Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.

Objection 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active " (Wis. 7:24). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.

Objection 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.

On the contrary, It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" (Malachi 3:6).

I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above (Question 3, Article 7) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.

Reply to Objection 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.

Reply to Objection 3: These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod deus non sit omnino immutabilis. Quidquid enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo mutabile.

Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, spiritus creator movet se nec per tempus nec per locum.

Ergo deus est aliquo modo mutabilis.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Sap. VII dicitur de sapientia quod est mobilior omnibus mobilibus.

Sed deus est ipsa sapientia. Ergo deus est mobilis.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, appropinquari et elongari motum significant. Huiusmodi autem dicuntur de deo in Scriptura, Iac. IV, appropinquate deo, et appropinquabit vobis.

Ergo deus est mutabilis.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Malach. III, ego deus, et non mutor.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod ex praemissis ostenditur deum esse omnino immutabilem.

Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod deum dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia.

Ex quo patet quod impossibile est deum aliquo modo mutari.

Secundo, quia omne quod movetur, quantum ad aliquid manet, et quantum ad aliquid transit, sicut quod movetur de albedine in nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam. Et sic in omni eo quod movetur, attenditur aliqua compositio.

Ostensum est autem supra quod in deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino simplex. Unde manifestum est quod deus moveri non potest.

Tertio, quia omne quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et pertingit ad illud ad quod prius non pertingebat. Deus autem, cum sit infinitus, comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod prius non pertingebat.

Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus.

Et inde est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti, posuerunt primum principium esse immobile.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum modum quo Plato dicebat primum movens movere seipsum, omnem operationem nominans motum; secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere et velle et amare motus quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo deus intelligit et amat seipsum, secundum hoc dixerunt quod deus movet seipsum, non autem secundum quod motus et mutatio est existentis in potentia, ut nunc loquimur de mutatione et motu.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse similitudinarie, secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit usque ad ultima rerum. Nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat a divina sapientia per quandam imitationem, sicut a primo principio effectivo et formali; prout etiam artificiata procedunt a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur inquantum similitudo divinae sapientiae gradatim procedit a supremis, quae magis participant de eius similitudine, usque ad infima rerum, quae minus participant dicitur esse quidam processus et motus divinae sapientiae in res, sicut si dicamus solem procedere usque ad terram, inquantum radius luminis eius usque ad terram pertingit.

Et hoc modo exponit dionysius, cap. I cael. Hier., dicens quod omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit ad nos a patre luminum moto.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi dicuntur de deo in Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut enim dicitur sol intrare domum vel exire, inquantum radius eius pertingit ad domum; sic dicitur deus appropinquare ad nos vel recedere a nobis, inquantum percipimus influentiam bonitatis ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus.