Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.

Plato the philosopher, aided in legislation by the books of Moses, censured the polity of Minos, and that of Lycurgus, as having bravery alone as their aim; while he praised as more seemly the polity which expresses some one thing, and directs according to one precept. For he says that it becomes us to philosophize with strength, and dignity, and wisdom,—holding unalterably the same opinions about the same things, with reference to the dignity of heaven. Accordingly, therefore, he interprets what is in the law, enjoining us to look to one God and to do justly. Of politics, he says there are two kinds,—the department of law, and that of politics, strictly so called.

And he refers to the Creator, as the Statesman (ὁ πολιτικός) by way of eminence, in his book of this name (ὁ πολιτικός); and those who lead an active and just life, combined with contemplation, he calls statesmen (πολιτικοί). That department of politics which is called “Law,” he divides into administrative magnanimity and private good order, which he calls orderliness; and harmony, and sobriety, which are seen when rulers suit their subjects, and subjects are obedient to their rulers; a result which the system of Moses sedulously aims at effecting. Further, that the department of law is founded on generation, that of politics on friendship and consent, Plato, with the aid he received, affirms; and so, coupled with the laws the philosopher in the Epinomis, who knew the course of all generation, which takes place by the instrumentality of the planets; and the other philosopher, Timæus, who was an astronomer and student of the motions of the stars, and of their sympathy and association with one another, he consequently joined to the “polity” (or “republic”). Then, in my opinion, the end both of the statesman, and of him who lives according to the law, is contemplation. It is necessary, therefore, that public affairs should be rightly managed. But to philosophize is best. For he who is wise will live concentrating all his energies on knowledge, directing his life by good deeds, despising the opposite, and following the pursuits which contribute to truth. And the law is not what is decided by law (for what is seen is not vision), nor every opinion (not certainly what is evil). But law is the opinion which is good, and what is good is that which is true, and what is true is that which finds “true being,” and attains to it. “He who is,”313    “I AM,” A.V.: Ex. iii. 14. says Moses, “sent me.” In accordance with which, namely, good opinion, some have called law, right reason, which enjoins what is to be done and forbids what is not to be done.

Πλάτων δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐκ τῶν Μωυσέως τὰ περὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ὠφεληθεὶς ἐπετίμησε μὲν τῇ Μίνωος καὶ Λυκούργου πολιτείᾳ πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μόνην ἀποβλεπομέναις, ἐπῄνεσε δὲ ὡς σεμνοτέραν τὴν ἕν τι λέγουσαν καὶ πρὸς δόγμα ἓν νεύουσαν αἰεί· καὶ γὰρ ἰσχύι καὶ σεμνότητι καὶ φρονήσει πρέπειν ἂν μᾶλλον φιλοσοφεῖν ἡμᾶς λέγει πρὸς τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀμετανοήτως χρωμένους γνώμῃ τῇ αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ἆρ' οὐ τὰ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἑρμηνεύει πρὸς ἕνα θεὸν ἀφορᾶν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἐντελλόμενος; τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δύο εἴδη λέγει, τὸ μὲν νομικόν, τὸ δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁμωνύμως ὠνομασμένον, καὶ πολιτικὸν μὲν κυρίως αἰνίττεται τὸν δημιουργὸν ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ βιβλίῳ τούς τε εἰς αὐτὸν ἀφορῶντας καὶ βιοῦντας ἐνεργῶς καὶ δικαίως σὺν καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ αὐτοὺς πολιτικοὺς ὀνομάζει, τὸ δὲ ἐπ' ἴσης τῷ νομικῷ κεκλημένον πολιτικὸν εἴς τε κοσμικὴν μεγαλόνοιαν διαιρεῖ εἴς τε ἰδιωτικὴν σύνταξιν, ἣν κοσμιότητα καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ σωφροσύνην ὠνόμασεν, ὅταν ἄρχοντες μὲν πρέπωσι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, πειθήνιοι δὲ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι γίγνωνται, ὅπερ ἡ κατὰ Μωυσέα πραγματεία διὰ σπουδῆς ἔχει γενέσθαι. ἔτι τὸ μὲν νομικὸν πρὸς γενέσεως εἶναι, τὸ πολιτικὸν δὲ πρὸς φιλίας καὶ ὁμονοίας ὁ Πλάτων ὠφεληθείς, τοῖς μὲν Νόμοις τὸν φιλόσοφον τὸν ἐν τῇ Ἐπινομίδι συνέταξεν, τὸν τὴν διέξοδον πάσης γενέσεως τῆς διὰ τῶν πλανωμένων εἰδότα. φιλόσοφον δὲ ἄλλον τὸν Τίμαιον, ὄντα ἀστρονομικὸν καὶ θεωρητικὸν τῆς ἐκείνων φορᾶς συμπαθείας τε καὶ κοινωνίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἑπομένως τῇ Πολι τείᾳ συνάπτει. ἔπειτα **. τέλος γὰρ οἶμαι τοῦ τε πολιτικοῦ τοῦ τε κατὰ νόμον βιοῦντος ἡ θεωρία· ἀναγκαῖον γοῦν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι ὀρθῶς, ἄριστον δὲ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν. ὁ γὰρ νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ εἰς γνῶσιν συντείνας βιώσειεν, κατευθύνας μὲν τὸν βίον ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς, ἀτιμάσας δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τά τε πρὸς ἀλήθειαν συλλαμβανόμενα μεθέπων μαθήματα. νόμος δέ ἐστιν οὐ τὰ νομιζόμενα (οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὅρασις) οὐδὲ δόξα πᾶσα (οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἡ πονηρά), ἀλλὰ νόμος ἐστὶ χρηστὴ δόξα, χρηστὴ δὲ ἡ ἀληθής, ἀληθὴς δὲ ἡ τὸ ὂν εὑρίσκουσα καὶ τούτου τυγχάνουσα· ὁ ὢν δὲ ἐξαπέσταλκέν με, φησὶν ὁ Μωυσῆς. ᾗ τινες ἀκολούθως δηλονότι τῇ χρηστῇ δόξῃ λόγον ὀρθὸν τὸν νόμον ἔφασαν, προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον. ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.