OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by will what it does by motion, how is it an eternal god, effecting eternal life without will? If among eternal things heaven does not effect eternal life (for they have this from their own nature), and things that are generated and corruptible do not live eternally, where is the eternal life which heaven effects? If the motion of heaven is useful not only for the generation of things that come to be, but also for the corruption of things that are corrupted, how is heaven a god and its activity eternal life, through which corruptible things are corrupted? If it is not possible for something from matter to be co-ungenerated with matter, how is heaven ungenerated, being from matter? If that which is from both is posterior to both, how is heaven, which is from matter and form, co-eternal with both? If the form is not from matter, but from the maker, how is heaven, having its matter from one source and its form from another, ungenerated? If heaven is a material body and has a spherical shape and is ungenerated, how does it not have both from matter, both being what it is and having what it has? If matter is that which primarily underlies and is inherent in things that come to be from it in their own right, how does heaven, being ungenerated, have matter underlying and inherent in it like generated things do? 53. From the same argument. Since heaven is a divine body, for this reason it has a circular body, which by nature is always moved in a circle. Why then is not the whole body of heaven of this kind? Because it is necessary for something of the body that moves in a circle to remain at the center, but it is possible for no part of this body to remain, either at all or at the center. For its natural motion would have been toward the center; but it moves by nature in a circle; for the motion would not have been eternal; for nothing contrary to nature is eternal. And what is contrary to nature is posterior to what is according to nature, and in generation, what is contrary to nature is a kind of deviation from what is according to nature. It is necessary, therefore, that there be earth; for this rests at the center. But if there is earth, it is necessary that there also be fire; for if one of the contraries exists by nature, it is necessary that the other also exist by nature, if indeed it is a contrary, and that there be some nature of it; for the same matter of contraries is also prior to privation, I mean, for example, the hot to the cold. But if indeed there is fire and earth, it is necessary that there also be bodies between them; for each has a contrariety with respect to each of the elements. And since these exist, it is necessary that there be generation, because it is not possible for any of them to be eternal; for the contraries act on and are acted upon by each other, and are destructive of each other. Furthermore, it is not reasonable that there be any eternal movable thing whose motion cannot be eternal according to nature; and motion belongs to these. That it is necessary, therefore, for there to be generation is clear from these things. And if generation, it is necessary that there also be another corruption, either one or more; for according to the whole it is similarly necessary for the elements of the bodies to be disposed to each oth

καὶ λόγον ἔνυλον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, δι' ὃν ἕτερον τὸ οὐρανῷ εἶναι τῷ τόδε οὐρανὸν εἶναι; Eἰ οὐ δύναται ὁ οὐρανὸς ποιῆσαι τῇ βουλήσει ἃ ποιεῖ τῇ κινήσει, πῶς θεὸς οὗτος ἀΐδιος, ἀΐδιον ἐνεργῶν ζωὴν ἀβουλήτως; Eἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ ὁ οὐρανὸς τὴν αἰώνιον ζωήν (ἔχουσι γὰρ ταύτην ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως), τὰ γενητὰ δὲ καὶ φθαρτὰ αἰωνίως οὐ ζῶσι, ποῦ ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή, ἣν ἐνεργεῖ ὁ οὐρανός· Eἰ μὴ μόνον πρὸς γένεσιν τῶν γιγνομένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν φθειρομένων φθο ρὰν χρησίμη ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κίνησις, πῶς θεὸς ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, δι' ἧς φθείρεται τὰ φθαρτά; Eἰ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης συναγένητον τῇ ὕλῃ οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι, πῶς ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανός, ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης; Eἰ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ὕστερον ἀμφοτέρων, πῶς ὁ οὐρανός, ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους, συναΐδιός ἐστιν ἀμφοτέροις; Eἰ τὸ εἶδος οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τοῦ ποιοῦντος, πῶς ὁ οὐρανός, ἄλλοθεν ἔχων τὴν ὕλην καὶ ἑτέρωθεν τὸ εἶδος, ἀγένητός ἐστιν; Eἰ ὑλικόν ἐστι σῶμα ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ σφαιρικὸν ἔχει τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ἔστιν ἀγένητος, πῶς οὐκ ἀμφότερα ἔχει ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, καὶ τὸ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν ὃ ἔχει; Eἰ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη τὸ τοῖς καθ' αὑτὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς γιγνομένοις πρώτως ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἐνυπάρχον, πῶς ἀγένητος ὢν ὁ οὐρανός, ὡς τὰ γενητὰ τὴν ὕλην ἔχει ὑποκειμένην τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσαν; νγ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἐπειδὴ ὁ οὐρανὸς σῶμά τι θεῖον, διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει τὸ ἐγκύκλιον σῶμα, ὃ φύσει κινεῖται κύκλῳ ἀεί. ∆ιὰ τί οὖν οὐχ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τοιοῦτον; Ὅτι ἀνάγκη μένειν τι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ φερομένου κύκλῳ τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ μέσῳ, τούτου δ' οὐδὲν οἷόν τε μένειν μόριον οὔθ' ὅλως οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέ σου. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις ἦν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον· φύσει δὲ κύκλῳ κινεῖται· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀΐδιος ἡ κί νησις· οὐθὲν γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν ἀΐδιον. Ὕστερον δὲ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἔκστασίς τίς ἐστιν ἐν τῇ γενέσει τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν γῆν εἶναι· τοῦτο γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γῆν, ἀνάγκη καὶ πῦρ εἶναι· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων εἰ θάτερον φύσει, ἀνάγκη καὶ θάτερον εἶναι φύσει, ἐάνπερ ᾖ ἐναντίον, καὶ εἶναί τινα αὐτοῦ φύσιν· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ὕλη τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τῆς στερή σεως προτέρα, λέγω δὲ οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπερ ἔστι πῦρ καὶ γῆ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν εἶναι σώματα· ἐναντίωσιν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἔχει πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων. Τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων ἀνάγκη γένεσιν εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν οἷόν τ' αὐτῶν εἶναι ἀΐδιον· πάσχει γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ ἐναντία ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ φθαρτικὰ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν. Ἔτι δὲ οὐκ εὔλογον εἶναί τι κινητὸν ἀΐδιον, οὗ μὴ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν ἀΐδιον· τούτων δ' ἐστὶ κίνησις. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γένεσιν, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον. Eἰ δὲ γένεσιν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλην φθοράν, ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ὡσαύτως ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς ἄλ