Chapter XXV.—Argument Continued and Concluded.

Nor again is it the happiness of soul separated from body: for we are not inquiring about the life or final cause of either of the parts of which man consists, but of the being who is composed of both; for such is every man who has a share in this present existence, and there must be some appropriate end proposed for this life. But if it is the end of both parts together, and this can be discovered neither while they are still living in the present state of existence through the numerous causes already mentioned, nor yet when the soul is in a state of separation, because the man cannot be said to exist when the body is dissolved, and indeed entirely scattered abroad, even though the soul continue by itself—it is absolutely necessary that the end of a man’s being should appear in some reconstitution of the two together, and of the same living being. And as this follows of necessity, there must by all means be a resurrection of the bodies which are dead, or even entirely dissolved, and the same men must be formed anew, since the law of nature ordains the end not absolutely, nor as the end of any men whatsoever, but of the same men who passed through the previous life; but it is impossible for the same men to be reconstituted unless the same bodies are restored to the same souls. But that the same soul should obtain the same body is impossible in any other way, and possible only by the resurrection; for if this takes place, an end befitting the nature of men follows also. And we shall make no mistake in saying, that the final cause of an intelligent life and rational judgment, is to be occupied uninterruptedly with those objects to which the natural reason is chiefly and primarily adapted, and to delight unceasingly in the contemplation of Him who is, and of His decrees, notwithstanding that the majority of men, because they are affected too passionately and too violently by things below, pass through life without attaining this object. For the large number of those who fail of the end that belongs to them does not make void the common lot, since the examination relates to individuals, and the reward or punishment of lives ill or well spent is proportioned to the merit of each.

οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μακαριότης ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν θατέρου τούτων ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἄνθρωπος ἐσκοποῦμεν ζωὴν ἢ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνεστῶτος ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τοιοῦτος γὰρ πᾶς ὁ τόνδε τὸν βίον λαχὼν ἄνθρωπος καὶ δεῖ τῆς τούτου ζωῆς εἶναί τι τέλος οἰκεῖον. εἰ δὲ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τὸ τέλος, τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ζώντων αὐτῶν ἔτι κατὰ τόνδε τὸν βίον εὑρεθῆναι δυνατὸν διὰ τὰς πολλάκις ἤδη ·ηθείσας αἰτίας οὔτε μὴν ἐν χωρισμῷ τυγχανούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τῷ μηδὲ συνεστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον διαλυθέντος ἢ καὶ πάντῃ σκεδασθέντος τοῦ σώματος κἂν ἡ ψυχὴ διαμένῃ καθ' ἑαυτήν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζῴου σύστασιν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φανῆναι τέλος. τούτου δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑπομένου, δεῖ πάντως γενέσθαι τῶν νεκρωθέντων ἢ καὶ πάντῃ διαλυθέντων σωμάτων ἀνάστασιν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους συστῆναι πάλιν· ἐπειδή γε τὸ μὲν τέλος οὐχ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἀνθρώπων ὁ τῆς φύσεως τίθεται νόμος, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προλαβοῦσαν ζωὴν βεβιωκότων, τοὺς δ' αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους συστῆναι πάλιν ἀμήχανον, μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν σωμάτων ταῖς αὐταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀποδοθέντων. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολαβεῖν ἄλλως μὲν ἀδύνατον, κατὰ μόνην δὲ τὴν ἀνάστασιν δυνατόν· ταύτης γὰρ γενομένης καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόσφορον ἐπακολουθεῖ τέλος. τέλος δὲ ζωῆς ἔμφρονος καὶ λογικῆς κρίσεως οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι τις εἰπὼν τὸ τούτοις ἀπερισπάστως συνδιαιωνίζειν οἷς μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ὁ φυσικὸς συνήρμοσται λόγος, τῇ τε θεωρίᾳ τοῦ δόντος καὶ τῶν ἐκείνῳ δεδογμένων ἀπαύστως ἐπαγάλλεσθαι· κἂν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμπαθέστερον καὶ σφοδρότερον τοῖς τῇδε προσπεπονθότες ἄστοχοι τούτου διατελῶσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀκυροῖ τὴν κοινὴν ἀποκλήρωσιν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀποπιπτόντων τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτοῖς τέλους, ἰδιαζούσης τῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐξετάσεως καὶ τῆς ἑκάστῳ συμμετρουμένης ὑπὲρ τῶν εὖ ἢ κακῶς βεβιωμένων τιμῆς ἢ δίκης.