Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica
After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the
to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes
having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them
left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin
regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes
and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is
a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo
a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern
through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo
agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min
to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-
distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt
Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and
is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr
but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to
When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th
concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be
as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat
this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c
definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e
the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i
is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h
is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,
we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that
with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that
a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th
For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.
the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many
Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-
Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t
We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w
in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says
theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn
organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc
simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then
he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving
closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso
it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic
a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,
Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat
have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will
to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo
both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for
of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer
has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply
would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw
Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some
The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first
but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath
For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent
fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is
are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y
it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,
and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y
and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided
what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a
proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause
in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje
by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not
having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi
tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t
make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o
cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer
Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,
such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si
often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it
they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi
and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo
they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with
for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the
an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w
of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap
enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle
to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org
parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but
knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan
from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so
they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be either separated or united. If it is separated, how will the animal be one? 45 But if it is continuous, it is necessary for the vegetative powers also to be united with it. It is in no way strange for the soul, being one, to make use of different activities. Aristotle wants the substance of the soul to be one, composed of different united substances. But what is it that unites them? In things where one part has the character of form, and the other of matter, one must not seek for the unifier; for the union is from within, just as iron, having been scraped and made suitable for an axe and a saw, does not need something else to be the unifier of such a shape with the iron, but these things automatically grow together with one another; for matter and form are among the relatives, and relatives ** the irrational soul is as matter to the rational, and the vegetative to the irrational similarly. But we might also say that this is the unifier, that the vegetative soul is matter to the irrational. The soul is divided into similar parts accidentally (for by the division of the body in which it is, it is also divided along with it) as in the case of plants <and> insects. Each of the powers of the soul has been allotted a part of the body, in which it is primarily established and acts. Soul is the actuality of a natural, organic body that has life potentially. A state is more than an activity, because it always accompanies all who possess it. And where there is activity at hand, there is also the state, but not indeed the other way around. Some do not accept the given definition of the soul, because there is no common genus of the soul, just as there is none for atoms. And besides, actuality is spoken of homonymously of the separable and inseparable body. The irrational soul and the vegetative soul cannot act without their subject. But the rational soul, by its activity alone, that is by its own will, moves the animal, using the irrational soul as an instrument. Aristotle applies none of the categories to the soul except substance, which he subdivides <into> the composite and the simple, and he divides the simple into matter and form. He calls composites not artificial things but natural ones, of which some have life and are ensouled, while others do not. Entelechy is so called from "the one" and "the perfect" and "to hold together". For form both perfects and holds together and unifies. And he said "that has life potentially" 46 instead of "organized," which is neither the seed nor the corpse. <Animal> is more than to live; for embryos also live, but animals are among ** in which it is doubted. ** the form and actuality; but not indeed the other way around. For the activity from the state is actuality, but not indeed also form. In things in generation and corruption, the activity is naturally separated from the state, as the activity of the teacher from the state of the student. But in divine things, state runs together with activity; for there are activities without potentiality. Plants also have simple organs, each having its own activity. But in the case of animals, the organs have many and various, since the souls of animals are various in their impulses, while those of plants are simple. The fruit is properly the seeds of the fig and the pits of the olives, the pericarp is the fluid poured around them along with the skin. The first power of the vegetative soul is <the> generative, for this is the end of nature, to preserve its subjects; second, the augmentative, as perfecting and bringing to the natural measure; third, the nutritive, whose work is to preserve the form, for we are preserved <so long> as we are nourished. As sight is better than hearing, and this than smell, and that than taste and touch. Touch seems not even to be a sense; for the others have their own oppositions, black-white, low-high, and the
καὶ κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μόριον ἐνεργεῖ. δοκεῖ ὡς μία οὖσα ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖ. εἰ γὰρ διῄρηται, ἀνάγκη τὰ μόρια ἢ διακεκριμένα εἶναι
ἢ ἡνωμένα. εἰ διακέκριται, πῶς ἔσται τὸ ζῷον ἕν; 45 εἰ δὲ συνεχές ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς φυτικὰς δυνάμεις ἡνωμένας εἶναι αὐτῷ.
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον τὴν ψυχὴν μίαν οὖσαν διαφόροις κεχρῆσθαι ἐνεργείαις. Ἀριστοτέλης μίαν οὐσίαν εἶναι βούλεται τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκ διαφόρων
συγκειμένην οὐσιῶν ἡνωμένων. τί δὲ τὸ ἑνοῦν ταύτας; ἐν οἷς τὸ μὲν εἴδους λόγον ἐπέχει, τὸ δὲ ὕλης, οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν τὸ ἑνῶσον·
οἴκοθεν γὰρ ἡ ἕνωσις, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος ἀποξεσθεὶς καὶ ἐπιτήδειος γεγονὼς εἰς σκέπαρνον καὶ πρίονα, οὐ δεῖ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ
ἑνοῦν τὸ τοιόνδε σχῆμα τῷ σιδήρῳ, ἀλλ' αὐτομάτως συμφ[ύεται ταῦτα] ἀλλήλοις· ὕλη γὰρ καὶ εἶδος τῶν πρός τι, τὰ δὲ πρός τι
** ἡ ἄλογος ψυχὴ ὡς ὕλη πρὸς τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ἡ φυτικὴ πρὸς τὴν ἄλογον ὁμοίως. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑνοῦν τοῦτο ἂν εἴπωμεν, ὅτι ἡ φυτικὴ
ψυχὴ ὕλη πρὸς τὴν ἄλογον. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ διαιρεῖται μέρη ἡ ψυχή (τῷ γὰρ διαιρεῖσθαι <τὸ> ἐν ᾧ ἐστι σώματι καὶ
αὐτὴ συνδιαιρεῖται) ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν <καὶ τῶν> ἐντόμων. ἑκάστη τῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς κεκλήρωται μόριον τοῦ σώματος, οὗ πρώτως
ἱδρυμένη ἐνεργεῖ. Ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἐπὶ πλέον τῆς ἐνεργείας ἕξις, διότι
ἀεὶ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἔχουσι παρακολουθεῖ. καὶ ἔνθα μὲν κατὰ προχείρισιν ἐνέργεια, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἡ ἕξις, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν. τινὲς
οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τὸν ἀποδοθέντα ὅρον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κοινὸν γένος τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν ἀτόμων. ἄλλως τε καὶ ἢ ὁμώνυμος
ἡ ἐντελέχεια ἐπὶ τοῦ χωριστοῦ καὶ ἀχωρίστου σώματος λεγομένη. ἡ ἄλογος ψυχὴ καὶ ἡ φυτικὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐνεργεῖν οὐ
δύναται. ἡ δὲ λογικὴ μόνῃ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἤγουν τῇ αὐτῆς βουλήσει, κινεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὡς ὀργάνῳ τῇ ἀλόγῳ χρωμένη. Οὐδεμίαν τῶν κατηγοριῶν
ἐφαρμόττει τῇ ψυχῇ Ἀριστοτέλης εἰ μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἣν ὑποδιαιρεῖ <εἴς τε τὴν> σύνθετον καὶ ἁπλῆν, καὶ τὴν ἁπλῆν εἴς τε τὴν ὕλην
διαιρεῖ καὶ τὸ εἶδος. σύνθετα δὲ οὐ τὰ τεχνικὰ λέγει ἀλλὰ τὰ φυσικά, ὧν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωὴν καὶ εἰσὶν ἔμψυχα, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει.
Ἐντελέχεια λέγεται παρὰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ τὸ συνέχειν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τελειοῖ καὶ συνέχει καὶ ἑνοῖ. τὸ δὲ «δυνάμει
ζωὴν ἔχοντος» 46 εἶπεν ἀντὶ τοῦ διωργανωμένου, ὃ οὔτε τὸ σπέρμα οὔτε ὁ νεκρός. <ζῷον> τοῦ ζῆν ἐπὶ πλέον· ζῇ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔμβρυα,
ζῷα δὲ παρ' ** ἐν οἷς ἐπιδιστάζεται. ** τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐντελέχεια· οὐ μὴν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν. ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως ἐνέργεια ἐντελέχεια,
οὐ μὴν καὶ εἶδος. ἐν τοῖς ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ πέφυκε χωρίζεσθαι ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἕξεως, ὡς ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ διδασκάλου τῆς τοῦ
μαθητοῦ ἕξεως. ἐν δὲ τοῖς θείοις σύνδρομος ἕξις τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἄνευ γὰρ δυνάμεως ἐνέργειαί εἰσιν. Ἔχουσι καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄργανα
ἁπλᾶ, ἰδίαν ἕκαστον ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ζῴων τὰ ὄργανα πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἔχει, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ζῴων αἱ ψυχαὶ ποικίλαι
ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, τῶν δὲ φυτῶν ἁπλαῖ. Καρπός ἐστιν αἱ κεγκραμίδες τοῦ σύκου κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐλαιῶν οἱ πυρῆνες, περικάρπιον τὸ περικεχυμένον
αὐτοῖς ὑγρὸν μετὰ τοῦ δέρματος. Πρώτη δύναμις τῆς φυτικῆς ψυχῆς <ἡ> γεννητική, τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς φύσεως τὸ φυλάττειν τὰ
ὑποκείμενα· δευτέρα ἡ αὐξητικὴ ὡς τελειοῦσα καὶ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν μέτρον ἄγουσα· τρίτη ἡ θρεπτικὴ ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ σῴζειν
τὸ εἶδος, μέχρι γὰρ <τοσούτου> σῳζόμεθα ἔστ' ἂν τρεφώμεθα. Ὡς ὄψις κρείττων ἀκοῆς, καὶ αὕτη ὀσφρήσεως κἀκείνη γεύσεως καὶ
ἁφῆς. ἡ ἁφὴ δοκεῖ μηδὲ αἴσθησις εἶ<ναι>· αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἔχουσιν ἰδίας ἀντιθέσεις, μέλαν λευκόν, βαρὺ ὀξύ, καὶ τὰ
