OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while others are always both either in potentiality or in actuality, such as the concave and the convex, and others are always in actuality, such as the above and below. These being the divisions of relatives, whenever we wish to solve the difficulty of some inquiry through the concept of 'relative,' one must first understand to which division of relatives the object of inquiry belongs, and then in this way, according to the nature of the division, construct the analogy which the example has to the thing being exemplified; but if not, the example will be found to be inappropriate and the difficulty unsolved. If the creator and the creation are among those relatives which are spoken of in relation to each other by the very term they are called (for the creation is of the creator and the creator is of the creation), but the respondent, wishing to show by an example that the generated is co-generated with the ungenerated, took for his demonstration a relative from those not spoken of in relation to each other (for the right is not called of the left, nor the left of the right), it is clear that he has used an inappropriate example that, according to the nature of what is being demonstrated, does not possess an analogy capable of solving the difficulty of the inquiry in relation to what is being exemplified. But if someone wishes to say that the creator was first, and the creation came to be later, he will fall into another absurdity. For he will be found to be saying that the creator exists in potentiality and not in actuality (which is nothing other than to say that God is imperfect), and in addition to this, the creation no less co-exists with the creator, it too being in potentiality just as the creator is, since in all cases relatives subsist equally. If, therefore, the creator is in potentiality, the creation is also in potentiality; but if the creator is in actuality and perfect, the creation is likewise. Clearly, then, it is evident to all that the creation co-exists with the creator, insofar as he is creator. If, just as God has a relative relationship to the creation as creator, so also He has the same relative relationship to the generated as ungenerated, and to later things as first, and has nothing imperfect either in His ungeneratedness or in His primacy (for by no reasoning is it possible to say God is an imperfect ungenerated or an imperfect first, by virtue of His ever being both in potentiality, both ungenerated and first), so it is not possible for God to be imperfect, being first a creator in potentiality. But if because he is first a creator in potentiality, and later in actuality, he is accused of imperfection, then it is necessary also that because he is first in potentiality both ungenerated and first, and later in actuality, he be accused of imperfection. But if it is absurd to accuse God of imperfection in his ungeneratedness and primacy, it is therefore also absurd to accuse him of imperfection in his creative power, because he did not make the world at the same time as he existed, but later when he willed. For it is not possible for one who is imperfect in some relative relationship not to be similarly imperfect in all other relative relationships.

φερές, ὧν ἐστι κοινὸν τὸ ποτὲ μὲν δυνάμει λέγεσθαι θάτερον ὅπερ λέγονται, ποτὲ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὰ δὲ ἀμφότερα ἀεὶ ἢ δυνά μει ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὡς τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτόν, τὰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὡς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Τούτων οὐσῶν τῶν πρὸς τὶ τῶν διαιρέσεων, ὅταν βουλώμεθά τινος ζητουμένου λῦσαι τὸ ἄπορον διὰ τοῦ πρὸς τί, χρὴ πρῶτον καταμαθεῖν ποίας διαι ρέσεως τῶν πρὸς τὶ ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον, εἶθ' οὕτως κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τῆς διαιρέσεως κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀναλογίαν, ἣν ἔχει τὸ ὑπόδειγμα πρὸς τὸ ὑποδεικνύμενον· εἰ δὲ μή γε, εὑρεθή σεται τὸ ὑπόδειγμα ἀνοίκειον καὶ τὸ ἄπορον ἄλυτον. Eἰ ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα τῶν πρὸς τὶ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀλλήλων λεγομένων ὅπερ λέγονται (δημιουργοῦ γὰρ τὸ δημιούργημα καὶ τοῦ δημιουργήματος ὁ δημιουργός), ὁ δὲ ἀποκρινάμενος, βου λόμενος ὑποδείγματι δεῖξαι συναγένητον τῷ ἀγενήτῳ τὸ γε νητόν, ἔλαβεν εἰς τὴν τούτου δεῖξιν τὸ πρὸς τὶ τῶν ἀλλήλων μὴ λεγομένων (τὸ γὰρ δεξιὸν οὐ λέγεται τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ οὔτε τὸ ἀριστερὸν τοῦ δεξιοῦ), δῆλός ἐστιν ὅτι ἀνοικείῳ ὑποδείγματι ἐχρήσατο κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ δεικνυμένου ἀναλογίαν οὐκ ἔχοντι λυτικὴν ἀπορίας τοῦ ζητουμένου πρὸς τὸ ὑποδεικνύμενον. Eἰ δέ τις θέλει λέγειν ὅτι πρότερον μὲν ἦν ὁ δημιουρ γός, ὕστερον δὲ γέγονε τὸ δημιούργημα, καὶ ἄλλῳ περιπεσεῖται ἀτόπῳ. Eὑρεθήσεται γὰρ δυνάμει εἶναι λέγων τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ (ὅπερ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸν θεὸν ἀτελῆ λέ γειν), καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδὲν ἧττον συνυφίστασθαι τῷ δη μιουργῷ τὸ δημιούργημα, δυνάμει ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ ὁ δη μιουργός, ἁπανταχοῦ τῶν πρὸς τὶ ὑφισταμένων ἐπ' ἴσης. Eἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς δυνάμει, καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα δυνάμει· εἰ δὲ ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ τέλειος, καὶ τὸ δημιούργημα ὁμοίως. Σαφῶς τοίνυν παντὶ δῆλον ὑπάρχει τὸ συνυφίστασθαι τῷ δημιουργῷ, καθὸ δημιουργός, τὸ δημιούργημα. Eἰ, ὥσπερ πρὸς τὸ δημιούργημα τὴν κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τὶ σχέσιν ἔχει ὁ θεὸς ὡς δημιουργός, οὕτως ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τὶ σχέσιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ γενητὸν ὡς ἀγένητος, καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα ὡς πρῶτος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀτελὲς ἔχει οὔτε ἐν τῇ ἀγενεσίᾳ αὑτοῦ οὔτε ἐν τῇ πρωτείᾳ αὑτοῦ (οὐδενὶ γὰρ λόγῳ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν τὸν θεὸν ἀγένητον ἀτελῆ ἢ πρῶτον ἀτελῆ, διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτόν ποτε δυνάμει ἀμφότερα, ἀγένητόν τε καὶ πρῶτον), οὕτως οὐκ ἐν δέχεται ἀτελῆ εἶναι τὸν θεόν, πρότερον ὄντα δυνάμει δημιουρ γόν. Eἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρῶτον μὲν δυνάμει δημιουρ γόν, ὕστερον δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, διαβάλλεται εἰς ἀτέλειαν, ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρῶτον μὲν δυνάμει ἀγένητόν τε καὶ πρῶτον, ὕστερον δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, διαβληθῆναι αὐτὸν εἰς ἀτέ λειαν. Eἰ δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ διαβάλλειν τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀτελείᾳ τῆς ἀγενεσίας τε καὶ πρωτείας, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ διαβάλ λειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀτελείᾳ τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἅμα τῷ εἶναι αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ὅτε ἐβούλετο. Oὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν κατά τινα τοῦ πρὸς τὶ σχέσιν ἀτελῆ ὄντα μὴ κατὰ τὰς λοιπὰς πάσας τοῦ πρὸς τὶ σχέσεις ὁμοίως εἶναι ἀτελῆ.