we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either equal motions hindering each other according to resistance, or unequal, and on account of the prevalence of one the other became motionless, being overcome by the force of the prevailing one, not accomplishing its own natural motion, in vain would things be that are thus hindered from their proper and natural motions, and clearly these would be the works neither of God nor of nature. If God was not the maker of these things that come to be in vain, nor was nature, then of the things that do not come to be in vain, but unhindered accomplish their own natural motions, of these God is the maker, and nature. How then is it not of the most absurd things to say that these things are ungenerated, eternal, and without beginning, of which God and nature are the maker? And if we call those shoes the works of a craftsman that have a demonstration, why do we not also call the bodies that perform their proper motions according to nature the thoughts of God and nature? 5. From the same argument. Therefore, that the principle without matter is one thing and the principle of form in matter is another is well said, and let this be true. But nonetheless there is no necessity on account of this for there to be more worlds, nor is it possible for more to come into being, since this one is from all the matter, just as it is. If the difference of the principle with respect to the principle is that of being without matter and in matter, it is clear that the principle in matter is subsequent to the principle without matter. How then is the world ungenerated, having its constitution from the subsequent principle? If matter is formless and without substance and deprived of being a "this something" before receiving form and becoming a substance and a "this something," how is the world ungenerated, having come to be from such matter? If he who possessed the principle of the one world also possessed the principles of more worlds, and did not make the creation of the world according to his own will as he pleased, but by the abundance of matter was able to make one world and by the lack of it was not able to make more worlds, how does it not seem that he possessed in vain the principles of more worlds, whose creation he was not able to achieve because of the lack of matter? If it is impossible for an ungenerated thing to come from an ungenerated thing, how, if matter is ungenerated and the world is ungenerated, does the one come from the other? If, just as God made the things from matter, he did not also make matter, then God does not make as many things as he wills, but as many as he is able. But if in all things he has power equal to his will, then God is the maker of matter, just as also of the things from matter. If matter, being subject to God for the making of things from it, being formless and without substance, and without quality and quantity, was changed by the power of God into all these things and became a substance having quality and quantity, how was it not increased by the same power of God that worked so many changes in it to such an extent, so that also more

γομεν, οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπόδεσις. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν. Eἰ ἦσαν ἐν φορᾷ σωμάτων κινήσεις ἐναντίαι, ἢ ἴσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν κωλύουσαι τὰς ἀλλήλων κινήσεις, εἴτε ἄνισοι, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐπικράτειαν τοῦ θατέρου τὸ ἕτερον ἀκίνητον ἐγίνετο, τῇ βίᾳ τοῦ ἐπικρατοῦντος ἐπικρατούμενον, τὴν αὑτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μὴ ἀνύον κίνησιν, μάτην ἂν ἐγένετο τὰ οὕτως πρὸς τὰς οἰκείας τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεις ἐμ πεποδισμένα, καὶ θεοῦ οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔργα ταῦτα οὔτε φύσεως δηλονότι. Eἰ τῶν μάτην γινομένων ὁ θεὸς τούτων ποιητὴς οὐκ ἦν οὔτε ἡ φύσις, τῶν οὐ μάτην ἄρα γιγνομένων, ἀλλ' ἀνεμποδίστως τὰς κατὰ φύσιν αὑτῶν κινήσεις ἐντελούντων, ὁ θεὸς τούτων ἐστὶ ποιητὴς καὶ ἡ φύσις. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων τὸ ἀγένητα λέγειν ἀΐδιά τε καὶ ἄναρχα ταῦτα, ὧν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ ποιητής; Καὶ εἰ ὑποδή ματα ἔργα τεχνίτου ἐκεῖνα λέγομεν τὰ ἔχοντα ὑπόδεσιν, διὰ τί μὴ καὶ τὰ σώματα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν τὰς οἰκείας ἐκτελοῦντα κινήσεις λέγομεν νοήματα θεοῦ τε καὶ φύσεως; ν. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸν λόγον τὸν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τῆς μορφῆς καλῶς λέγεται, καὶ ἔστω τοῦτο ἀληθές. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη διὰ τοῦτο πλείους εἶναι κόσμους, οὐδὲ ἐνδέχεται πλείους γενέσθαι, ἐπείπερ οὗτος ἐκ πάσης ἐστὶ τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ἔστιν. Eἰ τὸ ἀΰλως καὶ ἐνύλως ἐστὶ τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἡ διαφορά, δῆλον ὅτι ὕστερον τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀΰλου ὁ λόγος ὁ ἔνυλος. Πῶς οὖν ἀγένητος ὁ κόσμος ἐκ τοῦ ὑστέρου λόγου τὴν σύστασιν ἐσχηκώς; Eἰ ἀνείδεος καὶ ἀνούσιος καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τόδε τι ἐστερημένη ἡ ὕλη πρὸ τοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ γε νέσθαι οὐσία καὶ τόδε τι, πῶς ἀγένητος ὁ κόσμος ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης γεγονώς; Eἰ ὁ ἐσχηκὼς τὸν λόγον τοῦ ἑνὸς κόσμου οὗτος καὶ πλειόνων κόσμων εἶχε τοὺς λόγους, καὶ μὴ τῷ ἀρεσκομένῳ τοῦ κόσμου ἐποίει τὴν ποίησιν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν βούλησιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ εὐπορίᾳ τῆς ὕλης ἴσχυσε ποιεῖν κόσμον ἕνα καὶ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ αὐτῆς οὐκ ἴσχυσε ποιεῖν πλείονας κόσμους, πῶς οὐ δοκεῖ μάτην ἐσχηκέναι πλειόνων κόσμων τοὺς λόγους, ὧν τὴν ποίησιν οὐκ ἴσχυσε διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς ὕλης; Eἰ ἐξ ἀγενήτου ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἀγένητον, πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητος μὲν ἡ ὕλη, ἀγένητος δὲ καὶ ὁ κόσμος, γίνεται οὗτος ἐξ ἐκείνης; Eἰ μή, ὡς ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, οὕ τως καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐποίησεν, οὐκ ἄρα ποιεῖ ὁ θεὸς ὅσα βού λεται, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἰσχύει. Eἰ δὲ ἴσην τῇ βουλήσει ἔχει τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐν πᾶσι, ποιητὴς ἄρα τῆς ὕλης ὁ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης. Eἰ ἡ ὕλη ὑποκειμένη θεῷ εἰς ποίησιν τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς, ἀνείδεος οὖσα καὶ ἀνούσιος, ἄποιός τε καὶ ἄποσος, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως μετεβλήθη εἰς ταῦτα πάντα καὶ γέγονεν οὐσία πεποιωμένη καὶ πεποσωμένη, πῶς οὐκ ηὐξήθη ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως τὰς τοσαύτας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐργασαμένης μεταβολὰς εἰς τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ πλείονας