V. On St. Cyril's Formula [ mia physis sesarkomene ]

 ( From the Atlantis of July, 1858.) Analysis of the argument

 THE inquiry turns upon the use of terms Phraseology of science gradually perfected especially in the province of Revelation Mistakes during the process Reluctance of early Catholics to pursue it illustrated by the Homoüsion  and by other terms especially the hypostasis .

 Yet this no proof of carelessness about dogma Athanasius dogmatic, though without science his varying application of hypostasis  One hypostasis taught in fourth century and in third Three by Alexandrians both One and Three by Athanasius, who innovates on the Alexandrian usage, yet without changing the general sense of the term which denotes the One Supreme Being as individual, personal and the God of natural theology and also as being any or each of the Three divine Persons Latitude in the sense of the term illustration from Athanasius.

 Usia has a like meaning and is preferred by Athanasius, as a synonyme for hypostasis  and physis also and eidos . These terms are inapplicable in their full sense to the Word's humanity yet they are so applied  e .g. hypostasis  and usia  and physis  but not in their full sense.

 Especially not physis  first on Scripture grounds next on grounds of reason The divine physis must retain the fulness of its attributes therefore the human physis must have a restricted meaning How then is there a human physis at all? Hence the form and the force of Cyril's Formula.

 Illustration from the Council of Antioch which teaches the unalterableness of the divine usia  together with the Catholic Doctors generally with Athanasius and other Fathers some of whom therefore attribute the human conception to the operation of the Word Thus Cyril too by the "One Nature" denotes the Word's eternity, unity, unalterableness.

 The same Council teaches that the Word's usia occupies the humanity and that the humanity is taken up into the Word's usia  as, analogously, the creation also is established in His usia  Contrast between physis and usia  The proper meaning of physis  shows the delicacy of applying the term to His humanity which is in a state above nature and therefore was not commonly called a physis  till Leo and the Council of Chalcedon.

 This is clear from the early Fathers who appropriate the term to the divinity and describe the humanity as an envelopment as an adjunct as a first-fruit not, as homoüsion with us and omit the obvious contrast of the Two Natures The term "man" equivalent to "nature."

 Recapitulation The Word's Nature is One and is Incarnate Fortunes of the Formula.

 The  enquiry [ Mia Physis tou Theou Logou Sesarkomene ]

 1.

 THIS celebrated Formula of St. Cyril's, perhaps of St. Athanasius's, was, as is well known, one of the main supports of the Monophysites, in controversy with the Catholics of the fifth and following centuries. It has been so fully discussed by theologians from his day to our own, that it hardly allows of any explanation, which would be at once original and true; still, room is left for collateral illustration and remarks in detail; and so much shall be attempted here.  turns  upon the  use of  terms.  First of all, and in as few words as possible, and ex abundanti cautela : Every Catholic holds that the Christian dogmas were in the Church from the time of the Apostles; that they were ever in their substance what they are now; that they existed before the formulas were publicly adopted, in which, as time went on, they were defined and recorded, and that such formulas, when sanctioned by the due ecclesiastical acts, are binding on the faith of Catholics, and have a dogmatic authority. With this profession once for all, I put the strictly theological question aside; for I am concerned in a purely historical investigation into the use and fortunes of certain scientific terms.  

 Phraseo  logy of  science  gradually  perfected,

   2.

 Even before we take into account the effect which would naturally be produced on the first Christians by the novelty and mysteriousness of doctrines which depend for their reception simply upon Revelation, we have reason to anticipate that there would be difficulties and mistakes in expressing them, when they first came to be set forth by unauthoritative writers. Even in secular sciences, inaccuracy of thought and language is but gradually corrected; that is, in proportion as their subject-matter is thoroughly scrutinised and mastered by the co-operation of many independent intellects, successively engaged upon it. Thus, for instance, the word Person requires the rejection of various popular senses, and a careful definition, before it can serve for philosophical uses. We sometimes use it for an individual as contrasted with a class or multitude, as when we speak of having "personal objections" to another; sometimes for the body, in contrast to the soul, as when we speak of "beauty of person." We sometimes use it in the abstract, as when we speak of another as "insignificant in person;" sometimes in the concrete, as when we call him "an insignificant person." How divergent in meaning are the derivatives, personable,personalities,personify,personation,personage,parsonage ! This variety arises partly from our own carelessness, partly from the necessary developments of language, partly from the exuberance of human thought, partly from the defects of our vernacular tongue.  especially  in the  province  of revela  tion.  Language then requires to be refashioned even for sciences which are based on the senses and the reason; but much more will this be the case, when we are concerned with subject-matters, of which, in our present state, we cannot possibly form any complete or consistent conception, such as the Catholic doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. Since they are from the nature of the case above our intellectual reach, and were unknown till the preaching of Christianity, they required on their first promulgation new words, or words used in new senses, for their due enunciation; and, since these were not definitely supplied by Scripture or by tradition, nor for centuries by ecclesiastical authority, variety in the use, and confusion in the apprehension of them, were unavoidable in the interval. This conclusion is necessary, admitting the premisses, antecedently to particular instances in proof.  Mistakes  during  the  process.  Moreover, there is a presumption equally strong, that the variety and confusion which I have anticipated, would in matter of fact issue here or there in actual heterodoxy, as often as the language of theologians was misunderstood by hearers or readers, and deductions were made from it which the teacher did not intend. Thus, for instance, the word Person, used in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, would on first hearing suggest Tritheism to one who made the word synonymous with individual ; and Unitarianism to another, who accepted it in the classical sense of a mask or character .    Even to this day our theological language is wanting in accuracy: thus, we sometimes speak of the controversies concerning the Person of Christ, when we mean to include in them those which belong to the two natures which are predicated of Him.  

 Reluctance  of early  Catholics to  pursue it

   3.

 Indeed, the difficulties of forming a theological phraseology for the whole of Christendom were obviously so great, that we need not wonder at the reluctance which the first age of Catholic divines showed in attempting it, even apart from the obstacles caused by the distraction and isolation of the churches in times of persecution. Not only had the words to be adjusted and explained which were peculiar to different schools or traditional in different places, but there was the formidable necessity of creating a common measure between two, or rather three languages, Latin, Greek, and Syriac. The intellect had to be satisfied, error had to be successfully excluded, parties the most contrary to each other, and the most obstinate, had to be convinced. The very confidence which would be felt by Christians in general that Apostolic truth would never fail, and that they held it themselves, each in his own country, and the orbis terrarum with them, in spite of all verbal contrarieties, would indispose them to define it, till definition became an imperative duty.  illustrated  by the hom  oüsion,  I think this plain from the nature of the case; and history confirms me in the instance of the imposition of the homoüsion, which, as one of the first and most necessary steps, so again was apparently one of the most discouraging, in giving a scientific expression to doctrine. This formula, as Athanasius, Hilary, and Basil affirm, had been disowned as consistent with heterodoxy by the Councils of Antioch, A.D. 264-72, yet, in spite of this disavowal on the part of bishops of the highest authority, it was imposed on all the faithful to the end of time in the Ecumenical Council of Nicæa, A.D. 325, as the best and truest safeguard, as it really is, of orthodox teaching. The misapprehensions and protests, which, after such antecedents, its adoption occasioned for many years, may be easily imagined. Though above three hundred bishops had accepted it, large numbers of them in the next generation were but imperfectly convinced of its expedience; and Athanasius himself, whose imperishable name is bound up with it, showed himself most cautious in putting it forward, though it had the sanction of an Ecumenical Council. He introduces the word, I think, only once into his three celebrated Orations, and then rather in a formal statement of doctrine than in the flow of his discussion, viz. Orat . i. 4. Twice he gives utterance to it in the Collection of Notes which make up what is called his fourth Oration ( Orat . iv. 9, 12.) We find it indeed in his de Decretis Nic . Conc . and his de Synodis ; but there it constitutes his direct subject, and he discusses it in order, when challenged, to defend it. And in his work against Apollinaris he says [ homoousios he trias ], i. 9. But there are passages of his Orations in which he omits it, when it was the natural word to use; vid . the notes on Orat . i. 20, 21, and 58 fin . Oxf . transl . Moreover, the word does not occur in the  Catecheses of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, A.D. 347, nor in the recantation made before Pope Julius by Ursacius and Valens, A.D. 349, nor in the cross-questionings to which St. Ambrose subjected Palladius and Secundianus, A.D. 381. At Seleucia, A.D. 359, a hundred and fifty Eastern Bishops (with the exception of a few Egyptians) were found to abandon it, while at Ariminum in the same year the celebrated scene took place of four hundred bishops of the West being worried and tricked into a momentary act of the same character. They had not yet got it deeply fixed into their minds, as a sort of first principle, that to abandon the Formula was to betray the faith. We may think how strong and general the indisposition was thus to regard the matter, when even Pope Liberius consented to sign a creed in which it was omitted ( vid . Athan. Histor . Arian . 41 fin .)  and by  other  terms,  This disinclination on the part of Catholics to dogmatic definitions was not confined to the instance of the [ homoousion ]. It was one of the successful stratagems of the Arians to urge upon Catholics the propriety of confining their statement of doctrine to the language of Scripture, and of rejecting [ hypostasis,ousia ], and similar terms, which when once used in a definite sense, that is, scientifically, in Christian teaching, would become the protection and record of orthodoxy.  especially  the hypo  stasis ;  In the instance of the word [ hypostasis ], we find Athanasius, Eusebius of Vercelli, and other Catholic Confessors of the day, recognizing and allowing the two acceptations then in use, in the Council which they held in Alexandria, A.D. 362.  

 yet this  no proof  of care  lessness  about  dogma.

   4.

 Such a reluctance to fix the phraseology of doctrine cannot be logically taken to imply an indisposition towards dogma itself; and in matter of fact it is historically contemporaneous with the most unequivocal dogmatic statements. Scientific terms are not the only token of science. Distinction or antithesis is as much a characteristic of it as definition can be, though not so perfect an instrument. The Epistles of Ignatius, for instance, who belongs to the Apostolical age of the Church, are in places unmistakeably dogmatic, without any use of technical terms. Such is the fragment preserved by Athanasius ( de Syn . 47): [ Heis iatros esti sarkikos kai pneumatikos,genetos kai agenetos ], etc. I refer the reader to the remarks on those Epistles made in Tract ii. in this volume; also supra, p. 51; but the subject would admit of large illustration.  Athanasius  dogmatic,  though  without  professing  science.  Indeed no better illustration can be given of that intrinsic independence of a fixed terminology which belongs to the Catholic Creed, than the writings of Athanasius himself, the special Doctor from whom the subsequent treatises of Basil, the two Gregories, and Cyril are derived. This great author scarcely uses any of the scientific phrases which have since been received in the Church and have become dogmatic; or, if he introduces them, it is to give them senses which have long been superseded. A good instance of his manner is afforded by the long passage, Orat . iii. 30-58, which is full of theology, with scarcely a dogmatic word. The case is the same with his treatment of the Incarnation. No one surely can read his works without being struck with the force and exactness with which he lays down the outlines and fills up the details of the Catholic dogma, as it has been defined since the controversies with Nestorius and Eutyches, who lived in the following century; yet the word [ theotokos ], which had come down to him, like [ homoousios ], by tradition, is nearly the only one among those which he uses, which would now be recognized as dogmatic.  

 His varying  application  of hy  postasis .

 One hypo  stasis  taught  in 4th  century,

   5.

 Sometimes too he varies the use which he makes of such terms as really are of a scientific character. An instance of this is supplied by hypostasis, a word to which reference has already been made. It was usual, at least in the West and in St. Athanasius's day, to speak of one hypostasis, as of one usia, of the Divine Nature. Thus the so-called Sardican Creed, A.D. 347, speaks of [ mia hypostasis, hen autoi hoi hairetikoi ousian prosagoreuousi ]. Theod. Hist . ii. 8; the Roman Council under Damasus, A.D. 371, says that the Three Persons are [ tes autes hypostaseos kai ousias ]; and the Nicene Anathematism condemns those who say that the Son [ egeneto ex heteras hypostaseos e ousias ]; for that the words are synonymes I have argued, after Petavius against Bull, in one of the Dissertations to which I have already referred, vid . supr . p. 78. Epiphanius too speaks of [ mia hypostasis ], Hær . 74, 4, Ancor . 6 (and though he has [ hai hypostaseis ] Hær . 62, 3. 72, 1, yet he is shy of the plural, and prefers [ pater enupostatos, huios enupostatos ], etc., ibid . 3 and 4. Ancor . 6, and [ tria ] as Hær . 74, 4, where he says [ tria enupostata tes autes hypostaseos ]. Vid . also [ en hypostasei teleiotetos ]. Hær . 74, 12. Ancor . 7 et alibi ); and Cyril of Jerusalem of the [ monoeides hypostasis ] of God, Catech . vi. 7, vid . also xvi. 12 and xvii. 9 (though the word may be construed one out of three in Cat . xi. 3), and Gregory Nazianzen, Orat . xxviii. 9, where he is speaking as a natural, not as a Christian theologian.  and in 3rd  century.  In the preceding century Gregory Thaumaturgus had laid it down that the Father and Son were [ hypostasei hen ]; and the Council of Antioch, between A.D. 264 and 272, calls the Son [ ousiai kai hypostasei theon theou huion ]. Routh, Reliq . t. 2, p. 466. Accordingly Athanasius expressly tells us, " Hypostasis is usia, and means nothing else but [ auto to on ]," ad Afros, 4. Jerome says that "Tota sæcularium litterarum schola nihil aliud hypostasin nisi usiam novit." Epist . xv. 4. Basil, the Semi-Arian, that "the Fathers have called hypostasis usia ." Epiph. Hær . 73, 12 fin . And Socrates says that at least it was frequently used for usia, when it had entered into the philosophical schools. Hist . iii. 7.  Three by  Alexan  drians.  On the other hand the Alexandrians, Origen ( in Joan . ii. 6 et alibi ), Ammonius ( ap . Caten . in Joan . x. 30, if genuine), Dionysius ( ap . Basil. de Sp . S . n. 72), and Alexander ( ap . Theod. Hist . i. 4), speak of more hypostases than one in the Divine Nature, that is, of three; and apparently without the support of the divines of any other school, unless Eusebius, who is half an Alexandrian, be an exception. Going down beyond the middle of the fourth century and the Council of A.D. 362 above referred to, we find the Alexandrian Didymus committing himself to bold and strong enunciations of the three Hypostases, beyond what I have elsewhere found in patristical literature.  Both one  and three  by Athan  asius,  It is remarkable that Athanasius should so far innovate on the custom of his own Church, as to use the word in each of these two applications of it. In his In illud Omnia he speaks of [ tas treis hypostaseis teleias ]. He says, [ mia he theotes, kai heis theos en trisin hypostasesi ], Incarn . c . Arian . if the work be genuine. In contr . Apoll . i. 12, he seems to contrast [ ousia ] and [ physis ] with [ hypostasis ], saying [ to homoousion henosin kath' hypostasin ouk epidechomenon esti, alla kata physin ]. Parallel instances occur in Expos. Fid . 2, and in Orat . iv. 25, though the words may be otherwise explained. On the other hand, he makes usia and hypostasis synonymous in Orat . iii. 65, 66. Orat . iv. 1 and 33 fin . Vid. also Quod Unus est Christus, and the fragment in Euthym. Panopl . p. 1, tit. 9; the genuineness of both being more than doubtful.  who inno  vates on  the Alexan  drian  usage,  There is something more remarkable still in this innovation, in which Athanasius permits himself, on the practice of his Church. Alexander, his immediate predecessor and master, published, A.D. 320-324, two formal letters against Arius, one addressed to his namesake of Constantinople, the other encyclical. It is scarcely possible to doubt that the latter was written by Athanasius; it is so unlike the former in style and diction, so like the writings of Athanasius. Now it is observable that in the former the word hypostasis occurs in its Alexandrian sense at least five times; in the latter, which I attribute to Athanasius, it is dropt, and usia is introduced, which is absent from the former. That is, Athanasius has, on this supposition, when writing in his Bishop's name a formal document, pointedly innovated on his Bishop's theological language, and that the received language of his own Church. I am not supposing he did this without Alexander's sanction. Indeed, the character of the Arian polemic would naturally lead Alexander, as well as Athanasius, to be jealous of the formula of the [ treis hypostaseis ], which Arianism was using against them; and the latter would be confirmed in this feeling by his subsequent familiarity with Latin theology, and the usage of the Holy See, which, under Pope Damasus, as we have seen, A.D. 371, spoke of one hypostasis, and in the previous century, A.D. 260, protested by anticipation, in the person of Pope Dionysius, against the use which might be made, in the hands of enemies, of the formula of the three hypostases . Still it is undeniable that Athanasius does at least once speak of three, though his practice is to dispense with the word and to use others instead of it.  yet  without  changing  the  general  sense of  the term,  Now then we have to find an explanation of this difference of usage amongst Catholic writers in their application of the word. It is difficult to believe that so accurate a thinker as Athanasius really used an important term in two distinct, nay, contrasted senses; and I cannot but question the fact, so commonly taken for granted, that the divines of the beginning of the fourth century had appropriated any word whatever definitely to express either the idea of Person as contrasted with that of Essence, or of  Essence as contrasted with Person . I altogether doubt whether we are correct in saying that they meant by hypostasis, in one country Person, in another Essence . I think such propositions should be carefully proved, instead of being taken for granted, as at present is the case. Meanwhile, I have an hypothesis of my own. I think they used the word in East and West with only such a slight variation in its meaning, as would admit of Athanasius speaking of one hypostasis or three, without any great violence to that meaning, which remained substantially one and the same. What this sense is I proceed to explain.  

 which de  notes the  one  Supreme  Being

   6.

 The Schoolmen are known to have insisted with great earnestness on the numerical unity of the Divine Being; each of the Three Divine Persons being one and the same God, unicus, singularis, et totus Deus. In this, however, they did but follow the recorded doctrine of the Western theologians of the fifth century, as I suppose will be allowed by critics generally. So forcible is St. Austin upon the strict unity of God, that he even thinks it necessary to caution his readers against supposing that he could allow them to speak of One Person as well as of Three in the Divine Nature, de Trin . vii. 11. Again, in the Creed Quicunque, the same elementary truth is emphatically insisted on. The neuter unum of former divines is changed into the masculine, in enunciating the mystery. "Non tres æterni, sed unus æternus." I suppose this means, that Each Divine Person is to be received as the one God as entirely and absolutely as He would be held to be, if we had never heard of the other Two, and that He is not in any respect less than the one and only God, because They are Each that same one God also; or in other words, that, as each human individual being has one personality, the Divine Being has three.  as indivi  dual, per  sonal,

 as the God  of natural  theology,  Returning then to Athanasius, I consider that this same mystery is implied in his twofold application of the word hypostasis . The polytheism and pantheism of the heathen world imagined, not the God whom natural reason can discover, conceive, and worship, one, individual, living, and personal, but a divinitas, which was either a quality, whether energy or life, or an extended substance, or something else equally inadequate to the real idea which the word, God, conveys. Such a divinity could not properly be called an hypostasis or said to be in hypostasi (except indeed as brute matter in one sense may be called an hypostasis ), and therefore it was, that that word had some fitness, especially after the Apostle's adoption of it, Hebr . i. 3, to denote the Christian's God. And this may account for the remark of Socrates, that it was a new word, strange to the schools of ancient philosophy, which had seldom professed pure theism, or natural theology. "The teachers of philosophy among the Greeks," he says, "have defined usia in many ways; but of hypostasis they have made no mention at all. Irenæus the grammarian affirms that the word is barbarous." Hist . iii. 7. The better then was it fitted to express that highest object of thought, of which the "barbarians" of Palestine had been the special witnesses. When the divine hypostasis was confessed, the word expressed or suggested the attributes of individuality, self-subsistence, self-action, and personality, such as go to form the idea of the Divine Being to the natural theologian; and, since the difference between the theist and the Catholic divine in their idea of His nature is simply this, that, in opposition to the Pantheist, who cannot understand how the Infinite can be Personal at all, the one ascribes to Him one personality and the other three, it will be easily seen how a word, thus characterized and circumstanced, would admit of being used, with but a slight modification of its sense, of the Trinity as well as of the Unity.  and also as  being any  and each  of the  Three  Divine  Persons.  Let us take, by way of illustration, the word [ monas ], which, when applied to intellectual beings, includes idea of personality. Dionysius of Alexandria, for instance, speaks of the [ monas ] and the [ trias ]: now, would it be very harsh, if, as he has spoken of "three hypostases [ en monadi ]," so he had instead spoken of "the three [ monades ]," that is, in the sense of [ trisupostatos monas ], as if the intrinsic force of the word monas would preclude the possibility of his use of the plural [ monades ] being mistaken to imply that be held more monads than one? To take an analogous case, it would be about the same improper use of plural for singular, if we said that a martyr by his one act gained three victories, instead of a triple victory, over his three spiritual foes.    This then is what I conceive Athanasius to mean, by sometimes speaking of one, sometimes of three hypostases . The word hypostasis neither means Person nor Essence exclusively; but it means the one personal God of natural theology, the notion of whom the Catholic corrects and completes as often as he views Him as a Trinity; of which correction Nazianzen's language ([ on autos kata ten physin kai ten hypostasin ], Orat . xxviii. 9), completed by his usual formula ( vid . Orat . xx. 6) of the thee hypostases, is an illustration. The specification of thee hypostases does not substantially alter the sense of the word itself, but is a sort of catachresis by which this Catholic doctrine is forcibly brought out (as it would be by the phrase "three monads"), viz. that each of the Divine Persons is simply the Unus et Singularis Deus. If it be objected, that by the same mode of reasoning, Athanasius might have said catachrestically not only three monads or three hypostases, but three Gods, I deny it, and for this reason; because hypostasis is not equivalent to the simple idea of God, but is rather a definition of Him, and that in some special elementary points, as essence, personality, etc., and because such a mere improper use or varying application of the term would not tend to compromise a truth, which never must even in forms of speech be trifled with, the absolute numerical unity of the Supreme Being. Though a Catholic could not say that there are three Gods, he could say that the definition of God applies to unus and tres . Perhaps it is for this reason that Epiphanius speaks of [ tria enupostata, sunupostata, tes autes hypostaseos ]. Hær . lxxii. 4 ( vid . Jerome, Ep . xv. 3), in the spirit in which St. Thomas, I believe, interprets the "non tres æterni, sed unus æternus," to turn on the contrast of adjective and substantive.  Latitude  in the  sense of  the term  Petavius makes a remark which is apposite to my present purpose. "Nomen Dei," he says, de Trin . iii. 9, §10, "cum sit ex eorum genere quæ concreta dicuntur, formam significat, non abstractam ab individuis proprietatibus, ... sed in iis subsistentem. Est enim Deus substantia aliqua divinitatem habens. Sicut homo non humanam naturam separatam, sed in aliquo individuo subsistentem exprimit, ita tamen ut individuum ac personam, non certam ac determinatam, sed confuse infiniteque representet, hoc est, naturam in aliquo, ut diximus, consistentem ... sic nomen Dei proprie ac directe divinitatem naturamve divinam indicat, assignificat autem eundem, ut in quapiam persona subsistentem, nullam de tribus expresse designans, sed confuse et universe ." Here this great author seems to say, that even the word "Deus" may stand, not barely for the Divine Being, but besides "in quapiam persona subsistentem," without denoting which Person; and in like manner I would understand hypostasis to mean the monas with a like undeterminate notion of personality (without which attribute the idea of God cannot be), and thus, according as one hypostasis is spoken of, or three, the word may be roughly translated, in one case "personal substance," or "being with personality," in the other "substantial person," or "person which is in being." In all cases it will be equivalent to the [ theotes ], the [ monas ], the divine [ ousia ], etc., though with that peculiarity of meaning which I have insisted on.  illustrated  from Atha  nasius, etc.  These remarks might be illustrated by a number of passages from Athanasius, in which he certainly implies that the [ monas ], that is, the indivisible, numerically one God, is at once Father and Son; that the Father, who is the [ monas ], gives to the Son also to be the [ monas ]; and to have His (the Father's) hypostasis,i.e . to be that hypostasis, which the Father is. For instance, he says that the [ monas theotetos ] is [ adiairetos ], though Father and Son are two;  Orat . iv. 1, 2. He speaks of the [ tautotes tes theotetos ], and the [ henotes tes ousias ], Orat . iii. 3; of the [ henotes tes homoioseos ], de Syn . 45; of the [ tautotes tou photos ], de Decr . 24; of "the Father's hypostasis being ascribed to the Son," Orat . iv. 33; of the [ patrike theotes ] being [ to einai tou huiou ], Orat, iii. 3; of [ to einai tou huiou ] being [ tes tou patros ousias idion ]. ibid .; of the Son being the [ patrike idiotes ], Orat . i. 42; of the Father's [ theotes ] being in the Son, de Syn . 52 (whereas the Arians made the two [ theotetes ] different in kind); of the Son's [ theotes ] being the Father's, Orat . iii. 36; of the Son's [ patrike theotes ], Orat . i. 45, 49; ii. 18, 73; iii. 26; of the Son's [ patrike physis ], Orat . i. 40; of the Son being [ to patrikon phos ], iii. 53; and of the Son being the [ pleroma tes theotetos ], Orat . iii. 1. Vid . also Didym. Trin . i. 15, p. 27; 16, p. 41; 18, p. 45; 27, p. 80; iii. 17, p. 377; 23, p. 409. Nyss. Test . c . Jud . i. p. 292; Cyril, c . Nest . iii. p. 80 b.  

 Usia has  a like  meaning,

   7.

 Since, as has been said above, hypostasis is a word more peculiarly Christian than usia, I have judged it best to speak of it first, that the meaning of it, as it is ascertained on inquiry, may serve as a key for explaining other parallel terms. Usia is one of these the most in use, certainly in the works of Athanasius, and we have his authority, as well as St. Jerome's, for stating that it had been simply synonymous with hypostasis . Moreover, in Orat . iii. 65, he uses the two words as equivalent to each other. If this be so, what has been said above, in explanation of the sense he put on the word hypostasis, will apply to usia also.    This conclusion is corroborated by the proper meaning of the word usia itself, which answers to the English word "being." But, when we speak of the Divine Being, we mean to speak of Him, as what He is, [ ho on ], including generally His attributes and characteristics, and among them, at least obscurely, His personality. By the "Divine Being " we do not commonly mean a mere anima mundi, or first principle of life, or system of laws. Usia then, thus considered, agrees very nearly in sense, from its very etymology, with hypostasis . Further, this was the sense in which Aristotle used it, viz. for what is "individuum," and "numero unum;" and it must not be forgotten that the Neo-Platonists, who exerted so great an influence on the Alexandrian Church, professed the Aristotelic logic. Nay, to St. Cyril himself, the successor of Athanasius, whose formula these remarks are intended to illustrate, is ascribed a definition, which makes usia to be an individual essence: [ ousia, pragma authuparkton, me deomenon heterou pros ten heautou sustasin ]. Vid . Suicer. Thes . in voc .  and is pre  ferred by  Athanasius  Yet this is the word, and not hypostasis, which Athanasius commonly uses, in controversy with the Arians, to express the divinity of the Word. In one passage alone, as far as I recollect, does he use hypostasis : [ ou ten hypostasin chorizon tou theou logou apo tou ek Marias anthropou ]. Orat . iv. 35. His usual term is usia : for instance, [ ten theian ousian tou logou henomenon physei toi heautou patri ]. In Illud Omnia, 4. Again, [ he ousia haute tes ousias tes patrikes esti gennema ]. de Syn . 48; two remarkable passages, which remind us of the two [ ousiai ] and two [ physeis ], used by the Alexandrian Pierius (Phot. Cod . 119), and of the words of Theognostus, another Alexandrian, [ he tou huiou ousia ek tes tou patros ousias ephu ]. ap . Athan. de Decr . Nic . c. 25. Other instances of the usia of the Word in Athanasius are such as the following, though there are many more than can be enumerated:  Orat . i. 10, 45, 57, 59, 62, 64 fin .; ii. 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 22, 47, 56.  as a syn  onyme for  hypostasis    In all these instances usia, I conceive, is substantially equivalent to hypostasis, as I have explained it, viz. expressing the divine [ monas ] with an obscure intimation of personality inclusively; and here I think I am able to quote the words of Father Passaglia, as agreeing (so far) in what I have said. "Quum hypostasis," he says, de Trinitate, p. 1302, "esse nequeat sine substantia, nihil vetabat quominus trium hypostasum defensores hypostasim interdum pro substantia sumerent, præsertim ubi hypostasis opponitur rei non subsistenti, ac efficientiæ." I should wish to complete his admission by adding, "Since an intellectual usia ordinarily implies an hypostasis, there was nothing to hinder usia being used, when  hypostasis had to be expressed." Nor can I construe usia in any other way in the two passages from In Illud Omnia, 4, and de Syn . 48, quoted above, to which may be added Orat . ii. 47, init . where Athanasius speaks of the Word as [ ten ousian heautou ginoskon monogene sophian kai gennema tou patros ]. Again he says, Orat . iv. 1, that he is [ ex ousias ousiodes kai enousios, ex ontos on ].    If we want a later instance, and from another school, of usia and hypostasis being taken as practically synonymous, when contrasted with the economia, we may find one in Nyssen c . Eunom . Orat . v. p. 169.  

 and physis  also,

   8.

 After what I have said of usia and hypostasis, it will not surprise the reader if I consider that physis also, in the Alexandrian theology, was equally capable of being applied to the Divine Being viewed as one, or viewed as three, or as each of the three separately. Thus Athanasius says, [ mia he theia physis ]. contr . Apoll . ii. 13. fin, and de Incarn . V . fin . Alexander, on the other hand, calls the Father and Son [ tas tei hypostasei duo physeis ] (as Pierius, to whom I have already referred, uses the word), Theod. Hist . i. 4, p. 15; and so Clement, also of the Alexandrian school, [ he huiou physis he toi monoi pantokratori prosechestate ], Strom . vii. 2. In the same epistle Alexander speaks of the [ mesiteuousa physis monogenes ]; and Athanasius speaks of the [ physis ] of the Son being less divisible from the Father than the radiance from the sun, de Syn . 52, vid . also Orat . i. 51. Cyril too, Thesaur . xi. p. 85, speaks of [ he gennesasa physis ] and [ he gennetheisa ex autes ]; and in one passage, as Petavius, de Trin . iv. 2, observes, implies three [ physeis ] in one [ ousia ]. Cyril moreover explains as well as instances this use of the word. The [ physis tou logou ], he says, signifies neither hypostasis alone, nor what is common to the hypostases, but [ ten koinen physin en tei tou logou hypostasei holikos theoroumenen ]. ap . Damasc. F. O . iii. 11. And thus Didymus speaks of the [ analloiotos physis en tautoteti ton prosopon hestosa ]. Trin . i. 9.  and  [ eidos ].  [ Eidos ] is a word of a similar character. As it is found in John v. 37, it may be interpreted of the Divine Essence or of Person; the Vulgate translates "neque speciem ejus vidistis." In Athan. Orat . iii. 3, it is synonymous with [ theotes ] or usia ; as ibid . 6 also; and apparently ibid . 16, where the Son is said to have the [ eidos ] of the Father. And so in de Syn . 52. Athanasius says that there is only one [ eidos theotetos ]. Yet, as taken from Gen. xxxii. 31, it is considered to denote the Son; e . g . Athan. Orat . i. 20, where it is used as synonymous with Image, [ eikon ]. In like manner He is called "the very [ eidos tes theotetos ]." Ep . Æg . 17. But again in Athan. Orat . iii. 6, it is first said that the [ eidos ] of the Father and Son are one and the same, then that the Son is the [ eidos ] of the Father's [ theotes ], and then that the Son is the [ eidos ] of the Father.  

 These  terms in  applicable  in their  full sense  to the  Word's  humanity,

   9.

 So much on the sense of the words [ ousia, hypostasis, physis ], and [ eidos ], among the Alexandrians of the fourth and fifth centuries, as denoting fully and absolutely all that the natural theologian attaches to the notion of the Divine Being, as denoting the God of natural theology, with only such variation of sense in particular passages as the context determines, and as takes place when we say, "God of heaven," "God of our fathers," "God of armies," "God of peace;" (all of which epithets, as much as "one" or "three," bring out respectively different aspects of one and the same idea,) and, when applied to the second Person of the Blessed Trinity, meaning simply that same Divine Being, Deus singularis et unicus, in persona Filii. Now then the question follows, which brings us at once upon the Formula, which I have proposed to illustrate; viz., since the Word is an [ ousia,hupostasis ], or [ ousia ], can the man, [ anthropos ], manhood, humanity, human nature, flesh, which He assumed, be designated by these three terms in a parallel full sense, as meaning that He became all that "a human being" is, man with all the attributes and characteristics of man? Was the Word a man in the precise and unrestricted sense in which any one of us is a man? The Formula denies it, for it calls Him [ mia physis sesarkomene ], not [ duo physeis ]; and in the sense which I have been ascribing to those three terms, it rightly denies it; for in the sense in which the Divine Being is an usia, etc., His human nature is not an usia, etc.; so that in that sense there are not two [ physeis ], but one only, and there could not be said to be two without serious prejudice to the Catholic dogma.  

 yet they  are so  applied,

   10.

 I have said, "in the sense in which the Divine Being is an usia ;" for doubtless this and the other terms in question need not be, and are not always taken in the sense which attaches to them in the above passages.  e.g. Hypo  stasis  1. Hypostasis, for instance, is used for substance as opposed to appearance or imagination, in Hebr. xi. 1. And in like manner Epiphanius speaks of the Word's [ sarkos hypostasin alethinen ]. Hær . 69, 59. And Irenæus, of "substantia carnis," Hær . iii. 22, which doubtless in the original was hypostasis, as is shown by the [ ou dokesei, all' hypostasei aletheias ], ibid . v. 1. In a like sense Cyril of Jerusalem seems to use the word, Cat . vii. 3, ix. 5, 6, x. 2. And Gregory Nyssen, Antirrh . 25 fin . and apparently in the abstract for existence, c.  Jud . p. 291. And Cyril of Alexandria, whose Formula is in question, in his controversy with Theodoret. [ Sustasis ] is used for it by Athan. c.  Apoll . i. 5, ii. 5, 6, etc. Vid . also Max. Opp . t. 2, p. 303, and Malchion ap . Routh. Rell . t. 2, p. 484. The two words are brought together in Hippol. c . Noët . 15 fin . (where the word hypostasis is virtually denied of the human nature), and in Nyss. Test . c . Jud . i. p. 292. Also, [ he sarx ouk hypostasis idiosustatos egegonei ]. Damasc. c . Jacob . 53. For [ idiosustatos ], vid . Didym. Trin . iii. 23, p. 410. Ephraëm, ap . Phot. Cod . 229, p. 785 fin . Max. Opp . t. 2, pp. 281 and 282.  and usia,  2. If even hypostasis may be found of the Word's humanity, there is more reason to anticipate such an application of the other terms which I have classed with it. Thus as regards usia : [ theos on homou te kai anthropos teleios ho autos, tas duo autou ousias epistosato hemin ], says Melito ap . Routh. Rell . t. 1, p. 115. And Chrysostom, [ ouchi tas ousias suncheon ], in Psalm . 44, p. 166; also in  Joann . Hom . ii. 2. Vid . also Basil. in Eunom . i. 18. Nyssen, Antirrh . 30. Cyril. 2 ad Succ . p. 144. But the word ( i . e . substantia ) is more common in this sense in Latin writers:  e . g . Tertullian. de Carn . Christ . 13, 16, etc. Præscr . 51. Novat. de Trin . 11 and 24. Ambros. de Fid . ii. 77. Augustin. Epist . 187, 10. Vincent. Commonit . 13. Leon. Epist . 28, p. 811. As to Alexandrian writers, Origen calls the Word's soul, substantia, Princip . ii. 6, n. 3, as Eusebius, [ noera ousia ], de Const . L ., p. 536. Petavius quotes Athanasius as saying, [ to soma koinen echon tois pasi ten ousian ], de Incarn . x. 3, § 9, t. 6, p. 13, but this may be external to the union, as [ aparchen labon ek tes ousias tou anthropou ], Athan. de Inc . et c . Ar . 8 fin .  and physis ;  3. The word physis has still more authorities in its favour than usia ; e . g . [ physeis duo, theos kai anthropos ], Greg. Naz. Orat . xxxvii. 11. Epist . 101, pp. 85, 87. Epist . 102, p. 97. Carm . in Laud . Virg . v. 149. de Vit . sua, v. 652. Greg. Nyssen. c.  Apoll . t. 2, p. 696. c . Eunom . Orat . 5, p. 168. Antirrh . 27. Amphiloch. ap . Theod, Eran . i. 66. Theod. Hær . v. 11. p. 422. Chrysostom, in 1 Tim . Hom . 7, 2. Basil. Seleuc. Orat . 33, p. 175. And so natura, in Hilar. Trin . xi. 3, 14, in Psalm . 118, lit . 14, 8. Vid . also Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, etc. For other instances, vid . Conc. Chalc. Act . 2, t. 2, p. 300. Leon. Epist . 165. Leont. c.  Nestor.  ap . Canis. t. 1, p. 548. Anastas. Hodeg . x. p. 154 (ed. 1606), Gelas. de  D . N . ( in Bibl . P . Paris. Quart. 1624), t. 4, p. 423. As for Alexandrian writers, I do not cite Origen ( e . g . in Matth . t. 3, pp. 852, 902, t. 4, Append . p. 25, etc.), because we cannot be sure that the word was found in the original Greek. But we have [ theos  en physei, kai gegonen anthropos physei ], Petr. Alex. ap . Routh. Rell . t. 3, p. 344-346. And [ En ekaterais tais physesi huios tou theou ] Isid. Pelus. Epist . i. 405. And Athanasius himself, [ he morphe tou doulou ] is [ he noera tes anthropon sustaseos physis sun tei organikei katastasei ]. c. Apoll . ii. 1. Vid . also i. 5, ii. 11. Orat . ii. 70, iii. 43. Nor must it be forgotten that Cyril himself accepted the two [ physeis ]; vid . some instances at the end of Theod. Eran . ii. Vid . also c . Nest . iii. p. 70, d . e . and his Answers to the Orientals and Theodoret.  but not in their full sense,

 11.

 However, though we could bring together all the instances which Antiquity would furnish on the point, still the fact would stand, first, that these terms did not belong to the Word's humanity in the full sense in which they were used of His Divine nature; secondly, that they, or at least [ physis ], were not ordinarily applied to it in any sense by Catholic writers up to the time of Cyril.  especially  physis,

 first, on Scripture grounds,  That they did not apply to it, especially physis, in that full sense in which it belonged to His divinity, was plain on considering what was said of Him in Scripture. He differed from the race, out of which His manhood was taken, in many most important respects. (1) He had no human father, Matt. i. 20; Luke i. 34, 35. Gregory Nyssen, with a reference to this doctrine, says, "He was not a man wholly ([ di' holou ]), not a man like others altogether ([ koinos ]), but He was as a man." Antirrh . 21. (2) He had no human [ hegemonikon ], or sovereign principle of action in the soul; for if there were two [ kuria ] or [ hegemonika ], there were two beings together in Him, which is a tenet contrary to the whole tenor of the Gospels, and when put forth by some early Gnostics, was condemned, as it would seem, by St. John, 1 Epist . iv. 3. (3) He was sinless; and, though sin is not part of our nature, yet St. Paul does call us by nature children of wrath, [ physei ], Eph. ii. 3, which would be a reason for being cautious of applying the term to the Word's humanity; and, though it is true that St. Paul elsewhere speaks of the law of conscience being [ physei ], Rom. ii. 14, 15, yet St. Jude speaks of a base knowledge also being [ physikon ], v. 10. (4) We may consider in addition how transcendent was His state of knowledge, sanctity, etc. (5) His body was different in fact from ours, as regards corruptibility, as would appear from Acts ii. 31, xiii. 35. (6) It had a life-giving virtue peculiar to itself, Matt. vii. 23; John ix. 6. (7) After the resurrection it had transcendent qualities; came and vanished; entered a closed room; ascended on high, and appeared to St. Paul on his conversion, while it was in heaven.  

 next, on grounds of reason.

   12.

 But besides this argument from the sacred text, there seemed a necessity from the nature of the case to lay down restrictions so great, on the sense in which the Word took our common nature, as almost to deprive it of that name. The divine and human could not be united without some infringement upon the one or the other. There were those indeed, who, like some early teachers of the Gnostic family, whom I just now spoke of, and the Nestorians at a later date, escaped from the difficulty by denying the union; but, granting two contraries were to meet in one, how could that union be, without affecting, in its own special attributes and state, either the human or the divine? Which side of the alternative was to be followed, is plain without a word; [ ouk en somati on emoluneto ], says Athanasius, [ alla mallon kai to soma hegiazen ]. Incarn . V . D . 17. There is a similar passage, Nyssen, Antirrh . 26. [ ton gar hemeteron rhupon ], etc. Here we are concerned with the alternative itself. Either the Word must be absorbed into the man, or the man taken up into the Word. The consideration of these opposite conclusions will carry us nearly to the end of our discussion; I shall pursue the separate investigation of them under the letters a and b.

 The divine  physis must  retain the  fulness of its attributes:

 (a) The former of these was the conclusion in which resulted the speculations of the Sabellians and Samosatenes, who explained away the "incarnate Word" into a mere divine attribute, virtue, influence, or emanation, which dwelt in the person of one particular man, receiving its perfect development in him, and therefore imperfect before the union, changed in the act of union, dependent on him after the union. Eusebius (whose language, however, is never quite unexceptionable) may be taken as the spokesman of the Catholic body on this point. "The indwelling Word," he says, "though holding familiar intercourse with mortals, did not fall under the sympathy of their affections; nor, after the manner of a man's soul, was fettered down by the body, or changed for the worse, or came short of His proper divinity." de Laud . C . p. 536. And then he has recourse to an illustration, common with the Fathers, and expressed by Eustathius of Antioch thus: "If the sun, which we see with our eyes, undergoes so many indignities, yet without disgrace or infliction, do we think that the immaterial Wisdom is defiled or changes His nature, though the temple in which He dwells be nailed to the Cross, or suffers dissolution, or sustains a wound, or admits of corruption? No, the temple is affected, but the stainless usia remains absolutely in its unpolluted dignity," ap . Theod. Eran . iii. p. 237. Vid . also Vigil. Thaps. c . Eutych . ii. 9. p. 727. And Anast. Hodeg . 12, in controversy with Apollinarians, Eutychians, etc., who were involved in the same general charge.  therefore  the human  physis must  have a restricted  meaning.  (b) But, on the other hand, if the divinity remains unchanged, change must happen to the humanity; and accordingly, the Fathers are eloquent upon the subject of this change, which from the very nature of the case, and independent of the direct testimony of scripture and tradition, was necessary. To say nothing of the celebrated passages in Nyssen, who has no special connection with the Alexandrian Church, I shall content myself with a passage from Origen: "Si massa aliqua ferri semper in igne sit posita, omnibus suis poris omnibusque venis ignem recipiens, et tota ignis effecta, si neque ignis ab ea cesset aliquando, neque ipsa ab igne separetur, nunquidnam dicimus hanc ... posse frigus aliquando recipere? and Sicut ... totam ignem effectam dicimus, quoniam nec aliud in ea nisi ignis cernitur, sed et si quis contingere atque attrectare tentaverit, non ferri, sed ignis vim sentiat ; hoc ergo modo, etiam illa anima, quæ, quasi ferrum in igne, sic semper in Verbo, semper in Sapientia, semper in Deo posita est, omne quod agit, quod sentit, quod intelligit, Deus est," etc. de Princ . ii. 6, n. 6; vid . contr . Cels . iii. 41, p. 474. Hence Isidore, another Alexandrian, says that the Word called Himself bread, because He, as it were, baked His human substance ([ ten zumen tou anthropeiou phuramatos ]; vid . [ phurama ] also Hippol. Elench . p. 338) "in the fire of His own divinity." Epist . i. 360. Passages from Cyril, Damascene, etc., might be quoted to the same effect, e . g . Cyr. Quod unus, p. 776. Damasc. c . Jacob . p. 409. Hence it was usual with Athanasius and other Fathers to call the incarnation a [ theosis ] or [ theopoiesis ] of the [ anthropinon ] ( vid . Concil. Antioch, infr . p. 374. Athan. de Decr . 14 fin . de Syn . 51. Orat . i. 42, etc. etc.), from the great change which took place in its state, or rather difference in its state from human nature generally.  

 How then is there a  human  physis at all?

   13.

 But, if the humanity assumed was thus extricated from the common usia or physis, to which, under other circumstances, it would have belonged, and, being grafted upon the Word, existed from the very first in a super -natural state, how could it be properly called nature ? In the words of Damascene, [ he men physis tes sarkos theoutai, ou sarkoi de ten physin tou logou. theoi men to proslemma, ou sarkoutai de ]. c . Jacob . 52, p. 409. It is but in accordance with this train of thought to lay down, that there is only one nature in Christ. Here, then, we see the meaning of Cyril's Formula.  

Hence the  force of  Cyril's  Formula.

 It means ( a ), first, that when the Divine Word became man, He remained one and the same in essence, attributes, and personality; in all respects the same as before, and therefore [ mia physis ].

 It means ( b ), secondly, that the manhood, on the contrary, which He assumed, was not in all respects the same nature as that massa,usia,physis, etc., out of which it was taken, 1, from the very circumstance that it was only an addition or supplement to what He was already, not a being complete in itself; and 2, because in the act of assuming it, He changed it in its qualities.

 This added nature, then, was best expressed, not by a second substantive, as if collateral in its position, but by an adjective or participle, as [ sesarkomene ]. The three words answered to St. John's [ ho logos sarx egeneto ], i . e . [ sesarkomenos en ].  

 Illustration from  Council of  Antioch,

   14.

 We have an apposite illustration of this account of the Formula in an early passage of history, as contained in the fragmentary documents which remain to us of the Great Council of Antioch, A.D. 264-272 (to which I have already referred), in which Paul of Samosata was condemned, Malchion being the principal disputant against him. Paul denied that the Divine Being was in Christ in essence or personality; I say "in essence or personality," for, as I have explained above, since the Divine Essence cannot be without personality, to deny the one was to deny the other, and the further question, whether that personality was single or trine, did not directly come into controversy. By such a doctrine, both points of Cyril's subsequent formula were sacrificed: ( a ) the divine physis in Emmanuel was explained away, and ( b ) the flesh, being denied its hypostatic union, was no longer [ hyperphues ], but remained in its strictly natural usia, as any other individual of our race who was in the divine favour. The Synodal Epistle strikes at ( a ) the former of these errors; and the fragments of Malchion's disputation ( b ) at the latter.  

 which teaches the unalterableness of the one divine usia,

   15.

 ( a ) Paul said that the Word was not incarnate as an usia, but only as a quality; the Fathers of the Council therefore declare that, on the contrary, He really was an usia and hypostasis (for they use the terms as equivalent) Routh. Rell . t. 2, p. 466; a [ zosa energeia enupostatos ], p. 469; the Creator of the universe, p. 468; and Son and God before the creation, p. 466; and that He became incarnate [ atreptos ]. Still further to destroy the notion of a separation into two beings, they call this pre-existing Word Christ, p. 474, and they assert that He is [ hen kai to auto tei ousiai ], from first to last, on earth and in heaven. In thus speaking, they are evidently entering a protest against another contemporaneous aspect of the same doctrine, into which even Catholics had, as far as language goes, been betrayed. The opinion I have in mind is that of the [ prophorikos logos ], or that the Word or Son, at first nascent or inchoate, had been perfected by the Incarnation. Not only had Tertullian said, speaking of the "Fiat Lux" at creation, "Hæc est nativitas perfecta sermonis," c . Prax . 7, but Hippolytus even, that the "Word, before His incarnation and [ kath' heauton ], was not [ teleios huios ], though [ teleios logos on monogenes ]." c . Noët . 15. Vid. supr . pp. 272, 280.  together  with Catholic  doctors  generally,  Now, all these points, the oneness and identity of the Word considered in usia, His unalterableness in His incarnation, His perfection from eternity, His one sonship, and the impiety of dividing Word and Son, or holding two sons, were traditional matters for Catholic teaching and preaching (against those who imagined some change or other in His nature or state), from the date of this Council, two hundred years before Cyril, down to that of the Council of Chalcedon, after his death, to say nothing of other periods of history. Cyril comes in merely as one instance of the inculcation of this doctrine out of a hundred like his. His peculiarity is his using the term physis of the Word (which, as I have instanced supr . p. 352, was a specially Alexandrian word for usia or hypostasis ), and yet not using it for our Lord's humanity.  with Atha  nasius  All this may be illustrated from Athanasius, who, in controversy not only with Apollinarians, but with teachers of the Samosatene school, had to protest against any degradation of the Word's nature, and therefore to maintain His unity, His unchangeableness, and His perfection . "They fall into the same folly as the Arians," he says, "for the Arians say that He was created that He might create; as if God waited till creation, for His probole ([ hina probaletai ]), as these say" ( vid . e . g . Tertullian supr .), "or His creation, as those" (the Arians). He goes on to condemn the notion that [ ho logos, en toi theoi ateles gennetheis ], is [ teleios ] ( vid . Hippolytus supr .); "He was not anything, that He is not now, nor is He what He was not" (here is the "one and the same" of the Council supr .), "otherwise He will have to be imperfect and alterable ." Orat . iv. 11, 12. Again: "The world was made by Him; if the world is one and the creation one, it follows that Son and Word are one and the same before all creation, for by Him it came into being." 19. "As the Father is one," he says, "so also the [ monogenes ] is one." 20. [ Tauton ho huios kai logos ]. 29. "Those men degrade the Divine incarnation and think as heathens do, who conceive that it involves an alteration, [ trope ], of the Word; ... but let a man understand the divine mystery, to be one and simple," 32. Again: "God's Word is one and the same ; as God is one, His Image is one, His Word one, and one His Wisdom." Orat . ii. 36. Elsewhere he says, "God's Word is not merely [ prophorikos ], nor by His Son is meant His command," e .g. Fiat lux, "but He is [ teleios ek teleiou ]," ibid . ii. 35. Vid . also iii. 52, Epiph . Hær . 76, p. 945, Hilar. Trin . ii. 8. Also Didym. Trin . i. 10, fin . 20, p. 63, 32, p. 99, iii. 6, p. 357. Nyssen, Antirrh . 21 and 56.  and other  Fathers,  So again, [ autos atreptos menon kai me alloioumenos en tei anthropinei oikonomiai kai tei ensarkoi parousiai ], Athan. Orat . ii. 6. And so again contr . Apoll . ii. 3, 7. And so Pseudo-Athanasius, ap . Phot.: "The Word took flesh to fulfil the economy, and not [ eis auxesin ousias ]." And so, [ Ousia menousa hoper esti ], Chryst. in Joan . Hom . xi. 1, Naz. Orat . 29, 19, Procl. ad . Arm . p. 615, Maxim. Opp . t. 2, p. 286. And so, "Manens id quod erat, factus quod non erat," August. Cons. Ev . i. 53. Vid . also Hilar. Trin . iii. 16; Vigil. c . Eut . i. 3, p. 723. And in like manner Leo, " Simplex et incommutabilis natura Deitatis [in Verbo] tota in sua sit semper essentia ( usia ), nec damnum sui recipiens aut augmentum, assumptam naturam beatificans." Epist . 35, 2. And again, "In se incommutabilis perseverans; deitas enim, quæ illi cum Patre communis est ( i . e . [ he physis tou theou logou ]) nullum detrimentum omnipotentiæ subiit ( i . e . [ mia estin ]); ... quia summa et sempiterna essentia ( i . e . [ ousia mia ])," etc. etc. Leon. Serm . 27, 1.  who there  fore attri  bute the  human  conception  to the ope  ration of  the Word.  Moreover, I do not think it a refinement to suggest that this was one reason why so many of the Fathers interpret Luke i. 35 of the Word, not of the Spirit. It was their wish to enforce His personal being and omnipotent life before and in the first beginnings of the economy; as is done by Athanasius by saying [ logos en toi pneumati eplatte to soma ]. Serap . 1, 31, and elsewhere by referring to Prov . ix. 1; e . g . Orat . ii. 44, and so Leo, Epist . 31, 2. Thus Irenæus (after insisting on the real existence of both natures, and saying, "if what had existed in truth, [ ouk emeine pneuma ] after the incarnation, truth was not in Him") proceeds to say that the " Verbum Patris et Spiritus Dei viventem et perfectum effecit hominem." Hær . v. 1. Hilary too, after laying down "Forma Dei manebat," Trin . ix. 14, adds, "ut manens Spiritus Christus, idem Christus homo esset," with a reference to the passage in St. Luke. Clement, too, says, contrasting the personality of the Christian [ logos ] with the Platonic, [ ho logos heauton gennai ], Strom . v. 3. This doctrine of one [ huiotes ] with a double [ gennesis ], must not be confounded with the Sabellian tenet of the [ huiopator ], which related to the Trinity, not the Incarnation. It is with the same purport that the creed in Epiphanius speaks of the Son as "not in man, [ eis heauton sarka anaplasanta, eis mian hagian henoteta ]." Ancor . fin .  

 Thus  Cyril, too,  by the One  nature  denotes

   16.

 So much on the light thrown upon the [ mia physis ] (viz. [ tou theou logou ]), by the language of other Fathers. Cyril, too, in like manner, does but teach that the [ physis ] of the Word is [ mia ], one and the same. His "One nature of God" implies, with the Council of Antioch, a protest against that alterableness and imperfection, which the anti-Catholic schools affixed to their notion of the Word. The Council says "one and the same in usia :" it is not speaking of a human usia in Christ, but of the divine. The case is the same in Cyril's Formula; he speaks of a [ mia theia physis ] in the Word. He has, in like manner, written a treatise entitled "Quod unus sit Christus;" and in one of his Paschal Epistles he enlarges on the text, "Jesus Christ yesterday and today the same and for ever." His great theme in these works is, not the coalescing of the two natures into one, but the error of making two sons, one before and one upon the Incarnation, one divine, one human, or again of degrading the divine usia by making it subject to the humanity. Vid . also his Answers adv . Oriental . et Theod . passim .  the Word's  eternity,  Thus, for instance, he says to Nestorius: "It is at once ignorant and impious even to imagine that the Word of the Father should be called to a second beginning of being, or to have taken flesh of the Holy Virgin, as some kind of root of his own existence," c . Nest . i. p. 7. Vid . also ibid . p. 5, c .  unity,  So to Successus, "There is one Son, one Lord, before the incarnation and after; the Word was not one Son, and the child of the Virgin another; but [ autos ekainos ho proaionios ], man, not by change of nature, but by economical good pleasure." Ep . 1, pp. 136-7. Vid . c . Nest . iv. fin . [ Christon hena kai huion kai kurion apoteteleke ton auton onta theon kai anthropon ], ibid . ii. 58. "The nature of the Word remained what it was," ibid . i. p. 15. [ Meneneke en anthropoteti theos ], ibid . iii. p. 73. "He is one, [ kai ou dicha sarkos ], who in His own nature is [ exo sarkos ], ibid . p. 45. [ Heis noeitai meta sarkos ]," ibid . 55. Vid . also ii. p. 60 A, and ad Succ . Ep . 2, p. 145.  unalter  ableness.  And when he is formally called on to explain his Formula, his language is still more explicit in the same sense. "He remained what He was, [ physei theos ]; and He remained one Son; but not without flesh," ad Succ . Ep . 2, p. 142. "The [ physis ] of the Word has not changed into [ ten tes sarkos physin ], nor the reverse; but each remaining and being recognized [ en idioteti tei kata physin ] by an ineffable union, He shows to us [ mian huiou physin ], but that [ physin sesarkomenen ]," ibid . "Had we," he continues, "stopped without adding [ sesarkomene ], they might have had some pretence for speaking, but [ he en anthropoteti teleiotes ] and [ he kath' hemas ousia ] is conveyed in the word [ sesarkomene ]," ibid . p. 144, etc.  

 The same  Council  teaches  that the  Word's  usia  occupies  the huma  ity,

   17.

 (b) Now we come in the next place to [ sesarkomene ], and must return to the Council of Antioch and Paul of Samosata, and to Malchion, who was appointed by the Council to dispute with him.

 Malchion views Paul's doctrine in its consequences to the humanity assumed. He accuses him of denying [ ousiosthai en toi holoi soteri ton huion ton monogene ], Routh. Rell . t. 2, p. 476; [ ten sophian sungegenesthai toi anthropinoi ousiodos ], p. 484; [ di' heautes epidedemekenai ousiodos en toi somati ], p. 485; [ ousian einai ousiomenen en somati ], p. 485; [ theon sunousiomenon toi anthropoi ], p. 486; that is, of denying that the divine usia in its fulness had simply taken possession of, occupied, and permeated an individual of our race, and that all that was in His human nature, totum quantumcumque, was lived in by, and assumed into, the usia of the Word. What had been from eternity an usia only in itself, now manifested itself as [ en tei ktisei ] or [ en tois genetois ]; whereas Paul held nothing more than that a human usia had received the Divine Wisdom [ kata poioteta ], p. 484. In a fragment of Africanus (A.D. 220), we find a statement parallel to Malchion's, the same prominence being given to the Divine Nature in contrast with the economy. [ En tei oikonomiai, hos kata ten ousian holen ousiotheis, anthropos legetai ], ibid . p. 125; that is, His absolute and whole divinity, not an emanation, or virtue, or attribute, simply filled, energetically appropriated, and sovereignly ruled a human nature as an adjunct; and he refers to Col. ii. 9, in which it is said that in Him, that is, in the human nature, dwells the whole fullness of the Divinity [ somatikos ], substantially. Vid . the striking passage in Cyril, c . Nest . i. p. 28, a . b . and [ pachunetai ], Damasc. c . Jacob . p. 409. In these statements, the usia of the Word is put so prominently forward as to imply prima facie that in His economy there is no usia besides it. Compare with them Athanasius's words, in his de Decretis : "As we, by receiving the Spirit, do not lose our proper usia, so the Lord, when made man for us, and bearing a body, was no less God: for He was not lessened by the envelopment of the body, but rather deified it and rendered it immortal;" 14. If we were to bring out in a formal statement the impression which such a parallel creates, it would be this that the Word had one usia, divine; and we one usia, human; and that as our proper usia remains one and the same, [ mia physis ], though it received grace, so the divine usia remained one and the same, though it took upon it humanity, as an adjunct or possession. And, in like manner, Didymus, on Acts ii. 36, after contrasting the usia of the Word with the Word as "conformed to our humiliation," says, "To describe a thing as being in this way or that, is not to declare its usia ;" Trin . iii. 6.  and that  the huma  nity is  taken up  into the  Word's  usia,  Now there is another way of expressing the same doctrine, viz., to say, not that the Word came as an usia into a created nature, but became an usia to, or the usia  of, a created nature. In this mode of statement it is not said that the Word [ ousiothe en tei ktisei ], but [ he ktisis ousiothe ] in the Word; but the meaning is the same, for in both cases only one Usia is spoken of, who, besides being what He is in and for Himself, [ kath' heauton, eph' heautou ], etc., also makes Himself, and serves as, an usia to the created nature which He assumes. Thus (for illustration, but illustration only), fire [ ousiothe ] in iron, or is in iron, because its real and substantial presence is in every part of the mass, which is simply mastered by it; and iron [ ousiothe ] in fire, or is in fire, in the sense that it is transformed into a new nature, which depends for what it is solely on the presence of the fire. Accordingly Nazianzen, after saying [ theou d' holou meteschen anthropou physis ], that is [ theos ousiothe en physei anthropou ], goes on to speak of human nature as [ ousiotheis ] ( i . e . [ en theoi ]) [ hosper augais helios ], de Vit . sua, v. 642, the material body of the sun being flooded with light. Here then, as little as in the former form of speech, are two usias spoken of.  

as analogously the  creation  also is established in  His usia .

 This latter mode of speaking will be illustrated by the parallel use of it by Athanasius in relation to the creation generally, not to the hypostatic union. He says (analogously) that the whole universe depends for its stability upon the Word; that the [ physis ton geneton ], as having its hypostasis [ ex ouk onton ] ( i . e . from what has no [ ousia ]), is evanescent, and must be protected against itself. Accordingly, the Creator, [ ousiosas ten ktisin ] in His Word, does not abandon it [ tei heautes physei pheresthai ], etc., c . Gent . 41, vid . Didym. Trin . iii. 4, p. 351.  Contrast  between  physis  and usia .  And this illustration enables us to advance a step further. Even in Nazianzen's verses supr . usia is contrasted with physis as with something inferior to itself; the contrast is brought out more pointedly in the last statement of Athanasius, and it will appear that, if there were reasons for backwardness in calling the Word's humanity an usia, lest it should introduce the notion of a second and independent being, so there were even stronger reasons against calling it a physis .  

 The  proper  meaning  of physis

   18.

 Physis is a word of far wider extent of meaning than usia, and may be said to be a predicate of which usia may be made the subject. When applied to the Supreme Being, it means His attributes; as, [ idion gnorisma tes theias physeos he philanthropia ], Nyssen. Orat . Catech . 15. When applied to the universe, it means phænomena ; hence, those who investigate them, as distinct from ontologists, whose subject is usia, are called physicists. When applied to man, it means his moral disposition, etc., as the poet's " Naturam expellas furca," etc., and as we speak of good and ill nature. When applied to the moral (as well as to the material) world, it means the constitution or laws which characterize it; Butler saying, that "the only distinct meaning of the word is stated,fixed,settled," Anal ., part i. ch. i. Hence, though in the Catholic doctrine of Holy Eucharist, the substance of the bread ceases to be, the natura, as being what schoolmen have called the accidents, may be said to remain, as in the Epistle to Cæsarius ascribed to Chrysostom, in which we read, "divina sanctificante gratia, mediante Sacerdote, dignus habitus est, [panis] dominici corporis appellatione etiamsi natura panis in ipso permansit."  shows the  delicacy  of apply  ing the  term  to His  humanity,  But if physis or natura is thus to be taken for the attributes and properties of humanity generally, as contrasted with usia or essence, it became a grave question whether, in applying it to the Word's humanity, there was not the risk of that very degradation of the divine usia, against which the Catholic writers, as we have seen, so strongly protested. If an human usia involved the risk of two beings or personalities, a human physis implied a contamination with human passions and excesses. St. Hilary, while he adopts the word, illustrates the abuse which might be made of it. "Si assumpta caro," he says, "id est, totus homo, passionum est permissa naturis," etc. Trin . x. 24. Tertullian, on the other hand, taking the word in the same general sense, repudiates it, and adopts substantia ( usia ) instead, making natura equivalent to culpa . He says that the Word, in taking flesh, abolished, "non carnem peccati sed peccatum carnis, non materiam sed naturam, non substantiam sed culpam ." de Carn . Christ . 16. Leo corrects this language pointedly, saying, "Assumpta est natura non culpa." Serm . 22, 3. Athanasius, too, as the Greek Fathers and Catholics generally, reserves the word physis for our moral constitution as it came from the Creator, and refers sin to the will of the individual. He says that it is "the impiety of the Manichees to say that the [ physis ] of the [ sarx ], and not merely the [ praxis ], is sin." c . Apoll . i. 12-19; vid . also ii. 6-9, and Vit . Ant . 20.  which is  in a state  above  nature,  But, on the other hand, in matter of fact, the humanity of the Word was not left in its natural state, but as the Council of Antioch had said, [ tetheopoietai ]; since then it was beyond all doubt in a state above nature or super -natural, why (as I have said above) should it be any longer called a nature? It was that which would have been a nature, had it not been destined to be united from the first to the Word; but in fact it had been taken out of the massa, the [ phurama, ton geneton ], and been refashioned, as Isidore said, supr ., "by fire of the divinity." "The body itself," says Athanasius, "which had a mortal [ physin ], rose again [ hyper physin ], on account of the Word which was in it, and lost the corruption which is [ kata physin ], and became incorruptible, being clad in the Word, which is [ hyper anthropon ]." ad Epict . 10. That which had a special fulfilment after the resurrection, was analogously true in the incarnation itself.

 When then Cyril said [ sesarkomene ], he meant to express that our Lord's humanity had neither the [ hegemonikon ] of an usia, nor the imperfections and faults of a physis .  

 and there  fore not  commonly  called  a physis,

 till Leo  and the  Council  of Chalce  don,

 as proved  from the  early  Fathers

   19.

 No wonder then, these things being considered, that, after we have done our utmost, we shall be unable to discover more than a few instances in the early Fathers, compared with the multitude of opportunities which the subject-matter of their works admits, of dogmatic statements verbally contrary to Cyril's Formula, while, on the other hand, that Formula admits, or even requires by its very wording, an explanation absolutely consistent with the Catholic dogma, as expressed, at least in Alexandria, up to his time. No wonder that, while the whole body of theologians admitted the [ ek duo physeon ], it remained for a Pope, who saw with a Pope's instinctive sagacity the need of the times, to explain the old truth, in which all of Christendom agreed, under the comparatively new formula of the [ en dusi physesi ]. To prove a negative, difficult at all times, cannot be expected here; but as I have given specimens of the Catholic use of physis or natura, in application to the humanity of the Word, which, though not near all which could be found, are sufficient to justify the Council of Chalcedon in adopting it into their formal definition of faith; so now, in conclusion, I will, in addition to the general considerations which I have enlarged on in explanation of Cyril's Formula, set down some instances of the absence of the word physis in great theological authorities and others during the first four centuries, in denoting the Word's humanity, where it might naturally have been expected.  

 who ap  propriate  the term  to the  divinity,

   20.

 1. Thus Athanasius, in a remarkable passage, in which his eagerness to avoid ascribing human imperfections to the Word's humanity makes him speak as if he would deny to it a will (which is contrary to his categorical statement elsewhere, de Incarn . et c . Ar . 21), uses physis simply for His divine nature. "He set up anew," he says, "the form of man in Himself, in the spectacle of a flesh which had no fleshly wills or human thoughts, in an image of renovation. For the will is of the [ theotes ] alone; since the whole [ physis ] of the Word was there." c . Apoll . ii. 10. And he argues, against the Arian objection from "The Lord created me," etc., in Prov . viii. 22, not simply that it refers to the Word's human  usia, but that it does not refer to His usia (as if He had no usia but one), that it refers to something happening [ peri ekeinon ], something adventitious, an adjunct or circumstance, which is not such as at all to warrant the inference that "what is said to be created is at once in nature and usia a creature." Orat . ii. 45.  and des  cribe the  humanity  as an  envelop  ment,  2. The force of this last expression [ peri ekeinon ] will be seen in the de Decr . 22, where he not only denies that the divine usia admits of accidents, but that it has anything "about it" necessary for its perfection; [ exothen tina peribolen echein, kai kaluptesthai, e einai tina peri auton ]. Such a [ peribole ] then, or [ kalumma ], he considers the humanity. Hence, in spite of the Apollinarian perversion of the idea, we find it called a [ peribole ], Theod. Eran . i. p. 23; [ kalumma ], Athan. Sabell . Greg . 4; [ prokalumma ], Theod. ibid . also Gent . vi. p. 877; [ katapetasma ], Athan. ad Adelph . 5, Cyril. Cat . xii. 26. xiii. 22. Cyril. Alex. Quod unus, p. 761. [ propetasma ], Athan. Sabell . Greg . 4. [ parapetasma ], Theod. ibid . p. 22. [ stole ], ibid . p. 23. Velamen, Leon. Epist . 59, p. 979. Serm . 22, p. 70. 25. p. 84. Vid . also the striking illustration, Athan. Orat . ii. 7, 8.  as an  adjunct,  3. A safer term, which became a term of science, was [ proslemma ] and the parts of its verb; [ ho pros auton lephtheis ], Athan. Orat . iv. 3. [ ho proslephtheis anthropos ], Nyssen, Antirrh . 35. [ to lephthen ], Cyril. c.  Nest . iii. p. 69. [ to proslabon kai to proslephthen ], Naz. Orat . xxxvii. 11. [ proslabon ], Isid. Ep . i. 323. [ kata proslepsin ], Cyril. ad Succ . Ep . 2, p. 1422. [ proslemma ] Naz. de Vit . sua, v. 648. Damasc. F . O . iii. 1.  as first  fruits,  4. These words denote the humanity in relation to the divine usia ; another word, "first-fruits," which is taken from St. Paul, considers it in relation to that universal human physis, from which it was taken; but marks still the same reluctance in theologians to call it distinctly by the latter name. [ Aparche ek tes ousias ton anthropon ], says Athanasius, de Incarn . et c . Ar . 8. And so Orat . iv. 33. Didym. Trin . iii. 9 fin . Cyril. c . Nest . i. p. 5. Nyssen. Antirrh . 15 fin .  not as ho  moüsion  with us,  5. The same reluctant is evidenced by the omission of the phrase [ homoousios hemin ], in relation to the humanity. This phrase is found in Eustathius and Theophilus ap . Theod. Eran . i. p. 56, ii. p. 154, and in Amphilochius ap . Phot. Cod . 229, p. 789; as is [ homophulos ] in Procl. ad Arm . pp. 613, 618, and [ homogenes ] Athan. S . D . 10. But the word [ homoousios ] itself Athanasius singularly avoids in this last passage, though he has just used it in expounding John xv. 1, etc. And he still more remarkably avoids it in his ad Epict . and contr . Apoll ., where it was the natural amendment upon [ homoousios tei theoteti ], which he is combating; yet he does not use it once, nay, he scarcely once, if ever, uses even [ ex ousias Marias ], substituting for it simply [ ex Marias ].  and omit  the ob  vious con  trast of  the Two  Natures.  6. In like manner, in the antithesis between the divine and human natures, which is of constant occurrence in the Fathers, the word physis for the latter is scarcely found, but [ anthropotes, sarx, oikonomia ], etc. For instance, Athanasius says, "The Word was by nature Son of God, but by economy son of Adam." de Inc . et c . Ar . 8. "He was by nature and usia the Word of God, and, according to the flesh, man." ad Epict . 12. Or, as Basil of Seleucia says, speaking of texts which refer to His mission, "These refer to His economy, not to His usia ." Orat . 32, p. 171.

 I set down some instances of this contrast:   1. [ theos en  anthropoteti ]. Cyril c . Nest . iii. p. 84.   2. [ theos en sarki ]. Athan. Orat . ii. 71. ad Epict . 10.   3. [ theos en somati ]. Orat . ii. 12. ad Epict . 10. Nyssen Antirrh . 55.   4. [ demiourgos en somati ]. Athan. ad Epict . 10.   5. [ huios en somati ]. Orat . i. 44.   6. [ logos  en somati ]. Sent . D . 8.   7. [ kurios  en somati ]. Orat . i. 43.   8. [ logos en sarki ]. ibid . iii. 54.   9. [ kurios ] and his [ sarx ]. Nyssen. Antirrh . 44.  10. [ logos ] and his [ sarx ]. Athan. Orat . i. 47. iii. 38.  11. [ logos ] and his [ anthropos ]. ibid . iv. 7.  12. [ logos ] and his [ enanthropesis ]. Cyril. c . Nest . iv. p. 109.  13. [ logos ] and his [ oikonomia ]. Didym. Trin . iii. 21. Cyril. c . Nest . iii. p. 58.  14. [ huios ] and his [ oikonomia ]. Athan. Orat . ii. 76.  15. his [ ousia ] and his [ oikonomia ]. ibid . ii. 45, iii. 51.  16. his [ ousia ] and his [ diakonia ]. ibid . i. 12.  17. his [ ousia ] and his [ epidemia ]. Origen. Caten . in Joan . i. p. 45.  18. his [ ousia ] and his [ epiphaneia ]. Origen. c . Cels . viii. 12.  19. his [ ousia ] and his [ tapeinotes ]. Didym. Trin . iii. 6.  20. his [ ousia ] and his [ doulike morphe ]. Nyssen. Antirrhet . 25.  21. his [ ousia ] and his [ anthropinon ]. Athan. Orat . iii. 51.  22. his [ ousia ] and his [ anthropos ]. Origen. c . Cels . vii. 16.  23. his [ hypostasis ] and his [ anthropos ]. Athan. Orat . iv. 35.  24. his [ physis ] and his [ anthropos ]. Origen. in Joan . tom. i. 30.  25. his [ physis ] and his [ anthropotes ]. Cyril. Schol . 25.  26. his [ physis ] and his [ soma ]. Athan. Orat . p. 57.  27. his [ physis ] and his [ sarx ]. Athan. Orat . iii. 34. Cyril. c . Nest . v. p. 132.  28. his [ theotes ] and his [ sarx ]. Didym. Trin . iii. 8.  29. his [ ensarkos epidemia ]. Athan. Orat . i. 59.  30. his [ ensarkos parousia ]. ibid . i. 8, 49, etc. etc. Incarn . 20. Sent . D . 9. Ep . Æg . 4. Serap . i. 3, 9. Cyril. Cat . iii. 11 et alibi . Epiph. Hær . 77, 67, etc. etc.  31. his [ somatike parousia ]. Athan. Orat . ii. 10.  The term  "man"  equivalent  to  "nature."  It may seem to some readers that the word [ anthropos ], which occurs among these instances, expresses the doctrine of a human nature even more strongly than [ physis ] could do, and even with some sort of countenance of the Nestorian doctrine of a double personality. But the word is in too frequent use with the Alexandrian and other divines to admit of the suspicion. I will set down one or two specimens of the parallel use of homo among the Latins. "Deus cum homine miscetur; hominem induit." Cyprian. Idol . Van . p. 538. "Assumptus a Dei Filio homo." Hilar. in Ps . 64. 6, "Assumptus homo in Filium Dei." Leon. Serm . 28, p. 101. " Suus," the Word's, "homo." ibid . 22, p. 70. " Hic homo." Leon. Ep . 31, p. 855. " Ille homo, quem Deus suscepit." Augustin. Ep . 24, 3.  Parallel of  Hilary's  phraseo  logy.  The word "assumptus" in some of these passages is the Latin of the [ proslephtheis ] spoken of above, and reminds us of Hilary's division of the Word's attributes into naturalia and assumpta, from which we might draw an additional illustration, did we choose to pursue it, of the early theological language, and that the more striking, because, as we have seen, that Father has no difficulty of using the word natura, when the occasion calls for it, of the Word's humanity. Vid . the Benedictine Preface in Hilar . Opera .  

 Recapitu  lation.

   21.

 To recapitulate the conclusions to which we have arrived, concerning the sense of the Formula, [ mia physis sesarkomene ].  The  Word's  nature  1. [ physis ] is the Divine Essence, substantial and personal, in the fulness of its attributes the One God. And, [ tou logou ] being added, it is that One God, considered in the Person of the Son.  is one  2. It is called [ mia ] (1) because, even after the Incarnation, it and no other nature is, strictly speaking, [ idia ], His own, the flesh being "assumpta;" (2) because it, and no other, has been His from the first; and (3) because it has ever been one and the same, in nowise affected as to its perfection by the incarnation.  and incar  nate.  3. It is called [ sesarkomene ], in order to express the dependence, subordination, and restriction of His humanity, which (1) has neither [ hegemonikon ] nor personality; (2) has no distinct [ huiotes ], though it involved a new [ gennesis ]; (3) is not possessed of the fulness of characteristics which attaches to any other specimen of our race. On which account, while it is recognized as a perfect nature, it may be spoken of as existing after the manner of an attribute rather than of a substantive being, which it really is, as in a parallel way Catholics speak of its presence in the Eucharist, though corporeal, being after the manner of a spirit.  

 Fortunes  of the  Formula.

   22.

 It only remains to add concerning the Formula, that, in spite of the misapprehensions to which it has given rise, and the suspicion with which it has been viewed, it is of recognized authority in the Catholic Church. Whether Athanasius himself used it, is a contested point. Flavian admitted it at the Latrocinium, A.D. 449, in the presence of its partisans, the Eutychians, who condemned and murdered him there. It was indirectly recognized at the fourth General Council at Chalcedon, A.D. 452, in the Council's reception of Flavian's confession, which contained it. It was also received in the fifth General, and in the Lateran of A.D. 649. But, for this point of history, I refer the reader to Petavius de Incarn . iv. 6, who brings together all that has to be said upon it in the course of a few pages.

 It is perhaps scarcely necessary to observe, that my reason for not referring in the above inquiry to the works of the Areopagite, to the disputation between Dionysius and Paul of Samosata, to Hippolytus contr . Beron . et Helic . and some other works and fragments, has been a disbelief of their genuineness.