OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generation, if indeed there is also fire, and this and the other things, if indeed there is also earth; and this, because it is necessary for something to remain always, if indeed something is also to be moved always. If, because it has neither heaviness nor lightness, there is a body always movable around the center of the heavenly body, then it is necessary for the whole body of heaven to be moved around the center; but if heaven has such a body, but does not have such a motion, it is clear that it is moved contrary to nature. If the body of heaven is moved around the center, not as a whole according to the motion of the element from which the body is said to be, but spherically by the interchange of its parts, how does the spherical motion not overpower the motion of the element? And yet for bodies made of the elements, motion does not exist according to their form, but according to the elements from which they are. How then for the body of heaven has the necessity of motion been altered? For a body having neither heaviness nor lightness, it is necessary for it to have motionless rest rather than unstable motion; for if it is neither borne downwards by heaviness, nor upwards by lightness, it is necessary for it to remain motionless. If a stone were fashioned into the shape of a sphere and placed in the air, to be borne down to its own place, it would not be borne downwards rolling spherically because of its shape, but it would be borne in a straight line according to its own heaviness. How then does the fifth element, of which heaven is made, which is naturally suited to move around the center because it has neither heaviness nor lightness, not move as a whole with its parts around the center according to its own nature, but is moved spherically by the interchange of its parts, a motion which is not of the nature of the element but of the spherical shape? If nothing in eternal things is contrary to nature, nor superfluous, nor in vain, how is heaven not moved contrary to nature, and in vain does it have the nature of the element according to which it is not moved, and superfluously is it moved by the first unmoved mover with a motion, which it could have been moved even without that one? If that which is at rest were not always at rest in the center, that which is moved would not always be moved around the center. How then is it not false that heaven is always moved by its own nature? If the earth did not have the nature and the position which it has, and likewise if heaven did not have the nature and the position which it has, that which is moved would not be moved, nor would that which is at rest be at rest. How then are these things eternal and ungenerated, of which the 'what it is' and the 'how it is' of each is on account of the other; which is a property of generated things? If in eternal things there is nothing either according to providence or anything automatic (for things according to providence are secondary to providence, and the automatic is either contrary to nature or an accident in things that come to be by choice; but that which is contrary to nature is secondary to that which is according to nature; for that which is contrary to nature comes to be through the deviation of that which is according to nature;

ληλα. Νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι δῆλον, διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν πλείω τὰ ἐγκύκλιά ἐστι σώματα, ὅτι ἀνάγκη γένεσιν εἶναι, γέ νεσιν δέ, εἴπερ καὶ πῦρ, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν γῆν· ταύτην δέ, ὅτι ἀνάγκη μένειν τι ἀεί, εἴπερ καὶ κινεῖσθαί τι ἀεί. Eἰ διὰ μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βαρύτητα καὶ κουφότητα ἐστὶ σῶμα ἀεὶ κινητὸν περὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σῶμα, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον· εἰ δὲ σῶμα μὲν τοιοῦτον ἔχει ὁ οὐρανός, κίνησιν δὲ τοιαύτην οὐκ ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν κινεῖται. Eἰ περὶ τὸ μέσον κινεῖται τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σῶμα, οὐχ ὅλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν φορὰν τοῦ στοιχείου, ἐξ οὗ εἶναι λέγεται τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σφαιρικῶς κατὰ ἀντιμετάστασιν τῶν μερῶν, πῶς οὐχὶ ἡ σφαιρικὴ κί νησις ἐπικρατεῖ τὴν στοιχείου κίνησιν; Καίτοι οὐδαμῶς τοῖς ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων σώμασιν ἡ κίνησις κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν εἰσί. Πῶς οὖν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σώματος ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς κινήσεως ἐνήλλακται; Σώματι μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχοντι μήτε κουφότητα ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἔχειν στάσιν ἀκίνητον μᾶλλον ἢ κίνησιν ἄστατον· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ὑπὸ βαρύτητός ἐστι κατωφερὲς μήτε ὑπὸ κουφό τητος ἀνωφερές, ἀνάγκη μένειν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον. Eἰ ἐσχη ματίζετο λίθος τῷ τῆς σφαίρας σχήματι καὶ ἐτίθετο ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, ἐνεχθῆναι κάτω εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν, οὐκ ἂν ἐφέρετο κάτω κυλιόμενος σφαιρικῶς διὰ τὸ σχῆμα, ἀλλὰ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ἐφέρετο κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βαρύτητα. Πῶς οὖν τὸ πέμπτον στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ ἔστιν ὁ οὐρανός, τὸ πεφυκὸς περὶ τὸ μέσον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βαρύτητα ἢ κουφότητα, οὐ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ὅλον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι φέρεται περὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ σφαιρικῶς κατὰ ἀντιμετάστασιν τῶν μερῶν κινεῖται τὴν κίνησιν, οὐκ οὖσαν τῆς τοῦ στοιχείου φύσεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ σφαιρικοῦ σχήματος; Eἰ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε πε ριττὸν οὔτε μάτην ἐστί τι ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς παρὰ φύσιν κινούμενος, καὶ μάτην ἔχει τοῦ στοι χείου τὴν φύσιν, καθ' ἣν οὐ κινεῖται, καὶ περιττῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτως κινοῦντος μὴ κινουμένου κινεῖται κίνησιν, ἣν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνου ἠδύνατο κινηθῆναι; Eἰ μὴ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ἠρέμει ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, οὐκ ἂν τὸ κινούμενον ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον ἐκινεῖτο. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν κινεῖσθαι ἀεὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει; Eἰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἣν ἔχει ἔσχεν ἡ γῆ, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς εἰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἣν ἔχει ἔσχεν, οὐκ ἂν τὸ κινούμενον ἐκινεῖτο, οὔτ' ἂν τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ἠρέμει. Πῶς οὖν ἀΐδια ταῦτα καὶ ἀγένητα, ὧν τὸ τὶ εἶναι καὶ τὸ πῶς εἶναί ἐστιν ἑκατέρου διὰ θάτερον· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἴδιον τῶν γενητῶν; Eἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὔτε κατὰ πρόνοιάν ἐστί τι οὔτε τι αὐτόματον (τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πρόνοιαν δεύτερα τῆς προνοίας, καὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτόματον ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν γιγνομένοις ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν δεύτερόν ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐκτροπὴν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν γίνεται τὸ παρὰ φύσιν·