OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. From the same argument. The heaven is one of the particulars and of the things from matter; but if it is not constituted from a part of it but from all of it, being heaven and being this heaven is a different thing for it, however neither could another exist nor could more come into being, because this one has encompassed all the matter. If the heaven is one of the particulars and of things composed of matter and form, so that for it to be heaven is one thing, and to be the immaterial form another, how is it not created, having a beginning of its own substance, the composition of matter and form from which it exists? If matter in itself has neither weight nor lightness (for these are affections of the bodies that come to be from it), if from all of such matter the heaven came to be, which has neither weight nor lightness, from where have all other things come to be, since all matter was used up in the making of the heaven? If before matter was given form by the form of heaven it thus had neither weight nor lightness, as it now has none after it has been given form, how was it not moved before the imposition of form, as it is now moved after the imposition of form? If to be moved belongs to substance, and not having weight and lightness belongs to matter and not to substance, and the heaven is moved in a circular motion because it does not have weight and lightness, it is clear that the heaven is moved in this way because of matter and not because of form. How then was matter unmoved before the form in respect to circular motion, having neither weight nor lightness? 52. From the second book of *On the Heavens*. Each thing that has a function exists for the sake of its function. And the activity of God is immortality; and this is eternal life. Therefore it is necessary for God to have eternal motion. And since the heaven is such a thing (for it is a divine body), for this reason it has a circular body, which by nature is always in motion. If of the uncreated and eternal there is no cause of its being, and those things that have a function exist for the sake of the function, then those things whose functions are the cause of their being are not eternal. If it is characteristic of inanimate things to perform their natural activities by their presence alone, and of rational beings to do so by will, how is the heaven a god, since it achieves immortality not by will, but by the motion and displacement of its own parts? If the uncreated needs no one or nothing external for cooperation either for its being or for its acting, how is the heaven, needing the earth, around which it moves, in order to be movable, and needing the sun and the moon and the other stars in order to act, uncreated? If of the uncreated there is no form in the maker, how, if the heaven is uncreated, does it have an immaterial form in the maker

κόσμους γενέσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς γένεσιν ἑνὸς κόσμου ἀναλωθεῖσα ἄκοντα τὸν θεὸν ἔπαυσε τοῦ ποιεῖν πλείονας κόσμους; να. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς ἔστι μὲν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἐκ μορίου αὐτῆς συνέστηκεν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁπάσης, τὸ μὲν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ ἕτε ρόν ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε εἴη ἂν ἄλλος οὔτ' ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο γενέσθαι πλείους διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν τὴν ὕλην περιειληφέναι τοῦτον. Eἰ ἔστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ λόγου συγκειμένων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐρανῷ, τῷ ἀΰλῳ δὲ λόγῳ εἶναι ἕτερον, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι γενητὸς ἀρχὴν ἔχων τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας, τὴν σύνθεσιν ὕλης τε καὶ λόγου ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν; Eἰ ἡ ὕλη καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὔτε βαρύτητα ἔχει οὔτε κουφότητα (ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς γινομένων σωμά των πάθη), εἰ ἐκ πάσης τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης γέγονεν ὁ οὐρανὸς ὁ μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχων μήτε κουφότητα, πόθεν γέγονε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, τῆς ὕλης ἀναλωθείσης πάσης εἰς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ποίησιν; Eἰ πρὸ τοῦ εἰδοποιηθῆναι τὴν ὕλην τῷ εἴδει τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὕτως οὐκ εἶχε βαρύτητα καὶ κουφότητα, ὡς νῦν οὐκ ἔχει μετὰ τὸ εἰδοποιηθῆναι αὐτήν, πῶς οὐκ ἐκινεῖτο πρὸ τῆς εἰδοποιήσεως, ὡς νῦν κινεῖται μετὰ τὴν εἰδοποίησιν; Eἰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι οὐσίας ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βαρύτητα καὶ κουφό τητα ὕλης ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ οὐσίας, κινεῖται δὲ ὁ οὐρανὸς τὴν κύκλῳ κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βαρύτητα καὶ κουφότητα, δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὴν ὕλην τὸ κινεῖσθαι οὕτως ἔχει ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ οὐ διὰ τὸ εἶδος. Πῶς οὖν ἀκίνητος ἡ ὕλη πρὸ τοῦ εἴ δους κατὰ τὴν κύκλῳ κίνησιν, οὔτε βαρύτητα ἔχουσα οὔτε κουφότητα; νβ. Ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ. Ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου. Θεοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζωὴ ἀΐδιος. Ὥστε ἀνάγκη τῷ θεῷ κίνησιν ἀΐδιον ὑπάρχειν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ οὐρα νὸς τοιοῦτον (σῶμα γάρ τι θεῖον), διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει ἐγκύκλιον σῶμα, ὃ φύσει κινεῖται ἀεί. Eἰ τοῦ μὲν ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀϊδίου οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον, ὧν δέ ἐστιν ἔργον ταῦτα ἕνεκεν τοῦ ἔργου ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδια ὧν τὰ ἔργα τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν αἴτια. Eἰ ἀψύχων ἐστὶ τὸ τῇ παρουσίᾳ μόνον ἐνεργεῖν τὰς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείας, λογι κῶν δὲ τὸ τῇ βουλήσει, πῶς ἐστι θεὸς ὁ οὐρανός, ὁ μὴ βου λήσει τὴν ἀθανασίαν ἐνεργῶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κινήσει τε καὶ τῇ μεταστάσει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μερῶν; Eἰ τὸ ἀγένητον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ εἶναι οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν χρῄζει τινὸς ἤ τινων τῶν ἔξωθεν τῆς συνεργείας, πῶς ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν κι νητὸν χρῄζων τῆς γῆς, περὶ ἣν κινεῖται, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τῆς σελήνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων, ἐστὶν ἀγένητος; Eἰ τοῦ ἀγενήτου οὐκ ἔστι λόγος ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανός, ἔχει λόγον ἄϋλον ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι