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Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata, or Miscellanies
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Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.
Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.
Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.
Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.
Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.
Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.
Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.
Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.
Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.
Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?
Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.
Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.
Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.
Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.
Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.
Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”
Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”
Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.
Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.
Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.
Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.
Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.
Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.
Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.
Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.
Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.
Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.
Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.
Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.
Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.
Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.
Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.
Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.
Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.
Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.
Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.
Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.
Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.
Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.
Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.
Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.
Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.
Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.
Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.
Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.
Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.
Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.
Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.
Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.
Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.
Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.
Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.
Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.
Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.
Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.
Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.
Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.
Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.
Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.
Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.
Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.
Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.
Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.
Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.
Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.
Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.
Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.
Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.
Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.
Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.
Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.
Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.
Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.
Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.
Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.
Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.
Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.
Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.
Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.
Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.
Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.
Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.
Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.
Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.
Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.
Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.
Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.
Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.
Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.
Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.
Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.
Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.
Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.
Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.
Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.
Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.
Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.
Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.
Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.
Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.
Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.
Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.
Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.
Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.
Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.
Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.
Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.
Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.
Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.
Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.
Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.
Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.
Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.
Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.
Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.
Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.
Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.
Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.
Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.
Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.
Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.
Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.
Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
Plato the philosopher, aided in legislation by the books of Moses, censured the polity of Minos, and that of Lycurgus, as having bravery alone as their aim; while he praised as more seemly the polity which expresses some one thing, and directs according to one precept. For he says that it becomes us to philosophize with strength, and dignity, and wisdom,—holding unalterably the same opinions about the same things, with reference to the dignity of heaven. Accordingly, therefore, he interprets what is in the law, enjoining us to look to one God and to do justly. Of politics, he says there are two kinds,—the department of law, and that of politics, strictly so called.
And he refers to the Creator, as the Statesman (ὁ πολιτικός) by way of eminence, in his book of this name (ὁ πολιτικός); and those who lead an active and just life, combined with contemplation, he calls statesmen (πολιτικοί). That department of politics which is called “Law,” he divides into administrative magnanimity and private good order, which he calls orderliness; and harmony, and sobriety, which are seen when rulers suit their subjects, and subjects are obedient to their rulers; a result which the system of Moses sedulously aims at effecting. Further, that the department of law is founded on generation, that of politics on friendship and consent, Plato, with the aid he received, affirms; and so, coupled with the laws the philosopher in the Epinomis, who knew the course of all generation, which takes place by the instrumentality of the planets; and the other philosopher, Timæus, who was an astronomer and student of the motions of the stars, and of their sympathy and association with one another, he consequently joined to the “polity” (or “republic”). Then, in my opinion, the end both of the statesman, and of him who lives according to the law, is contemplation. It is necessary, therefore, that public affairs should be rightly managed. But to philosophize is best. For he who is wise will live concentrating all his energies on knowledge, directing his life by good deeds, despising the opposite, and following the pursuits which contribute to truth. And the law is not what is decided by law (for what is seen is not vision), nor every opinion (not certainly what is evil). But law is the opinion which is good, and what is good is that which is true, and what is true is that which finds “true being,” and attains to it. “He who is,”313 “I AM,” A.V.: Ex. iii. 14. says Moses, “sent me.” In accordance with which, namely, good opinion, some have called law, right reason, which enjoins what is to be done and forbids what is not to be done.
Πλάτων δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐκ τῶν Μωυσέως τὰ περὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ὠφεληθεὶς ἐπετίμησε μὲν τῇ Μίνωος καὶ Λυκούργου πολιτείᾳ πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μόνην ἀποβλεπομέναις, ἐπῄνεσε δὲ ὡς σεμνοτέραν τὴν ἕν τι λέγουσαν καὶ πρὸς δόγμα ἓν νεύουσαν αἰεί· καὶ γὰρ ἰσχύι καὶ σεμνότητι καὶ φρονήσει πρέπειν ἂν μᾶλλον φιλοσοφεῖν ἡμᾶς λέγει πρὸς τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀμετανοήτως χρωμένους γνώμῃ τῇ αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ἆρ' οὐ τὰ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἑρμηνεύει πρὸς ἕνα θεὸν ἀφορᾶν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἐντελλόμενος; τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δύο εἴδη λέγει, τὸ μὲν νομικόν, τὸ δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁμωνύμως ὠνομασμένον, καὶ πολιτικὸν μὲν κυρίως αἰνίττεται τὸν δημιουργὸν ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ βιβλίῳ τούς τε εἰς αὐτὸν ἀφορῶντας καὶ βιοῦντας ἐνεργῶς καὶ δικαίως σὺν καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ αὐτοὺς πολιτικοὺς ὀνομάζει, τὸ δὲ ἐπ' ἴσης τῷ νομικῷ κεκλημένον πολιτικὸν εἴς τε κοσμικὴν μεγαλόνοιαν διαιρεῖ εἴς τε ἰδιωτικὴν σύνταξιν, ἣν κοσμιότητα καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ σωφροσύνην ὠνόμασεν, ὅταν ἄρχοντες μὲν πρέπωσι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, πειθήνιοι δὲ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι γίγνωνται, ὅπερ ἡ κατὰ Μωυσέα πραγματεία διὰ σπουδῆς ἔχει γενέσθαι. ἔτι τὸ μὲν νομικὸν πρὸς γενέσεως εἶναι, τὸ πολιτικὸν δὲ πρὸς φιλίας καὶ ὁμονοίας ὁ Πλάτων ὠφεληθείς, τοῖς μὲν Νόμοις τὸν φιλόσοφον τὸν ἐν τῇ Ἐπινομίδι συνέταξεν, τὸν τὴν διέξοδον πάσης γενέσεως τῆς διὰ τῶν πλανωμένων εἰδότα. φιλόσοφον δὲ ἄλλον τὸν Τίμαιον, ὄντα ἀστρονομικὸν καὶ θεωρητικὸν τῆς ἐκείνων φορᾶς συμπαθείας τε καὶ κοινωνίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἑπομένως τῇ Πολι τείᾳ συνάπτει. ἔπειτα **. τέλος γὰρ οἶμαι τοῦ τε πολιτικοῦ τοῦ τε κατὰ νόμον βιοῦντος ἡ θεωρία· ἀναγκαῖον γοῦν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι ὀρθῶς, ἄριστον δὲ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν. ὁ γὰρ νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ εἰς γνῶσιν συντείνας βιώσειεν, κατευθύνας μὲν τὸν βίον ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς, ἀτιμάσας δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τά τε πρὸς ἀλήθειαν συλλαμβανόμενα μεθέπων μαθήματα. νόμος δέ ἐστιν οὐ τὰ νομιζόμενα (οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὅρασις) οὐδὲ δόξα πᾶσα (οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἡ πονηρά), ἀλλὰ νόμος ἐστὶ χρηστὴ δόξα, χρηστὴ δὲ ἡ ἀληθής, ἀληθὴς δὲ ἡ τὸ ὂν εὑρίσκουσα καὶ τούτου τυγχάνουσα· ὁ ὢν δὲ ἐξαπέσταλκέν με, φησὶν ὁ Μωυσῆς. ᾗ τινες ἀκολούθως δηλονότι τῇ χρηστῇ δόξῃ λόγον ὀρθὸν τὸν νόμον ἔφασαν, προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον. ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.