OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated; for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with the ungenerated and the ungenerated with the uncreated. But if this is absurd, then it is also absurd to say that a creation is ungenerated. If things that are relative exist simultaneously by nature and for this reason it is necessary for the creation to be co-ungenerated with the creator, as it seems to the respondent, then it is necessary in the same way to say that the generated is co-ungenerated with the ungenerated. For these too are relative; for the ungenerated is relative to the generated, and the generated to the ungenerated. But if when the generated does not exist the ungenerated is ungenerated in potentiality, and when the generated exists the ungenerated is ungenerated in actuality, then it is necessary to understand this in the same way also in the case of the creator and the creation, and of the archetype and the image; and no absurdity results. For the nature which the relative has in the case of the creator and the creation, it also has in the case of the generated and the ungenerated. And the first and the later are among things that are relative; for the later is relative to the first and the first to the later, and they are simultaneous by nature in potentiality or by nature in actuality. But if, according to the respondent, the creation is co-ungenerated with the ungenerated creator, since it is relative and simultaneous by nature, then in this way the generated will also be co-ungenerated with the ungenerated God. For God is first, and the generated is later; and the prior and the later are, as relative, simultaneous by nature. But if, without being sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in actuality, it is impossible for the first and the later to be simultaneous by nature, then neither is the creation co-eternal with the creator, nor the image with the archetype. That things that are relative exist simultaneously by nature has been clearly demonstrated and is acknowledged by all, and is easy to know from this itself. For the right and the left are among things that are relative. Just as, therefore, it is not possible for the right to exist without the left existing, nor the left without the right, so it is not possible for the creator to exist without the creation, or the creation without the creator. If, therefore, the creator is ungenerated, the creation is also ungenerated. For if, just as the right and the left existed in relation to one another in the same substance in the whole part, so also the creator and the creation existed in relation to one another in the same substance in the whole part, the example would have a place, which the respondent used when he tried to show that the creation is co-ungenerated with the creator; but if the right and the left are in relation to one another in the same substance in the whole part, but the creator and the creation are not such, it is clear that the respondent used an inappropriate example, which has no analogy to the nature of the matter with respect to what is being shown. Of things that are relative, some are called of each other what they are called, for example the father is called father of the son and the son is called son of the father, but others are not called of each other what they are called, as the straight and the

ἐστιν, ὀφείλει καὶ ἀδημιούργητον λέγειν τὸ δημιούργημα, ἐπειδὴ ὁ δημιουργὸς αὐτοῦ ἀδημιούργητός ἐστιν· ἀντακολουθοῦσι γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῷ μὲν ἀγενήτῳ τὸ ἀδημιούργητον καὶ τῷ ἀδημιουργήτῳ τὸ ἀγένητον. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν δημιούργημα ἀγένητον. Eἰ ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ πρὸς τὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη συναγένητον εἶναι τῷ δη μιουργῷ τὸ δημιούργημα, καθὰ τῷ ἀποκριναμένῳ δοκεῖ, ἀ νάγκη ἄρα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον συναγένητον λέγειν τὸ γενητὸν τῷ ἀγενήτῳ. Πρὸς τὶ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ γε νητὸν τὸ ἀγένητον, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀγένητον τὸ γενητόν. Eἰ δὲ τοῦ γενητοῦ μὲν οὐκ ὄντος δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγένητον ἀγένητον, ὄντος δὲ τοῦ γενητοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν ἀγένητον τὸ ἀγένητον, ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ τοῦ δημιουργήματος καὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος καὶ τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦτο ὡσαύτως νοεῖν· καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον συμβαίνει. Ἣν γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν τὸ πρὸς τὶ κατὰ τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει καὶ κατὰ τὸ γενητὸν καὶ ἀγένητον. Καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστερον τῶν πρὸς τὶ ἐστίν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ὕστερον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ ἅμα εἰσὶ τῇ φύσει δυνάμει ἢ τῇ φύσει ἐνεργείᾳ. Ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον τὸ δημιούρ γημα συναγένητόν ἐστι τῷ ἀγενήτῳ δημιουργῷ, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἅμα τῇ φύσει, ἔσται ἄρα τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ τὸ γενητὸν συναγένητον τῷ ἀγενήτῳ θεῷ. Πρῶτος μὲν γὰρ ὁ θεός, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ γενητόν· καὶ ἔστιν ὡς πρὸς τὶ ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. Eἰ δέ, χωρὶς τοῦ ποτὲ μὲν δυνάμει, ποτὲ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστε ρον εἶναι ἅμα τῇ φύσει, οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ δημιούργημα συναΐδιόν ἐστι τῷ δημιουργῷ οὔτε ἡ εἰκὼν τῷ παραδείγματι. Ὅτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὶ ἅμα τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχει, σαφῶς πᾶσιν ἀποδέδεικται καὶ ὡμολόγηται, καὶ αὐτόθεν ·ᾴδιον γινώσκειν. Τὸ γὰρ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν πρὸς τί. Ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ δεξιὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ μηδὲ τὸ ἀρι στερὸν ἐκτὸς τοῦ δεξιοῦ, οὕτως οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ δημιουργήματος ἢ τὸ δημιούργημα ἄνευ τοῦ δη μιουργοῦ. Eἰ οὖν ἀγένητος ὁ δημιουργός, ἀγένητον καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα. Eἰ μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ὑπῆρχε τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ μέρει πρὸς ἄλ ληλα, οὕτως ὑπῆρχε καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ μέρει πρὸς ἄλληλα, εἶχεν ἂν χώραν τὸ ὑπόδειγμα, ᾧ χρησάμενος ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἐπειρᾶτο δεῖξαι συναγένητον τῷ δημιουργῷ τὸ δημιούργημα· εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ μέρει πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὁ δὲ δημιουργὸς καὶ τὸ δημιούρ γημα οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνοικείῳ ὑποδείγματι ἐχρή σατο ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος, πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος μηδε μίαν ἀναλογίαν ἔχοντι πρὸς τὸ ὑποδεικνύμενον. Τῶν πρὸς τὶ τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων λέγονται ὅπερ λέγονται, οἷον ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ υἱοῦ λέγεται πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς λέγεται υἱός, τὰ δὲ οὐ λέγονται ἀλλήλων ὅπερ λέγονται, ὡς τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ περι