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it rightly says that the rational soul knows itself among all beings. Sight sees in straight lines, and it perceives primarily the colors, but along with them it also discerns the colored body and its size and shape and the place where it is and the distance and the number and motion and rest and the rough and smooth and even and uneven and the sharp and the blunt and the composition, whether it is watery or earthy, such as moist or dry. Therefore, its proper object of sense is color; for only through sight do we perceive colors; and immediately with the color, also the colored body and the place in which the seen object happens to be, and the distance between the one seeing and the one being seen. For by however many of the senses the body is also revealed, by these the place is also immediately discerned, as by touch and by taste; but these perceive only when they approach the body, except for those things to be defined next; but sight perceives even from afar. And since it perceives its proper objects of sense from afar, it necessarily follows that it alone sees also the distance, and that it discerns the size only when it can encompass the apparent object in a single glance. But in those cases where the seen object is larger than can be encompassed in a single glance, in these sight requires also memory and thought. For viewing it part by part and not as a single whole, it necessarily moves from one part to another, and that which always falls upon it during the transition is an object of sense; but the things seen before, memory preserves. Thought brings both together, the sensible and the memorable. Therefore, it perceives size in two ways, sometimes alone, sometimes with memory and thought; but of the number of seen things beyond three or four, of that which is not seen in a single glance, and of movements and of polygonal shapes, never alone, but always with memory and thought. For it cannot gather five and six and seven and more without memory. Likewise neither hexagonal and octagonal and polygonal shapes. And motion, occurring by transition, has a first part and a second. And where there is a first and a second and a third, memory alone preserves this; but the up and down and the uneven and even, and likewise also the rough and smooth and the sharp and blunt are common to touch and to sight, since they alone discern place. But they also require thought. For only that which falls upon the sense in a single glance is the work of sense alone; but the things perceived through several are not of it alone, but also of memory with thought, as was shown before. And sight is by nature able to penetrate transparent things even to their depth, of air first and especially; for it passes through the whole of it; and second, of water that is still and clear; at any rate, we see fish swimming; and less so through glass and other things of such a kind, it being clear, of course, that they are illuminated; and this too is proper to it. But let no one be deceived that the perception of hot things is also of sight, since on seeing fire we know immediately that it is also hot; for if you trace the matter back to the first sight, you will find that when sight first beheld the fire, it had perception only of the color and shape; but when touch also approached, we learned that it is also hot, which memory preserved, having received it from touch; now therefore, when we behold fire, we see nothing other than the shape and the color of the fire; but thought, through memory, includes the heat along with the things seen. The same reasoning also applies to the apple. For if the apple is not identified by its color and shape alone, but also by its scent and by the quality according to taste, it is not that sight, by perceiving these things, knows that it is an apple; but the soul preserves the memory from smell and taste and, at the same time as seeing, also thinks of these things along with the shape and the color. Therefore, when we think a wax apple is a real apple

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πάντων ψυχὴν τὴν λογικὴν εἰκότως φησὶ γνωρίζειν ἑαυτὴν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν. Ὁρᾷ δὲ ἡ ὄψις κατ' εὐθείας γραμμάς, αἰσθάνεται δὲ κατὰ πρῶτον μὲν λόγον τῶν χρωμάτων, συνδιαγινώσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ κεχρωσμένον σῶμα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν χώραν ἔνθα ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ διάστημα καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν κίνησίν τε καὶ στάσιν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ λεῖον καὶ ὁμαλὸν καὶ ἀνώμαλον καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν εἴτε ὑδατῶδες εἴτε γεῶδές ἐστιν, οἷον ὑγρὸν ἢ ξηρόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον αὐτῆς αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ χρῶμα· διὰ μόνης γὰρ τῆς ὄψεως τῶν χρωμάτων ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα· εὐθέως δὲ σὺν τῷ χρώματι καὶ τὸ κεχρωσμένον σῶμα καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ὁρώμενον, καὶ τὸ διάστημα τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε ὁρῶντος καὶ τοῦ ὁρωμένου. ὁπόσαις γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεων συνεμφαίνεται καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ταύταις εὐθέως καὶ ὁ τόπος συνδιαγινώσκεται, ὡς τῇ ἁφῇ καὶ τῇ γεύσει· ἀλλ' αὗται μὲν τότε μόνον ὅταν προσπελάσωσι τῷ σώματι συναισθάνονται, πλὴν τῶν ἑξῆς διορισθησομένων· ὄψις δὲ καὶ πόρρωθεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πόρρω θεν ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητῶν ἀναγκαίως ἐπηκολούθησε τὸ μόνην ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ διάστημα, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τότε μόνην διαγινώσκειν ὅταν τὸ φαινόμενον δύνηται διὰ μιᾶς προσβολῆς περιλαβεῖν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι τὸ ὁρώμενον ἢ κατὰ μίαν προσβολὴν περιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐν τούτοις ἡ ὄψις δεῖται καὶ τῆς μνήμης καὶ τῆς διανοίας. κατὰ μέρος γὰρ αὐτὸ θεωμένη καὶ οὐχ ὑφ' ἓν ὅλον, ἀναγκαίως εἰς ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου μεταβαίνει, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐμπῖπτον ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν μετάβασιν αἰσθητόν ἐστι· τὰ δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἑωραμένα ἡ μνήμη διαφυλάττει. συνάγει δὲ ἀμφότερα ἡ διάνοια τό τε αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὸ μνημονευτόν. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους διχῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ποτὲ μὲν μόνη, ποτὲ δὲ μετὰ μνήμης καὶ διανοίας· τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ τῶν ὁρωμένων τοῦ ὑπὲρ τρία ἢ τέσσαρα, τοῦ κατὰ μίαν προσβολὴν μὴ ὁρωμένου, καὶ τῶν κινήσεων καὶ τῶν σχημάτων τῶν πολυγώνων, οὐδέποτε μόνη, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μετὰ μνήμης καὶ διανοίας. οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὰ πέντε καὶ ἓξ καὶ ἑπτὰ καὶ πλείω χωρὶς μνήμης συναγαγεῖν. οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ ἑξάγωνα καὶ ὀκτάγωνα καὶ πολύγωνα σχήματα. καὶ ἡ κίνησις δὲ κατὰ μετάβασιν γινομένη τὸ μὲν ἔχει πρότερον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον. ἔνθα δὲ πρότερον ἐστὶ καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον, τοῦτο μνήμη μόνη διαφυλάττει· τὸ δὲ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τὸ ἀνώμαλον καὶ ὁμαλόν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ λεῖον καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ ἀμβλὺ κοινὰ τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ τῆς ὄψεώς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόναι τὸν τόπον διαγινώσκουσι. χρῄζουσι δὲ καὶ διανοίας. μόνον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ κατὰ μίαν προσβολὴν προσπῖπτον τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνης αἰσθήσεως ἔργον ἐστί· τὰ δὲ κατὰ πλείους οὐ μόνης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μνήμης μετὰ διανοίας, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείχθη. τῶν δὲ διαφανῶν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ βάθους διϊκνεῖσθαι πέφυκεν ἡ ὄψις, ἀέρος μὲν πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα· ὅλον γὰρ διεξέρχεται· δεύτερον δὲ ὕδατος ἠρεμοῦντός τε καὶ καθαροῦ· τοὺς ἰχθῦς γοῦν νηχομένους ὁρῶμεν· ἧττον δὲ δι' ὑάλου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων, δῆλον δέ, ὅτι πεφωτισμένων· καὶ ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο ἴδιον αὐτῆς. μὴ ἀπατήσῃ δέ τινας ὡς καὶ τῶν θερμῶν ἡ ἀντίληψις ὄψεώς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πῦρ ὁρῶντες ἴσμεν εὐθέως ὅτι καὶ θερμόν ἐστιν· ἂν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην ὄψιν ἀναγάγῃς τὸν λόγον εὑρήσεις ὡς τότε ὅτε πρῶτον ἡ ὄψις ἐθεάσατο τὸ πῦρ, μόνου τοῦ χρώματος καὶ σχήματος ἔσχεν τὴν ἀντίληψιν· προσελθούσης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὅτι καὶ θερμόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ διεφύλαξεν ἡ μνήμη παραλαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς ἁφῆς· νῦν οὖν, ὅταν θεασώμεθα πῦρ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο βλέπομεν ἢ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ πυρός· ἡ δὲ διάνοια συμπαραλαμβάνει τοῖς ὁρωμένοις διὰ τῆς μνήμης καὶ τὴν θερμότητα. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος κἀπὶ τοῦ μήλου. εἰ γὰρ οὐχ ὑπὸ μόνου τοῦ χρώματος καὶ σχήματος εἰδοποιεῖται τὸ μῆλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ποιότητος, οὐχὶ καὶ τούτων ἡ ὄψις ἀντιλαμβανομένη οἶδεν ὅτι μῆλόν ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν μνήμην ἀποσῴζει τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὀσφρήσεώς τε καὶ γεύσεως ἅμα τε τῷ θεάσασθαι συνεπινοεῖ καὶ ταῦτα τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι. ὅταν οὖν κήρινον μῆλον νομίσωμεν ἀληθινὸν εἶναι μῆλον