῇ δυϊκῇ σημασίᾳ. ἐπεὶ οὖν διὰ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου τὸν τοῦ δόγματος ἑαυτοῦ λόγον συνίστησι, τῇ τούτου ἀνατροπῇ κἀκεῖνο πάντως συναπελέγχεται· ὃ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι ὅτι Ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἐστιν ἐκ πνεύματος καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἠξίουν τοῦτο πρότερον στῆσαι, ποίου σώματος καὶ πόθεν 3,1.186 εἰλημμένου καὶ πότε πλασθέντος καὶ ποδαπῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ λογικῆς ἢ ἀνθρωπίνης ἢ ἀλόγου, τουτέστιν, εἰ κτηνείας εἶναι τὸν