belching forth according to what seems right to each, how could they not be thought to be guessers rather than men of knowledge of the truth? For some say the world is one, others many, others that it is created, while there are those who, opposing these altogether and differing in their opinions, say it is indestructible and uncreated; and some say it is governed by the providence of God, while others, even without providence, have assigned the well-ordered motion of the elements to chance and accidents; and some say it is ensouled, while others say it is neither ensouled nor intelligent; and in general, one might see their argument on each point as if drunk, thrown here and there. But since, having selected Plato from the others, he especially delights in his opinions, I would say that Plato and Pythagoras hold somewhat more fitting opinions concerning both God and the world; but they acquired this training, or rather knowledge, by having encountered the Egyptians, among whom there was much talk about the all-wise Moses and the wonder of his doctrines was held in honor. Nevertheless, they say that Plato himself held opinions contrary to his own, and that Aristotle, who studied with him, chose not to think his thoughts, but to oppose and argue against him. For Porphyry says that Plato held an opinion about heaven, and said that its corporeal aspect was composed of the four elements, brought into harmony with each other by a soul; Therefore, he says, it remains composite even now and has been named according to what is predominant. 2.17 He etymologizes the name, I think, and says it is called heaven (ouranos) as being a certain visible thing (horaton), so that from being seen it might be understood as heaven. To Aristotle, however, it did not seem that these things were so. Why so? For he says that heaven is not composite, nor is it from the four elements, but he conceives of a fifth body, which does not partake of the four and is altogether deprived of them. And Plato says the world is ensouled and an intelligent living being, and he sets a providence over it; but his student again has not thought so; for it is neither wholly ensouled throughout, nor intelligent, nor governed by providence. And again, the one defines it as created and perishable, at least as regards its own nature, while the other does not grant it to be created, but as indestructible and uncreated. And again, the clever and famous Plato defines the principles of the universe to be three: God and matter and form; and he says God is the maker, matter is the substrate, and form is the paradigm of each of the things that come into being; but again Aristotle rises up against him and does not agree at all; for he does not deem it worthy to think or speak of form as a principle, but says the principles are two, God and matter. And Plato again, saying that the principles of all things are three, God and matter and form, also brings in a fourth, which he calls the universal soul. And in addition to this, having said that matter is uncreated, he also says that it is created; then, having granted that form, whatever it is, subsists by itself, he fights against his own discoveries; for he said that it exists in the thoughts of God and does not have its own existence, that is, subsistence. 2.18 To whom, then, should the investigators of the truth incline, that they may travel the blameless and most unerring path? Which of those named shall we acquit of speaking falsely? To whom is it worthy to assign the vote for having in no way erred? Rather, how could they be credible for persuading anyone, who have erred so much from the truth that they not only oppose each other but even contradict their own opinions? And the all-wise Julian praises these things and is astounded, and while he mocks the writings of Moses, he dares to set against them in comparison the words of Plato, confusing all things, up and down, and says: {JULIAN} Here let us compare, if you wish, the things of the
κατὰ τὸ ἑκάστῳ δοκοῦν ἐρευγόμενοι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἶναι νοοῖντο στοχασταὶ μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιστήμονες; Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕνα τὸν κόσμον, οἱ δὲ πολλούς, ἕτεροι δὲ γενητόν, εἰσὶ δὲ οἳ τούτοις εἰσάπαν ἀνθεστηκότες καὶ διάφοροι τὰς γνώμας ἄφθαρτόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον εἶναι λέγουσιν αὐτόν· καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοίᾳ Θεοῦ διοικούμενον, οἱ δὲ καὶ προνοίας δίχα καὶ τὴν τῶν στοιχείων εὔτακτον κίνησιν αὐτοματισμοῖς καὶ συμβεβηκόσιν ἐκνενεμήκασι· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐψυχῶσθαί φασιν αὐτόν, οἱ δὲ οὔτε ἔμψυχον οὔτε νοερόν· καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς κατίδοι τις ἂν οἰονεὶ μεθύοντα τῇδε κἀκεῖσε διαρριπτούμενον τὸν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ λόγον αὐτοῖς. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν Πλάτωνα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκκεκρικὼς ταῖς αὐτοῦ μάλιστα δόξαις ἐμφιλοχωρεῖ, φαίην ἂν ὅτι Πλάτων τε καὶ Πυθαγόρας δοξάζουσι μέν πως ἐπιεικέστερον περί τε Θεοῦ καὶ κόσμου· συνειλόχασι δὲ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο παίδευσιν εἴτουν ἐπιστήμην Αἰγυπτίοις ἐμβεβληκότες, παρ' οἷς δὴ πολὺς ὁ περὶ τοῦ πανσόφου Μωσέως λόγος ἦν καὶ τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ δογμάτων τὸ θαῦμα τετίμητο. Πλὴν αὐτόν τέ φασιν ἑαυτῷ τὸν Πλάτωνα τἀναντία δοξάσαι, καὶ αὐτῷ φοιτήσαντα τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη μὴ τὰ αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον ἑλέσθαι φρονεῖν, ἀντιφέρεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἀντεξάγειν αὐτῷ. Φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Πορφύριος δοξάσαι τὸν Πλάτωνα περὶ οὐρανοῦ, φάναι τε ὅτι τὸ σωματοειδὲς αὐτοῦ συνέστη ἀπὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, ἀλλήλοις ὑπὸ ψυχῆς συμπεφωνηκότων· ∆ιό, φησί, καὶ νῦν συμμιγὴς μένει καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλεονάζον ὠνόμασται. 2.17 Ἐτυμολογεῖ δέ, οἶμαι, τοὔνομα καὶ κεκλῆσθαί φησιν οὐρανὸν οἷον ὁρατὸν ὄντα τινά, ἵν' ἐκ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι νοοῖτό τις οὐρανός. Ἀριστοτέλει γε μὴν οὐχ ὧδε ταῦτ' ἔχειν ἐδόκει. Πόθεν; Οὐ γάρ τοί φησι συντεθεῖσθαι τὸν οὐρανόν, οὔτε μὴν ἐκ τεσσάρων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἐπινοεῖ δὲ πέμπτον τι σῶμα τῶν τεσσάρων ἀμέτοχον καὶ ὁλοτρόπως ἠμοιρηκός. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ἔμψυχόν τε τὸν κόσμον φησὶ καὶ ζῷον νοερόν, ἐφίστησι δὲ καὶ πρόνοιαν αὐτῷ· ὁ δ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν φοιτητὴς οὐχ ὧδε πεφρόνηκεν· οὔτε γὰρ ἔμψυχον ὅλον δι' ὅλων οὔτε νοερὸν οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον. Καὶ αὖθις ὁ μὲν γενητόν τε καὶ φθαρτὸν τό γε ἧκον εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν διορίζεται, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ γενητὸν δίδωσιν αὐτὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ μὲν δὴ δεινὸς καὶ διαβόητος Πλάτων τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς διορίζεται, Θεὸν καὶ ὕλην καὶ εἶδος· καὶ Θεὸν μὲν εἶναί φησι τὸν ποιητήν, ὕλην δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, εἶδος δὲ τὸ ἑκάστου τῶν γινομένων παράδειγμα· ἀντανίσταται δὲ πάλιν Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει καθάπαξ· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος ἀρχὴν ἢ φρονεῖν ἢ λέγειν οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, δύο δὲ εἶναί φησι τὰς ἀρχάς, Θεὸν καὶ ὕλην. Τρεῖς δὲ δὴ πάλιν ὁ Πλάτων τὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὰς εἶναι λέγων, Θεόν τε καὶ ὕλην καὶ εἶδος, προσεπάγει καὶ τετάρτην, ἣν δὴ καθόλου ψυχὴν ὀνομάζει. Καὶ πρός γε δὴ τούτῳ τὴν ὕλην ἀγένητον εἰπών, καὶ γενητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναί φησι· εἶτα τὸ εἶδος, ὅ τί ποτέ ἐστιν, ὑφεστάναι δοὺς αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτό, μάχεται τοῖς ἰδίοις αὐτοῦ εὑρήμασιν· ἔφη γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ νοήμασιν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ ἰδίαν ὕπαρξιν ἔχειν, ἤγουν οὐσίωσιν. 2.18 Τίσιν οὖν ἄρα προσνενευκότες οἱ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐρευνηταὶ τὴν ἀμώμητον καὶ ἀπλανεστάτην διᾴττοιεν τρίβον; Τίνα τῶν ὠνομασμένων τοῦ ψευδοεπεῖν ἀπαλλάξομεν; Τίνι τὴν ψῆφον τοῦ κατὰ μηδένα διαπταῖσαι τρόπον ἀπονέμειν ἄξιον; Μᾶλλον δὲ πῶς ἂν εἶεν ἀξιόχρεῳ πρός γε τὸ δεῖν ἀναπεῖσαί τινας οἵ γε τοσοῦτον διημαρτήκασι τἀληθοῦς ὡς μὴ μόνον ἀλλήλοις ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς ταῖς σφῶν ἀντιφέρεσθαι δόξαις; Ἐπαινεῖ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ κατατέθηπεν ὁ πάνσοφος Ἰουλιανός, καὶ κατασκώπτει μὲν τὰ Μωσέως, ἄνω δὲ καὶ κάτω τὰ πάντα κυκῶν τοὺς Πλάτωνος λόγους ἀντιπαρεξάγειν αὐτοῖς ἀποτολμᾷ, καί φησι· {ΙΟΥΛΙΑΝΟΣ} Ἐνταῦθα παραβάλωμεν, εἰ βούλεσθε, τὰ τοῦ