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measured out more than the life of the Father, with no interval of time being pre-conceived for the hypostasis of the Only-Begotten. 1.1.172 And yet, even if this were so (for let it be said for now by way of hypothesis), how does the substance that precedes in time have more being than the later one—I mean, according to the very principle of being—so that one should be called 20supreme and proper20 and the other not be so? For the life-span of the one born earlier is greater than that of the younger, but the substance 1.1.173 on account of this has neither more nor less. And this will become clearer through examples. What less than Abraham, according to the principle of substance, did David have, who appeared fourteen generations later? Was his humanity in any way altered, and was he less a man because he was later in time? And who is so foolish as to say this? 1.1.174 For the principle of substance is one for both, in no way being altered by the passage of time. Nor would anyone say that one is more a man because he is prior in time, and the other partakes less of the nature because he lived after others, as if either the nature had been used up in those who came before, or time had exhausted its power on those who had passed away 1.1.175. For it is not dependent on time to define for each the measures of nature, but nature itself remains on its own, preserving itself through those who come after; while time proceeds in its own way, either containing or flowing past nature, which remains fixed and unchangeable within its own 1.1.176 limits. Therefore, not even if precedence were granted to time, as the argument supposed, will they properly attribute the supremacy of substance to the Father alone; and since there is no difference according to the priority of time (for how could one conceive of such a thing in the case of a pre-eternal nature, when every measurable interval is found to be beneath the divine nature?), what argument is left for those who attempt to divide the pre-temporal and incomprehensible substance by a distinction of 'higher' and 'lower'? 1.1.177 But the argument has no doubt that what is dogmatized by these men is an advocacy of the Jewish dogma, since they show that only the substance of the Father subsists, which alone they contend properly exists, while counting that of the Son and of the Spirit among things that do not exist. 1.1.178 For everything that does not properly exist is said to exist only in word and by a customary misuse of language, just as a man is not the one shown by imitation in a picture, but the one who is properly so called. This one is not a likeness of a man, but is the archetype of the likeness; but the image is a man only as far as the name, and for this reason it cannot properly be called what it is called, because it is not by nature what it is named. 1.1.179 And here, then, if the substance of the Father alone is properly so called, but that of the Son and of the Spirit is not, what else is this if not a manifest denial of the saving proclamation? Therefore, let them return from the church to the synagogues of the Jews, since by not granting that the Son properly exists, they establish that he does not exist at all; for what is not properly so is the same as what is non-existent. 1.1.180 But since he wishes to be wise in such matters and scorns those who attempt to write without logical expertise, let him tell us who are despised, from what wis 1.1.181 dom he came to know the 'more' and 'less' of substance. What is the argument that has established such a difference, that one substance exists more than another substance? I am speaking of the very meaning of substance; for let him not bring forward the differences of qualities or of properties, as many as are apprehended concerning the substance by the logic of conception, being something other than the 1.1.182 underlying subject. For it is not differences of vapors or colors or weight or power or rank or of ways and characters, or whatever else is observed concerning both body and soul, that we are proposing to examine now, but I am speaking of the underlying subject itself, to which the name of substance has been properly applied, whether it has any difference with respect to another substance in existing 'more'. But not yet up to now

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πλέον τῆς τοῦ πα τρὸς ζωῆς διεμέτρησε, μηδενὸς διαστήματος χρονικοῦ προ επινοουμένου τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑποστάσεως. 1.1.172 Καίτοι εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἦν (εἰρήσθω γὰρ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τέως), ἡ τῷ χρόνῳ προήκουσα τῆς μεταγενεστέρας οὐσίας τί μᾶλλον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, κατ' αὐτὸν λέγω τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον, ὥστε τὴν μὲν 20ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυρίαν20 λέγειν, τὴν δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν; τοῦ γὰρ προγενεστέρου πρὸς τὸ νεώ τερον ὁ μὲν χρόνος τῆς ζωῆς πλείων ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ οὐσία 1.1.173 παρὰ τοῦτο οὔτε πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἔχει. σαφέστερον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ δι' ὑποδειγμάτων γενήσεται. τί ἔλαττον εἶχε τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον ὁ μετὰ δεκατέσσαρας γενεὰς ἀναδειχθεὶς ∆αβίδ; ἆρά τι μετεποιήθη τῆς ἀνθρω πότητος ἐπὶ τούτου καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος ἦν, ὅτι τῷ χρόνῳ μεταγενέστερος; καὶ τίς οὕτως ἠλίθιος ὥστε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν; 1.1.174 εἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἑκατέρων τῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲν τῇ παρόδῳ τοῦ χρόνου συναλλοιούμενος. οὐδ' ἄν τις εἴποι τὸν μὲν μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι διὰ τὸ προήκειν τῷ χρόνῳ, τὸν δὲ ἔλαττον μετέχειν τῆς φύσεως, ὅτι μεθ' ἑτέρους τῇ ζωῇ ἐπεδήμησεν, ὥσπερ ἢ προαναλωθείσης ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν τῆς φύσεως, ἢ τοῦ χρόνου τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς παρῳχηκόσι 1.1.175 προδαπανήσαντος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἔστιν ἀφορίζειν ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέτρα τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μένει διὰ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων ἑαυτὴν συντηροῦσα· ὁ δὲ χρόνος φέρεται κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον τρόπον εἴτε περιέχων εἴτε καὶ παραρρέων τὴν φύσιν παγίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις 1.1.176 μένουσαν ὅροις. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ εἰ τῷ χρόνῳ δοθείη τὸ πλέον ἔχειν, καθὼς ὁ λόγος ὑπέθετο, κυρίως τῷ πατρὶ μόνῳ τὸ ἀνώτατον τῆς οὐσίας προσμαρτυρήσουσι· μηδεμιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς κατὰ τὰ πρεσβεῖα τοῦ χρόνου διαφορᾶς (πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῆς προαιωνίου φύσεως τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπινοήσειε, παντὸς διαστήματος μετρητικοῦ κάτω τῆς θείας φύσεως εὑρισκομένου) τίς καταλείπεται λόγος τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσι τὴν πρόχρονόν τε καὶ ἀκατάληπτον οὐσίαν τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω διαφορᾷ διασχίζειν; 1.1.177 Ἀλλ' οὐδεμίαν ἀμφιβολίαν ὁ λόγος ἔχει, ὅτι συνη γορία τοῦ Ἰουδαϊκοῦ δόγματός ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τούτων δογ ματιζόμενον, μόνην ὑφεστάναι τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν ἐν δεικνυμένων, ἣν μόνην κυρίως εἶναι διισχυρίζονται, τὴν δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσι λογιζομένων. 1.1.178 πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μὴ κυρίως ὂν ἐν ῥήματι μόνῳ καὶ καταχρήσει συνηθείας εἶναι λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάζεται οὐχ ὁ διὰ μιμήσεως ἐπὶ τῆς εἰκόνος δεικνύμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ κυρίως λεγόμενος. οὗτος οὐχ ὁμοίωμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπόν ἐστι τοῦ ὁμοιώματος· ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν μέ χρις ὀνόματος ἄνθρωπος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχει τὸ κυρίως λέγεσθαι ὅπερ λέγεται, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῇ φύσει ὃ ὀνομάζεται. 1.1.179 καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν εἰ μόνου τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ οὐσία κυρίως λέγεται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος οὐκέτι, τί ἄλλο ἢ οὐχὶ ἄρνησίς ἐστι περιφανὴς τοῦ σωτηρίου κηρύγματος; οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐπὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς τῶν Ἰου δαίων παλινδρομείτωσαν, ἐν τῷ μὴ διδόναι τὸν υἱὸν κυρίως εἶναι τὸ μηδὲ ὅλως εἶναι κατασκευάζοντες· τὸ γὰρ ἄκυρον τῷ ἀνυπάρκτῳ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. 1.1.180 Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα βούλεται καὶ διαπτύει τοὺς ἄνευ λογικῆς ἐντρεχείας ἐπιχειροῦντας τῷ γράφειν, εἰπάτω τοῖς καταφρονουμένοις ἡμῖν, ἐκ ποίας σο 1.1.181 φίας τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον τῆς οὐσίας ἐγνώρισε. τις <ὁ> λόγος ὁ τὴν τοιαύτην διαφορὰν παραστήσας, ὅτι οὐσία τις ἑτέρας οὐσίας μᾶλλον ἔστι; κατ' αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ σημαι νόμενον τῆς οὐσίας· μὴ γὰρ δὴ προφερέτω τὰς τῶν ποιοτή των ἢ τὰς τῶν ἰδιωμάτων διαφοράς, ὅσαι περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἐπινοίας καταλαμβάνονται, ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ 1.1.182 ὑποκείμενον οὖσαι. οὐ γὰρ ἀτμῶν ἢ χρωμάτων ἢ βά ρους ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀξιώματος ἢ τρόπων καὶ ἤθους δια φορὰς ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο περί τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν θεωρεῖται, ταῦτα πρόκειται νῦν ἐξετάζειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ ὑποκεί μενον, ᾧ κυρίως τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἐπικέκληται ὄνομα, εἴ τινα πρὸς ἄλλην οὐσίαν ἐν τῷ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει. ἀλλ' οὔπω μέχρι τοῦ νῦν